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This thesis seeks to explain the near absence of derivative contracts in the rice market, 
in the light of these instruments’ prominence in other agricultural commodity markets. 
To do so, I compare rice with three of these commodities – wheat, sugar and coffee – 
identifying differences preventing or encouraging the financial development of rice and 
not of others. I explore the development of derivatives markets in four geographic case 
studies: the USA, Thailand, Japan and Vietnam. To answer the research question, I 
primarily use interview data of industry stakeholders in the four markets examined, 
such as farmers, millers, traders, analysts and contract engineers. The research 
determines why rice stands as an exception in regard to financial development and 
this case provides in return a new approach to the development of derivatives market. 
The study challenges the common argument of the existing literature that a single 
factor is enough to impede the development of a futures market. In the case of rice, it 
is the accumulation of obstacles that supress futures trading. I argue through this 
thesis that the propensity of market participants to get involved in a derivative market 
is key to the outcome of financial development. In rice, two types of factors deter the 
participation of key stakeholders in the building of financial markets: (i) their risk profile, 
affected by factors such as their ability to store the commodity and the prevalence of 
their crop risk over price risk; (ii) the potential weakening of their market power by 
futures contracts. Such power can be the result of the profile of the supply chain, but 
its most important driver is the opacity of the rice market. Three other factors, more 
systemic, appear particularly important: (i) the heavy politicization of the rice market 
disrupts the nature of the risk that can be hedged and traded with futures contracts; 
(ii) the geography of the physical market does not favour financial development. 
Derivatives markets find their roots in the financially sophisticated economies of 
developed countries, before expanding onto the markets of developing countries. 
However, for markets that are almost exclusively situated in developing countries, like 
rice, financial development struggles to take place endogenously: (iii) the 
fragmentation of the market into different varieties is not conducive to the construction 
of a standardised market. Finally, this thesis highlights the importance of the link 





In this thesis, I investigate the reasons why, unlike most other agricultural crops, rice 
is not traded on financial markets. To do so, I lead a comparative analysis between 
rice, wheat, sugar and coffee. This allows me to identify what criteria makes an 
agricultural good suitable for this form of trading that serves both risk management for 
actors of the supply chain, and an investment opportunity for speculators.  
In order to understand the differences between rice and other crop studied, I explore 
cases in the USA, Thailand, Japan and Vietnam. In these countries, I review the 
success and failure of financial products meant to trade agricultural commodities. To 
do so, I interviewed a range of market participants such as farmers, millers, traders, 
analysts and finance professionals.  
The common argument in existing literature is that a single characteristic of the market 
is enough to make the crop unsuitable for financial trading. In this study, I argue 
otherwise. I explain that the rice market faces a variety of obstacles preventing its 
trading on financial markets. This includes the lack of potential market participants: 
actors that have the technical potential to hedge rice prices on financial market are 
reluctant to, either because they have other risk management solutions or because 
financial trading is a threat to their market power. Three other factors appear 
particularly important: (i) there is a lot of government intervention in rice, whereby, the 
market is not liberalised enough for financial risk management and speculation; (ii) the 
market is almost exclusively located in developing countries with economies that are 
not financially mature; (iii) financial markets prefer raw materials that are uniform. The 
rice market is made of a large range of varieties and qualities of the grain, making it 
unsuited to financial trading. Coffee, sugar and wheat do not face such obstacles. 
Their geographical organisations, the types of regulations propose by governments, 
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Chapter I: Introduction and Conceptual 
Framework 
 
“Understand, a lot of our markets – corn, wheat and oats – launched on January 
2nd, 1877; rice has been around since 1986. So almost every institution that 
trades or handles or deals in corn, soybeans, wheat, meal, oil… futures are 
integrated into that. And rice? It’s not that way yet. So a lot of what we are 
talking about in respect to liquidity, is just a market and the institutions within 
that are only kind of starting … so that can take time.” 
In the summer of 2017, Fred Seamon,1 the Executive Director in Agricultural Markets 
of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) told me in those words that history was a 
contributing factor to the modest liquidity of its rough rice futures contract. While being 
a viable and important explanation from the perspective of the exchange in the case 
of this particular American contract, the picture for the rice market across the globe is 
more complex. The history of derivative finance for rice goes back much further than 
when it was first listed on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1986. In fact, 
derivative finance was invented precisely for rice, back in the 17 th century, in Japan. 
However, unlike other agricultural commodities for which the creation of their major 
futures contracts in the late 19th century led to their long-term development, rice 
experienced a chaotic history of financial development. Over three centuries, some 
functioning futures contracts for rice disappeared without being replaced, while many 
others simply failed. This has led to present times where rice stands as an exception 
within major food commodities: the one that does not use derivatives. Whether 
derivative finance is seen as an opportunity for market participants to manage risk and 
obtain information, or a force destabilising prices, understanding what causes the 
development of these markets to happen or not is necessary for the study of a 
commodity market. It becomes even more valuable when this market is the food staple 
of half of the world’s population and is often believed to be the biggest employing 
                                                 




industry globally, with an estimated 1 billion households depending on it for their 
livelihood (Diouf, 2003). In many developing countries, the mechanisms of the rice 
market have far-reaching implications for the life of both the city dwellers feeding 
themselves with rice and the rural poor for whom paddy2 production is the main 
livelihood. This thesis aims to explain why rice differs from other agricultural markets 
in its financial development patterns. 
In this introduction, I provide the background to this research. I start by defining 
financial development, portraying the rice market and introducing several successive 
key concepts such as risk and derivative contracts. I subsequently introduce the 
prominence of derivatives trading in agricultural markets and provide a brief history of 
futures contracts for rice. These discussions will lead me to the problem statement. 
Thereafter, I present the hypotheses to answer the research question, before 
introducing my methodology to explore these hypotheses. Finally, I provide a first 
overview of the findings and arguments of this thesis, also allowing me to discuss my 
contribution to the field. 
 
I) Defining financial development 
As this thesis aims to analyse the financial development of various commodity 
markets, clearly defining financial development is necessary to support further 
discussion. A physical commodity market can develop in various ways, such as 
progress in its infrastructure, the widening of its geographical scope or the growth in 
the volumes traded. This thesis is a study of the development that results in 
participants in a commodity market being increasingly able to trade risk – in particular, 
price risk – through the use of financial contracts. I refer to this phenomenon as the 
financial development of a commodity market. 
The concept of financial development is already used in the literature, although its 
definitions vary. For instance, Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull state that financial 
development “is defined by the extent to which a country’s legal system can enforce 
financial contracts among its residents so that they can use these contracts to insure 
                                                 
2 The expression refers to rice before milling. Outside of the USA, it is called paddy.  
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against idiosyncratic risks” (2009, p. 373). Such a definition constrains the 
phenomenon to the national level and uses the legal system as the single factor for 
financial development. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) define financial 
development as the level of access to credit. Some authors also equate financial 
development to the growth in financial intermediation (De Gregorio & Guidotti, 1995; 
Patrick, 1966). Levine believes that financial development occurs when financial 
markets, instruments and intermediaries ameliorate five financial functions that are “(i) 
production of ex ante information about possible investments, (ii) monitoring of 
investments and implementation of corporate governance, (iii) trading, diversification, 
and management of risk, (iv) mobilization and pooling of savings, and (v) exchange of 
goods and services” (2005, p. 870). This broad definition covers all possible functions 
of financial markets, making it particularly useful for the study of the financial sector’s 
development as a whole. However, when studying specific financial markets, one of 
the above functions is usually the primary role of the market and the others are by-
products. For instance, derivatives markets primarily aim at enhancing function (iii), 
while (i) and (v) are the results of these markets mechanisms, and (ii) and (iv) remain 
marginal effects. Levine’s approach is therefore too broad for my purpose here. Sahay 
et al. (2015) also provide a relevant definition of financial development as a 
combination of depth, access and efficiency of both financial institutions and financial 
markets. The issue with this definition is that it is built to serve the index proposed by 
the authors, leaving little room for the study of the process of development. For 
instance, by focusing on financial institutions and markets, it ignores the role of non-
financial actors in that process. These non-financial actors are particularly important 
in food commodity markets. These definitions do not fit exactly the needs of this thesis 
because the concept of financial development used in these contexts is the 
development of the financial sector, its structures and mechanisms. In this thesis, I am 
instead interested in the development of physical commodity markets where finance 
(or more precisely, as I explain later in this section, derivative finance) is the means to 
this development. By discussing the financial development of a commodity market, I 
am therefore not grounding this thesis in the realm of the existing literature on financial 
development.  
I adopt a definition of financial development based on Rajan’s (2006) understanding 
of the concept, that is the financial sector’s ability to spread risk, and what Hardie calls 
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financialization,3 that is “the measure of the ability to trade risk” (2012, p. 4). Linking 
finance and risk management fits the function of hedging markets within the 
commodity industry. However, in Rajan’s definition, the use of the expression 
“spreading risk” is contentious as it can be argued that finance is instead a transferring 
of risk from many risk averse individuals to few risk-seeking counterparties and so 
instead concentrates risk. Therefore, I prefer Hardie’s concept of risk trading. Rajan, 
like the definitions discussed in the previous paragraph, also uses the financial sector 
as the primary object of study, which does not fit the aim of this thesis, as I will argue 
later in this section. Understanding, as Hardie does, the concept as a measure is 
interesting as it provides a way to quantify the gradual process of the development. It 
is useful because by looking at rice, I am analysing a market’s financial development 
in its early stages. It avoids a binary classification, where a commodity would be 
financially developed or not. However, as already mention when discussing Sahay et 
al. (2015), financial development needs to be understood not only as a measure (and 
therefore a degree) of the ability to trade risk, but also as a process of increasing ability 
to trade risk. The ability to trade risk should be understood as the ability to sell or buy 
price risk. In situations of market development, this is very often through the use of 
derivatives trading. As a result, this thesis focuses extensively on derivatives markets.  
This definition has the advantage of being a neutral starting point when discussing the 
effects of the phenomenon. The social science literature often attaches a negative 
connotation to the rise of derivatives markets, especially futures contracts, and many 
of the research studies their dangerous effects on agricultural markets (Ghosh, 2010; 
Cheng & Xiong, 2013; Bargawi & Newman, 2017).4 I do not adopt this normative 
approach. My goal is to identify reasons for the peculiar financial underdevelopment 
of rice. This will sometimes imply the examination of its pros and cons from different 
actors' opinions, but I do not attempt to take part in the debate. Therefore, I use a 
definition that does not entail a value judgment in any direction.  
                                                 
3 Although he uses this concept, Hardie’s definition is unique and differs significantly to other definitions 
within the financialization literature. His study of the financialization of government debt is also a study 
of the development of bond markets. It is therefore possible to use it as a definition of financial 
development.  
4 This body of literature is a constituent of the study of financialization, which explores the issues related 
to the growth of the financial sector in relation to the real economy. Although this research does not  
intend to study this theme, understanding what causes the development of financial instruments in 
commodity markets will serve future studies on the financialization of food.  
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Hardie goes further in defining the process by identifying two variables – partially 
independent from each other – that contribute to the financial development 
(financialization in his words) of a market: these are the ability of individual actors to 
trade risk, and the ability to trade risk offered by the market structure. I adopt these 
variables, although what he calls financialization of the market actors and the market 
structure, I will call financial sophistication. It should be noted that I do not intend to 
use this term as a value judgement and do not imply that sophistication should be a 
goal to achieve. The word sophistication simply refers to the level of ability to trade 
risk. Moreover, when I talk about the sophistication of the market structure or a market 
actor through the thesis, I constantly refer to their financial sophistication.  
The sophistication of an individual actor, their ability to trade risk, is determined by a 
set of factors including their literacy, financial education, market knowledge, access to 
information, and human, financial and technological resources to trade risk. The 
sophistication of an actor is theoretical in the sense that it is their expected ability to 
trade risk considering that a financial instrument is available to them. It is thus 
independent of the sophistication of the market structure. A market actor can be more 
or less sophisticated; this is not a binary variable. However, as the level of 
sophistication cannot be measured, I often refer to it relative to other actors: less 
sophisticated or more sophisticated actors. Ultimately, the level of sophistication 
influences the sort of instrument a market actor is able to use. Some of the least 
sophisticated actors will only be able to use the most basic form of instruments, such 
as forward contracts, or even no financial instruments at all. The sophistication of an 
actor can both increase and decrease. Although elements such as financial education 
can hardly be lost, an actor can, for instance, regress in its financial resources to trade 
risk.  
The sophistication of the market structure represents the opportunity given to market 
actors to trade risk. It is determined by the availability of financial instruments for the 
actors of this market. As previously mentioned, for commodity markets, these financial 
instruments mostly come in the form of derivative contracts (forwards, futures, swaps 
and options). The contract specifications determine the range of situations in which 
they can be used. However, their final use or not by market actors is, in theory, not 
relevant to the sophistication of the market structure. The market structure of a 
commodity market can be: 
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- Unsophisticated: there are no derivative contracts available for the specific 
market considered.  
- Partially sophisticated: the market has one or more form of derivative 
contracts that can cover certain varieties and qualities of the commodity, 
and is not presently evolving towards including more varieties or qualities. 
- Sophisticated: the range of derivative contracts offer the possibility to hedge 
or speculate upon most varieties and qualities of the commodity. This 
includes consistent price spreads between the varieties and qualities, 
making it possible to hedge against a benchmark. In this case, a market 
structure could be understood as sophisticated. The degree of 
sophistication of the market structure could still increase if additional types 
of derivative contracts are introduced for varieties that are already covered 
by derivatives. 
The financial development of the market is a function of the sophistication of the 
market participants and the sophistication of the market structure. Due to the variety 
of factors influencing these two variables, it is unlikely that the market itself will be 
absolutely underdeveloped or fully developed. Therefore, the market can be described 
by its level of financial development. This level can be changed by: 
- An increase or decrease in the number of highly sophisticated actors.  
- An increase (or less likely decrease) in the level of sophistication of some 
actors. 
- The introduction or withdrawal of a type of derivative contract.  
- The introduction or withdrawal of certain contract specifications. 
It is important to remember that financial development is not necessarily a linear 
dynamic, always going forward, and that a reversion of the process can be observed. 
Phenomena of retreat of derivatives trading or temporary financial development are 
not historically uncommon on the rice market, with the disappearance of many futures 
contracts. 
The financial development of the market combines the sophistication of different 
market actors and the sophistication of the market structure, making any precise 
numerical measurement of the level of financial development of the market difficult. 
The best indicator of an agricultural market’s financial development is the liquidity of 
its derivatives markets. The more financially developed the market is, the more liquid 
its range of derivative contracts are expected to be. The data for the liquidity of futures 
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markets, represented by open interests and volumes, are publicly available. It is not 
the case for most types of OTCs, for which empirical knowledge of market participants 
must be trusted to understand the liquidity level in the market. 
The concept of financial development of commodity markets is therefore linked to the 
concept of development of derivatives market. This, whether financial or commodity 
derivatives, is discussed in many academic papers. However, there is no consistent 
definition of what development means, nor is there even an explicit definition. Basu 
and Gavin (2010) use the term growth instead of development. They approach the 
phenomenon as an increase in commodity derivatives trading that is faster than the 
growth in commodity production. Sundaram (2012) also uses the concept of growth, 
and measures it by the total value of derivatives markets. Using the concept of 
development of derivatives explicitly, Shamsher and Taufiq (Shamsher & Taufiq, 
2008) articulate it in two stages: (1) the existence of derivatives instruments and (2) 
the liquidity of the market. Riederová and Růžičková (2014) do not define precisely 
what they call development of derivatives, only mentioning the increase in their 
prevalence. However, they attribute the development of derivatives markets to the 
historical evolutions of their underlying assets. Kuzman, Ercegovac and Momčilović 
(2018) discuss the development of Serbian derivatives markets with regards to 
exchange instruments, trading volumes and number of market participants, but without 
clearly defining development. Fernandez (2003), when discussing the development of 
derivatives markets in Latin America, does not define the concept either, but uses 
notional amounts – a measure of market size – as the indicator for development. Some 
other authors have discussed related concepts with deeper conceptual differences. 
For instance, Kroszner (1999) studies how derivatives have developed in the sense of 
their adaptation to constraints such as credit risk and regulatory frameworks. He 
focuses more on the organisational development of futures clearinghouses than on 
the development of markets. Pennings and Muelenberg (1999) study not the 
development of commodity derivatives but their developing instead, thus taking the 
point of view of an exchange attempting to succeed at introducing a contract.  
Although this literature on the topic is relevant to this thesis and my conclusion will 
engage with the takeaway of some of these studies, I prefer referring to the financial 
development of commodity markets than to the development of derivatives markets 
because it allows me to keep the physical market as primary object of study. First, that 
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allows me to look at the possible risk management of all physical market participants, 
whether they are sophisticated or not. Second, within the physical market for one crop, 
multiple derivatives markets can co-exist. I am therefore interested in the reasons 
allowing a crop industry to increase its use of derivatives contracts, rather than the 
growth of one derivatives market in particular. Finally, some forms of derivatives 
trading do not exactly fit the concept of derivatives markets. For instance, two physical 
market participants could trade a forward contract5 without the existence of a broader 
market for these instruments, but that would constitute a first degree of risk trading 
within the industry.  
 
II) Overview of the global rice market 
As suggested in the opening paragraph, rice is a key market for millions of people 
throughout the world, especially in the Global South; the grain is known to characterise 
the agricultural system of Eastern Asia, from Pakistan to Japan, and it is also a major 
staple in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. In this section, I intend to provide a 
first snapshot of the rice market that will facilitate discussion throughout this entire 
thesis. 
a. Geography of the rice market 
In terms of a geographical description of the rice market, there is a clear imbalance of 
the importance of rice between developed and developing countries. Unlike most other 
major commodities, the West is not a dominant player in the trade of this grain. Italy 
and the USA are the only significant Western countries in the global market, as they 
export significant volumes. None of the important importers is found in the developed 
West. As for other developed countries, Japan and South Korea still have an important 
rice culture today (Franks, 2015). However, their protectionist policies, which make 
them produce their own rice and avoid all exchanges with foreign nations, isolate them 
from the world rice market (Les Echos, 2014). Rice is thus characterised by its South-
South exchanges. To qualify this phenomenon, I will use, in this thesis, the concept of 
unipolarity of the rice market, representing its concentration in developing countries.  
                                                 
5 See section IV of this chapter 
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With rice, being a large producer (as a country) and a large exporter is not correlated. 
China, Indonesia and the Philippines are within the top 10 of the largest production, 
but still face shortfalls to their needs and are consequently some of the largest 
importers of rice. Conversely, Uruguay is a minor producer, but exporting all of its 
production allows the country to enter the top 10 of the biggest exporters. Globally, 
rice exports are dominated by India and Thailand, which hold about 50% of the 
international market, closely followed by Vietnam (USDA, 2019). The exports are 
strongly concentrated in the hands of a few countries, while imports are more evenly 
distributed. Other than these three big producers previously mentioned, important 
importers include Iran, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria (USDA, 2019). One key feature of 
the world rice market is the stability of export channels between countries. One 
exporting country usually holds stable shares of import markets of another country 
from one year to the other. For instance, a lot of the exports of the two giants of 
Maritime Southeast Asia – Philippines and Indonesia – comes from Vietnam.  
 
Table 1: Top 10 producing, consuming, exporting and importing countries of rice, (000 metric tonnes) 
I extensively discuss the mechanisms of the world market; however, it is essential to 
note that this represents only a small share of the rice industry. Most rice is consumed 
in the country where it is produced (Latham, 1998). Producing countries consume their 
own rice and export the surplus to countries that either do not produce or are not self-
sufficient. The world rice market is, therefore, only a surplus market. Domestic markets 
are very significant within the industry. Over the past decade, the share of rice traded 
internationally increased from 7% to 9% (Timmer, 2012; Jha, Kubo, & Ramaswami, 
2016). This is a significant increase, but these numbers should be compared to other 
agricultural goods where international trade usually represents 30% to 70% of the 
market. 
1 China 142,274 China 143,553    India 11,202    China 3,170      
2 India 115,805 India 101,271    Thailand 10,095    Philippines 1,747      
3 Indonesia 38,516    Indonesia 36,433      Viet Nam 4,727      Benin 1,727      
4 Bangladesh 36,274    Bangladesh 35,367      Pakistan 4,059      Iran 1,444      
5 Viet Nam 28,961    Vietnam 21,317      USA 3,552      Côte d'Ivoire 1,394      
6 Thailand 20,811    Philippines 13,883      Myanmar 2,471      Saudi Arabia 1,272      
7 Myanmar 17,873    Thailand 11,700      China 2,011      Senegal 1,119      
8 Philippines 12,708    Myanmar 10,283      Brazil 1,049      Iraq 1,081      
9 Brazil 7,702      Japan 8,450        Uruguay 931         South Africa 1,039      
10 Pakistan 7,358      Brazil 7,433        Italy 716         Indonesia 1,001      
Producer Consumer Exporter Importer
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b. Profile of a diverse grain 
To understand the rice market, understanding the grain is also necessary. Rice is a 
product that is usually consumed as such, rather than as a transformed product. In 
this way, it differs from a product like wheat, for instance, that is turned into pasta or 
bread. Nevertheless, rice can be traded at three stages of its processing: paddy (also 
called rough rice, which is unmilled rice), brown rice or white rice. For instance, most 
of the paddy traded will be conducted between farmers and millers.  
In addition to the diversity of possible milling processes, rice is a highly heterogeneous 
grain in nature. First, rice is divided in two main varieties, the long-grain Indica rice, 
and the short-grain and medium-grain Japonica. Long-grain rice grows in warmer 
climates and is, therefore, more common in the latitudes closer to the equator, while 
Japonica grows better in colder climates, making it popular in more northern latitudes 
and the highlands of tropical countries. Traditionally, Japonica is consumed in 
Northern China, Korea and Japan, while Indica is popular in the rest of Asia. Japonica 
is also a more expensive crop but is not heavily traded internationally as its consuming 
countries are self-sufficient. Most of the Japonica globally traded is for sushi rice, with 
California being the main supplier. Within the long-grain rice industry, white Indica is 
the most common variety. However, there exists some fragrant varieties such as 
basmati and jasmine rice (of which Thai Hom Mali is the highest quality), which are 
sold at a premium. Beyond the variety, two other criteria matter for rice, which 
fragments the market further. One is the quality (or grade) of the rice. This is calculated 
by measuring the amount of broken grains during the milling process. Rice will 
therefore be graded by the percentage of broken rice. The other criterion is the origin. 
It is a factor that is prevalent in the value of a rice lot. For instance, Thai rice is usually 
worth more money than Vietnamese rice for an equivalent grade. Although this will not 
be specified in the name of the rice, many other criteria are examined to assess rice 
quality, such as the moisture or the number of black and red kernels in a specific 
amount of rice (see appendix A). Overall, the complexity of grading in rice – unlike soy 
or corn, for instance – makes for a poorly integrated market as all origins and grades 




III) Risk exposure 
As derivative contracts are the subject of the thesis, and those instruments serve the 
purpose of risk management, the concept of risk should be discussed first. The notion 
of risk in agriculture is complex because it takes various forms and consequently does 
not accept a single definition. The simplest definition that can be adopted is that risk 
is the probability of an outcome differing from the expected outcome at the time of 
decision-making. In economic terms, risk can be understood as the probability of a 
loss of utility by an economic agent. 
When discussing one risk, several components of risk must be considered, including 
the nature and source of the risk, the risk for whom, the risk preference of the agent, 
and if it is an individual risk or systemic risk. 
Hardaker et al. (1997) have listed the main risks affecting farming activities. Production 
risk is rooted in the unpredictability of agricultural output due to different factors such 
as climatic conditions and the performance of the crop, exposure to diseases or bugs 
etc. Price or market risk is the unpredictable change in the prices of inputs and outputs 
between the decision-making and the cash transfer. New laws or regulations, the 
transformation of subsidies schemes or taxation related to a change in government or 
public policy reorientation can be classified as political risk. Sovereign risk is related 
to action by a foreign government, such as the non-respect of a trade agreement. 
Contractual risk (Hardaker et al. name it relationship risk) derives from the potential 
breakdown of an agreement by any agent part of the supply chain. Political, sovereign, 
and contractual risks constitute together institutional risk: the exposure to unpredicted 
change in an expected long-term social structure. Human or personal risks define 
major life crises (death, illness, divorce) of any agent of a business that may threaten 
the sustained activity of this business. Together, all the types of risks listed above form 
the so-called business risks. They are the risks inherent to the business activity that 
threatens its profitability. 
In addition to business risks, financing risk (Hardaker et al. name it financial risk) 
defines all type of risk related to the way an agricultural activity is financed. Especially 
as borrowing involves repayment with interest rates, financing risk is seen as a 
multiplier of business risk.  
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Although these risks are often presented, in the agricultural economics literature, as 
affecting farmers, they are also a concern for most other actors in the subsequent 
supply chain. For instance, production risk can expose a processor to a disruption of 
the supply they need to fill up their processing capacity. Just like farmers and 
processors/millers, traders and exporters are also exposed to market risk and 
institutional risk. The first one affects their income while the second threatens the 
viability of their business. Howerver, I will show through this thesis that the trading 
mechanisms used by intermediaries and their respective market power influence the 
extent to which market risk will affect their income.       
In this thesis, I focus on price/market risk and the way it threatens income security of 
market participants, especially farmers, processors and traders. However, other types 
of risk such as political risk are also likely to trigger market risks by creating market 
reactions and therefore, price shocks. Importantly, some types of risk can have an 
impact on income, depending on whether an individual shares them with others or not. 
Production risk is a good example. If a small group of farmers is the victim to a flood, 
their loss in production is unlikely to affect market prices. These farmers will 
consequently suffer a loss in income because they have a very small crop to sell at 
the normal market price. In a second situation in which a drought affects the entire 
production of a country, the whole market would be affected, but the decline in 
production (and therefore crop to sell) should be in part compensated by a rise in 
prices. Tomek and Paterson call this a “partial natural hedge” (2001, p. 967). This 
example illustrates that producers can be exposed to two types of risks: the ones that 
are applied on an individual level, and the ones of a systemic nature.  
There is a theoretical debate about whether or not all price movement constitutes price 
risk, from an individual point of view. Tomek and Paterson note “the commonly used 
risk measure includes both upward and downward deviations from the mean, but 
perhaps only downward (upward) deviations are relevant to farmers (processors)” 
(2001, p. 958). Other authors suggest that “price risk can be defined as the difference 
between the expected price and the actual price of the commodity” (Banterle & 
Vandone, 2013, p. 530). Therefore, this suggests that any uncertainty in price is a risk 
as it affects decision-making (Mohan, 2007). An underestimation of future prices at the 
time of decision making on planting can be reflected in a loss of utility at the time of 
sale. This is more consistent with the original definition of risk I adopted earlier. The 
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multi-directionality of market risk is also important because to attract investors and 
consequently liquidity in hedging markets, there is a need for both potential loss and 
profits. Finally, this approach allows for understanding the risk of the market as a 
whole, not only farmers. It is useful as the uncertainty of traders could also contribute 
to market instability, for instance, and therefore generate more risk. This is why both 
upward and downward price movements could be useful in the analysis. 
 
IV) Types of commodity derivative contracts 
To manage price risk, many market actors use derivative contracts, allowing them to 
sell this risk to a different actor. The seller of the price risk is risk-averse, while the 
buyer is a risk seeker. In this section, I briefly review the most common derivative 
instruments available to market actors as understanding their basic mechanisms will 
facilitate discussion throughout the thesis. 
a. Forwards 
Forward contracts (Figure 1) are non-standardised (made ad hoc for each trade) 
derivative instruments. They are the simplest form of derivative contracts. A forward 
contract is an agreement, between two parties that are in successive positions in the 
supply chain (for instance a farmer and a miller, or a miller and a trader), to trade at 
time t a given quantity of a commodity for a fixed price agreed at time t-1. By doing so, 
the seller (called short) secures a fixed income, while the buyer (called long) fixes i ts 
cost. However, if the buyer is only an intermediary in the supply chain (not the final 
user), they might offset this long position with a subsequent short position. Otherwise, 
they will assume all the market risk. The commodity agreed to change hand at time t 
may, but does not have to, exist at t-1. As forward contracts are made ad hoc, 
specifications (the quantity, quality of the grain, delivery point, date of delivery etc.) 
are decided and agreed (customised) by the two parties engaging in the transaction 




Figure 1: Forward contracts 
Forward contracts present a few major disadvantages. Firstly, in the case of market 
opacity, it can be difficult to price a forward contract. More importantly, it is difficult for 
a market actor to be sure his counterpart will respect the terms of the contract. 
Depending on the existence of enforcing mechanisms, the benefit of hedging of price 
risk can be cancelled by the resulting contract/counterparty risk.  
b. Futures contracts 
To avoid the disadvantages of forward contracts, futures contracts help create 
transparency and guarantee enforcement of contracts. Just as a forward contract, a 
futures contract is an agreement between two parties to buy and sell a commodity at 
a later date. Unlike forward contracts, futures contracts are a type of standardised 
derivative contract. A commodity exchange sets a standardised contract with clear 
specifications for the commodity. At a time t-1, a futures seller enters the short position 
of the contract, engaging to deliver the quantity of the commodity specified by the 
contract (also called contract unit). In exchange, he will receive at expiration (maturity) 
time t the price P-1 of the contract at t-1. This inflow of money is brought by a futures 
buyer who enters the long side of the contract and is in theory guaranteed, in 
exchange, the delivery of the commodity at expiration time t.  




Figure 2: Futures contracts 
 
In reality, most shorts and longs do not take part in physical delivery through the 
exchange. When available, market participants prefer a different type of settlement 
called cash settlement to physical delivery. This requires one of the two parties to 
transfer the difference between P-1 and P to the other party. In a situation where a 
futures contract for a tonne of a commodity is sold at t-1 at a price P-1=$400, there 
are two possible cases at t: the price at expiration is higher, e.g. P(1)=$450; or the 
price at expiration is lower, e.g. P(2)=$350. In case (1), the seller pays the difference 
$450-$400=$50 to the clearinghouse which later pays the buyer, while in case (2) it is 
the buyer who pays the difference $400-$350=$50 to the clearinghouse, which itself 
pays the seller. By making the transaction between market participants indirect, the 
exchange removes counterparty risk. Even if the cash settlement option does not exist 
at expiry, all participants have the option to close their position by entering an offsetting 
transaction, i.e. buying a contract if they previously sold one and vice versa. Many 
participants will do so shortly before contract expiration (when futures and cash price 
are converging)6 to avoid having to deliver.  
A significant consequence of this system of cash settlement and the possibility to offset 
a contract is that physical market participants are not the only ones taking part in the 
market. Both hedgers and speculators can take part.7 When the contract is settled 
financially or the position is close, the gain or benefit to the hedger should be offset by 
                                                 
6 See below 
7 Through this thesis, I argue that not only can they both take part, but they are also necessary for the 
success of derivative markets.  
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the physical position held by the hedger. For instance, if a farmer was the seller of the 
contract in case (1), he sells his crop for $450 on the cash market at t, but must refund 
$50 to the buyer of the futures contract. His net benefit is, therefore, $400, which is 
the price he hedged with the futures contract. On the other hand, a speculator has no 
physical position in the crop market and simply takes the risk of making a profit while 
being exposed to a loss. Speculators are important because they allow diverting price 
risk outside of the market, where most physical participants are risk-averse. 
Several fundamental concepts surrounding futures contracts must be understood prior 
to the study of derivative trading. I briefly introduce them here to facilitate discussion 
later in the thesis. Other more specific technical concepts will be introduced in 
subsequent chapters when they are needed.  
Contract specification: When an exchange creates a new futures contract, a 
fundamental step is to decide on contract specifications (contract specs). 
Specifications are determined with the objective of attracting the maximum market 
participants. These include details such as the grade of the commodity, the contract 
size and details of the delivery mechanisms. I list in Appendix B the specifications that 
usually appear for any listed contract.  
Open Interest, Volumes and Liquidity: Open interest (OI) represents the number of 
contracts (commitments of traders, or total number of short positions) open at any one 
time on a futures and options market. Volumes represent the number of contracts 
traded over a given period. Liquidity is the ease of getting in and out of a contract. That 
is to say, to find a matching offer to a bid and vice versa. Volumes are the best measure 
of liquidity, although OI can serve this purpose for some contexts discussed in this 
thesis.  
Basis: The difference between a local cash (spot) price of a commodity and the price 
of a specific futures contract for the same commodity is called the basis. This 
difference is expressed in cents. It is calculated as follow: 
 Local cash price – futures price = basis 
For instance, if the cash price of rough rice in Crowley, LA is $12.50 per hundredweight 
(CWT) at a certain date in May, and on that same date the price of the July Chicago 
rough rice contract (which is the nearby contract) is $12.30, then the Crowley basis is 
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20 over. If the price in Crowley was $12.10, then the basis in Crowley is 20 under. If 
the cash price is referred in relation to a distant contract, such as November in the 
original example, and the price of the November contract is $11.90, then we would say 
that the basis is 60 over November. 
Many factors influence the basis at a precise location (CBOT, 2003): 
- transportation costs  
- local supply and demand conditions, such as grain quality, availability, need, 
local weather 
- interest/storage cost 
- handling costs and profit margins 
Convergence of cash and futures prices: If a contract functions correctly, it is expected 
that the cash price at the delivery point and the price of the futures contract converge 
ahead of the delivery period until they become equal close to the delivery date. This 
mechanism is due to the possible arbitrage between the two prices in the delivery 
month. If the futures price is lower than the cash price, buyers of the commodity would 
buy the futures and take delivery of it, as this is the cheapest source of supply for the 
commodity. The growing demand for the futures drives futures prices up, therefore 
triggering convergence of the two prices. If the futures price is higher than the cash 
price in the delivery month, then there is an incentive for market participants to buy the 
commodity in the cash market at a low price and sell the futures contract and make 
delivery at a higher price. These increases in the demand in the cash market and 
supply in the futures market drive cash prices up and futures prices down. This also 
results in the convergence of prices.  
Terminal markets: The last notion I want to introduce is terminal markets. I name 
terminal markets futures markets that have the function of externalising the risk from 
inside an industry to outsiders, specialised in risk trading. For instance, a forwards 
contract is usually an agreement between two participants of the physical market. 
When hedging, they must enter into offsetting trades to effectively lock in prices. If a 
miller enters a forward contract with a farmer, he must enter another contract with a 
different party to cover his long position on the first contract. Otherwise, they will 
assume the risk of a price fall through which he could pay more for procuring the rice 
through the forward than he would receive for selling the rice cash after milling. The 
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issue is that most actors in the industry are risk-averse and are reluctant to carry the 
risk of not offsetting. As the chain of forward contracts cannot continue forever along 
the supply chain, risk needs an escape door to be taken by speculators, often 
exogenous to the industry. This is possible with liquid futures markets. That is why I 
call these terminal markets.  
c. Other derivative contracts 
Through this thesis, I will discuss other types of derivative contracts. These will mostly 
be grouped under the denomination Over The Counter (OTCs) contracts. This means 
that they are not publicly listed through an exchange. Forward contracts are the 
simpler form of OTC contracts. However, in commodity markets, there is a wide variety 
of possibilities to make OTC contracts tailored to the needs of market participants. 
This can include, for instance, complex pricing mechanisms of the contract over time. 
I will explain the details of these contracts when they are useful for the discussion. 
The other major types of derivative contracts that have their importance in commodity 
markets is options. These are either based on futures contracts or are OTCs for which 
one of the party has the option, but not the obligation, to execute the transaction 
(whether buying or selling the underlying commodity) before or at expiry. When buying 
the option, the holder of the option pays the seller a premium that is priced upon the 
risk related to the price of the underlying commodity. This form of contract is close to 
the mechanism of insurance.  
V) Financial development of agricultural commodities 
As mentioned early in this introduction, the futures contracts for agricultural goods on 
American exchanges traces back to the late 19th century. It started with grains such 
as wheat and corn in Chicago in 1877 and the futures for soft commodities (coffee and 
sugar) followed in New York five years later. The lack of historical accounts limits the 
ability to describe the dynamics of sophistication of the then market structure and the 
market actors. What can be said is that the concept of risk trading has only grown from 
here, with some particular episodes contributing to the expansion of derivatives 
trading. For instance, in the 1980s, the Reagan-Thatcher wave of neoliberal policies 
led to the liberalization of food markets, in part forced on developing countries in 
exchange for the bailing out by international financial institutions (IFIs) of their debt 
31 
 
generated by the oil crisis of the 1970s. Liberalization resulted in more risk to be 
hedged, increasing the popularity of derivatives trading. Futures contracts were also 
understood as a policy instrument to support export prices and stabilise revenues 
(Thompson, 1985).  
Even if it is complex to fully track the process of the financial development of food 
markets, it is possible to present the current picture of this development. Most major 
agricultural markets (such as corn, wheat, cocoa, sugar, soybeans, coffee, rubber, 
etc.) have heavily developed derivatives markets. To illustrate the importance of 
finance in these markets, I list in Table 1 the main futures contracts available for the 
different commodities I will look at in my thesis.  
 
Coffee Chicago (CBOT), NY (ICE), London (ICE), Addis Ababa 
(ECX), Osaka (ODE), Sao Paulo (BM&F BOVESPA) 
Sugar NY (ICE), Chicago (CBOT), Mumbai (NCDEX), Sao Paulo 
(BM&F BOVESPA), Osaka (ODE), Zhengzhou (ZCE) 
Wheat Chicago (CBOT), Kansas City (KCBT), Minneapolis (MGEX), 
London (ICE), Addis Ababa (ECX), Zhengzhou (ZCE) 
Table 2: Main futures contract for coffee, wheat and sugar 
 
The existence of a contract is not in itself evidence of a highly financially developed 
market; the contracts must also be traded actively. Figure 3 and Table 3 therefore 
presents the volumes and open interest of futures contracts in a single trading day for 
coffee, wheat and sugar on their main trading market, as well as for rice, for 
comparison purposes. These are expressed in Metric Tonnes to account for the 
various contract units of the different contracts. It also presents the volumes produced 
globally in 2019 and compares it to the volumes present on financial markets 
(materialised by Open Interests). While the volumes of coffee financially traded are 
significantly lower than for sugar and wheat, this only reflects the smaller production 
of this crop. The ratio of production to financial trade is actually the highest in coffee. 
In comparison, only a fraction of the global production of rice is traded in Chicago. 
32 
 
This is only illustrative of how widely traded these commodities are on their main 
market. Some of their secondary futures markets can also be liquid, indicating an even 
greater degree of financial development. The use of derivative instruments has 
become, over the past century, an integral part of the business on these markets and 
the actors’ level of sophistication usually matches the high sophistication of the market 
structure. OTC contracts are also very prevalent in these markets, although their 
decentralised nature makes the measurement of their use impossible.  
 
 
Figure 3: Volumes traded for selected futures contracts8 on the 30th of April 2021 vs. 2019 global 
production9 
 
                                                 
8 Major futures contracts for each crop have been compiled and expressed in Metric Tonnes, depending 
on the contract size. These contracts are the ICE Sugar No. 5, No.11 and No.16 for sugar; ICE Coffee 
C and Robusta contracts for coffee; CME Chicago, Kansas City and Black Sea Wheat as well as 
Euronext Milling Wheat for wheat, and CME Rough Rice contract for rice.  
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30th of April 2021 Sugar Coffee Wheat Rice 
Volume 
     
5,437,520  
     
876,671  
    
21,702,446  
     
39,403  
Open Interest 
     
54,782,813  




     
826,644  
Global Production 2019 
   
180,000,000  






% of Global Production 
traded with Futures 30.4% 59.2% 14.4% 0.2% 
Table 3: Volumes traded of selected futures contracts⁷ on the 30th of April 2021 vs. 2019 global 
production⁸ 
 
VI) History of rice futures markets 
The history of futures contracts is not one of constant underdevelopment and 
unsophistication of the market structure. There is a past of functioning derivative 
trading for this grain, but also of various failures more recently. Presenting this 
historical background will facilitate discussion in the subsequent chapters.  
a. Dojima Futures Market:  
Futures trading in rice finds its origin at the end of the Tokugawa-period in Japan (also 
called Edo-era, 1603-1868). This also marks the birth of derivative finance. Rice 
traders in Osaka then speculated on the price of rice in an unstructured way that was 
assimilated to gambling (Moss & Kintgen, 2010). With time, and in the context of 
alternating policies of ban and authorisation,10 the market slowly formalised to become 
the Dojima exchange by the end of the 1720s (Moss & Kintgen, 2010) . Rice bills, that 
were warehouse receipts, started being highly used in Osaka, making the trading of 
futures possible once those rice bills were standardised (Schaede, 1989). An 
exchange – in the form of an association of traders, clearing houses – in charge of 
changing rice into money and keeping merchants’ deposits, as well as book-keeping 
of all transactions, contributed to the sophistication of the Dojima futures market 
(Schaede, 1989) 
                                                 
10 I discuss these policies in detail in Chapter V 
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The Dojima market was highly organised and Schaede (1989) demonstrates that it 
satisfied most of the necessary components of a modern futures market:  
(1) only exchange members can participate in the market; 
(2) contracts traded are standardised; 
(3) for each position, a ‘good-faith’ money (margin) has to be deposited at the 
clearinghouse; 
(4) trading is not bilateral, but the clearinghouse enters each transaction as a third 
party and guarantees the fulfilment of all contracts; 
(5) the contract runs for a certain trading period and open positions are reassessed 
daily in accordance with price fluctuations (mark-to-market); and 
(6) positions dissolved before the end of the trading period are cleared by cash 
settlement. 
… the Dojima market practices generally satisfied these criteria except that it had 
different margin rules, different mark-to-market mechanisms,11 and several clearing 
houses (Schaede, 1989, p. 488).  
The careful recording of market data at the time have made possible many recent 
econometric analyses to determine whether the market was efficient. Hamori et al. 
(2001) explain that Miyamoto (1988) concludes that the market was efficient based on 
the correlation between spot and futures prices between 1757 and 1826. They later 
expose Ito’s work (1993) that concludes the opposite for the period between 1763 and 
1780, based on (1) the impossibility to estimate the spot price at contract expiration 
from the futures price at the beginning of the contract; and (2) the absence of 
convergence between spot and futures prices at maturity (Hamori, Hamori, & 
Anderson, 2001). Using similar efficiency conditions to Ito, Hamori et al. examine two 
sets of data, between 1763 and 1780, and from 1851 to 1864. They conclude that the 
market was efficient in the first period, under a stable political environment, but 
became inefficient in the second period in the context of political turmoil12 (Hamori, 
Hamori, & Anderson, 2001). 
Certain patterns make the Dojima market intriguing and different from modern 
commodity futures markets. Considering it as a commodity exchange is already a 
                                                 
11 The mark-to-market is the measure of the fair price value of the asset at a current time.   
12 See Chapter V 
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strong statement. In this era, rice in Japan was not only a staple but also a currency, 
a mean of payment and taxation. Schaede thus argues that the Dojima market was 
rather a securities exchange, with little connection to the underlying commodity that 
should be considered as money (Schaede, 1989).  
However, Wakita (2001) defends a very different argument and finds that each 
seasonal market had a well-defined function for agricultural trade. Trading in rice 
futures then, unlike trading in the present-day futures market, was conducted in three 
seasonal markets: 
1. The spring market: January 8-April 28 (called ``winter trading'' along with that 
in the below autumn market). 
2. The summer market: May 7-October 9 (called ``summer trading''). 
3. The autumn market: October 17-December 24 (called winter trading). 
The summer market seems to have primarily catered to the need for hedging against 
the risk of an unsatisfactory harvest; whereas the primary function of the autumn 
market opening shortly after the harvest may have been to facilitate hedging against 
the risks of shipping harvested rice to Osaka and determining the quantity that would 
actually be shipped. The spring market, on the other hand, can reasonably be 
characterised as the market for transactions of the rice already stored in Osaka as well 
as the additional shipments of rice from the colder Hokuriku districts, which usually 
arrived in April (Wakita, 2001, pp. 538-539). 
The Dojima market came to an end in 1939 when it was absorbed by the Government 
Rice Agency to maintain stable prices by controlling production (Frédéric, 2011; Whipp 
(a), 2011). 
b. Futures Trading in early 20th Century Burma: 
In 1900, a rice futures contract was established in Rangoon, the then capital of British 
colonial Burma, which was considered the Asian rice bowl at the time. It lasted during 
the first half of the 20th century. The market seemed to be institutionally well settled. 
The contract could specify delivery in one, two, three or six months (Cheng S. H., 
2012). The contract had a well-defined standardisation, with only one grade tradeable 
through futures contracts: the so-called Small Mills Specials. The market was not 
trading in paddy, which meant the main actors using the futures market were millers 
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and exporters, alongside investors trading futures for profit (Cheng S. H., 2012). 
Cheng describes ways millers could use the market to deal with certain businesses 
such as forward agreements: 
If a miller contracted to deliver rice in a few months to a buyer and had not yet bought 
paddy to mill and if he feared that the price of paddy was going to rise the miller could 
buy futures rice from speculators so that he could be sure of fulfilling the contract 
without loss (2012, p. 76). 
It seems that the price behaviour of this futures market was coherent. Futures prices 
were slightly lower than spot prices and both converged towards delivery, with 
seasonality sometimes affecting this gap. This is the sign of a well-functioning market 
(Latham, 1986; Cheng S. H., 2012). Despite rudimentary infrastructure and the 
contract being directly traded from the pavement of Mogul Street, the Rangoon market 
seemed institutionally well constructed and well-functioning (Latham, 1988; Cheng S. 
H., 2012). 
The emergence of futures trading in Burma seems to be explained by the growing 
financial cultures in Europe at the time. Colonial trading companies from Liverpool, 
London, Hamburg and Bremen were established in Rangoon and may be responsible  
for the creation of this futures market (Latham, 1986). The colonial hypothesis is 
reinforced by the existence of a futures market in Saigon (French Indochina) from 
1907, while Bangkok, then capital of the independent Kingdom of Siam, where 
Chinese merchants mainly operated, did not use futures trading (Latham, 1986). The 
market seems to have lasted until the Second World War, but no clear end date is 
available. 
c. Futures Contracts Attempts in the late 20th century:  
The second half of the 20th century has been characterised by a multitude of attempts 
to establish rice futures. This revival came from the West – in countries’ with 
economies developing financially where rice is of lesser socio-economic importance 
than in Asia. After a failed attempt to create a rice futures contract in the New York 
Mercantile Exchange in 1964, the emergence of rice futures in the USA came during 
the 1980s under the presidency of Ronald Reagan and its strong policy of liberalisation 
(The Journal of Commerce, 1986). The first one was established in New Orleans in 
April 1981. The location was strategic as the city is the main port for exporting 
American long-grain rice grown in the southern states of Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi 
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and Arkansas. The New Orleans Commodity Exchange was created specifically for 
rice futures trading and the only other commodity traded, in very small volumes, was 
cotton. Both milled rice contracts and rough rice (paddy) were traded on the market 
(The New York Times, 1981). Thomas Webber, the president of the NOCB, was very 
ambitious at the opening of the market, “[predicting] daily futures trading of between 
$600 million and $1 billion by midsummer” (The New York Times, 1981). However, by 
midsummer, the disillusion was already clear, with an underperforming market and Mr 
Webber already replaced by a new president (Sloane, 1981). An article in The New 
York Times described the situation: “The New Orleans exchange, which trades in rice 
and cotton futures contracts, began operations just four months ago during an 
industrywide slump, and has gotten off to a sluggish start” (Sloane, 1981). This 
agricultural depression carried on in the USA in the following years, leading to the 
market’s liquidation in June 1983 due to the low volume of contracts traded (The New 
York Times, 1983). In order to keep the futures alive, the commodity exchange was 
merged with the MidAmerica Commodity Exchange (MidAm) and moved to Chicago. 
Despite this deal, the contract did not meet more success and was closed a year later 
in 1984 (Latham, 1998).  
Strengthened by its new affiliation to the Chicago Board of Trade, giving access to its 
investor members and supposedly more liquidity, MidAm and its subsidiary, the 
Chicago Rice and Cotton Exchange initiated another attempt two years later. A new 
contract, for rough rice only, was established in August 1986. The year 1987 created 
new hope in a long-term performing contract as a drought during the Monsoon season 
in India and Thailand contracted world production and consequently boosted American 
prices. The price of futures contracts went from 5 to 10 cents a pound between August 
and October 1987 (Jouzaitis, 1987). However, this contract joined the long list of rice 
futures failures, and the Chicago Rice and Cotton Exchange was vacated in November 
1991 (US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 1991). The CBOT picked up this 
contract to convert it into its own rice futures the following year, in 1992. This contract 
is still traded (although in relatively low volumes), covering U.S. southern long-grain 
paddy.  
On the other side of the Atlantic, in November 1990, an attempt to create a rice futures 
market on the London Futures and Options Exchange (Fox) did not meet much 
success (Latham, 1998). The main innovation of this contract was that it targeted rice 
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grown in another country than the one where the contract was established. The 
contract specification was for Thai 100% grade B rice, with a seller’s option to deliver 
U.S. rice grade #2, 4% broken (at 5% premium). Together, these varieties represented 
a standard for high quality internationally traded long-grain rice. The international 
aspect of the contract was further demonstrated by the use of US Dollars on this 
market (LRBA, 1990). Shortly before the planned opening of the futures market, a 
circular from the London Rice Broking Association (LRBA) stated:  
It is hoped that the rice industry, including exporters, importers and traders, will use 
this market for protecting themselves against adverse price movement and for 
assessing the day to day business operations. The business will be transacted by a 
computer screen matching system which would remove the need for open outcry 
markets such as those currently thriving in Chicago and elsewhere (LRBA, 1990).  
Even if the project was short-lived, the London rice futures is an interesting case of 
attempting to create a futures market essentially designed for international trade.  
A striking fact about these past futures markets is the lack of information available 
despite them being part of a fairly recent history. Newman says that “many of these 
exchanges have now been lost to history, forgotten even by most local denizens and 
market participants” (Newman, 2014, p. 59). More information is generally available 
about their creations than disappearances and failures. This thesis attempts, when 
possible, to solve this issue as it will help to understand the issues specific to rice 
futures markets. 
d. Modern rice futures markets in East Asia: 
Attempts to create futures markets have geographically shifted to East Asia in recent 
years. 
The Agricultural Futures Exchange of Thailand (AFET), established in 1999 and 
known for its trading in rubber, attempted to establish a futures contract or contracts 
for 5% broken white rice and Hom Mali rice in Thailand from 2007. A first contract, 
AFET BWR5, was established in March 2007 but it failed to attract trading interest and 
trading volumes remained very thin. The contract was essentially maintained to assist 
the Thai government in selling its rice stocks. It was replaced in April 2011 by another 
contract, the WRF5, changing the contract unit specification. While the quanti ty 
specified for one AFET BWR5 was 15MTS of rice, the WRF5 was for 50MTS of rice. 
This contract was not more successful in attracting trading interest. The contract 
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became useless after the introduction of the paddy pledging scheme in October 2011, 
as prices became artificially stable, removing the raison d’être of the market (McKenzie 
A. , 2012).  
An expert working group organised by the RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security 
(NTS) Studies met in March 2012 in Singapore. The meeting was supported by the 
National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS), Singapore. The idea was to 
examine the opportunity of creating a rice futures contract for the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region based in Singapore, to stabilise rice market 
prices (RSIS Centre for Non Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, 2012). A series of 
papers published in the ADB (Asian Development Bank) Sustainable Development 
Working Papers Series were similarly examining this possibility. Singapore was 
chosen for a variety of reasons, such as the fact that Singapore is not a producing 
country, its time zone, its port and warehouses infrastructures, to ensure a well-
functioning delivery. It should also be noted that it is the most advanced financial 
centre in the region. The call for papers has offered several very insightful works on 
the need for risk management tools in the rice market. Overall, many of the 
respondents and participants were enthusiastic about the prospect of such a contract 
for rice even if there were a few concerns, especially in terms of losing control of the 
market by traditional participants and governments to financial market forces (RSIS 
Centre for Non Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, 2012). In any case, most of the 
papers produced for this occasion conclude that, regardless of whether a rice futures 
contract is desirable or not, the current structure of the international rice trade does 
not allow for a successful futures market (RSIS Centre for Non Traditional Security 
(NTS) Studies, 2012; McKenzie A. , 2012; Pochara, 2012; Hamilton, 2012). The report 
of the meeting published in September 2012 consequently discouraged Singapore 
from establishing such a market for the time being (RSIS Centre for Non Traditional 
Security (NTS) Studies, 2012).   
It is in China that new rice futures have emerged and strengthened. The first Chinese 
futures contract for rice was established on the Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange 
(CZCE) in 2008 for early long-grain rice (GOV.cn, 2008). The Chinese government 
took further its efforts to make rice hedging possible as it approved, in October 2013, 
the creation of two new futures contracts on the CZCE: one for japonica rice (started 
trading in November 2013) and one for late Indica rice (started trading in March 2014) 
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(Oryza, 2014; CZCE, 2017; China Daily, 2013; Reuters, 2013). Both of these varieties 
are nowadays grown in China for the domestic markets. The trading volumes of these 
contracts remains extremely thin, especially compared to wheat. On the CZCE, the 
ratio of daily volumes of rice to wheat is often around 1:500 (CZCE, 2017). It should 
be noted that towards the end of 2010, there was a boom in the volume of early long -
grain contracts. However, this was short-lived, and at the beginning of 2011, this 
increased attention completely faded. McKenzie explained this phenomenon by new 
Chinese regulations at the time, aiming to discourage speculation (McKenzie A. , 
2012). 
Finally, Japan has seen the most recent attempt to establish a modern rice futures 
market. In July 2011, after 72 years of suspension, rice trading was allowed again with 
the establishment of two futures markets: the Tokyo Grain Exchange (TGE) (for Tokyo 
rice) and the Kansai Commodities Exchange (for Osaka rice)13 (Japan Times, 2014). 
However, in the context of the Fukushima disaster, it proved difficult to build liquidity 
(Whipp (b), 2011; Japan Times, 2014). Due to the low volumes of contracts traded, 
the TGE was forced out of business in 2013 and the contracts for Tokyo rice were 
transferred to the Kansai Commodities Exchange alongside Osaka rice futures. The 
exchange was subsequently renamed Osaka Dojima Commodity Exchange (Japan 
Times, 2014). This was not enough to attract much more activity on the market, and 
the objective of trading volumes of 4000 contracts a day has never been reached. 
Combining Osaka and Tokyo rice, volumes rarely exceed 1000 contracts in a trading 
day (Japan Times, 2014; Quandl, 2017). Despite this partial failure, the exchange 
continued its efforts on rice by revising its strategy. The Tokyo contract was maintained 
as a benchmark for rice going into industrial use, while Osaka rice was withdrawn and 
replaced by contracts for Niigata (in 2016) and Akita (in 2019) rice that represent better 
benchmarks of the market for household and restaurant consumption.  
 
                                                 
13 Regardless of the origin, all rice grown in Japan is medium-grain japonica rice.  Tokyo rice are 
varieties grown in Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama and Chiba prefectures. Osaka rice comes from Shiga and 
Mie prefectures.   
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VII) Problem statement 
An obvious empirical observation emerges: there is a fundamental divergence 
between rice and other agricultural markets in their history and current use of 
derivative instruments. This research aims to answer the following research question: 
what explains the fact that financial development – materialised on commodity markets 
by the increasing capacity to trade risk through derivative contracts – characterises 
most food markets but has remained marginal in the rice market? This puzzling fact is 
reinforced by the observation that since WWII, rice futures contracts are not simply 
almost non-existent, they have often failed. In comparison, derivatives markets have 
strengthened their influence on other agricultural markets. My research is thus driven 
by a set of additional sub-questions. Why do futures contracts fail? Do patterns of 
failure appear in the rice market? How does it differ from other commodity markets? 
How does the rice market currently manage its risk in the absence of financial hedging 
instruments? How have derivative markets developed in other crop markets?  
VIII) Aims and contribution 
The aim of my research is two-fold. The fundamental driver of this study is to provide 
an academic understanding of a practical issue that animates debate in the rice 
industry. Industry stakeholders have long been asking the question that forms the 
research question of this thesis. However, knowledge is very fragmented on the rice 
market due to secrecy, opacity and lack of integration. The research thus seeks to 
concentrate the market knowledge and analyse it to provide a Political Economy 
insight into the reasons for the financial underdevelopment of rice. The research could 
also have a further reaching impact as many actors believe that this is critical 
knowledge to make progress in terms of transparency and risk management. In 
addition, as my analysis explores thex structures of the rice industry, these findings 
can serve for a variety of other purposes when it comes to the Political Economy of 
rice.  
The second main objective of the research is to increase the understanding of the 
mechanisms involved in commodities’ financial development. This part of the research 
presents a valuable contribution to the academic theory on the topic. In particular, the 
research advances the debate about which major factors contribute to the success or 
failure of futures contracts. More importantly, I propose a specific understanding of 
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financial development in the context of developing countries, for which the existing 
literature remains narrow. I thus provide a new theory of financial markets 
development that awards importance to the geographical chronology of the process.  
 
IX) Hypotheses 
Prior to the beginning of the data collection phase of this research, I formulated four 
main hypothetical answers to the research question to drive the research. These ones 
were produced from the existing literature, market sentiment I had captured during my 
time as an analyst at the LiveRiceIndex, and logical stipulations.  
In the academic literature, the question is hardly studied directly. Only three authors 
attempted to diagnose the absence of rice futures contracts, two of whom did so 
concisely. In his book, Futures and Options Markets: An Introduction, Carter argues 
that the need for derivative hedging instruments is removed in rice by the "combination 
of government programs and the preponderance of buying and processing 
cooperatives" (Carter, 2007). Although his consideration of the question remains brief, 
Latham (1998) proposes a more elaborated set of explanations. He first argues that 
the vast number of varieties and qualities of rice make standardisation impossible, 
while it is necessary for futures contracts14. His second main argument is that futures 
markets for rice lack financing because of the disinterest from hedgers (especially Thai 
traders) (Latham, 1998). He states that traders are satisfied with the existing situation, 
making them reluctant to change their way of trading. Roche (1992) dedicated an 
entire chapter to discuss the potential for futures contracts for rice, and proposes four 
main factors to explain the absence of futures trading. He first agrees with Latham 
about the lack of standardisation. He also argues that the tradition of default in the 
industry that makes difficult to collect payment from “losers” in futures contracts (I 
argue in Chapter VI that this issue can affect OTC contracts but not futures). He adds 
that there is a lack of liquidity in countries where rice is traded. Finally, his most 
important argument is that price opacity profits some traders, who are, therefore, 
reluctant to display publicly their price expectations.  
                                                 
14 See Chapter II 
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The thesis aims to go much further into details in regards to the factors deterring the 
establishment of rice futures contracts. I formulated this set of four main hypotheses. 
Developing countries hypothesis: As explained earlier, there is a strong unipolarity in 
rice with the trade mostly taking place in developing countries. I hypothesise that this 
peculiar feature could play a role in the financial underdevelopment of the market. 
Countries that are still in the early stage of their socio-economic development may not 
offer a favourable environment for futures markets. The legal framework, for instance, 
may be an obstacle to derivative trading, as suggested by Roche (1992). Some 
countries lack property rights or contract law, while others may have legal systems 
that do not fit the needs of Western finance. The sophistication of potential market 
actors may be another obstacle characteristic of developing countries. In places where 
financial sophistication is low in all sectors of the economy, there can be a lack of 
financial education and derivative trading expertise allowing for the building of liquidity. 
Similarly, market actors may lack the means – such as access to credit – to finance 
their participation in derivative trading (such as the need to manage margin calls). 
Finally, infrastructures can be missing. Both informatics systems and large delivery 
infrastructures are needed for the establishment of commodity exchanges. They can 
be lacking in some developing countries.  
Market structure hypothesis: Apart from the geographic unipolarity discussed in the 
previous hypothesis, other market structure aspects may answer the research 
question. It cannot be excluded that the fragmentation of the market into an infinite 
number of small market actors rather than institutionally well-established participants 
can limit the participation in futures markets (Roche, 1992; Latham, 1998). As Carter 
mentioned, many of the few large entities involved in rice trade are co-operatives. 
These can, under certain circumstances, have marketising models removing free 
market risk, leaving them with no reason to trade derivatives. Other large entities can 
have counter-incentives in participating as it may threaten their asymmetric market 
power. This is challenging the neo-liberal narrative that non-sophisticated actors are 
victims and simply leftovers of the financial system. It is generally assumed in the 
Western financial literature that producers at different levels of the supply chain are 
risk-averse and consequently willing to use derivative contracts (Hardaker, Huirne, & 
Anderson, 1997; Tomek & Paterson, Risk Management in Agricultureal Markets: A 
Review, 2001). However, I must review a hypothesis suggested by Hardie: “Less 
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[sophisticated] actors can see [financial development] as contrary to their interests, 
and therefore act in ways that hinder that [financial development]” (Hardie, 2012, p. 
5). This comes down to researching stakeholders that would deliberately act against 
the emergence of financial risk management in rice-growing countries. Finally, another 
type of integration is lacking: price integration across varieties, qualities and 
geographical areas. This makes hedging with a futures contract potentially inefficient. 
Information hypothesis: Rice is characterised by a strong asymmetry of information. 
Information remains largely private and difficult to acquire; many quantitative data are 
simply unavailable, even to analysts. This means that the market is largely inefficient. 
The price of commodities depends not so much on actual demand and supply but 
rather on information regarding demand and supply (Tomek & Paterson, Risk 
Management in Agricultureal Markets: A Review, 2001). In theory, prices of commodity 
futures contracts are lower than spot prices and converge as the contract gets closer 
to maturity. This is due to the decreasing level of risk, which is caused by increasingly 
reliable information on prices as the maturity date gets closer and the decreasing time 
for non-forecast events to take place. However, in an opaque market, this relation can 
be broken, resulting in non-convergence at maturity and therefore hedging 
inefficiency. This is a disincentive for its use by physical market participants.  
The other issue created by opacity is that some actors take advantage of their 
information asymmetry to set prices advantageous for their business. As futures 
markets make a price publicly available, they thus have an interest in keeping rice 
financially underdeveloped, recalling the previous hypothesis (Roche, 1992). 
Politicization hypothesis: The last hypothesis is the role that politicization can play in 
impeding the process of financial development. It will be demonstrated through this 
thesis that the rice market is under unusual and intense political pressure and 
intervention, compared to other commodities. This is due to its role in food security 
and livelihood for large shares of populations in Asia (Gulati & Narayanan, 2003; 
Shigetomi, 2011; Clarete, Adriano, & Esteban, 2013). This politicization is a 
destabilising factor for international trade and prices. It is also a reason for the lack of 
price integration as each country has its own price program. As a result, speculators 
are usually wary of being involved in a market where the link between the physical and 
the derivative is frequently disrupted, and where the price formation can be challenging 
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to forecast. Political intervention can also remove the need for private hedging when 
it takes the form of government insurance schemes or market price setting. 
  
X) Methodology 
As I hypothesised that the geography of the rice market, its lack of integration and 
preponderance in developing countries is key to its financial development, I needed to 
ground my analysis in a set of geographical cases. The cases-based method allows a 
qualitative researcher using “a small sample of purposively chosen cases of a given 
event or process” to explore the mechanisms of this process (Schrank, 2006, p. 22). 
In my research, this process is the financial underdevelopment of rice, and my cases 
must therefore be valuable cases containing the causal explanation to this 
underdevelopment. I thus used three main geographical cases: the USA, Vietnam and 
Thailand. I justify the selection later in this chapter. 
Since the research question is derived from the observation of the fundamental 
anomaly of the rice market regarding financial development, the research inevitably 
must be articulated around a comparative method. The strategy of this research is to 
identify singularities within the rice market that cause this anomaly of market 
development when compared to other agricultural commodities that use derivatives. 
Any fundamental difference could be the factor hindering derivatives development for 
rice. 
To complete the hypotheses formulated in this introduction, in Chapter II, I present the 
theory around the failure of futures contracts, which will allow me to identify 
prerequisites to financial development, as well as other challenges in the building of 
the derivative markets. The rest of the thesis attempts to identify whether such factors 
could explain the financial underdevelopment of rice. When the hypothesis is 
confirmed to be a matter for the rice market, I then use the comparative study to 
determine whether such factors are, indeed, obstacles to financial development. To 
do so, each factor must be compared with the comparison markets. If they are 
components of these markets, it would mean that these factors, by themselves, cannot 
prevent financial development. In such cases, I will need to determine if they are, at 
least, limiting factors. To complete the comparison, I will also search within my 
46 
 
compared crops for elements that could have facilitated the development of derivatives 
trading and that might be missing in rice.   
I mentioned earlier that this thesis also aims to contribute to the theoretical 
understanding of commodity derivatives markets' development. Although rice was 
selected because of an interest in the case rather than being strategically selected for 
theoretical critique, it is still a very valuable case study for theory construction. 
Depending on the theory explored, investigating rice serves different purposes. For 
instance, when examining whether financial development is a dominant and 
unavoidable force on food markets, the rice market serves as a deviant case analysis. 
It is the one market that does not fit into this narrative (Lijphart, 1971). On the other 
hand, when studying the theory around the cause of contract failure, rice serves as a 
theory-confirming or theory-invalidating case study. It serves as a test of propositions 
of how futures contracts fail (Lijphart, 1971).  
a. Research Method 
The main body of this qualitative research is based on the interviews of 46 market 
stakeholders during 41 interviews. These took place in the US, the UK, Japan and 
Singapore, as well as remotely. All the participants were involved or formerly involved 
in commodity markets, whether in the physical supply chain, in the finance industry or 
as research analysts. The interview process was carried out from July 2019 to 
November 2019.  A list of interviewees is presented at the end of the thesis, while 
table 4 regroups the various profiles of my interviewees by activity and location. 
Interviews typically lasted one to two hours long. 
I originally intended to carry out fieldwork in each of my geographical cases. However, 
after time spent in Louisiana – where I interviewed members of the US physical 
markets – and Chicago – where I interviewed stakeholders of the futures market, I 
could not obtain a research permit for Thailand or Vietnam. I attributed the refusal to 
award me a research visa to the political sensitivity of the crops studied. However, my 
case studies were strategically chosen and there was data to be collected in these 
markets. During my time in the US, I had to carry out phone interviews on multiple 
occasions. This was, for example, because some of my interviewees were in New 
York City or spread out in the Midwest, or because hurricane Harvey, which struck 
Louisiana in the summer of 2017, limited my mobility in the region for a week. I had 
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thus familiarised myself to the process of phone or online interviews. This gave me 
confidence that such research could be carried to reach out to interviewees in 
Southeast Asia, although it limited me to discussions with only market participants 
fluent in English or French. As most of my target interlocutors were involved in the 
export market, this did not turn out to be a great obstacle. A handful of interviewees 
were not confident enough in their oral English proficiency and preferred to take part 
in a live written interview instead. The ability to interview remotely became particularly 
viable when it appeared that many market participants key to the process of financial 
development were spread out across the world. At the beginning of 2019, I held a 
research fellow position at Kyoto University, which allowed me to carry out strategic 
interviews in Japan. I also stopped in Singapore on the way back to Europe to carry 
out additional interview work. 
 
 
In order to successfully solve the puzzle of the research question, an important amount 
of contextualization of the market dynamics. This includes the study of the the lives, 
thoughts and profiles of market participants. This is precisely what interviews offered, 
the ability to collect a vast amount of data from a large number of people. As Hughes 
and Sharrock explain, it allows to go beyond what the researcher can immediately 
perceive and let interviewees “report on what they think about things, their past, give 
details of their occupation, home life, express their sentiments about the government 
                                                 
15 Others include functions such as advisors, academics and well-informed stakeholders who preferred 
to not have their function revealed for anonymity purposes.    











USA 5 4 5 2 5 
Thailand   4   
Vietnam   4 1  
Japan     4 
Rest of the 
World 
  6 2 4 
Total 5 4 19 5 13 
Table 4: Profile of the interviewee’s sample 
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of the day … and so on” (Hughes & Sharrock, 2007, p. 94). These accounts serve to 
complement the existing set of data in easily accessible documents and the past 
academic literature, but most importantly formulating new hypothesis, based on 
unexpected narratives and puzzling experiences, and testing their validity (George & 
Bennett, 2005). In addition, as I will repeat throughout this thesis, the rice industry is 
a secretive one. Only the interview process could allow me to obtain the disclosure of 
often confidential information that would not exist in written documents or be found in 
the academic literature (I discuss anonymity later in this section). Other methods such 
as ethnography would not have allowed me to talk to enough participants and 
therefore gather the fragmented knowledge and sentiment of the commodity markets 
I study. The expression ‘fragmented knowledge’ is important: it appeared clearly that 
the questions I explore in this thesis were not unfamiliar to market participants and 
many answers had already been thought through. However, market participants often 
hold a share of the knowledge necessary to answer these questions and do not 
communicate. Under such conditions, the role of the researcher is to gather and 
reconcile the information knowledge of the industry. The information I aimed to collect 
can be broadly divided in two groups: historical accounts of past attempts at financially 
developing commodities, and narratives about market structures and actors’ 
behaviour affecting the propensity of a commodity to develop financially.  
Using interviews as historical evidence is particularly challenging. Documenting the 
failure of futures market is difficult as exchanges are often prompt to supress records 
of projects that did not have the expected outcomes. In addition, some of these 
projects were several decades old, before the digital age allowed for the use of the 
memory of the internet. Various documents can be available but without setting a clear 
narrative of the events as they happened. As a result, using the memories of 
interviewees is often a viable source of data. However, this method also has downfalls. 
As argued by Ritchie (2003), recollection can vary, either intentionally as interviewees 
can embellish or omit facts for the service of their own agenda, or intentionally as their 
memories become imprecise. In order to validate the memories of interviewees, I 
aimed when possible to corroborate these with those of other interviewees, as well as 
triangulating with document sources to identify any possible inconsistency in the 
narrative. When this was not possible, I had to rely on the interviewee recollection of 
events while also acknowledging it was their view.  
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Interviews were also the best solution to capture the narratives and practices around 
the financial development of a crop. The absence of derivative finance in rice has been 
in part built upon the industry’s understanding of finance, as well as the perception of 
the rice market by the financial industry. Interviews therefore allowed letting 
participants use their own concepts and description of the matter that a survey would 
not have allowed for. In particular, semi-structured interview empower the researcher 
to discuss a range of topic while giving flexibility in the construction of the conversation, 
whether it is the order of question and the time dedicated to answer them (Robson, 
2002). Using this method exposed me to the bias of my participants regarding the topic 
of research. However, these participants, individually and collectively, have 
responsibilities in the level of financial development of the market. This means that 
these precise bias impact their market behaviour and are important to comprehend in 
order to answer the research question. The main risk with this process is to generalise 
a bias from the experience of few interviewees. The awareness of this risk played 
through the whole research process, from the sampling of interviewees to the analysis 
of interview materials.    
The semi-structured interviews also served a purpose in the comparative method used 
in this thesis. It was important to be able to ask similar questions to actors holding 
equivalent positions in different industries, or different geographical areas, while also 
adapting these questions to the interviewee’s role. This allowed me to compare 
practices and market structure in each of these markets, and to see how they impact 
financial development. Of course, such comparison meets limitation within the 
practicalities of the research process. In my case, it was the comparability of actor’s 
role onto the supply chain of their country and industry. For instance, I was limited in 
my ability to interview farmers in Southeast Asia while I had this access in the US. 
Ultimately, I argue that the role of US farmers and Southeast Asian exporters, although 
being different in the physical supply chain, was somehow similar in the process of 
financial development. However, I had to acknowledge in the conduct of my interviews 
that such comparison was not always consistent and part of the comparison work had 
to be done through the data analysis process rather than through data collection. 
The profile of my interviewees can be divided into two groups: key stakeholders, who 
could contribute their expertise on a precise area of the research, or individuals who 
are representative of their interest groups. The set of key actors were interrogated with 
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the aim of understanding specific events and market dynamics while generic actors 
were asked about their personal experiences and practices in order to represent their 
group. The key stakeholders were mostly individuals who had been involved in the 
creation of derivative contracts and could clarify the reasons for intending to establish 
them in the first place, as well as eventually try to diagnose their failures if relevant. 
They could also include other professionals that hold or have held preferential 
positions on the rice market, such as market makers in a specific contract. The key 
market actors can be assimilated to what the political science methodology literature 
calls “elites”, that is, those with close proximity to political power or with particular 
expertise (Slote Morris, 2009). The use of these interviewees that were not selected 
on a probability-sampling basis allowed to reconstruct the chronology of decision 
making that led to a set of events (Tansey, 2007). As I argue in Chapter II, individual 
human input has a role to play in the construction of financial markets; the testimony 
of these key market actors is therefore needed to understand the mechanisms of this 
process. The other advantage of key market actors is their ability to make inferences 
on larger groups of actors’ characteristics and decision. When, for instance, access to 
farmers was restricted, discussing with intermediaries who are familiar with their 
practices and preferences through their collaborations offered an alternative, although 
it expose the data to the bias of the key actor.    
The second set of interviewees represented larger groups of market actors. I intended, 
whenever possible, to interview multiple individuals for each group to avoid any outlier 
effect. These interest groups included exporters, millers, analysts, traders or farmers. 
The access to farmers, once again was limited by the impossibility to do fieldwork in 
Southeast Asia. However, through the first phase of the research, it appeared that 
depending on the level of financial maturity of a market, farmers might not be the most 
important stakeholders to talk to. In the US they were important because the futures 
contract is in place there and farmers could therefore be involved in it. This was not 
the case in Southeast Asia, where potential market makers such as Thai exporters 
were more relevant to the research process. I justify in Chapter VI why farmers cannot 
generate the liquidity in futures contract, and how some exchanges believing so has 
caused the failure of some contracts.  
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Access to interviewees was originally made possible by my professional experience  
on the rice market, providing me with a variety of gatekeepers.16 Afterwards, a 
snowball technique was used to identify interviewees. My two main other ways of 
identifying and contacting interviewees were the use of LinkedIn and the access to 
food industry conferences such as SIAL.17 Finally, other techniques, such as the use 
of professional association directories or public records of farmers who had benefited 
from government subsidies, have been attempted but remained largely unsuccessful. 
I must once again state that the rice market is secretive and the ability to get 
respondents is often restricted. However, this contributes to avoiding a bias in 
interviewee selection by the researcher, as any individual willing to take part in the 
discussion would have been invited to do so. Nevertheless, the method for identifying 
interviewees does include its bias. For instance, the use of Linkedin and international 
conference pushes towards the interviewing of globalised professionals communities. 
This bias has a restricted effect on the results: I argue in this thesis, with the case of 
Thai rice exporters, that these business communities would be the most likely to use 
futures when the market structure becomes sophisticated. As it appears that their 
propensity to do so is limited, interviewing these individuals to understand why was a 
priority.   
The sampling of interviewees faces the risk of bias coming not only from the 
researcher, but also from interviewees, what Costigan and Cox (2001) call self-
selection bias. This is the process by which a category of individuals sharing common 
features is less likely to be willing to participate than others. I was expecting that this 
bias could be significant in my research, as those who are not willing to see financial 
development in rice could have be reluctant to participate. In practice, this 
phenomenon has been minimal. It arises in the case of American co-operatives that I 
discuss in Chapter III. For the rest, participation has been balanced between those 
who believe derivative finance is needed in the rice market and those who do not think 
it is necessary. The snowball technique also create a risk of bias as interviewees can 
encourage peers they share opinions and practices with to become participants. 
However, once again, they have often done the opposite and directed me towards 
                                                 
16 I worked as an analyst for the LiveRiceIndex in 2016-2017.   
17 Salon International de l’Alimentation  
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other industry actors that did not share their belief. Therefore, I am confident that my 
sample of participants was representative of the various groups of the industry.  
After seeking interviewees’ approval, all but one interview was recorded. One 
interviewee declined to be recorded, pretexting the noisy environment where the 
interview took place. Approaches to anonymity was less consistent between my 
interviewees. Ideally, I wished to be able to name my interviewees. It allowed me to 
refer to them consistently through the thesis, and expose their legitimacy on some 
topics However, many preferred to remain anonymous. They did so for two main 
reasons: either they were concerned about governmental disapproval of their 
participation in my research, or did not wish to seek the approval of their employer to 
talk to me, nor engage their company in the expression of their personal opinion. In 
practice, the anonymisation of many interviewees has been challenging. For the group 
of interviewees representing groups of market actors, identifying them by their 
profession caused no issue. However, for key market actors, their position or the 
information they shared could have betrayed their identity. Some unique 
characteristics of these interviewees made them eligible for the study in the first place 
but also made the reference to these characteristics conflict directly with their need for 
anonymity (Morse, 1998). This is why, in this thesis, the source of some information 
has to be referenced only vaguely with no more details than that such information 
came from an interviewee. In order to protect further the identity of anonymous 
interviewees, no precise dates are given in the list of interviewees.  
 Looking at my list of interviewees, it looks as all my interviewees were men. Although 
there was an imbalance in the genders of my interviewees (which represent an 
equivalent imbalance in the industry), all of the women I interviewed but one required 
anonymisation. I believe that was not due to their gender but rather their positions in 
the industry, as their male counterparts with equivalent positions often required 
anonymity too.  
As mentioned earlier in this section. in addition to the interviews that will feed my 
qualitative analysis, I often added document analysis and short quantitative analysis 
for triangulation purposes. Apart from public organisations’ archives and statistics, 
newspapers are also a way to cover past events that were valuable for my research. 
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b. Case Studies 
I selected three case studies – the USA, Thailand and Vietnam – to conduct my 
research. These were expected to constitute together an optimal representation of the 
diversity of the global rice market. However, during the research process, the case of 
Japan appeared also to offer valuable lessons about politicization. I thus worked on 
three major case studies and a minor one. The main difference was that the data 
collection for the major case studies was made broad to obtain a maximum number of 
objects of analysis, while the research on Japan was very targeted to understand a 
precise issue. 
The USA was the first case study. Despite being the most financially developed 
economy in the world, many attempts to establish futures contracts for rice have failed 
there. Chicago currently hosts a rough rice contract, but this one is only thinly traded 
(CME Group (c), 2017). It thus provides for an interesting case study for multiple 
reasons. Firstly, as the US is a financially developed economy, it allows for isolating 
the analysis from the development hypothesis to eventually identify issues that are 
specifically linked to the nature of the crop. Secondly, the CBOT rough rice contract 
has the peculiarity of being a well-established contract while maintaining low liquidity. 
To the standards of American futures contracts, it appears as a failure, but to the 
standards of the rice market, it is successful. Understanding the achievements and 
shortfalls of this contract is thus important. Thirdly, the rough rice contract provides a 
rare opportunity to analyse rice actors' behaviour towards an ongoing contract. The 
rest of the analysis is based on research covering past and partially forgotten 
contracts, or the speculative attempt at a contract. Finally, in the last chapter of this 
thesis, we study the possibility of a world contract, and the most liquid existing contract 
is potentially key for it. This is why this one needs to be explored in detail early in the 
thesis.   
Thailand – consistently the largest or second-largest global rice exporter – is the 
second case study. During the late 20th century and early 21st century, Thailand was 
known as the “paradise of liberalised rice trade”, which was one reason why the 
London FOX made its rice attempt with Thai rice. After its failure, the next futures 
contract for rice would be established domestically in 2007 before defaulting in 2011 
(McKenzie A. , 2012). Surprisingly, this period coincides with the politicization of the 
Thai market as a result of the Shinawatra family’s involvement in market manipulation 
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(Biswas, Kastner, & Tortajada, 2015; Hookway, 2016). The politicization of the national 
market is one of the main reasons for using Thailand as a case study. The market not 
only presents signs of government involvement but also frequent shifts in these rice 
policies. As the constitution of Thailand expects free democratic elections, rice policies 
become an electoral determinant that increases political risk. As Thailand is one of the 
key actors on the global market, rice’s politicization does not only matter domestically 
but to the entire rice market to which it provides political risk. The Thai case is 
consequently very valuable as it allows for the examination of how linked the dynamics 
of politicization and financial development are.  
The case of Thailand is valuable to examine for two other reasons. Firstly, Thai 5% 
broken long-grain white rice is often used as a world benchmark. An international 
contract for rice would therefore most likely be based on this rice grade and other 
origins are expected to be possibly hedged against this grain (I will discuss this 
supposition in Chapter VII). Thailand would therefore be at the core of the 
development of derivatives trading. The second reason is that due to their market 
power and sophistication, Thai rice exporters are often understood as the most 
sophisticated actors of the Asian rice market. It is thus believed that they would have 
a key role to play in the successful development of derivative trading in the region.  
Vietnam is the other Southeast Asian case study used in my research. The reason 
behind this choice is that Vietnam differs from Thailand in many ways and therefore 
allows for focusing on other aspects of the financial underdevelopment. Unlike 
Thailand, Vietnam does not hold democratic multi-party governmental elections. 
Consequently, rice policies are designed for the long term, avoiding frequent shifts 
affecting the market. This gives the possibility to keep the variable of politicization 
stable and focus on other hypotheses such as the market structure or issues related 
to developing countries. This last point is even more relevant as, while Thailand is 
already an emerging Tiger economy, Vietnam remains a frontier economy. However, 
Vietnam is a major exporter of a variety of commodities and agricultural goods, 
including rubber and coffee, for which derivative trade is used. This shows that the 
financial development of commodity markets is possible in a developing country. I will 




c. Comparative case studies: 
As I mentioned earlier, I have selected three crops – wheat, sugar and coffee – to 
compare to rice in order to identify systemic differences. Although I have used them 
comparatively at various stages of the analysis when they are individually relevant in 
relation to rice market's features, each has been originally picked for a specific 
purpose.  
Firstly, it should be noted that each crop has a specific, respective importance in each 
geographical case study: the US is the second biggest global exporter of wheat, 
Thailand is one of the leading powers in the sugar trade, holding the second amongst 
the world’s top exporters, and Vietnam is the 2nd largest world exporter of coffee and 
is 1st for the robusta variety (Bain, 2013). 
Wheat is compared to rice primarily because it is one of the most financially developed 
agricultural commodities, with a long history of contract trading. Derivatives are traded 
both at the domestic and global level. It provides one of the most complete pictures of 
how the financial development of a grain industry can look. This case will be 
particularly useful in the case of the US and will allow for the understanding of the 
interaction between the futures market and OTC markets. Wheat also has the 
advantage that it shares many features with rice: it is a global commodity, it is a staple 
in some developing countries, and it is sometimes used as a substitute to rice for 
human consumption in some regions (especially in sub-Saharan Africa) and for 
livestock. Like rice, wheat is mostly a food and feed crop, unlike corn, for instance, 
which is now largely used for ethanol and has therefore turned into a hybrid 
food/energy market. These similarities are important because it enables the isolation 
of other factors of divergence that could impact the development of derivative markets.  
The principal interest for comparison between sugar, a financially developed crop, and 
Thai rice, is their different structure of politicization. The sugar market is also politicized 
in most countries, including Thailand. The study of sugar will therefore serve the 
understanding of why a crop’s politicization impedes the development of its derivatives 
market or not.  
Finally, coffee is compared to rice, especially within the context of Vietnam. Like rice, 
coffee is a non-homogenous commodity mostly produced in the Global South. 
However, unlike rice, it displays a high level of financial development through the 
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supply chain, through the use of international futures contracts and localised OTC 
contracts. This commodity is therefore particularly useful for the examination of the 
developing countries hypothesis. Furthermore, the case of Vietnam is interesting 
because local exchanges were attempted for coffee there. One of the questions about 
the financial development of rice being its geographical organization, exploring the 
functioning of futures contracts at the local level is particularly valuable. 
 
XI) Structure: 
I finish this introduction by presenting the structure of this thesis and the argument that 
will be carried through each chapter.  
Chapter II: Fragility of Futures Contracts 
This chapter aims to explain why futures contracts, fundamental elements of the 
sophistication of the market structure, tend to fail over time. I look at the literature about 
contract success and failures and show that it thoroughly discusses the economic 
rationales of the physical market prerequisites for a contract to have a chance to 
succeed. Although this is extremely important, I also argue that there is another crucial 
set of parameters involved in the success or failure of a contract: the circumstances 
of the birth and life of the contract. These include whether the engineering of the 
contract specs is right, how to create initial liquidity, exposure to manipulation, 
obsolescence of contracts, etc. These issues are less consistently discussed in the 
literature. This chapter argues that contract failure is the norm as there are so many 
reasons for a contract to not function and that the sophistication of the market structure 
in the long term through the availability of a derivative contract should be considered 
the exception.  
Chapter III: Explaining the Low Liquidity of the CBOT Rice Contract 
Chapter III examines the American rice market and its futures contract for rice. While 
it is the only truly functional contract for rice worldwide, it suffers from low liquidity. I 
propose a variety of factors that individually deplete the liquidity and together limit the 
financial development of the market. Some cover the hedging effectiveness of the 
contract, with problems of contract design and convergence between the cash and 
futures prices, while others involve an issue of the sophistication of the market actor. 
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By comparing the Southern rice market to the wheat market in the Midwest, I show an 
issue of maturity in the structure of the American rice market – there is a lack of 
intermediaries having the financial literacy to deal with derivative trading. In addition, 
farmers’ behaviour towards price risk is affected by their greater aversion towards 
production risk due to the climatic instability in the rice-producing state, making them 
unwilling to hedge price risk. Finally, I show that the ongoing farm program limits the 
need for hedging by producers.  
Chapter IV: The Political Burden of the Rice Market? 
The question of the impact of governments on commodity markets is examined in this 
chapter. The central argument of this chapter is that politicization, defined as the 
potential for governmental interventions motivated by final goals exogenous to the 
market, tends to impede the development of derivatives markets. Politicization has two 
main effects on commodity markets: they can suppress price volatility leaving no risk 
to be traded; or create significant political uncertainty in price formation which 
discourage speculators from taking part in the futures market. I show that the rice 
market, due to its political salience, is particularly exposed to the issue of politicization. 
I argue that this is the case in all rice economies, but use extensively the case of 
Thailand, as an example. I then present the state of politicisation on my compared 
market and find that coffee is a largely depoliticised market; wheat is politicised, but 
the components of politicisation are sufficiently simple for market participants to 
understand and model it in their price risk models; while sugar is closer to rice in term 
of complex politicisation globally. This means that while politicization can be a factor 
impeding the development of derivatives markets, it cannot be the single reason for 
the financial underdevelopment of rice.  
Chapter V: Politicization of Futures Contracts and Exchanges 
In this chapter, I show that governments do not necessarily intervene in the physical 
market but can also directly voluntarily suppress financial development by disrupting 
the functioning of futures contract and/or exchanges. This is both common for 
agricultural markets in developing countries, and rice futures markets in all its major 
producing countries. After reviewing issues faced by agricultural futures markets in 
developing countries, I use the cases of Japan before WWII and in the 21st century. 
This chapter demonstrates that the financial development of a crop in a developing 
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country, or a country where it is politically very salient such as rice in Japan, is unlikely 
to take place at the local level. I argue that futures market can be instrumentalised by 
governments or interest groups that are clients of political parties. I show that a 
government can intentionally disrupt financial development, but does not have 
significant impact when it attempts to encourage it.  
Chapter VI: Financial Development of Agricultural Commodities in Developing 
Countries 
This chapter seeks to show that several further issues characteristic of developing 
countries limit the development of derivatives. The case of Thai rice will illustrate how 
sophisticated market actors enjoy additional market power from the lack of futures and 
are therefore interested in the persistence of the status quo. An issue with the lack of 
market information also appears to limit the potential for the establishment of 
functioning futures contracts. This chapter also argues that the lack of robust contract 
law and derivative market regulation mechanisms prevent the good functioning of both 
OTC markets and, indirectly, Futures markets. However, I reject this argument as 
being a primary cause of financial underdevelopment of the rice market. Additional 
logistical issues that are characteristic of developing countries are also discussed. The 
case of local futures contracts for coffee in Vietnam will illustrate the difficulties in 
enhancing the sophistication of the market structure in developing countries. This 
chapter will finally demonstrate that understanding the financial development of soft 
commodities – sugar in particular – as a success in developing countries, is an illusion. 
Despite large shares of the supply chain being found in developing countries, the large 
scale of sugar farming is not characteristic of usual farming activities in those 
countries. In addition, most of the commercial liquidity of futures contracts for sugar 
comes from international trade. There is no reason to believe that sugar can be a 
model for rice – a market based upon small scale farming and small trading entities. 
Chapter VII: The Making of a Global Contract 
The previous chapters demonstrated the difficulties in establishing local contracts in 
developing countries, and observed that the financial development of coffee, sugar 
and wheat is based upon the creation of global contracts. This chapter evaluates the 
challenges in creating such a contract. It explains the need for, but also the complexity 
of establishing a global benchmark for rice because the market is fragmented both 
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geographically and in term of grades and varieties. I discuss the previous attempts at 
creating such a global contract for rice and the ongoing discussion about whether this 
can be done. I finish by discussing the emergent alternative currently gaining support 
in Europe: the use of swaps contract for Asian rice.  
Chapter VIII: Conclusion 
In this thesis, I demonstrate that historical attempts at establishing futures contracts 
for rice have failed mostly as a result of circumstantial problems, such as the solidity 
of the hosting exchanges or contract design mistakes. They do not ultimately 
demonstrate the impossibility to sophisticate the market structure in rice. However, the 
struggle of developing rice financially in the US suggest that the organisation of rice 
production and trading does not fit the prerequisite for futures contracts success. 
Therefore, there is a need to look at the various hypotheses to explain derivatives 
markets underdevelopment, including the politicization, various organisational 
problems found in developing countries, or the fragmentation of the market. These 
issues are also observed in other agricultural markets but none of those markets 
accumulates all these factors together. However, we may see in a near future the 
emergence of new derivative products able to solve the issue of the sophistication of 







Chapter II: Theory of Contract Failure, 
The Fragile Nature of Futures 
 
“I wonder why no one is offering a futures contract for rice”. During an interview in a 
noisy café in Singapore, a grain trader18 echoed the incredulity expressed a few 
months earlier by a rice exporter from the Thai company Tanasan19: “I am surprised 
there is no derivatives market like for sugar. Rice is not there yet”. These two men 
were aware that some attempts had been made but acted like those did not matter. 
From their point of view, indeed, the result was the same. There is no solution to 
financially hedge price risk faced by rice market stakeholders. However, for the scope 
of this thesis, it is fundamental to acknowledge these attempts, even if they did not 
result in the long-term sophistication of the market structure. Rice is like most major 
commodity markets for which complete underdevelopment of derivatives over time is 
rare. There are often been projects of establishing futures contracts, designed and 
offered by commodity exchanges. Until the 1990s, most of those exchanges were 
mutualised association of traders that operated not for profit but in the interest of their 
members by making a hedging tool available. Since then, most exchanges20 have 
become demutualised and privatised, now operating for profit. Exchanges make 
money by taking a small commission on every contract traded (Roche, 2017). 
Regardless of the motivation behind contract innovation, this has resulted in the launch 
of various contracts for rice, with only few successes and many failures. When 
investigating the absence of futures contracts for rice, the question should thus not 
only be why they are not offered, but also why, when they are or have been, they were 
hardly consumed. A part of the answer is that establishing futures contracts that are 
well functioning, for any commodity, is difficult.  
                                                 
18 Interview with an anonymous international wheat trader, Singapore, April 2019. 
19 Interview with an anonymous employee of the Thai rice exporting company Tanasan, Thailand, July 
2018. 
20 From all the currently operating exchanges I mention in this thesis, only the Osaka Dojima Exchange 
still operates as an association of traders.  
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In this chapter, I explain why commodity futures contracts tend to fail. It will allow the 
building of a theoretical framework to support the research in subsequent chapters. I 
argue that the failure of contracts can happen at four stages: (i) failure of the cash 
market to provide the prerequisite characteristics for the use of futures contract, (ii) 
mistakes in the engineering of the contract, (iii) failure to attract liquidity, (iv) the 
occurrence of one of the first three points in the long run, even after the successful 
launch of a contract. This categorisation is useful because while the first category 
implies, if validated as the reason for failure, the impossibility to make the market 
structure sophisticated, the second category allows for discarding the failure of one 
specific contract as a sign of fundamental obstacles to the development of derivatives 
trading. The third category appears to be context-specific and leads to different 
conclusions.  
 
I) Theory of success vs theory of failure. 
As this chapter attempts to theorise contract failure, it should first be explained why it 
does not theorise about contract success. In the key chapter of her PhD thesis that 
has since become a reference, Deborah Black (1985) chooses to establish a theory 
of contract success. Theory of contract success and theory of contract failure are 
clearly linked. It seems like a semantic detail as the use of affirmative or negative 
sentences often allows for a shifting between those theories. However, the choice 
between these theories carries implications of the researcher’s inclinations. Studying 
contract success could imply an objective to achieve this success. Theorising contract 
failure better supports a study attempting to explain where things go wrong. This suits 
the purpose of this thesis since the successive attempts at developing derivatives for 
rice were unsuccessful. However, the prevailing reason to examine failure is that well -
functioning futures are not the norm. Sources diverge regarding the futures’ rate of 
failure in their early years, mostly as a result of chosen metrics. Carlton (1984) found 
that 46% of US futures contracts created between 1921 and 1983 did not last longer 
than five years and that the average lifespan of those contracts was nine years. Silber 
(1981), depending on the measure used, found that a third to a quarter of futures 
contracts fail to attract significant trading volume. In any case, these studies show the 
challenge of establishing liquid futures markets. Contracts have a propensity to fail 
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because of the multiplicity of reasons that can cause failure. The success of a contract 
could thus be understood as the probability that none of these failing factors will arise. 
This chapter shows that although there are several prerequisites to success, failure is 
still possible after validation of those prerequisites. Instead, the entire list of factors 
potentially leading to contract failure is not known. From this observation, it is easier 
to anticipate that a contract will fail because of one of the known factors than succeed 
as a result of avoiding all failing factors, many of which are not known.  
 
II) Defining contract failure. 
Before reviewing the reasons for failures, it is important to define what is understood 
as failure (and success). The literature uses a variety of measures to determine 
whether a contract fails or not. This time, it does not matter whether we talk about 
success or failure as the two concepts are mutually exclusive. A popular method 
measures the number of contracts traded in a year. A minimum threshold that divides 
success from failure can be used, but its relevance is ultimately subjective, as noted 
in Sandor: 
If a successful contract is defined as one with an annual volume of 1,000 or more 
contracts, then eighteen [out of his sample] would be termed successful. It is important 
to emphasize that 1,000 contracts is an arbitrary number and a volume which is 
exceedingly low. It has been used because an exchange would probably not delist a 
commodity with that (Sandor, 1973, pp. 120-121). 
While Sandor was already cautious about this number, it has been subsequently 
criticised as too low. For example, Black (1985) noted that it represented an average 
of approximately five contracts traded daily. Silber (1981) also used the concept of 
minimum contract traded to avoid the contract being unlisted21 by the exchange but 
chose 10,000 contracts traded in a year. However, in his model, this minimum level 
must be reached after the third year of the contract’s existence. He also used another 
measure of success: examining whether a contract is still traded at the end of his 
sample period.  
                                                 
21 I explain the logic behind delisting below 
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Another measure that could be considered, if success is taken from the point of view 
of the exchange, would simply be whether a contract is profitable. The investment by 
exchanges in contract development is rarely known, but it is for instance estimated 
that the average cost of contract innovation (including contract creation and contract 
modification) was on average $40,000 in the 1970s in the US (Silber, 1981). There are 
no publicly available estimations of the current cost of developing a futures contract, 
although certain participants suggest the sum of $1M. Any volume of trading that 
would allow a return over the innovation costs could be understood as a success by 
the exchange if this one is for profit. The issue of this logic – in the context of my 
research – is that a contract could first succeed for the exchange and later be unlisted, 
leading to a de-sophistication of the market structure. With this approach, success is 
definitive even if market actors that are willing to use futures contract are subsequently 
deprived of hedging solutions.  
Carlton (1984) and Black (1985) used the survival of a contract as an indicator for the 
success (or not) of a futures contract. However, this measure was based on the listing 
by the Wall Street Journal rather than by the exchange. The policy of the Wall Street 
Journal is to list a contract if it reaches the levels of daily open interest of 5,000 
contracts and trading volume is greater than 1,000 contracts per day.  
In recent years, as it is easy to access the contracts listed by exchanges on their 
websites, the use of the Wall Street Journal has become somewhat obsolete. The will 
of an exchange to keep a contract listed is the first indicator of its success, or at least 
of its non-definitive failure. Only the delisting of a contract would signify its definitive 
failure. It is necessary to clarify why a contract would be delisted. Once a contract has 
been developed, there is no additional financial cost for an exchange to keep listing it. 
However, it is understood that there is a reputational cost for an exchange to list many 
illiquid contracts. The market appears unsuccessful and thus unreliable in the eye of 
potential new market participants. For this reason, it is also difficult to collect data 
about defunct contracts as their exchanges do not leave much information available 
about their past existence. 
In the case of this research, a successful futures contract should be defined as a 
contract that makes risk trading possible. The listing of a contract for the commodity 
is thus the first condition. However, an exchange could keep a non-traded contract 
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listed, expecting that the trading environment will change. In addition, a contract could 
exist but be unsuitable for hedging. Hedging effectiveness is consequently the second 
condition for a contract to contribute to the sophistication of the market structure. 
Hedging effectiveness has been understood as a factor of success in certain research 
(Gray, 1966; Tashjian Johnston & McConnell, 1989), but it is also used here as a 
measure of success. However, as this is not an econometrics study, the convergence 
of spot and futures prices (representing the hedging effectiveness) will not be 
numerically measured.22 Nevertheless, it is important to remember that usually, in the 
case of deliverable contracts, convergence attracts liquidity and liquidity contributes to 
convergence. Therefore, using the open interest and traded volumes as measures of 
liquidity is an indication of the success of the contract. It is important to combine the 
two because they do not individually guarantee hedging effectiveness. Large open 
interest with little traded volumes is very unlikely. Trading volumes alone are irrelevant 
from our point of view because large trading volumes combined with small open 
interest can be generated by over-speculation, and the futures price may end up far 
away from the physical market, limiting hedging effectiveness. In addition, liquidity is 
a third condition in and of itself as market participants unable to take part in delivery 
need the guarantee that they will find a counterpart when they wish to close their 
position. I will not use a minimum number of open interest and volume to differentiate 
success and failure. These numbers are relative to the size of the contract and the 
size of the physical market. Instead, I will mostly rely on market sentiment on whethe r 
the contract is liquid enough, and the hedging performance robust. Market participants 
interviewed over the course of this research have often mentioned issues of liquidity. 
This research attempts to determine whether their views are shared by most 
stakeholders, are specific to an interest group or are only an individual perception. 
 
III) Prerequisite structural factors to the use of futures contracts 
Not every commodity market suits the use of futures contracts. Certain conditions must 
be respected for a futures to have any chance to function correctly. The literature has 
                                                 
22 When studies have been conducted for certain contracts, I will use them. However, these studies are 
often lacking and it is necessary to propose an alternative theoretical method.  
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listed those conditions, certain of them attracting consensus, making them sine qua 
non parameters, while others are either disputed or sporadically mentioned. In this 
section, I review the physical market’s characteristics that, if missing, lead to the failure 
of a contract. 
- Volatility to attract hedgers and speculators: This is the most fundamental 
criteria necessary for the success of a futures contract. It is the object of a 
consensus from academics and market observers who have tried to list the 
prerequisites for contract success. It is named in a variety of ways in the 
literature, such as fluctuating prices (Black, 1985), uncertainty (Carlton, 1984) 
and cash price variability (Sandor, 1973; Brorsen & Fofana, 2001). The reason 
why fluctuating prices are necessary to the success of a futures contract is that 
it represents price risk necessary to attract both hedgers and speculators. 
Volatility is the raison-d’étre of futures markets. It creates a commercial need 
for hedging, as the greater the price risk, the more incentive physical market 
participants have to lock in prices (Black, 1985; Till, 2014). However, it is 
important to note that the propensity of commercials23 to hedge is also a 
function of their risk aversion, which can be particular to their market 
(Schneidau, 1970). Sufficient volatility also means that speculators, who seek 
risk by nature, have a higher potential for profit and are therefore more likely to 
participate in the contract (Black, 1985). Therefore, variability in prices is the 
parameter that brings together the two distinct groups of market participants. It 
is fundamental to the success of the contract that both sets of actors get 
involved in the market (Gray, 1966; Silber, 1981; Black, 1985; Till, 2014). Gray 
explains that the need for hedging is chronologically the first prerequisite for 
futures to function. Commercials’ reasons to use the futures may be “financing 
of inventories, forward pricing, or obtaining shopping convenience” (Gray, 
1966, p. 122). By using the contract, hedgers ensure the linkage with the cash 
market, keeping price behaviour coherent (Silber, 1981). Then the market 
needs to attract speculation, “chiefly to offset the tendency for short hedging to 
exceed long hedging” (Gray, 1966, p. 122); and because “without speculative 
                                                 
23 The term commercials refers to futures markets’ participants that are also active in the physical 
market. They are the hedgers in the derivatives market, while the non-commercials are the speculators.  
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capital, the risk reduction sought by hedgers will be too expensive” (Silber, 
1981, p. 129). 
- Price freely determined: The need for cash prices being competitively 
determined also attracted a broad consensus (Schneidau, 1970; Silber, 1981; 
Carlton, 1984; Black, 1985). For the market to be fair, the supply or the demand 
must not be in the hands of cartels or a monopolist/monopsonist, otherwise, it 
opens the door to manipulation. Manipulation pushes participants away, 
especially speculators who are completely free to participate or not in a market 
(hedgers could still be better off using a manipulatable futures market than 
having no hedging instrument) (Silber, 1981). The monopolistic or 
monopsonistic behaviour, as well as other types of manipulations of the cash 
price, may be the action of a government. It is largely assumed that most public 
policies for commodity trade and prices have a negative impact on the success 
of futures contracts (Gray, 1966; Black, 1985; Till, 2014). The issue of 
government involvement will be the topic of Chapter V.   
- Size of the cash market: The bigger the size of the cash market, the more likely 
the futures is to succeed. Several reasons link cash market size and contract 
success. First, the large volume of a physically traded commodity reduces the 
probability that a single actor can dominate or manipulate the market (Black, 
1985). Second, the larger the cash market, the more people are likely to be 
involved in that market and therefore be potential commercial users of the 
futures (Carlton, 1984; Black, 1985; Brorsen & Fofana, 2001). Third, a larger 
cash market involves what Carlton calls a larger value of transaction – the total 
financial value of the traded product – resulting in more positions to hedge and 
more incentives to speculate (Carlton, 1984). Fourth, if the market is broad, it 
is likely to be characterised by more continuous activity and frequent 
transactions that facilitate the balance of demand and supply and the flow of 
delivery that serves the arbitrage between cash and futures prices (Sandor, 
1973; Black, 1985; Brorsen & Fofana, 2001).  
- Supply chain organisation: Called industrial structure by Carlton (1984) and 
market structure/marketing channel by Brorsen and Fofana (2001), this point 
suggests that vertical integration is an obstacle to participation in futures 
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contracts. Indeed, the more actors at all levels of the supply chain willing to use 
futures, the more transactions will occur. For instance, if a farmer sells to a 
miller, who after processing sells to an exporter, those two transactions can be 
hedged on a futures market. However, if the exporter owns a mill and procures 
the grain from a farmer, the second transaction is internalised and does not 
need to be hedged. Calton (1984) also mentions that the systematic use of 
long-term forward contracting between two actors performs as vertical 
integration as it removes the need for price prediction and hedging.  
- Homogeneity: This describes the degree of variety and quality differentiation 
within one market. For example, sugar is understood to be a rather 
homogenous and undifferentiated commodity, while tea is a very 
heterogeneous good with a variety of unrelated prices. The extent of the need 
for homogeneity to succeed triggers discussions and varieties of approaches in 
the literature. Certain authors such as Sandor (1973) or Brorsen and Fofana 
(2001) believe that homogeneity (or the close movement in prices of different 
grades) should be understood as a prerequisite for the success of the futures. 
Carton (1984) believes instead that the contract can cover slightly different 
products if there is price correlation across those. Black (1985) and Schneidau 
(1970) focus instead on the need for a solid grading system and the ability to 
standardise the commodity. Finally, Gray thinks that homogeneity is 
overemphasised. He thinks that the prices of different grades do not have to 
move closely. He states instead that the futures can be of use for commercials 
active in grades that are not the one standardised “as long as there is a reliable 
and predictable relationship among the values of various grades” (Gray, 1966, 
p. 127). This applies to commodities for which different grades are inversely 
correlated (because of reversed harvesting seasons in the northern and 
southern hemispheres for instance). In this case, the importance is not that the 
spread between the prices of different grades is stable, but that they are 
deemed by market participants to be predictable.  
- Storability: Finally, the ability to store the crop at a delivery point, eventually a 
warehouse, over a significant length of time, has long been thought to be a 
prerequisite for contract success (Schneidau, 1970). It was thought that the 
commodity needed to be in place ready for delivery to make arbitrage possible 
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in the delivery month. This supposed that perishable commodities such as milk, 
meat or vegetables did not fit the criteria for futures contracts. Instead, Gray 
(1966) argued that what mattered was rather the availability of deliverable 
supplies. This notion is now somehow obsolete as the emergence of indexed 
contracts with cash settlement solved the issue of delivery when it is too 
complicated to set up.24 
One more point has been formulated by a single author but is significant. Silber (1981) 
stated that basis risk should not be excessive25. This means that a lack of geographical 
integration of the market could result in basis risk being equal or greater to price risk, 
making hedging unfavourable.  
The prerequisites listed in this section serve once again as a preliminary evaluation of 
the likelihood of a contract functioning. However, these do not guarantee avoiding 
failure. The subsequent chapters of this thesis will explore two problems: whether this 
theory is confirmed by financially developed markets (wheat, coffee and sugar) 
presenting those patterns, and whether the rice market does too. If not, it will cast 
doubt on the possibility to develop futures for rice. If so, it will imply that the failure of 
developing derivatives trading is due to other factors. The rest of this chapter explores 
what these factors can be. 
 
IV) Contract engineering issues 
In the previous section, we saw that the literature on contract failure and success 
extensively analyses whether the individual commodity markets fit the use of futures 
contracts for both hedgers and speculators. This comes down to examining market 
structure and price behaviour and concluding from it whether a contract could be 
successful or not. This can be understood as a matter of economic rationality. 
However, there is a part of contract success and failure, less systematically studied in 
the literature that,26 I argue, should be understood as a matter of human inputs. All 
                                                 
24 I discuss index-based futures contracts in Chapter VII.  
25 As basis fluctuates over time, basis risk describes the adverse effects of uncertainty in basis.  
26 Not all authors have gone beyond the economic rationality, sometimes because it did not fit the 
purpose of their research, such as Brorsen and Fofana (2001). Some, such as Roche (2016) and Gray 
(1966) have included contract design as a factor for success and failure. However, it is Black (1985) 
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early contracts failures are not the result of the underlying commodity’s cash market 
being unsuited for futures trading (Black, 1985). As a matter of fact, contract engineers 
rarely venture to create a contract upon a commodity that does fulfil the prerequisites 
for success. In reality, it is the engineering of the contract itself that goes wrong most 
of the time. If one of the many contract specifications that must be decided upon is 
wrong, it can cause a contract failure. The role of the contract designers (often called 
product managers on exchanges) therefore becomes crucial in the engineering of a 
robust contract. Individual contract engineering can seem irrelevant to the issue of the 
derivatives development of an entire commodity market. However, there is a possibility 
that a commodity’s derivatives have failed to develop, not as a result of the cash 
market structure, but as a result of mistakes made in the engineering of all its 
successive contracts. Therefore, this section attempts to identify what these 
engineering mistakes can be. 
The first thing contract designers must consider is who the contract is designed for. 
The contract specifications determine who is the most likely to use the contract. For 
instance, the choice of the product itself, for commodities that are transformed along 
the supply chain, can be important. If retailers are the most likely to use a certain 
contract, then an already transformed product is likely to be more appropriate than a 
raw product. Instead, if the exchange thinks that the commercial participation will come 
from farmers, then the raw form of the commodity will be picked. It is not difficult for 
contract designers to adapt the product to the target users (Silber, 1981). However, 
choosing the target users in the first place can be more challenging. It requires 
identifying the interest groups that are made up of enough sophisticated individuals to 
use the contract. In case the sophistication of market actors is limited because of 
financial education, certain exchanges will provide training to solve this issue. A failure 
to do so can result in the failure of the contract.  
The parameters that contract designers must decide upon are numerous. However, 
one is potentially the most important. I discuss in chapter VII the decision between 
basing the contract upon an index and using exclusively financial settlement, and 
making the delivery of the physical good on the exchange possible, giving market 
                                                 
that has categorised what she calls “commodity characteristics” and “contract characteristics” as two 
well separated matters.  
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participants a choice between cash and physical settlement. For now, I will focus on 
the second option, as it has been more common for commodity derivatives in the 20 th 
century, and my compared commodities are all dominated by deliverable contracts. If 
physical delivery is adopted then, defining the terms of the delivery becomes crucial. 
The delivery system must be functional to incentivise a part of the market to take part 
in it, generating the convergence between the cash and futures prices. The 
parameters to be decided include the location of the delivery point, the size of the 
delivery lot, the delivery instrument to be used, etc. If one of those parameters are not 
adapted to the needs of market participants, there will be a lack of delivery made and 
the cash and futures will not move in sync. Such issues have, for instance, explained 
the first failures of futures contracts for rice in the post-WWII era. In NYME in 1964, 
and in New Orleans in 1980, two contracts for milled rice were listed but failed soon 
after their introduction. Milo Hamilton,27 the former head trader for Uncle Bens, 
explained to me that the major flaw in both contracts was to do with the form under 
which the grain was delivered. The exchanges chose to have delivery in rice bags with 
the marking of the USDA while traders needed bags with their own label. Milo recalled 
a conversation with a major trader at the time:  
“he called up the millers and said ‘look I like the idea of a milled futures but I 
want you to put my bag marking, not USDA’s’, and they were so naïve they said 
‘no the contract says USDA #2 rice I’m going to stick that label on’… He told 
me it was untradeable for that reason. Now when they started up in New 
Orleans, they did the same stupid thing”.  
This is an illustration of a detail in the contract engineering leading to the contract 
failure. Without traders taking delivery, it was not possible to obtain convergence of 
cash and futures, and the contract was therefore useless as a hedging instrument.  
Such failure thus did not say anything about the feasibility of the project and the 
prerequisites of the cash market. Traders seemed enthusiastic about having a futures 
contract, but the unfavourable terms of the contract made them stay away from the 
derivatives market. Different contract specifications may have generated liquidity. 
                                                 
27 Interview with Milo Hamilton, Former Head of Trading at Uncle Bens (Mars), President at Firstgrain,  
Austin, Texas, USA, August 2017. 
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However, even with appropriate specifications, the exchanges may also have 
encountered systemic market issues further down the line.  
The whole process of contract engineering lies in making a contract that is not too 
disadvantageous for anyone (Gray, 1966; Silber, 1981; Black, 1985). It implies 
consulting the parties involved in the industry and finding a compromise that will be 
viable for a sufficient number of participants. In the case of the rice bags issue, it could 
have been fixed without harming other parties, but often interests in contract 
specifications collide. Fred Seamon, contract manager at CME, said “you want a 
futures to be fair to both buyer and seller sides, you don't want either one of them to 
have an advantage or you don't have a market. So, I joke about this, but our job is to 
make a lot or all of customers a little unhappy with the contract terms”. Creating a 
contract that puts the long or the short in a better position would consequently 
discourage stakeholders from taking the opposite position. There would be no trade 
as a result and the futures would fail. 
I explained how major contract flows, especially when it comes to delivery, cause 
failure. However, even smaller issues can lead to this result. The list of details 
potentially affecting the functioning of the contract is so long that it is potentially 
unknown by contract makers. In Lamon Rutten’s28 words: “there are small things that 
if you get them wrong, it can kill the contract”. He chose to illustrate his point with the 
case of crude oil. Currently, the largest commodity futures contract globally is the 
crude oil contract on NYMEX. This exchange is now part of the CME Group, but unti l 
2008, the two exchanges were rivals. CME was the first one to introduce crude oil 
futures contracts in 1981, a year and a half before NYMEX. The two contracts were 
identical except for one difference. The floor brokers on CME were used to very small 
tick sizes29 and therefore did not want a whole cent per barrel for a thousand barrels 
contract. In their view, $10 (1 cent times 1000 barrels) was too much; they preferred 
a 5$ tick. CME introduced a contract with a 0.5¢ per barrel tick value. The problem 
was that on the physical market for crude oil, no one prices in half cents. With that 
mistake, the contract stood no chance to attract commercial participation. About 
                                                 
28 Interview with Lamon Rutten, CEO of the Indonesia Commodity & Derivative Exchange (ICDX),  
Jakarta, Indonesia, December 2019.  
29 See appendix A  
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eighteen months later, NYMEX introduced the same contract, altered with a whole 
cent tick; it was an immediate success. “So small things can mess you up”, Rutten 
continued. “You can have wrong delivery location or delivery grade, wrong logistics. 
You can treat two specific different grades as if they were the same, but the market 
says they are not. And they will not trust the way the market will move”. Therefore, the 
ability of the contract designer and their team to fully understand the needs of the 
physical market through research and consultation is a fundamental parameter that 
decides the success or failure of the contract. In the following chapters, I will, when 
possible, evaluate to what extent the failures of individual contracts for rice are the 
results of such mistakes or the signs of deeper structural obstacles to the 
sophistication of the market structure. 
 
V) Generating initial liquidity and catch 22 
Once a commodity fits the criteria for futures trading and the contract has been well -
engineered, there is not yet insurance that the contract will take off. In this section, I 
examine the last obstacle to the sophistication of the market structure of a commodity 
through a futures contract: the attraction of liquidity. The first weeks of existence of the 
contract are often decisive in generating liquidity, but exchanges face a problem. 
There is a vicious cycle from the initial lack of liquidity. At age 0 of the contract, there 
is not yet participation; there is no guarantee for liquidity nor convergence. That is a 
counterincentive for hedgers and speculators to get involved. However, if they do not, 
the liquidity will never be generated and the contract will remain inefficient. Similarly, 
speculators prefer to be active on very liquid markets and by waiting for the market to 
be liquid, they deprive markets of liquidity. In the US, my interviewees frequently 
referred to this situation as the catch 22 of futures trading. Many market participants 
tell exchange managers that they would like to use the contract once it is liquid, but if 
all the potential contract users have this same reasoning, the contract cannot start. 
Julian Roche30 – contract manager at London FOX in the 1990s – said, “the big 
problem with launching any futures contract is that everyone stands at the edge of the 
                                                 
30 Interview with Julian Roch, Former Product Developer at London FOX, Western Australia, July 2017.  
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pool waiting for somebody to jump in. The creation of liquidity in the early stages of a 
contract is absolutely crucial”. Similarly, Fred Seamon told me:  
“Anyhow, with a new contract you usually have a broad base of support on both 
the buy side and sell side. They want the contract to work. But they don’t want 
to be the first and they don’t want to trade it until it has liquidity. … Cocoa for 
instance, we launched a contract. Almost all our market participants thought 
our cocoa contract was a better contract [than the existing ICE contract] but 
they would not trade it because it didn’t have liquidity.”  
That is why, before even launching the contract, contract managers usually 
concentrate substantial efforts in convincing a few major market actors to trade the 
contract from the start to persuade others to do the same. This operation, for which 
failure can mean contract death, has varying levels of success. I asked Fred Seamon:  
SL: Do you have an explanation for that or is it just a matter of luck? 
FS: I wish we did understand that better because some contracts work, and 
some don't. Some take a long time though, just because they don't show 
promise right away doesn't mean it's a failure. It may be something that evolves. 
I think back to ethanol that we launched, it's still a small contract that has grown 
significantly, but it just started. I remember that we were happy that it traded 
almost every day even though it was just one or two contracts. I remember it 
jumped from 8 contracts a day to 12 and we brought in cookies to eat because 
we were in double digits! It grew from there, but it took a long time. You need 
commercial participants who are dedicated to it and don't mind trading small 
lots to begin with and then kind of grow with the product. But that’s something 
the exchange doesn't have figured out after all these years31. Because most 
products still ultimately fail. 
The randomness of the successes at building liquidity makes many believe that when 
a futures market survives this stage, it has gone through an accident of development. 
In fact, the success of this operation is a mix of human input (the ability of contract 
makers to convince major actors to take part and the will of those to do so) and market 
                                                 
31 CME was founded in 1898 
75 
 
structure (the existence of major sophisticated actors or their ability to participate). It 
should also be noted that it is not only the ability of participants to trade futures that 
matters, but also their will to do so. Gray (1966) argues that a factor affecting the 
success and failure of contracts is the disposition to use or boycott a futures market. 
This one lies in part in the existence of power advantage in the cash market. For 
instance, if a set of actors hold an information advantage within the existing market 
structure, they are likely to be reluctant to use a futures market that would create 
transparency. Therefore, any research on futures contracts should examine, for each 
case of a development attempt of a commodity, what the dynamics behind the build-
up of liquidity were: who were the actors targeted by the exchange, whether they 
participate, why they chose to (or not), did the potential for liquidity exist in the first 
place, etc.  
 
Figure 4: Catch 22 of liquidity and convergence 
VI) Fragility of Existing Contracts 
It is important to acknowledge that the sophistication of the market structure through 
futures is never definitive. The rice market illustrates that: although it is the commodity 
for which derivative contracts were first invented, it lacks futures markets nowadays. 
Taking a futures contract off the ground and successfully building liquidity, avoiding 
the common failure of contracts in their early age, does not give a long-term guarantee 
of survival. Julian Roche wanted me to be aware that the battle against the failure of 
a contract was never definitely won:  
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“Futures contracts, Sulian, are very, very fragile. Even if they trade large 
quantities and so forth on one day, they can not trade it the following week. 
They are fragile instruments and they need careful nurturing. Very careful 
designing to start with, and then very careful nurturing continuously throughout 
their operation; otherwise they will die. They are fragile flowers, they really are. 
And I think the evidence of the rice market really brings that home”.  
Through the contract life, contract managers and their teams work on what they call 
'product maintenance'. It involves monitoring the performances of the contract, 
especially the convergence, as well as modifying contract specifications to echo 
commodity markets, which are constantly evolving. Fred Seamon said, “a futures 
market has to reflect the changes in the cash market, or the futures contract becomes 
obsolete”. While most scholars have only studied the failure of contracts in their early 
age, Till (2014)also explored the issue of obsolescence over time. It is one of four 
factors she lists to explain the failure of long-existing contracts. Interestingly, her 
definition does not exactly fit the narrative of contract managers. In their 
understanding, it is the failure to respond to certain physical market alterations that 
can be compensated by modifications of the contract specifications. In her words, 
obsolescence is the result of deeper and more radical transformations of the cash 
market. She refers to technological changes turning the commodity into "new and 
different products in their production, price and distribution patterns", or government  
intervention affecting the need for price hedging (Till, 2014, p. 9). In this case, the 
contract could not fit risk management purposes for the commodity anymore. To 
simplify, obsolescence, according to Till, is the loss of a prerequisite for the 
establishment of a contract. Obsolescence for contract managers is the failure to re-
engineer the contract according to the needs. Both definitions are valid and important, 
but the similar labelling of these two issues can create confusion. Contract managers’ 
definition matches Till’s second explanatory factor better: a contract becoming 
disadvantageous for hedgers. However, my interviewees largely argued that the 
contract should not become disadvantageous to anyone in the market, whether 
hedgers or speculators. The main issue with affecting the hedging performance is that 
hedgers represent the root of the liquidity and without them, the market breaks the 
rational relationship between cash and futures prices. The reasoning of the previous 
section is still relevant long after the establishment of the contract. The disengagement 
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for any reason of some market participants can further lead a rapid fall in participation 
and death of a contract as they will take away with them others who do not want to 
remain in a market losing liquidity.   
Till’s third factor is that the perishable nature of the commodity made physically 
delivered futures vulnerable to manipulation. Although the risk of manipulation – if it is 
obvious to market participants – already hinders the chances of a futures contract 
success at the start, manipulation of a contract can unexpectedly occur later in its 
lifetime32. For reasons that are beyond the scope of this thesis, it is largely understood 
that perishable commodities such as potatoes and onions are more exposed to 
manipulation. However, it is a mistake to think that only perishable contracts can be 
manipulated. All futures markets are potentially exposed to manipulation and such 
manipulations are a threat to the survival of the contract itself. Although repeated 
manipulation could lead regulators to force an exchange to delist a contract, this 
situation is very unlikely ever to happen. Instead, a heavily manipulated market is 
unlikely to survive as market participants losing faith in the fairness of that market are 
likely to withdraw. This will result in depleting liquidity until the death of the contract.  
The last factor suggested by Till is competition. This is simply the idea that two 
contracts for the same commodity can hardly survive alongside each other. Carlton 
(1984) has shown that competition between exchanges can trigger contract failure. 
Pennings and Leuthold (2001) notice that competition between contracts can also 
happen within a single exchange. If the products traded are not different enough, they 
can take away trading volume from one another, leading to the failure of one of the 
contracts. They call this phenomenon cannibalism. Black (1985) also mentions that 
competition can come from other derivatives instruments such as a functioning forward 
market. This thesis does not delve into the details of the competition issue as it does 
not apply to rice; hardly one contract for a section of the rice market ever existed at a 
given time, so looking at competing contracts would not be relevant. 
                                                 





The theory of contract failure is of great implications for the rice market. As mentioned 
in the introduction chapter of this thesis, financial development is not a foreign concept 
to this crop market. The fact that rice has had many past contracts that have been 
traded or simply attempted, for today being very thinly traded through derivatives , 
shows the relevance of the theory of contract failure. The long history of futures trading 
in rice until World War II shows that, at least at the time, the crop met most 
prerequisites to the functioning of a futures contract. The end of futures trading in 
Japan in 1939 illustrated the concept of obsolescence, the one defined by Till (2014), 
as the control of the rice supply chain by the government put an end to the need for 
future hedging by market participants. However, in this thesis, the focus is onto 
understanding why there has not been a revival of futures contracts for rice since 
WWII. The theory of contract failure therefor serves to answer whether repeated 
patterns of contract failures appear on the rice market. By examining a number of rice 
contract failures (or partial failure) in subsequent chapters, it appears that most of the 
time, major contract engineering issues or Catch 22 did occur in rice, obscuring the 
role of prerequisites in contract failure. This means that the primary causes of failures 
were not shared by the different contracts that were not successful. However, I will go 
further and examine whether the prerequisites were fulfilled, and argue that they are 
not. In many cases, issues related, for instance, to politicization or market actors’ 
propensity to hedge negatively impacted the prospect of financial development of rice. 
In this way, the theory of contract failure and the case of rice feed each other. The 
various empirical example that the rice market provided and that I discuss through this 
thesis will confirm the applicability of the theory, in particular the part surrounding 
human input issues. However, as the occurrence of these issues impede the 
identification of failure to fulfil the prerequisite, having a full theory of potential 
structural causes making a commodity unfit for futures trading allows to examine the 
market structure underlying the past attempts at financial development of rice. In 
addition, as I compare rice to other crops for which some contracts managed to 
overcome the high probability of failing due to ad hoc issues, I am in a position to test 
the validity of the list of prerequisites. Coffee, wheat and sugar all fail, to some extent, 
to completely fulfil all of the criteria discussed in section III. I will show how they may 
not always have prices freely determined, homogenous market or perfect supply chain 
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organisation. It puts these prerequisites into a realm where they are not binary but 
rather variables that influence the propensity of a commodity to develop financially. As 
a stand-alone issue, the absence of one condition such as homogeneity can be 
overcome under certain circumstances. I will for instance discuss the grading systems 
in coffee. On the other hand, by failing at sufficiently satisfying many of the 
prerequisites, rice has a very low potential for financial development.  
Finally, the study of these crops in the coming chapters importantly shows under what 
conditions these prerequisites are likely to be fulfilled. For instance, I will argue that 
the combined geographical unipolarity of the rice market into the Global South and its 
role as a staple food made the likeliness of its prices being freely determined very low. 
The nature of coffee, a luxury good consumed in the Global North, made it more likely 
to fulfil that prerequisite and contracts succeed.    
 
VIII) Summary 
In this chapter, I proposed a theoretical model to explain what leads to the failure of 
many futures contract. I outlined the construction of futures contracts, starting from the 
theoretical prerequisites to futures market, before presenting the practice of building 
the right contract, attracting participation in the contract, while finally examining how 
all these elements need to be maintained through time. Futures contracts can fail at 
any of these stages. However, the replicability of one contract's experience only 
applies to the theoretical part, while the practice is case-specific. Through this thesis, 
I apply this model to the rice market. I show that although it is difficult to generalise 
from past failures as most rice futures have failed in their practice, the examination of 
the theoretical prerequisites indicate that rice was by nature difficult to develop a 
derivatives market for. In addition, the build-up of liquidity is limited by a variety of 
market organisation factors, such as the geographical distribution of market 







Chapter III: The Low Liquidity of the 
CBOT Rough Rice Futures 
 
The CBOT rough rice contract, hosted nowadays by CME, has been the only futures 
for rice that has, through time, consistently maintained a minimum level of liquidity 
post-WWII. While it is a unique case in rice for its success, it is peculiar relative to all 
commodity futures contracts because it has survived for more than 35 years with low 
trading volumes and open interest. This chapter questions why this contract, which 
has managed to attract some minimum liquidity to survive, is failing at increasing 
participation further, which suggests limited financial development of the American rice 
market.33 Indeed, this contract has been primarily developed to serve the needs of the 
US supply chain, with little correlation with the global market. Chapter VII discusses 
what the CBOT rough rice contract means to the financial development of the global 
rice market. 
This case study is important because the US is a financially developed economy 
where most agricultural goods are already traded through derivatives. Therefore, the 
results of the research could show that there are reasons inherent to rice that would 
explain its issues with the development of futures. However, it appears that the 
reasons that will be highlighted in this chapter are often context-specific to the US rice 
industry. Despite that, the US case provides lessons on the functioning of futures 
markets, the importance of convergence, the role of sophisticated actors, the difficulty 
to generate liquidity and the interaction between futures markets and OTC markets. 
Some of the challenges that will be highlighted in this chapter will be echoed in other 
case studies of this thesis. In addition, I will discuss in Chapter VII how a liquid Chicago 
contract could have served financial development in other markets. Therefore, it was 
unavoidable, in this thesis, to settle the questions around the CME rough rice 
contract’s struggle to succeed despite survival.  
                                                 




In the first section, I introduce the issue of the lack of liquidity in the rough rice contract 
and connect it to issues of price behaviour. In the second section, I question whether 
fundamental contract flaws could explain this problem and conclude that it is not the 
case. In the third section, I argue that a reason for the small size of the CBOT rough 
rice market is that the underlying market itself is small. A large share of the American 
rice industry is, for a variety of reasons, not eligible to hedge risk on futures contracts 
for long-grain rough rice. Finally, I explain that the farmers (the remaining branch of 
the industry) that could use the contract rarely do so for two main reasons: first, their 
risk perception affects their propensity to hedge; second, unlike the wheat market, 
there are very few intermediary actors in the supply chain that perform the function of 
offering OTC contracts to give farmers indirect access to the futures market. Howeve r, 
these actors using it find it efficient and contribute to the survival of the contract.   
 
I) Liquidity, convergence and basis issues 
Chapter II highlighted the importance of the relationship between cash and futures 
prices, as convergence issues can be both a cause and a result of contract failure 
through its relationship with liquidity. This section investigates whether the rough rice 
contract is characterised by a phenomenon of catch 22. I argue that it is the case, 
although without causing the definitive failure of the contract.   
“Liquidity – ease of getting in and out (of the futures market) without disturbing the 
price – is important” (Hieronymus, 1971, p. 38). This is how Hieronymus simply stated 
a fundamental aspect of all financial markets. As I previously explained, liquidity 
depends on the amount of participation in a contract. I often asked CME futures 
stakeholders whether there was an issue of liquidity in the rice contract. A casual “oh 
yeah” answered by a broker34 was a simple summary of the market sentiment. Even 
Fred Seamon, the contract manager of CME, acknowledges the issue: 
“Yes, it could certainly be bigger. It is the most and only liquid rice futures 
contract in the world … but yes the rice market is not as advanced as corn, 
soybeans, wheat, oats even. Oats is a dying market in the US but the oats 
                                                 
34 Interview with Scott Minton, CME Rice Futures Broker, Chicago, USA, September 2017. 
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market uses the contract more intensively than what rice does. Yes, rice is 
never going to be the size, based on its current design, of a corn or soybean 
contract, but it could be much larger than what it is.”  
There is no doubt that the volumes and open interest of the contract are small. John 
Morgan35, the procurement manager of Supreme Rice Mill in Louisiana, explained that 
the small liquidity prevented many market participants from using the futures for risk 
management and pricing strategy, "especially when it is trading 200 contracts a day. 
That's nothing. Two hundred contracts is 400k hundredweight; [every mill] in the US 
[is] milling more than that in a day.” He explained how, in the mid-2000s, his company 
sometimes represented 60 per cent of the contract’s buying side. Similarly, during his 
time as director of rice procurement for Mars Inc. in the 1980s and 1990s, Milo 
Hamilton traded 40 to 50% of all US rice futures. Such shares of the market obviously 
create issues of market power and imbalance, as well as creating issues of liquidity 
for Mars due to the lack of trading counterpart. The question is not why those people 
could trade so many contracts, but why there are not more other participants diluting 
the volumes instead. Why are market actors reluctant to use the market for hedging 
and as a result, provide liquidity? 
 
Figure 5: Monthly average of daily volume of trade in the Chicago Rough Rice contract 
                                                 
























































































































































“Lack of liquidity comes from the danger of no convergence” John Owen36 - a northern 
Louisiana rice farmer - said. He explained that in the past, the basis was sometimes 
20% of the value of the cash, making the market nervous of using the contract for 
hedging. “It is not true risk management if you have the spectre of non-convergence”. 
John Denison,37 a farm manager on the Louisiana Gulf coast, described rice futures 
not tracking well the cash price, but considered the contract still good enough as a risk 
management solution. When voicing their concerns about basis, interviewees 
mentioned both the lack of convergence between the futures and cash at the delivery 
point, but also the fact that a lack of market integration could cause the basis in their 
geographical location to fluctuate.38 Farmers were the most emphatic group about this 
issue. Jackie Lower,39 a Louisiana farmer, argued that the basis in other markets, 
soybeans for instance, was more constant, predictable and tight than rice. For rice, 
the local price can swing under and over the futures. Because of the unpredictabili ty 
of its basis “you are not confident that the futures is as good as cash”. If the basis does 
not simply represent the cost of carry and transportation costs, it means the law of one 
price40 does not apply, so the futures does not function well as a substitute for cash. 
This chapter later explains that this basis risk affects the propensity of producers to 
enter the futures market.   
Although the issue of convergence and basis was widely mentioned by interviewees, 
it has rarely been proven. Giesler (1998) studied the basis in Southwest Louisiana, 
where many of my interviewees operate. He found that in some years, the variations 
in the basis was larger than the variations in the futures price, suggesting a great deal 
of basis risk. McKenzie et al. (2002) did not focus on the co-movement of cash and 
futures over time but looked instead at the futures ability to forecast cash prices at 
delivery location and contract maturity. They examined whether market participants, 
who suggest pricing inefficiencies as a legitimate explanation for low participation in 
                                                 
36 Interview with John Owen, US rice farmer, Louisiana, USA, August 2017.  
37 Interview with John Denison, US Rice Farm Manager at Sweet Lake Land and Oil Co, Louisiana,  
USA, August 2017. 
38 This is important because it increases the number of actors affected by basis issues. As Hieronymous 
explained, “for users of futures markets, the important basis is that one that applies to the operational 
problem at hand” (Hieronymus, 1971, p. 151) 
39 Interview with Paul “Jackie” Lower, US Rice Farmer, Louisiana, USA , August 2017. 
40 The law of one price suggests that in an efficient market, a similar good should be sold for the same 
price in different locations, with price differences only justified by transportation costs.   
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the futures, were correct. They found that the market was efficient at the time, despite 
being thinly traded. They concluded that “the rice futures market should be considered 
as both a potentially useful price risk management and forecasting tool” (McKenzie, et 
al., 2002, p. 492). However, a lack of data prevents the replication of similar studies 
since then. Interviewees explained that in other markets such as wheat and corn, 
convergence is constantly measured based on USDA’s daily report of basis in many 
locations. The agency gathers elevator bids daily and makes these data public but 
does not provide similar services for rice. Without good daily price series, market 
participants struggle to measure convergence. “So everybody kind of has their own 
idea on whether it is converging, but it is hard to really have that conversation without 
good cash data" an interviewee explained. “How do you measure convergence if you 
have a weak cash data service?” another asked rhetorically41. Instead, traders, 
analysts, CME’s product development and surveillance teams and government 
regulators rely on a weekly cash price provided by a floor trader. Not only does this 
impede the work of market surveyors, who cannot pin whether participants act 
economically as this opacity hides convergence, but it also impacts the likeliness to 
obtain convergence at all. “With a more transparent cash market you are more likely 
to get convergence because you can see what the cash is, what the futures is, and 
the opportunity for arbitrage” the interviewee continued. Therefore, market participants 
must arbitrage cash and futures based on their own understanding of market 
conditions. However, if their estimations are wrong, they may worsen the price gap 
between the two markets. The debate about whether prices converge and the futures 
performs its hedging function is not settled. However, the lack of compiled cash data 
means that the sceptics are not proven wrong and consequently refuse to engage in 
a market they do not trust, tightening the number of potential participants. An 
interviewee noticed that the small size of the resulting market means there are not 
enough participants to take part in arbitrage, making the convergence issue worse. 
This is a direct application of the theoretical problem of catch 22 discussed in Chapter 
II. 
This catch 22 is reinforced at many levels. For instance, the illiquidity of the market 
means that it is easier to manipulate. Although there is no clear evidence that such 
                                                 
41 Interview with two anonymous US agricultural futures market stakeholders, USA, September 2017. 
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manipulation takes place, it is a concern for market participants and a disincentive for 
both hedgers and speculators. Even without malevolent manipulation, the absence of 
liquidity means that the futures price can be significantly disturbed by large trades. 
Rice commercials are particularly concerned by the action of large speculators. A 
miller42 said it was a reason for their refusal to trade futures: 
Miller: One of the things you'll see is if other commodities like corn really go up, 
the [speculative] funds will say "we need more of an Ag portfolio", so they'll 
dump a bunch of money into the futures market. So it will go up, not for supply 
and demand, just because people are trying to spread out their risk. … So you 
have to be careful about what the hedge funds are doing. 
SL: That makes you distrust the dynamic of the futures... 
Miller: Right, and if we get stuck into something like that, I don't know if we can 
survive it.  
In effect, the speculative interest in the futures contract is too thin. Many potential 
hedgers say they would use the contract if it were more liquid. However, at this low 
level of liquidity, the irregular and oversized participation of speculators can instead 
be harmful. What stakeholders complain about is not the speculators themselves but 
the size of the market that fails to dilute and normalise speculators’ individual actions.  
If they were many speculators active in the contract, they would have less individual 
market power, would practice arbitrage and correct mispricing, attracting hedgers in 
return. However, as mentioned in Chapter II, they will not come without existing 
liquidity either.  
One more effect of the contract’s illiquidity is the little trading volumes and open 
interest being concentrated in the front month, as illustrated on a given day in Table 
5. Trading activity more than three months into the future is rare. Interviewees noticed 
that it limits opportunities for pricing, backing up of OTC contracts and building long-
term hedging strategies.43 This is another reason for the restricted participation.  
                                                 
42 Interview with an anonymous US Rice Miller, Southern USA, August 2017. 




Table 5: Distribution of Open Interest in the successive Rough Rice contract months (Source: Barchart) 
This section suggests a strong phenomenon of catch 22 in the US rough rice futures. 
However, it does not explain whether the low liquidity and convergence issues are 
solely caused by each other, nor why the contract stagnates at trading levels that are 
low but not null. In the rest of this chapter, I will examine whether other issues could 
explain the lack of participation in the CME rice futures, but also what motivates the 
ones who still trade the contract to do so.   
 
II) Contract design issues 
As the first American rice futures of New York and New Orleans failed because of 
contract flaws, I question in this section whether similar issues can explain the CBOT 
contract struggle regarding liquidity and convergence. Although I will argue that it is 
not the case, it is necessary to discard the hypothesis before examining the cash 
market mechanisms hindering financial development. Small disagreements always 
exist within the industry on the ideal specification but no consensus about one 
fundamental flaw was raised. Instead, when problems were identified, contract 
managers have been able to correct them. When asked whether the contract 
specifications seemed correct, interviewees agreed that CME contract designers were 
close to the optimal contract specifications. Most did not believe the specifications 
could explain the unsatisfying contract performances: “I don’t really see where it could 
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be tricked”, a trader44 said; “I think it’s not bad, I think it’s close”, a miller45 echoed; “I 
think the construct of the contract is as good as it is ever gonna get”, a floor broker46 
summarised. However, most of them still flagged out things they think could be 
different. As the list of details is long, I only focus on two illustrative contract 
engineering problems that have been the source of most debates.47 As these problem 
were solved, they proved that the illiquidity of the market did not rest in the contract 
participation.   
During interviews, many argued that convergence issues might result from contract 
specifications discouraging participation delivery for arbitrage purposes. However, 
when I carried out my interviews, the main issue may have just been solved. The 
decision to transition from a warehouse receipt to a shipping certificate in the summer 
of 2017 was expected to be decisive. It was applied in 2018. The hypothesis was that 
the delivery instrument used was not convenient. When market actors participate in 
delivery on the exchange, what is transferred is not the actual commodity but instead 
a delivery instrument representing the commodity. A warehouse receipt is a proof of 
ownership of an amount of commodity stored in a warehouse (in the context of futures 
contracts, an exchange designated warehouse). "The warehouse receipt conveys the 
right to withdraw a specified amount and quality of the commodity at any time from the 
warehouse" (Höllinger, Rutten, & Kiriakov, 2009, p. 16). A shipping certificate is 
different in the sense that it does not represent ownership of the commodity standing 
in one place. It is instead a promissory note that a certain quantity of a commodity will 
be shipped into an exchange approved delivery facility within a designated period of 
time, when called for delivery (Sandor, 1973; CME Group, 2018). With the warehouse 
receipt system, warehouse managers were forced to fill up space in their warehouses 
for rice that could only be used for futures delivery. Its use of space was uncertain, 
depending on whether delivery would be asked for or not. The transition to shipping 
certificates gives the warehouseman a lot more space in storage, offering them more 
flexibility in terms of where rice can be stored and how the warehouse space can be 
used. They can now store rice away from the delivery point and still write a shipping 
                                                 
44 Interview with an anonymous US rice futures trader, Illinois, USA, September 2017. 
45 Interview with John Morgan, Vice President at Supreme Rice Mill, Louisiana, USA, August 2017. 
46 Interview with Scott Minton, CME Rice Futures Broker, Chicago, USA, September 2017. 
47 Other potential flaws were occasionally discussed without finding consensuses, such as storage 
rates, quality delivered and computerisation.   
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certificate. More rice is therefore eligible for delivery. Shipping certificates were already 
used for all other CME grain futures. Rice was the last contract to use warehouse 
receipts. As shipping certificates are integrated into the exchange mechanism, they 
are registered on the informatics system, automating the calculation and paying of 
storage cost. The logistic of delivery is thus simplified.   
The change of delivery instrument triggered optimism from most traders and 
processors. However, some doubted that the slight practical differences would change 
anything. To make delivery, the basis must be extremely tight, and if so, 
warehousemen would use the receipt anyway. Even if certificates enhance the 
eligibility for making delivery (warehouses can deliver more rice), there is no increased 
incentive for buyers to take delivery. Louisiana millers, for instance, have little interest 
in procuring rice through the exchange with delivery in Arkansas except under 
exceptional circumstances48. The exchange itself never claims that shipping 
certificates would impact convergence, only mentioning the automation of storage 
charges calculations and the increased flexibility given to warehousemen to manage 
delivery (CME Group, 2018). 
The transition to a new delivery instrument could be classified as an upgrade to the 
contract. However, another issue, trading hours, was suspected to be a proper 
contract flaw. Back in 2017, interviewees extensively criticised the market trading 18+ 
hours a day. At the time, rough rice followed the normal Globex trading hours rules for 
grains. These include a normal day trading session for Chicago time, but also a period 
of night trade from 7 pm to 7:45 am the morning after. Night trading sessions aim to 
increase liquidity with participation from East Asia and Europe. However, the rice 
futures recorded little activity coming from these places. I explain in detail in Chapter 
VII that this futures contract mostly fits the hedging needs of the Western Hemisphere 
industry. There was no rationale for having it tradable in the Pacific area or Europe. 
Similar trading hours are used for other crops such as wheat. However, the wheat 
futures is very liquid; it takes a lot of people to move its price. The contract is also used 
globally, both for speculation and hedging.49 The situation is different in rice. One 
interviewee said, "you have an illiquid market already, when you take this at night 
                                                 
48 The logistics of it is not favourable for millers on the coast.  
49 See Chapter VII 
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trade, at 3 in the morning, somebody can move the market 25cents on 13 lots, this is 
not a real market anymore".  Rice traders and brokers commonly argue that night trade 
destroys confidence in the market. The price formation at night is not organised around 
the participants' common belief about where the price is heading, but instead around 
distortion created by very few players acting alone. An interviewee put forwards that 
those rules divided the open interest maximum potential by two. Another knew for a 
fact that some colleagues stopped trading rice futures for this reason. There was a 
sense in the market that these rules should be changed. Therefore, there was a 
tension between the understanding of the exchange that additional liquidity could be 
attracted internationally and the market participant, who believed it would only trigger 
less domestic participation. 
An interviewee described a meeting in 2009, in Chicago to discuss the trading hours 
for rice. With approximately 50 people in the room, everybody but one person voted in 
favour of putting an end to night trade. One trader, who left the industry soon after, 
voted against because it benefited his option business. Without unanimity, night trade 
was maintained. In 2012, CME experienced different modifications to the trading hours 
(table 2) until it stabilised it in April 2013. However, the issue was solved a few months 
after these interviews. CME dissociated the rough rice trading hours from other 
contracts. Night-time trade became evening trade, making it more manageable for 
market participants. However, this did not result in the expected increase in open 
interests. Extended trading hours may not have served the contract, but it was not the 
ultimate factor impeding liquidity. This contract amendment only brought us closer to 
understand that the issue may not be rooted in contract specifications. 
If there were a major flaws in a contract, rice would be the commodity likely to be fixed 
faster. The CFTC rules specify that the exchange can bring modification in a contract 
only when there is not yet open interest in the contract month. For certain commodities, 
open interest can go as far as two years in the future. Deciding to apply a contract 
modification can thus take an extensive amount of time. In rice, there is such little use 
of the contract far into the future and the exchange can usually modify the contract 
within six months and therefore experiment with a variety of solutions to an identified 
problem. Consequently, the issue of contract obsolescence is also less likely to 





Dates Trading Hours 
Globex Open Outcry 
Prior to May 21, 2012 6pm to 7:15am and 
9:30am to 1:15pm 
Floor – 9:30am to 
1:15pm 
May 21, 2012 Onward 5pm to 2:00pm 9:30am to 1:15pm 
June 12, 2012 ONLY 5pm to 2:00pm 7:20am to 1:15pm 
June 25, 2012 Onward 5pm to 2:00pm 9:30am to 2:00pm 
June 29; Jul 11; Aug 10; Sep 12; Sep 28; 
Oct 11; Nov 9; and Dec 11, 2012 ONLY 
5pm to 2:00pm 7:20am to 2:00pm 
April 8, 2013 Onward 7pm to 7:45am and 
8:30am to 1:15pm 
8:30am to 1:15pm 
January 22, 2018 Onward – Rough Rice 
Only50 
7pm to 9:00pm and 
8:30am to 1:15pm 
 
Table 6: Changes in trading hours at CBOT 
It appears that the contract design issues (delivery instruments and trading hours) that 
many market participants believed to be key to contract failure have been fixed over 
the past few years. However, it did not result in a boost in liquidity, hinting that the 
contract flaws hypothesis can be rejected and fundamental problems are to be found 
elsewhere. The well-functioning contract specifications may even be responsible for 
the existing participation in the contract. While in this thesis, the failure of many futures 
contracts for rice appears to be due on circumstantial problems such as wrong contract 
specification, the US case gives the opportunity to look for structural factors for the 
financial underdevelopment of the market. It will be important to determine over the 
                                                 
50 Open outcry for rice was discontinued in 2015. 
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subsequent chapters whether the factors exposed in the following sections are 
replicable to the global rice industry or only to the US market.  
 
III) Size and structure of the American market 
In the absence of major contract flaws, one should question whether other 
prerequisites to the success of futures trading discussed in Chapter II are not fulfilled 
for the US contract. Within those, I argue that the market size is critical to 
understanding the small open interest of the futures market for rice. The American rice 
market is small compared to the underlying markets of other major CBOT contracts 
for corn, wheat and soybeans (Table 3). However, the amount of rice that can be 
hedged on the exchange is even smaller. In this section, I look at rice grown in the US 
producing states of Arkansas, Missouri, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas and California51. 
The size of the American rice market in 2017 is made of approximately 9 million MTS 
grown over 2.4 million acres. However, I argue that most of this rice is either not 
suitable for hedging on the CBOT or in the hands of market actors that have no 
incentive to use futures. This results in an even smaller underlying market and thus 
further liquidity issues. To forward my argument, I show that subsequent layers of US 
rice does not fit futures hedging, which discounts them from obtaining the remaining 
underlying market.  
US Crops, Average Yearly Statistics, 2013-201852 
 Area planted Production 
Value of 
production53 
 (1,000 acres) (1,000 bushels) (1,000 dollar) 
Corn 91 214 14 304 584 52 764 356 
Wheat 52 007 2 026 210 10 611 850 
Soybeans 84 265 4 077 311 39 897 967 
Rice 2 771 455 610 2 694 747 
Table 7: Size of US crop markets 
                                                 
51 This section only focuses on the US rice market. I explain in Chapter VIII why the CBOT rough rice 
contract should not be expected to be a global contract upon which foreign rice could be hedged, for 
now. 
52 Data from the USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Services (2019) transformed by the author 
53 The USDA computes the value of production by multiplying the volume of production by a year 
average price for the crop. 
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The first market section to be discounted from the underlying market is the Californian 
industry. Californian rice, produced in the Sacramento Valley, is almost exclusively 
made of a medium-grain called Calrose, a Japonica variety.54 As the main global 
supplier, California long held significant market power, which protected the few 
Californian co-ops from significant price risk. In 2012, a drought struck California, 
making the price of Calrose rise significantly. The industry decided collectively to plant 
less and keep the supply tight in the following years, expecting that the prices would 
keep increasing. Although this result was achieved, it also allowed competitors – 
essentially Italy and Vietnam – to enter the market, picking up the demand. Thus, there 
is more need today for Californian market participants to hedge prices than ten years 
ago. However, using the CBOT to hedge Calrose is not a viable solution as the spread 
between the two markets is inconsistent. The Calrose market does not closely 
correlate with the price dynamics of the long-grain traded in Chicago in the 
short/medium run, although common patterns are observed in the long run. This lack 
of opportunity for cross hedging was numerically proven by Yoon (2005) fifteen years 
ago. The two markets have not made significant progress towards cointegration since 
then. They are two clearly separated markets, both in term of geographical production 
and targeted consumer markets. They are not substitutable products. This 
fragmentation of the market thus does not fit the need for homogeneity of the crop.   
 
Figure 6: Californian rice and Gulf rice Prices (Source: LRI) 
                                                 
54 This variety, used notably for sushi, is mostly grown in North-East Asia. However, neither Japan nor 





Similarly, the patterns of the medium-grain market in Southern states are very different 
from the long-grain one. This market is dominated by Kellogg’s as the essential end 
users. This variety is used to produce their famous Rice Krispies cereal. Interviewed 
farmers and millers explained that producers would not dedicate acres to plant 
medium-grain unless they already had agreed with a buyer.55 This means that 
Southern medium-grain is essentially grown within the framework of contract farming. 
Farmers agree on an area to plant, either directly with Kellogg’s or with a miller having 
a similar arrangement with Kellogg’s (or another end-user). Since the price is usually 
set before planting, hedging is already effective, and there is no need for any additional 
derivative instrument. For the few cases when the price is not set previously, the long -
grain market can be used as a pricing indicator, since growing medium-grain equates 
an opportunity cost of not planting long-grain. However, a miller stated that the medium 
market was much more stable than the price for long-grain, in part due to the small 
number of actors involved. The Southern medium-grain market is therefore not 
contributing to the underlying market size for CBOT either and the entire production of 
US medium-grain should be discounted. The tiny production of US short-grain, 
essentially from California, follows the same logic and will be discounted from the total.  
What is left is a long-grain Southern market, composed of two major geographical sub-
markets. The river market is composed of two regions of production – the Arkansas 
Grand Prairie and the Mississippi Delta – starting from southern Missouri and following 
the Mississippi river onto North Louisiana. Within this sub-market, Arkansas is the 
leading producing state. Its total rice production is almost the size of the total rice 
production in all other US states. The Gulf market is found in South Louisiana - around 
the Acadian area between Lafayette and Lake Charles - and the Texan counties along 
the coast, on the other side of the state boundary.  
 
                                                 
55 As this is a very specific market, producers only plant if they have a demand for their rice. Kellogg’s  




Figure 7: Rice Production in the US 
The market in Arkansas is dominated by two major farmer co-operatives: Riceland 
Food and Producers Rice Mill, Inc. It is difficult to know precisely what share of the 
American market is in the hands of the co-ops. Numbers suggested by interviewees 
range from 40% to 60% of the Arkansas rice market, with 60% more often cited as the 
reliable number.56 Riceland is active in Missouri and Producers in Mississippi, 
controlling similar shares of production in those two states. Together, these two co-
ops represent a problem for futures’ liquidity. Co-ops pool rice from farmers for free, 
mill the rice, marketize it and sell it to long-term retailing and branding partners they 
have long-term pricing partnerships with. Their own brands of white and brown rice 
can even be found on the shelves of American supermarkets. Farmers are only paid 
once the co-op has sold the rice: they receive payment by the volume of rice provided 
to the pool, but that price is only determined afterwards upon the selling price out of 
the mill. They also receive a percentage (based on their share of ownership in the co-
op) of the value-added through milling and marketing the rough rice. The procurement 
and marketing mechanisms leave Riceland and Producers with essentially no hedging 
                                                 
56 I will use the number 60% since it is commonly cited by the industry participants. Greenwall (1995)  
evaluated the co-ops’ share of the Arkansas Market to 65% in the 1990s, and it is not believed that their 
market power has significantly declined since then. 
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needs. On the one hand, co-ops pool rice from farmers without a purchasing price. 
The origination cost for the raw material is zero. An interviewee said that their risk 
management tool is simply the farmer’s price being unknown until the entire deal 
through the supply chain is over. On the other hand, their selling price is usually fixed 
long-term. When it varies – which happens rarely – it is usually by a small amount and 
is simply transmitted to the price paid to farmers. As a result, the rice handled by 
Riceland and Producers is rice that will not be hedged on CBOT, making the market 
smaller once more. 
 
Figure 8: American rice co-ops supply and payment system 
Amongst the market actors interested in having a functioning futures contract, there is 
a lot of frustration towards the co-operatives. Louisiana farmers, millers, brokers, 
traders and even academics reproach them for not playing the game, for trying to 
impede the contract and for limiting price discovery (Taylor, Bessler, Waller, & Rister, 
1996; McKenzie, et al., 2002). They suspect them of protecting their market power by 
restricting competition. Some interviewees explained that co-operatives sometimes 
use futures when convergence fails. An experienced rice futures trader57 explained:  
"there are occasions when the market gets way out of line, the rice futures 
prices two dollars below their milled rice, then they're going to buy the futures, 
or they're going to sell puts. They are going to do something because it is too 
                                                 
57 Interview with an anonymous US rice futures trader, USA, September 2017  
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cheap. And the same thing if it gets too high, they are going to hedge the rough 
rice because it is more lucrative than to mill it." 
In the long run, co-operatives have an interest in inconsistent performances from the 
CBOT contract. On the one hand, they take advantage of it when it goes wide, and on 
the other, it discourages farmers from breaking free and marketising their rice 
themselves. If the futures was a reliable hedge, more Arkansas farmers may be willing 
to be independent as they could more easily manage risk. Such lack of participation 
from the co-ops to protect share of the market fits Gray’s (1966) theory of disposition 
to boycott a futures contract as a measure of market power. However, a rice broker 
said that the number of farmers leaving the co-ops structure increased over the past 
few years, amid low prices they would obtain for the farmers and the suspicion that 
they are managed in the interest of the staff rather than the farmers. He stated that the 
loss of market share was so important that they had to procure rice outside of their 
pool and that he had himself supplied them rough rice in the previous years. This 
suggests that more of the grain could become available for futures trading with time, 
as farmers enter the competitive market on the one hand, and the likelihood that co-
ops may need to hedge their procurement price increases on the other.   
The frustration of futures enthusiasts against the co-ops is understandable. However, 
from the co-ops’ point of view, not trading futures is rational since there is no risk to 
hedge. One cannot contribute to financial development as a commercial without 
physical risk to trade. However, critics argue that with the volumes they hold, they 
could use the futures to make additional profits and at the same time, increase the 
liquidity for the whole market. The managers of both co-ops have declined my requests 
for interviews, making it difficult to fully comprehend their sentiment towards futures 
trading, and determine whether they are actively boycotting or simply not profit 
maximising organisations. It should be mentioned that there is a broader context of 
critics against the co-ops. For instance, there is a general understanding that the co-
ops are not making efforts to maintain the quality standard of the market. Instead, they 
try to produce as much as possible to fill up their milling capacity. As this results in 
oversupply, low prices, and loss of quality reputation for the whole market, there is 
anger against the co-ops. It partly explains why certain stakeholders criticise the co-
ops approach to the futures contract, even if this approach is rational.  
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An interviewee noticed that this market power held by the co-ops was very much a 
specific attribute of the rice market that was not found in other American grain 
markets.58 A grain analyst working for a co-op59 explained to me how the functioning 
of co-operatives in wheat, corn and soybeans encouraged the use of futures instead 
of impeding it. Unlike in rice, wheat co-operatives do not pool the grain from farmers 
to process it. Instead, they pay the farmer at delivery and ensure the storage and 
marketing of the crop, rarely the milling. They are only an intermediary in the supply 
chain, often between the farmers and large trading companies such as Cargill, Bungee 
or Louis Dreyfus. Since they hold the grain in a liberalised market with prices 
determined freely, and the large number of them involves competition and little market 
power, wheat co-operatives are exposed to high price risk. Co-ops, therefore, use 
futures for two reasons: to manage short-term price risk in the first few days following 
the purchase until deciding what to do with the grain, or long term risk (it could be a 
year) if they decide to use the futures market to lock in a storage profit. They can do 
so because there is trading activity in the far away months of the futures contracts for 
wheat, while this is not the case for rice. As an additional example of the causality 
dilemma of liquidity, it is also their need to hedge in the long run that generates this 
liquidity in the far away months. Therefore, the co-ops are an asset for the wheat 
futures contract but a problem for rough rice futures. The presence of co-operatives in 
other grain markets thus does not invalidate the argument that they play a role in the 
financial underdevelopment of rice. It is instead the nature of the co-ops and their 
position in the supply chain that determines whether they will be an asset or a limiting 
factor to the size of the market. 
To conclude, as the US medium-grain and short-grain market, as well a large share of 
the Arkansas production is not available for hedging on CBOT, I calculated what is left 
as an underlying market for futures trading. I present the calculation for the year 2017 
in table 7. 
 
                                                 
58 Co-ops’ market power tends to be an ad-hoc function of a market. It is not, for instance, a function of 
market size. Although the market is small in the US, the Japanese rice market illustrates how a large 
market can be dominated by a single co-operative (see Chapter V). 







Total US Rice 8 911 400 100% 
Californian Medium-grain - 1 715 400 - 19% 
Southern Medium-grain - 678 000 - 8% 
US Short-grain - 125 550 - 1% 
Co-ops share of AR-MS-MO Long-grain 
production (60%) 
- 2 742 660 - 31% 
Remaining Rice CBOT Hedgeable 3 649 790 41% 
Table 8: Rice hedgeable on CBOT 
While the US rice market was understood as significantly smaller than other 
commodities financially developed through a contract listed on CME, this section 
showed that the structure of the American rice industry results in an underlying market 
that is less than half of what it could be thought to be. This shows that the US rice 
market hardly fulfils the cash market size criteria for a successful futures contract. This 
issue does not occur in the other crops mentioned. These markets are well integrated 
with systems of price premium and discount for quality and geographical differences, 
allowing most of the domestic production to be hedged on futures markets. 
Additionally, the nature of co-ops in these markets supports the use of futures 
contracts.   
  
IV) Lack of participation from farmers and the role of processors 
The previous section argued that a large share of the American rice market was not 
eligible for hedging through the CBOT contract. However, in the residual market, some 
participants are involved in futures trading while many chose not to. If they did, the 
open interest could be substantially higher than it is. Therefore, the rest of this chapter 
aims to explain what motivates the decision to hedge with futures or not. Due to their 
number, significant risk exposure and position in the supply chain, it is often suggested 
that the farmers part of the residual market could be the ones generating liquidity. In 
addition, farmers often take part in risk management through derivatives for other 
crops they farm, indicating a certain level of sophistication. Therefore, I inquire why 
American farmers, especially in Louisiana, rarely hedge rice price risk with futures. My 
argument revolves around two variables: (i) the price risk faced by farmers is diluted 
by factors related to farm management and public policy, putting farmers under less 
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pressure to hedge; (ii) the access to futures market is made difficult for farmers as a 
result of a lack of OTC contracts offered by processors and intermediaries.    
a. Production risk outweighing price risk 
For farmers, price uncertainty over a season can be difficult to isolate from a multiplici ty 
of other issues creating business risk for rice producers. The case of Luke60, a young 
farmer from Eunice in South Louisiana, illustrates the complexity of risk perception 
profiles found in the region. A hypothesis to explain the low use of futures to hedge 
price risk is that some farmers feel more exposed to the variability of production than 
to the variability in prices (Lapanand & Moschin, 1994; Pannell, Hailu, Weersink, & 
Burt, 2008; Lence, 1996). The uncertainty about the quantities to be harvested results 
in farmers not knowing what volumes should be hedged on the exchange and thus 
choosing to not hedge at all. Using the illustrative case of Luke, this section argues 
that the irreconcilability of the two types of risk for some farmers prevents them from 
using derivative contracts.   
Above concern about rice price shifts, Luke dreads crop loss. He is reluctant to sell 
forward because of potential failure to deliver. South Louisiana is a hostile environment 
for farmers in need of yield guarantees, due to the tropical cyclones that hit the coast 
from the Gulf of Mexico during summer, around harvest time. In the second year after 
Luke took over his father’s farm, he faced one of the most important natural disasters 
in the US during the 21st century: the 2016 Louisiana flooding. This was caused by a 
“no-name storm” which, as noted by the Washington Post at the time, generated three 
times more rainwater in Louisiana than Hurricane Katrina did 11 years earlier 
(Samenow, 2016). The days before this tropical depression hit Louisiana were 
decisive for farmers. As crops are insured (to cover for potential yield loss), they 
usually take decisions over crop management in agreement with their insurance 
company. The inconsistent forecast made decision-making complex. Luke’s insurance 
company was not sure about harvesting the rice. When he discussed with them on 
Monday 8th of August, the rice moisture was still up to 23%, making it dangerous to 
harvest. Farmers usually cut the rice anywhere between 16% and 19% moisture. Once 
it is put into the grain bin, fans placed underneath the bin blow air on the rice through 
                                                 
60 Interview with Luke D., US rice farmer, Louisiana, USA, December 2017.  
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little holes on the floor to dry it out. If the rice is too moist, the system does not work 
and the bin can even catch fire.  
“I didn't really want to cut it. They said we would get a little bit of rain but... this 
was on the Monday. I'll cut a little bit, maybe a truckload at 23%. We were not 
sure how much rain we were going to get. So I said ‘I don't want to burn the bin 
down or whatever’. So I waited. And by the Friday and Saturday, that's when 
we knew the rain was coming. It was unbelievable. It rained 15 inches 
overnight, something like that, and the whole place flooded.”  
300 of Luke’s 400 rice acres got severely affected. Luke gave me pictures of his field 
after the water had gone down. The desolation of the scene could not justify the 
abandon of the crop, the insurer was willing to minimise the losses. “They said ‘go 
ahead and cut it… save what you can, it's better than nothing’". 
 
Figure 9: Flooded rice field 
Luke eventually managed to cut his rice and obtained a yield that was not as low as 
could be expected. In his area, farmers consider 50 barrels per acre to be a good yield. 
That year, he made 39 barrels per acre. “That’s about average, that’s pretty good”. 
The insurance company consequently did not pay for yield loss. It later appeared that 
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the rice was damaged as it had sprouted. The milling quality turned out to be very low. 
While Luke sold his paddy for $16, he only got $13 from the mill. The insurance 
partially covered the difference.  
While Luke managed to get through this situation without major loss, the devastating 
effects this rain had on some of his neighbours left a mark in his mind: 
“At least I have been able to cut. Some people stayed under water for a month; 
they couldn't cut. It was already regrown; it had sprouted. As you can see in the 
picture, the sprout is really small. The root coming out, it's tiny. Theirs was 
green. You know what rice is like when it's a month old. They couldn't even cut 
it; they lost the whole thing. The guys I am talking about … he lost the whole 
thing. It was maybe 100 acres. The insurance … didn't want to pay. ... They 
paid some, but he never got back the time, the diesel, the equipment, the 
fertiliser, the water. There is so much expense! … So I think the company let 
the land go and somebody else picked it up and I don't know what the boy is 
doing...”   
 
Figure 10: Rice that started sprouting 
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Luke showed a risk understanding common to many farmers of the US Gulf. They 
balance price volatility against weather and production risk volatility, understanding 
the second as the greatest source of risk for their business. By locking in prices and 
then pledging a quantity of rice to be sold, farmers would significantly increase their 
financial risk. However, risk understanding varies from farmer to farmer. Jackie Lower, 
who is based on the Gulf, thought price risk was greater. While feeling exposed to 
price variations, he thinks that major storms are rare, despite having occurred two 
years in a row. However, the increasing frequency and larger scope of tropical storms 
due to climate change might shift this understanding. It appeared to affect younger 
farmers more because extreme weather damaging their crop already occurred many 
times since they started farming. Therefore, they perceive it as a normal recurrent 
phenomenon, compared to older farmers, who often have the sentiment that these 
years are only outliers within the many decades they have been farming.  
The tropical storm of 2016 was not Luke’s first experience making him cautious about 
selling forward. In the first year of farming without his father, Luke sold rice forward to 
a mill through his broker. However, when came time to ship out, he was 5k barrels 
short of what he had on the book. Unsure of why his calculations were wrong, Luke 
thinks it might have been due to shrinkage. “They wanted their rice; I was freaking 
out”. By chance, his second crop that year made exactly 5k additional barrels. “I was 
able to cover the contract. I guess that is why I don’t do [forward sell]. I like to have my 
eggs before I sell them”.   
Luke dreads the miller’s reaction if he was to be short on the contracted volume. 
Whether the buyers would allow him to make it up the following year or if he would 
have to compensate the loss in cash, Luke was not sure. It appeared that Luke did not 
have an issue with locking in a price for the coming crop, but he was not comfortable 
contracting for a quantity. He believes there is not enough price risk to justify the use 
of derivatives in the context of high yield uncertainty. Theory of optimal hedging 
suggests that farmers perceiving production risk will reduce the quantities they hedge 
(Lapanand & Moschin, 1994; Lence, 1996; Pannell, Hailu, Weersink, & Burt, 2008). 
Some farmers believe from experience that not only is there uncertainty in the quanti ty 
produced, but they may even lose their entire production to weather events. The 




It can be questioned whether the issue of production risk really is a unique 
characteristic of the US rice market, or if it affects every farmer regardless of their 
location or crop. Would wheat farmers be less affected by production risk? It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to quantitatively measure the level of production risk faced by 
different farmers under a set of different factors. However, it is possible to explain why 
US rice would be a special case. The first fact to remind is that the issue is not having 
production risk, but having production risk that outweighs price risk, at least in the 
perception of the farmer. I am not suggesting that no wheat farmers in the US Midwest 
has a great deal of production risk. Some may be farming in areas particularly prone 
to droughts, tornadoes or hail. However, considering the wide geographical distribution 
of wheat cultivation in the US, all farmers cannot be in a situation where they have 
more production risk than price risk. Some might, but others will be in climatically more 
stable regions and would, as a result, prioritise price hedging. In contrast, most farmers 
expected to use the US rough rice contract are concentrated around the cyclone-prone 
Gulf of Mexico and therefore share this characteristic of high production risk. Another 
hypothesis is that it is not necessarily the crop risk of wheat farmers that is low, but 
that they are facing a greater deal of price risk. Ultimately, the fact that many wheat 
farmers do take part in derivative markets through OTC contracts (I discuss these 
mechanisms later in this chapter) is enough evidence that they do not face the same 
production risk versus price risk dilemma as Louisiana rice farmers do.     
b. Diversifying price risk 
Luke illustrated another important element in the farmers' approach to price risk: 
diversification tends to push farmers to be less concerned about hedging one crop 
(Asplund, Forster, & Stout, 1989). This subsection argues that many farmers in 
Louisiana are highly diversified, resulting in a lack of urge to hedge rice. Like most 
farmers in the Cajun region, Luke’s production rotates between rice (the main crop), 
soybeans, and crawfish. The diversification creates different hedging needs because 
the price risk is not concentrated into one market. Crawfish may even be a key in 
understanding the hedging behaviour of farmers like Luke. 
Crawfish does not exactly constitute a rotation. It is rather a complementary use of the 
land primarily serving for rice. Luke calls that a "double-crop". When the rice is about 
to emerge, in June, he adds water to the field and throws in crawfish. This is called 
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stocking. The crawfish bury in the ground. The water can then be taken off the field for 
harvesting in August. In October, water is put back in the field; the crawfish comes out 
of the ground and can now be fished. 
This aspect of farm management is crucial for many rice farmers in Louisiana. Despite 
taking an important place in the farm activity, rice becomes secondary when it comes 
to income. “I am looking into break even or make a few dollars” with rice, said Luke. 
“But the crawfish is where the money is at. So I don’t worry too much about the rice.” 
Crawfish is not only a high-value product that does not need much input, it is also a 
source of income less affected by uncertainty. Another farmer61 confirmed that once 
the crawfish investments of the first year have been made, it becomes a profitable 
business that has helped a lot of local rice producers. For many of them, farming rice 
has become a way of providing an environment for crawfish farming62 more than a 
primarily profitable business (Thier, 2012). John Denison, the farm manager in South 
Louisiana, told me a similar story about producing honey, as rice fields provide a 
habitat for bees, an important part of their business. Under these circumstances, 
farmers are hoping they will be able to make marginal benefits with rice. As long as 
the price does not fall dramatically below cost, the farmers’ risk aversion is lessened 
by the production of those other more lucrative products. 
 All farmers interviewed in Louisiana were engaged in diversification practices. They 
usually have up to three other sources of income. Apart from crawfish, other crops 
included sugar, cotton, wheat, corn or potatoes, depending on the nature of the land, 
or cattle farming. Farmlands are also used to make an income out of tourism activities 
such as fishing, duck hunting or eco-tourism. I always asked my interviewees if such 
diversification, apart from increasing revenues and making good use of the land, was 
also a form of risk-mitigation strategy. The answers were consistently affirmative: 
“absolutely; no question about it!”, “it is a very important form of risk management, 
diversification is key”, “it’s a backup system you know”. Farmers feel that the 
probability of all their income sources failing at once is negligible. Consequently, they 
are less in need to lock in a price. Unfavourable market movements represent a 
financial loss but are unlikely to be dramatic for the economic performance of the whole 
                                                 
61 Interview with an anonymous US rice farmer, Central Louisiana, USA, August 2017.  
62 The rice field serves as an ecosystem to feed the crawfish. 
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farm. When diversification involves other crops, it also mitigates crop risk, since all 
crops do not react the same to extreme weather events. Some crops even have 
different production timelines, further mitigating the impact of sudden or longer-term 
weather issues. If the diversification is in the form of cattle farming or tourism, the 
weather may even have less impact. Finally, when it comes to farming other 
commodities, which are often financially developed, farmers have the opportunity, and 
often do hedge their production, which makes them more likely to try to play the market 
for potential benefits using storage with rice, instead of attempting to lock in prices. I 
discuss the hedging vs. storing decision in the following section.  
Diversification is less common in Arkansas, where farmers are encouraged by the co-
ops to entirely plant their fields in rice to fill up the capacities of processing facilities. 
However, once again, farmers there do not face the same price risk as farmers around 
the Gulf as their supply channels are of different natures.  
c. Soybeans rotation affecting risk behaviour 
Many of Luke’s peers share the feeling that the volatility in rice does not justify the use 
of hedging contracts. Interestingly, finance professionals in Chicago repeated that the 
volatility prerequisite for a functioning futures contract was a given. Why then, don’t 
American rice farmers perceive this risk? The answer might lie in the relativity of risk 
in rice and soybean farming. 
I did not mention soybean in the previous section because it does not exactly constitute 
a diversification in the business sense. Farmers grow soybeans essentially for soil 
management, rather than for its profitability. For most cereal farmers in the American 
Midwest, soybean is the sister crop of their main grain. It can be found in the northern 
states, such as North Dakota, which produce corn, alongside the Mississippi river 
where Winter Wheat is the main crop, and down to Arkansas and Louisiana where rice 
is produced.  
Every farmer I talked to in Louisiana grew soybeans on their farm, always within a 
logic of field rotation. Soybeans help replenish the ground with nitrogen needed to 
maintain the yields of grasses such as wheat, corn and rice. Interviewees explained 
that the results are so good that even when soybeans are not profitable “farmers would 
really rather stick to their rotation. At the end of the day, they make more money that 
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way." Soybeans also allow for better control of weeds to obtain a clear field, using 
Roundup, a herbicide, during this time of rotation with rice. 
 
Figure 11: Soybean production in the US 
Although rice farmers primarily plant soybeans for land management, cultivating the 
crop has deeper reaching effects on their business and risk behaviour. Some farmers 
had a sense that swings in soybeans prices were more dramatic than in rice, justifying 
more price hedging. However, this is not confirmed by numbers. Between August 2014 
and August 2019, the volatility of the rice futures contract was higher than the volatili ty 
of the soybean futures contract (I provide the results of the volatility computation in 
Appendix C). Apart from an exceptional day in rice on the 18th of August 2018, the 
largest price movements of both markets were comparable. The average price 
movements were also very close, although rice was slightly higher in both cases. A 
reason why Louisiana farmers may feel that soybeans are riskier is that the price 
fluctuates around their cost of production and it is this which decides whether it will be 
a loss, a profit or a break-even. In rice, the price is usually consistently above the 
production cost; price changes only affect the extent of the profit.63 However, farmers 
                                                 
63 This was often argued by market participants. It was not possible to triangulate this information as 
calculating production costs is difficult.  
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see soybeans as a riskier business than rice mostly because the former – a more 
fragile crop – is rarely stored on-farm. Additionally, truck drivers pick up soybeans in 
priority over rice because they are being paid more for driving the beans. 
Consequently, farmers tend to use their storage space for rice rather than soybeans. 
Soybeans leave the farm shortly after harvest while rice can be stored for months, 
sometimes years. Farmers are thus price takers at harvest time for soybeans and 
exposed to a great deal of risk. They use derivative finance to either price ahead of 
the harvest or use a stay in the market to price after having moved the crop.64 Instead, 
the ability to keep rice in their bins for long gives farmers flexibility to marketise their 
crop. If the price is low at harvest, they keep the rice, wait for prices to bounce back 
before selling. They may sometimes take wrong marketing decisions and sell while 
the trend of the market is not favourable, but at least they are taking a fully conscious 
decision. Despite that, storing should not be thought as the ultimate hedging solution 
for all farmers. First because some of them do not have the storage capacity of keeping 
all their rice on farm. Second, because they need a flow of revenue and holding on to 
the rice may not be an option. Still, the case of soybeans sheds light on the importance 
of the ability to store in the risk management of the crop as the greater flexibility to 
store rice reduces the pressure on financial hedging.  
Therefore, soybeans have a double effect on farmers. On the one hand, it contributes 
to their sophistication as most farmers engage in OTC contracts to sell their soybeans 
early or secure stay in the market contracts,65 but it also alters their risk perception as 
it relativises the risk implied by rice farming compared to the very uncertain nature of 
selling soybeans on the spot. 
 
d. Farm program  
Another disincentive to farmer’s participation use of futures is the relative protection 
by the federal government through the Price Loss Coverage (PLC). As it establishes 
a minimum price for a share of the production, the risk is lessened. However, I also 
                                                 
64 The need to secure a destination for the beans is such that production risk is this time outweighed 
when deciding whether to use forward contracts.   
65 If a farmer needs to move their beans but believe prices are increasing, they can sell the physical 
commodity and buy a long derivative position. As a result, they are “staying in the market”. 
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argue that this only impacts the need to hedge to an extent, as the mechanism of this 
program does not cover all downward price movement. 
The 2014 farm bill (which was itself largely renewed in 2018) established a reference 
price of $14 per hundredweight. It is compared to the so-called effective price, a 
national average market price received by producers from August of the production 
year to July of the following year (113th United States Congress, 2014).  If the effective 
price falls below the reference price, the difference is covered by the program. It acts 
as a minimum farm price protecting farmers from price below cost. Producers mostly 
agree that the farm program functions well as a safety net. Interviewees said that it 
does not make rice farmers less risk-averse but makes them better protected against 
price risk. It takes away some price risk from being hedged with futures. However, I 
argue that the farm program affects liquidity but does not justify the absence of hedging 
by farmers. Some elements suggest there is still a raison d’etre for futures alongside 
the farm program: 
- Remaining need to hedge: Farmers still have an incentive to hedge with 
derivatives and capture higher returns in case of price fall, whether the effective 
price is above or below the reference price: 
o If it is over and the PLC is not triggered, a derivative contract can act as 
a higher safety net. However, market prices have been below the 
reference price since the farm bill has been put in place, so this is only 
a theoretical situation. 
o Even if it is below, as the reference price is an average, it falls slower 
than the cash price. Unless the farmer sells their crop for an amount 
equal to the US average cash price, they are not guaranteed $14. By 
selling forward or cash, at the beginning of the falling trend, they will 
capture additional revenue. For instance, if they sell forward in May at 
$13 and the average price from August to July is $11, they will receive 
an additional $3 that will bring their revenue to $16.  
- Limitations: Several restrictions in the mechanism of the PLC do not make it as 
good as the revenue from cash sell and hedge. Firstly, the payment will only 
come 18 months after planting as the average price is calculated in the following 
12 months after harvest and compensations are paid in the following October. 
Secondly, the payment is only applied to 85% of the base acre of the farm 
dedicated to rice. If a farmer plants all their eligible acres for rice, 15% of the 
production will not be protected. Finally, the payment is limited to $125k per 
farmer, and $500k for the farm. A farmer estimated that he and his peers need 
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individually to gross $1.5M to $2M revenue to make a living. In case of 
significant price fall, the PLC would thus not be enough to cover losses. 
The impact of the farm program is thus not explicitly determined. On the one hand, it 
does not remove the logic behind the theoretical benefit of using derivative finance to 
hedge price risk. However, it is likely that certain farmers feel no need to hedge due 
to the PLC, while there is only less need. Since 2014, open interest has been lower in 
the rough rice futures than it had been in the previous four years, when the Food, 
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 had in place a much lower target price of $10.5. 
However, the correlation of the policy change with the stabilisation of open interest at 
a lower level does not firmly demonstrate causation either.  
e. The ‘This is not my job’ narrative 
Apart from the fact that the risk perception of farmers drives them away from futures 
hedging, they are also reluctant to participate in the futures market because they 
believe that it is not their place. Farmers have the sentiment that they expose 
themselves to a great deal of market risk by being active directly on the futures. In this 
section, I argue that they are right. There is a misconception that farmers are 
commercials like any other and that they should participate in futures trading. This is 
shared by some staff members of commodity exchanges of sophisticated participants 
in commodity markets. That explains the popularity of programmes made to train 
farmers in the functioning of futures trading. Even many academic researchers 
question the lack of farmers' use of futures contracts, and usually define not hedging 
at all as the only alternative. These include Shapiro and Brorsen (1988), Pennings and 
Leuthold (2000) and Lence (2009). This section allows me to deconstruct this idea 
before the following section exposes how farmers should become involved through 
simpler intermediary contracts. This supports a similar argument made by Paul et al. 
(1976) and Tomek (1987). 
The narrative that using futures markets is not part of the farmer’s job is fed by the 
confusion around how farmers use futures contracts. In the theory of agricultural 
economics, farmers, as other commercials, are almost exclusively perceived as 
hedgers. Accordingly, they are expected to use futures markets to lock in prices they 
will receive upon delivery and transfer price risk to speculators. However, I explain in 
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this section that farmers’ behaviour is more complex and can explain their tendency 
to abandon the futures market.   
Once they trade a number of contracts above a level determined individually for each 
commodity, futures traders have to report to CME and the CFTC through a document 
called Form 40. This is regardless of whether they self-identify as commercials 
(producer/merchant/processor/user) or non-commercials. The exchange and the 
regulators strictly require commercials to use the contract for hedging purposes only, 
while non-commercials use it for speculation. Non-commercials are restricted to a 
position limit – a maximum number of contracts they can hold at one time – while 
commercials can apply and obtain a hedge exemption that allows them to go over this 
limit in order to manage the price risk of their entire cash positions. Importantly, 
positions are not individually designated as hedge or speculations; it is based on the 
status of the futures trader. The exchange and the commission cannot differentiate 
these positions within the activity of a single trader. However, when it comes to market 
surveillance, commercials will have to justify their position as a bona fide hedge if they 
are being asked to by the CFTC. Farmers must consequently use the market only to 
lock in profits, not to take advantage of the market and make additional revenues. This 
is at least the case with their commercial accounts. They have the option to do so by 
opening a second, non-commercial account if they wanted to speculate. Jack 
Scoville,66 a Chicago based futures broker, explained that he is okay with his client 
farmers speculating as long they separate the two activities, allowing them to justi fy 
their trades to market surveillance and their personal accountant. 
However, discussions about whether farmers could speculate on their commercial 
accounts are rarely necessary, as there is a third category of futures market 
participants: non-reportable traders. Those who do not go over the threshold of a 
certain number of contracts traded do not have to report to the CFTC, regardless of 
whether their positions are for hedging or speculation. Most farmers are likely to fall 
under this category.67 Farmers can cultivate a blurry line between the two activities. In 
practice, they do. Some interviewees were vocal about their peers making mistakes 
                                                 
66 Interview with Jack Scoville, CME commodity futures broker, Chicago, USA, September 2017. 
67 For rough rice, the position limit is 50 contracts, worth 4550 MTS of rice. A 400-acre farm would 
produce around 1400MTS of rice a year (using the average US yield per acre in 2018). 
112 
 
when speculating, saying that farmers should only be hedging on futures markets, 
especially because they are likely to lose as speculators. Others openly said they were 
speculating more than hedging, while many used the expression “to play the market”. 
One farmer illustrated this use of futures: 
“We have [used futures] a couple of years ago, we saw the price was going 
down, we sold and bought the futures back thinking it was going to turn around, 
it never did. And that wasn't a good move, not at all. We are still trying to recover 
from that. So we are long now on the move back up. We won't get back all of 
that; we will get some of it back. So we will play with futures that way." He 
continued later: “[I only know one farmer] who can keep the dividing line 
between hedging from speculating. Because it is so easy to get caught in that 
speculative trap and think you know better than the market. That can be 
expensive.”  
In fact, the line between hedging and speculating is not so well defined. Speculators 
only trade futures by establishing a position and closing it out at a subsequent time 
with an offsetting trade, in an attempt to take advantage of price movements they 
expect to maximise their net revenue (Anderson & Danthine, 1983). The status of a 
hedger is more complex, especially when it comes to farmers. By synchronising their 
activity in the cash and futures markets, a pure (or routine) hedger, who formulates no 
judgment of price expectation, sells risk and ensures that his revenue will match his 
investment plus a predetermined profit (Johnson, 1960; Gray, 1960). Some authors 
argue that the activity of farmers on futures markets is far more complex. Anderson 
and Danthine (1983) state two important hypotheses: the first being that each futures 
participant has their own price expectation, which may or may not be equal to the 
current futures price. The second is that the farmer’s problem is to choose a quanti ty 
of input and pick a futures position that will maximise their expected net revenue , 
instead of laying off risk as the literature can suggest. Thus, there is a profit opportunity 
in the price expectation. As a result, the authors understand that “every hedger’s 
choice of futures can be usefully viewed as the combination of a pure hedge and a 
pure speculation” (Anderson & Danthine, 1983, p. 374). They find that hedgers hedge 
their output (either entirely, under conditions of production certainty, or partially, 
according to risk aversion in case of production uncertainty) "prior to readjusting their 
position, as speculators, on the basis of the expected futures-cash price differential" 
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(Anderson & Danthine, 1983, pp. 375-376). They add that “a rational hedger always 
speculates (that is, hedges ‘selectively’) unless he does not expect the next spot price 
to be any different from the current futures price” (Anderson & Danthine, 1983, p. 376). 
The term of selective hedging has been proposed by Gray (1960) who equates it to 
speculation by producers within the context of thin markets where producers cannot 
rely on consistent convergence and instead expect to find a bias between cash and 
futures at the end of the contract period. This reduces the effectiveness of routine 
hedging but increases the incentive to speculate to achieve maximal profit. That is not 
the case in more competitive markets where convergence is consistent and "the 
positions of rational hedgers would be closer to routine hedges" (Anderson & 
Danthine, 1983, p. 376). The rice market fits the model of thin futures markets, blurring 
the line between hedge and speculation. Hieronymus clarifies this hedge/speculation 
debate by stating “to hedge is to insulate one’s business activities from price level 
speculation while retaining the opportunity to speculate in a basis variation. This 
definition takes hedging out of the academic context of risk shifting and puts i t in the 
business context of trying to make a profit” (Hieronymus, 1971, p. 149). 
The issue is that managing such futures activity requires an advanced level of 
sophistication of the market actor. It involves an advanced understanding of futures 
trading, that can come at the expense of a learning cost, the ability to formulate 
unbiased price expectations, and most importantly, the great cost of managing 
positions – especially the management of margin calls68 (Pannell, Hailu, Weersink, & 
Burt, 2008). Pannel et al. argue that those combined costs are so high that “the 
greatest incentive to adopt hedging instruments will occur in situations where the main 
benefit is increasing expected profit through speculation, rather than hedging risk” 
(Pannell, Hailu, Weersink, & Burt, 2008, p. 49). In fact, participating in futures trading 
activity for hedging or speculative purposes is simply too demanding on a daily basis 
for farmers. A rice and sugar farmer in central Louisiana, told me he felt comfortable 
using the futures market directly but did not think any money could be made from it. 
The use of futures did not make a difference to his revenues. In his opinion, rice 
                                                 
68 Participants in futures markets must deposit a percentage of the value of their position to the clearing 
house, to guarantee their ability to cover possible loses. If the value of their positions increases, they 
are required to increase the deposit - this is called a margin call. Small market participants are 
consequently at risk of being unable to finance margin calls.   
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farmers should only focus on growing their crop, because “this is where the money is 
made". If a farmer is not good at farming, they will not have the quantity and quality of 
the crop to make money regardless of their positions on the futures market. Focusing 
on futures trading would be polluting for the mind of the farmer, according to this 
farmer. This was a sentiment also echoed by Luke. A narrative grew during interviews 
about what farmers should be expected to do or not and when it came to being active 
on a futures markets, they often argued “this is not my job”. There is no money to be 
made by trading actively for the farmer because they are “an amateur in the market 
dealing with professionals. The people who are trading in the futures market, that's 
their crop they are raising. That's all they're doing. And you don't have much of a 
chance. It's almost like putting a rescue football team up against the pro team”. I 
consistently encountered this narrative of farmer’s discomfort towards futures trading. 
Jackie Lower answered his own question about the fundamental reason why farmers 
don’t trade the contract, making it a thin market, by saying “Farmers who use futures… 
few used it and did well, as a hedger, but there is so many more than that have used 
it at some point and got burned. So they stay away from it.” Interviewees often reported 
attempting to use futures at some point, losing money through bad decision making, 
and never coming back. They did not always do so themselves, but recall instead, the 
bitter experience of their fathers. This fits the argument of Pennings and Leuthold  
(2000, p. 916) that “the decision to use futures is not solely made by the farmer, but it 
is also influenced by the opinions of others”, especially family members. As a result of 
personal or their relative's negative experiences, for many farmers, the futures market 
represents more of a risk than a safety net. 
“I think they are terrified of being wrong” about their hedging strategy, Milo Hamilton69 
told me. In fact, farmers are right – trading futures contracts and active financial risk 
management should not be part of their professional attributes. To benefit from a 
futures market, less sophisticated farmers should instead be offered (and use) OTC 
hedging products offered by intermediaries rather than managing their positions 
directly on the futures market and produce their own financial strategies (Paul, Heifner, 
& Helmuth, 1976; Tomek, Effects of futures and options trading on farm incomes., 
                                                 




1987). However, this offer is rare in the American rice market, and the following 
sections attempt to explain why. 
f. Processors: the missing key 
The condition for increased participation in price risk trading on the rice market does 
not lie in the direct participation of farmers in the futures market. Instead, commercial 
intermediaries would be the key to the development of derivatives trading. By serving 
as the bridge between the farmers and the futures market by offering OTC contracts, 
they increase both the sophistication of the market structure through an increase in 
derivatives instruments and increase the ability of farmers to trade risk since those 
contracts are tailored to their needs and constraints. In this section, I start by illustrating 
the functioning of this intermediary level of financial development on the American 
wheat market before explaining the failure to build such a system in the American 
Southern rice market.  
i. Intermediaries on the wheat market 
In the US, the wheat market illustrates indirect access to futures contracts. The 
commercial participation in CME futures is greatly due to the variety of OTC derivatives 
offered to farmers by intermediaries, whether they are elevators, co-operatives, 
brokers, grain merchants or processing companies. 
Brorsen and Anderson (1994) have listed two alternative options to the use of futures 
for farmers. While I discussed spreading the timing of sales before, I look this time into 
the forwarding option. Forward contracts are the most basic type of access to price 
risk management offered to wheat farmers, mostly by local elevators (Henderson & 
Fitzgerald, 2008). The basic price formula for a forward contract is the price of the 
futures contract plus the local basis. Forwards present, for farmers, a variety of 
advantages over futures. They solve the issue of managing margin calls, as well as 
basis risk for farmers since they deliver the grain instead of financially settling against 
the futures price (Nelson, 1985; Mark, Brorsen, Anderson, & Small, 2008; Taylor, 
Tonsor, & Dhuyvetter, 2013). Nelson (1985) finds that lumpiness (the difference 
between the desired quantity contracted and the quantity specified by a futures 
contract) is another factor why farmers, especially smaller-scale ones, prefer forwards: 
since futures contracts are standardised, the contract size is likely to not match the 
optimum quantity to be hedged, which results in over-hedging or under-hedging. As 
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the quantity contracted through a forward contract is decided ad hoc, this issue does 
not arise. To lay off the risk induced by such forward contract offerings, elevators need 
to engage in another offsetting derivative. One option is to buy a subsequent forward 
with an exporter, a flour miller or any other end-user that will carry the basis risk and 
hedging cost (Brorsen, Coombs, & Anderson, 1993). However, such contracts are not 
necessarily consistently offered. Often, the elevator offsets the risk on the futures 
market instead, taking on a short position. Therefore, it will assume the basis risk and 
hedging costs, although those costs are often passed on to the farmer, in the form of 
a premium included in the forward contract (Brorsen, Coombs, & Anderson, 1993; 
Townsend & Brorsen, 2000; Taylor, Tonsor, & Dhuyvetter, 2013). The main reason for 
elevators to offer the contract is to ensure their supply of wheat (Mark, Brorsen, 
Anderson, & Small, 2008). As elevators need to offset their long positions in those 
OTC contracts with a short futures position, farmers indirectly generate liquidity in the 
wheat futures market.   
Elevators also offer alternative contracts to farmers, giving them more flexibility on the 
way they marketise the wheat. Apart from forwards, two main types of contract can be 
used: hedge-to-arrive contracts (HTA) and basis contracts. Both involve delivery 
agreements similar to those of a forward contract. HTA contracts allow fixing the 
futures price while leaving the basis between the futures and the local cash price open. 
This is interesting for farmers if the ongoing basis at contracting time is wider than the 
normal average basis. Elevators will cover the HTA with a short futures position. The 
basis can be established anytime between when the contract is signed and delivery. 
Until the basis is established, an HTA is the equivalent of a futures position for a farmer 
as it leaves basis risk open, except that they will be able to lock in the basis when they 
wish, and they are not exposed to margin calls. Basis contracts offer the opposite 
opportunity. The basis between the futures and the local cash price is established 
upon signing the contract, while the futures price remains open. Those contracts are 
interesting for farmers when the basis is narrower than normal or is likely to widen 
while they are not ready to fix the futures price, as they believe this one will increase. 
Just as for HTA, the farmer can fix the futures price when they wish, converting the 
basis contract into a forward. To cover for their obligations to buy the grain, elevators 
need to take a long position in the futures market until the futures price in the basis 
contract is fixed.  
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By making these kinds of contracts available, elevators increase the sophistication of 
the market structure since it widens the derivatives instrument alternatives to futures. 
Forward contracts, HTA and basis contracts increase the opportunities to trade risk 
and, most importantly, to pack or unpack price risk and basis risk. Additionally, they 
contribute to the increasing of farmers’ ability to trade risk since those contracts are 
tailored to their needs and constraints, especially avoiding issues of margin calls. 
Finally, by involving farmers indirectly in futures markets (as OTCs need to be covered 
by futures positions) they trigger an increase in open interests. This is likely to attract 
a larger pool of speculators, creating the liquidity necessary for farmers who would 
want to be directly active in futures.  
In addition, other market participants get involved in providing risk management tools 
to farmers based on futures. For instance, the marketing branches of certain farmers 
co-operatives70 can set up contracts for producers to perform hedge functions for 
them. I interviewed an analyst in one of these co-op owned companies in Illinois, who 
worked with the co-operative system to offer OTC pricing solutions. He explained that 
one of the popular products is an exotic cash grain contract: these are OTC 
accumulators, priced on the model of Asian options. Those contracts price a 
commodity continuously over a period of time, often against the futures market. For 
instance, a producer wishing to sell 10k bushel of rice in 100 days from the day he 
enters the contract, would see 1/100 of his crop being priced against the futures every 
day during that pricing period. This means 100 bushels would be priced every day in 
relation to the prevailing market price. This allows smoothing price variation, reducing 
the impact of large market movements. Hedging also comes in with the application of 
ad hoc price floors and ceilings. The seller and the buyer agree on certain limits for 
the contract. If the price goes over and under those limits, the volume yet to be priced 
is entirely priced at this price floor or ceiling. These contracts can be constructed in 
many ways, with varying levels of complexity, since they are made ad hoc. Co-
operatives are not the only ones offering such contracts. Big grain trading companies 
such as ADM and Cargill also do. This shows how the variety of market actors are 
                                                 
70 These are not milling co-operatives pooling the grain and holding it all the way to retail like in rice. 
Instead, these are input and marketising co-ops that do not take part in milling the grain. Instead of 
pooling the wheat, they provide farmers with fuel, fertilisers and seeds, while also helping them to move 
the grain down the supply chain.    
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involved in the development of the derivatives market through the involvement of 
farmers. However, it is worth noticing that all these prices mechanisms also rely, for 
pricing, on the good functioning of the futures’ price discovery, thus requiring an 
advanced degree of financial development.   
ii. Lack of rice millers' participation in access to the futures 
Such widespread use of OTCs offered by intermediaries to farmers is nowhere as 
common on the rice market as it is on the wheat market. If the farmers’ concerns about 
using the futures directly is real, the absence of a large OTC market is a problem of a 
different nature. Milo Hamilton soon referred to this issue faced by farmers:   
“They have a basic problem, that is, if you go from the north of Arkansas south, 
with the exception of one firm along the gulf coast, Supreme Rice Mill, nobody 
will offer the farmers a stay in the market idea, as a pricing mechanism. … You 
can do that on your own by funding options and futures. But the problem with 
funding futures as an individual farmer is that the price can double or triple on 
you, and then suddenly you realise your banker you thought was a friend is no 
longer a friend.” 
Milo was raising the recurring issue of financing futures trading and managing margin 
calls. Interestingly, he referred to futures as the alternative solution to OTCs, 
confirming the sentiment that OTCs should be the default optimal instruments used by 
farmers in grain markets. This subsection explores the reason behind the lack of OTCs 
offered by intermediaries. I argue that most millers do not find the need to use futures 
contracts for themselves, limiting the financial development in the first place. In 
addition, although some farmers do forward contracting when it is offered, the 
manageability of their price risk, discussed earlier in this chapter, means that they are 
not under an uncontrollable pressure to become more sophisticated; this would force 
millers to offer these solutions.  
The structure of the rice market and the farmers’ ability to store rice implies that the 
next actor in the supply chain is often not an elevator but a mill. Therefore, before 
mentioning the price risk management opportunities offered to producers by their 
trading counterpart, it is necessary to look at the processing options available to 
farmers, as processors would be the ones that could offer those OTCs. In fact, the 
number of options for farmers is limited. In Arkansas, the processing is dominated by 
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the two co-ops that compete with only a handful of smaller mills. In Louisiana, one mill 
is the main destination for rough rice in the north - Kennedy Rice Mill. Kennedy's 
subsidiary in South Louisiana, Planters Rice Mill, was closed in the weeks before I 
arrived in Louisiana in the summer of 2017. This left the gulf area of Louisiana with 
only three mills. In Acadia, Crowley, a town self-named the rice capital of the US, two 
mills face each other on both sides of a little road: Supreme Rice Mill, a large 
processing facility, and Falcon Rice Mill, a smaller entity. Further west, next to the 
border with Texas, Farmers Rice Milling Company also processes a large share of the 
gulf rice. Two more mills can be found on the other side of the Texan border: Beaumont 
Rice Mills and Doguet's Milling Company. In addition, a couple of intermediaries in the 
area can help farmers to sell their paddy directly in Central America where it will be 
milled. As each mill operates essentially in its area, it leaves farmers with little option 
but to sell to that mill.   
As mentioned before, Supreme Rice Mill is the only entity consistently giving farmers 
access to the futures market by contracting with them and managing their positions. 
This is mostly due to one person, the Vice President and procurement manager John 
Morgan. Actors of the Louisiana rice market recurrently referred to him when it came 
to futures. “John Morgan would explain that better than me” was a frequent comment 
by my interviewees. This illustrates how rare futures market expertise is in this 
industry, while it is common in others. After studying accounting and finance at LSU, 
John Morgan worked in the gas industry in Texas, before joining Supreme Rice Mill. 
His experience in a financially developed industry such as energy trading contributed 
to his own sophistication as a market actor, which he brought with him to the Louisiana 
rice industry. He manages the price risk of the mill using the futures to avoid being 
caught between his long and short physical positions while processing the rice. 
However, more importantly, he offers OTC solutions for farmers. These are short-term 
forward contracts where the mill bids in August before taking delivery in 
September/October. More importantly, John Morgan offers basis contracts and HTA 
to farmers, just like in other grains markets. He also offers unpriced contracts for which 
he takes delivery of the grain after harvest but constructs an average price based on 
futures between August and November. John Morgan offers these contracts partly 
because he believes that the development of derivatives facilitates risk management 
for all market participants, facilitating everybody’s business. Most importantly, offering 
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such contracts allows him to retain his supplying farmers as he provides them with 
more than a destination for their rice. For the farmers willing to hedge with derivatives, 
this becomes a key element in the choice of the mill they work for. That Supreme Rice 
Mill offers these contracts is significant for the financial development of the gulf coast 
market as it increases the ability of farmers to take marketing decisions depending on 
their risk appetite. Many farmers I interviewed referred to the OTC offers from 
Supreme Rice Mill as a game-changer. Some explained that they used to sometimes 
feel limited by their financial education to use futures, but they were always listening 
to what sort of hedging solutions could come from this mill. John Morgan was helping 
them making coherent marketing decisions. John Denison, the farm manager, 
explained to me the difference between managing his own futures positions to shifting 
to OTC in those terms: 
“Twenty-four years ago [when he first took his job] the mills did not offer me any 
futures services for rice. I was forced to do it myself. Now this mill is offering me 
the use of the futures market to help manage my price risk. So it's a lot more 
efficient and cheaper to let them do it than having my own broker's account. I 
would have to provide my own margin, manage that margin. So that's one less 
layer of administrative cost that I can cut out. They're bigger, they have a bigger 
portfolio, they can manage it a lot better than I can manage it directly myself.” 
If John Morgan and Supreme Mill are a hedging solution for farmers, he stands as an 
exception in the Gulf. Other millers are not active in offering hedging solutions; some 
do not even hedge for themselves. I aimed at understanding why. Firstly, for smaller 
mills of the southern market, their restricted storage capacities mean that they do not 
hold the grain for more than two or three months. In addition, since they also sell spot, 
they can adjust their selling price. Only for the rice that goes directly to retail under the 
mill’s brand can an issue arise, since retailers will require a 60-day notice to adjust the 
price on the shelf. However, millers perceive that as a minor risk. As a result, despite 
the possibility of being sometimes squeezed between buying and selling, some millers 
do not believe they have a real need for risk management for themselves. Also, some 
millers have a sense that the futures do not perform well enough to be used. They 
echo the issue of liquidity exposed in section one of this chapter, arguing that the 
speculative funds can move the market widely and that the convergence is not 
consistent enough to be trusted. Some millers have expressed the wish to use the 
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futures contract if it was liquid and consistent, but believe that at this stage, it is not 
viable.   
In terms of providing solutions to farmers, this does not seem to be a concern for other 
millers. They understand the futures market exclusively as a tool to potentially hedge 
their own risk. As they do not believe in doing so, they naturally do not think that 
offering access to the market to farmers would make sense either. More importantly, 
they do not have the full expertise to do so and little incentive to develop it because of 
the lack of competition. As mentioned before, one mill often dominates one 
geographical area, leaving farmers with little choice where to deliver the rice. As a 
result, the mills do not have the same pressure in securing the supply of grain as wheat 
elevators have, pushing them to offer OTC contracts. However, this could change with 
the opening of new channels, involving exporting rough rice directly to Central 
America, which millers are deeply concerned about. Milo Hamilton told me that millers 
do not understand that their job, according to him, was not only to process the rice but 
also to lay off risk for the market. This was confirmed by a miller saying he did not think 
he had to involve futures in his business, as it had been functioning well for years 
without. Interestingly, the millers who complained about the lack of liquidity in the 
contract do not perceive that they could generate this liquidity by attracting the farmers 
in the market through offering OTCs. This is one more expression of the catch 22 of 
market participants wanting liquidity but rejecting the responsibility of creating it.   
Millers are not necessarily the only intermediaries that could help farmers gain indirect 
access to the futures market. Milo Hamilton pointed to merchants, such as elevator 
operators, that take possession of the rough rice before it is milled. Equally, brokers 
or even exporters of rough rice could perform the hedging for producers. However, the 
rice market is stuck in this vicious cycle of lacking the expertise in derivatives trading. 
Therefore, to many it does not seem worth acquiring. A broker71, who earlier in his 
career worked for a mill and ran an elevator, told me clearly that he advised his farmers 
clients to use the futures but without telling them how because his own knowledge was 
not complete enough. When he had his own elevator, he hired a professional to 
manage his futures positions. Bigger trading companies could help farmers access the 
futures like they do in grain but would in fact not do it because the volumes handled 
                                                 
71 Interview with a US rice broker, Louisiana, August 2017. 
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by rice farmers are too small. The size of market agents in rice acts as an obstacle to 
financial development.      
The financial education of farmers is not responsible for the lack of liquidity. Most 
farmers simply follow the marketing habits of the commodity they trade in. It does not 
take much financial knowledge for farmers to use OTC contracts. They have always 
done so to sell their soybeans because it is the standard of the industry, but do not 
question their absence for rice. John Morgan confessed that still most of the farmers 
he works with do not use his OTCs and explained clearly that most of the rice 
purchased is on the spot. It takes time to transform the marketising practices of an 
industry. However, just as on other grain markets, the more common those products 
are, the more they are used by farmers. So far, the offer of OTCs has attracted the 
consumption, rather than its demand forcing the supply. The discussions about risk 
perception, diversification and the rice program that came earlier have also 
suppressed the vital need for forward pricing. It is beneficial for farmers, but the 
difference in doing so or not is not significant enough to put pressure on millers. The 
farmers that are not pursuing price hedging are not acting as profit-maximising 
individuals.   
Many times my interviewees argued that the demand for OTCs might increase in the 
future as many new American rice farmers have gone to university in recent years, 
and most of them have studied agricultural economics in colleges of the Midwest. As 
a result, their awareness of the functioning of derivatives in other grain markets may 
put pressure on intermediaries to offer basis contracts and HTA. To sum up, the 
increased sophistication through education of new market actors that are young 
farmers could pressure other market actors, the processors and merchants, to become 
sophisticated themselves in order to create derivative products that will increase the 
sophistication of the market structure. This will, in turn, lower the requirements for 
farmers to be involved in risk trading, sophisticating them further.   
V) Discussion 
Diagnosing the situation of the Chicago Rough Rice contract is difficult because it is 
an exception within two spheres. Within the US commodity markets, rice futures are a 
failure because they remain mostly unliquid. However, within the context of the largely 
financially under developped rice market, it is mostly a success. The fact that market 
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participants who stay away from derivative trading make conscious decision not to do 
so is almost unique in the rice industry.  
At first glance, both the success and the failure of the Rough Rice contract seem highly 
specific. The small size of the physical market and its internal organization making 
very little of the crop eligible for trading on the futures market, the issues of production 
risk exacerbated on the Gulf coast and the particular model of diversified farming in 
Louisiana, as well as the small numbers of millers being mostly unfamiliar with futures 
trading, are characteristics unlikely to be often met in American crop markets.  
Similarly, there are ad hoc features of the US rice industry that guaranteed some 
success, but these were unlikely to be found elsewhere on the rice market: the 
financial sophistication of few key market players such as Milo Hamilton, John Morgan 
and a few farmers and the fact that the US is the most financially developed country 
in the world, with CME the largest commodity futures exchange on earth, are example 
of this singularity. However, that does not mean that the experience of the CME rice 
contract is not  of significance to the general study of financial development. 
The first major takeaway of this case is that the failure of a market to develop financially 
does not have to be caused by a single factor. Instead, it can be a case of multiple 
issues colliding. All the issues discussed in this chapter individually, such as the farm 
program, the ability to physically hedge of the lack of OTC offered by farmers all 
deplete liquidity. If these issues had not arisen, the market would likely be a little more 
liquid. This confirms the idea that instead of being prerequisites, we are mostly 
examining variables that modulate the level of financial development that is 
achievable.  
The other key lesson of the case of the US Rough Rice market is that the profile of 
industry participants is key to the process of financial development. Although it 
matters, this goes beyond the simple analysis of the actors’ sophistication. Their 
propensity to trade risk depends on their risk preference determined by their business 
practices. This, in part, will determine their willingness to enhance their sophistication. 
If a farmer is exposed to a great deal of price risk, or a miller needs to offer OTCs to 
get clients, it is likely that these actors will push to acquire the level of sophistication 
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required.72 The business profile of market actors therefore needs to occupy a large 
place in the study of financial development. For instance, the ability of market actors 
to hedge physically or diversify alter their propensity to hedge.  
It is not only the propensity of market actors to hedge that matters, but also the 
propensity of key market actors to boycott a contract. The case of American rice co-
ops not wishing to give farmers the ability to manage their risk independently shows 
how financial development can weaken the market power of some actors. The study 
of market power is, therefore, also necessary and should be continued through this 
thesis. This chapter illustrates how a few actors controlling too much of a market make 
it less likely to develop financially, either because these actors will refuse to participate 
in derivative trading and deprive financial markets of liquidity, or because whe n 
participating, they will create an unbalanced futures market. This narrative about key 
actors suggests that, beyond contract managers only, different individuals can 
determine the outcome of financial development.  
Finally, the case of the US gives a first example of the importance of the relationship 
between OTC markets and futures markets, both through the successes of the wheat 
market and the failure of the rice industry to trade risk. Futures markets serve as an 
outlet for the risk traded between less sophisticated physical market actors, while OTC 
trading backed up with futures contract provide the futures market with additional 
liquidity. Financial development is therefore contingent to the existence of physical 
market stakeholders acting as financial intermediaries.   
 
VI) Conclusion  
In this chapter, I examined the low liquidity phenomenon in the US rough rice futures 
market. The lack of participation in the contract implies inefficiency in the futures 
pricing relative to cash and results in further convergence issues.  As a result, the 
contract is not considered by many participants as a viable solution. Therefore, there 
is doubt that they consider the market structure as sophisticated, despite the existence 
                                                 
72 This argument needs to be moderated by reminding that all variables are not in the control of these 
market actors. I will argue in Chapter VI that farmers in Southeast Asia do not have the same potential 
for enhancing sophistication. 
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of the futures contract. I subsequently tried to examine why only a few market actors 
chose to use the futures contract. Firstly, I argued that there seems to be no major 
contract flaw and the few issues found, benefiting from the possibility of quick fixes for 
the rice contract, have been solved since my time in Chicago. However, this did not 
result in increased liquidity; reinforcing the argument that contract specifications are 
not the source of the problem.  
Subsequently, I examined the size of the American rice market and found that a large 
share of the rice produced in the US was not eligible for hedging on the CBOT contract. 
This is in part because certain varieties do not correlate with the long-grain rough rice 
covered by the contract, but also because the co-operative marketing system in place 
in Arkansas does not involve price risk that would justify the need for hedging. The 
thinness of the cash market underlying the futures could thus explain some limitations 
of the liquidity. However, the Louisiana and Texas market, where I carried out my 
research, could legitimately use the futures. Despite that, most stakeholders there do 
not. This is particularly critical for the exchange when it comes to farmers because 
their number could represent an important source of participation. I argue that 
expecting farmers to participate directly in futures trading themselves is misplaced. 
Transaction costs are too high for them to be directly active on futures markets. They 
do not do so on other markets either but instead use intermediaries. Some farmers 
acknowledge the benefit of OTCs and use them when they are provided by a miller. 
However, these farmers were often sophisticated enough to attempt using futures 
contracts before. Others are less interested in derivative contracts because, despite 
price volatility, the level of risk is suppressed in various ways, such as diversification 
and the farm program. In addition, some have the perception that the crop risk is higher 
than the price risk. As a result, these less sophisticated producers do not pressure 
processors and other intermediaries to become more sophisticated and provide 
indirect access to the futures market. It transpires that a lot of these issues are the 
result of long-term habits. Nevertheless, there seems to be a prospect of slow market 
transformation that would see more sophisticated actors involved, eventually 
contributing to the sophistication of the market structure and resulting in the 
accelerating dynamic of financial development of the US rice market. For now, the 
level of liquidity, allowing the contract to remain listed, is provided by sufficiently 
sophisticated actors alongside the Gulf coast, such as John Morgan and his client 
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farmers. This emphasises the important role of physical market actors in the process 
of financial development. 
This case study teaches us important lessons for the study of the development of a 
derivatives market, beyond the US rice market, that will re-emerge in later chapters. 
One is the importance of the interaction between the futures contract and an OTC 
market. For example, the Vietnam case in Chapter VI will show that targeting coffee 
farmers for direct liquidity in local coffee futures has caused damage to the futures 
market. I also exposed how the market actors' risk profile and their ability to manage 
risk away from derivatives plays a part in the success of futures. In particular, the US 
rice farmers' habit of managing risk through storage will be met again with Thai rice 
exporters. This chapter has demonstrated that even a well-engineered contract could 
face difficulties in increasing the sophistication of the market structure. Finally, the 
vicious cycle of non-convergence was illustrated. This constant threat of illiquid 
deliverable contracts is a key notion to assimilate. I will argue in Chapter VII that not 





Chapter IV: The Political Burden of the 
Rice Market 
 
 “So… rice is involved in a lot of politics” a US rice trader told me as they spoke at 
length about rice price volatility. Although only a brief mention, it hinted one of this 
thesis’ hypotheses for explaining the low financial development of the rice market. In 
the previous chapters, it appeared that the US farm program influenced the propensity 
of farmers to use the Chicago rough rice contract. Although I do not argue that it is a 
major hindering factor in the US, it was a first hint that government interventions in the 
physical market might influence the use of futures. In this chapter, I investigate 
whether the politicization of rice could affect the prospect of functioning derivatives in 
the wider market. This comes to question whether the condition discussed in Chapter 
II, “price freely determined”, is a missing variable that can partially or fully explain the 
lack of financial development in rice.  
This chapter argues that the strong politicization of the rice market, and the way it 
affects the market, is an important factor in its inability to develop financially. Despite 
this, I reject the idea that every politicization of an agricultural market is enough to 
counteract all dynamics of financial development. I start by defining the concept of 
politicization and articulate the forms it can take. I subsequently explain why 
politicization is usually expected to be an obstacle to the financial development of 
commodity markets. After briefly discussing the political salience of food markets in 
general, I detail why rice is the most political crop of all. I illustrate this with the case 
of rice in Thailand. Thereafter, I engage in a comparative exercise, by showing that 
the low politicization of the wheat and coffee markets seems to confirm that financial 
development thrives in the absence of government intervention. However, the case of 
the sugar market, a highly politicised market with functioning futures contracts, will 
raise doubts about politicization as a single factor against financial development. 
Furthermore, a detailed comparison will help understand that all forms of politicization 
are not equal when it comes to their impact on price risk. Compared to other 
agricultural markets, the politicization of rice is characterised by its unpredictability and 
its impact in all exporting countries. Therefore, I argue that the politicization of rice 
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suppresses the liquidity of derivatives for rice, but that the case of sugar, and to lesser 
extent wheat and coffee, show that even when prices are not freely determined, there 
is a scope for futures contracts to function. 
I) Understanding politicization 
a. Defining politicization 
The term politicization is often used in the commodity finance, agricultural economics 
and political economy of food literature. However, it is largely undefined and used as 
a self-explanatory concept, or as a substitute for another concept: government 
intervention. These interventions can come in the form of market regulation, 
supervision or participation, or alteration of market mechanisms. Politicization is 
mostly understood as the opposite of liberalisation.  
I distinguish between politicization and government intervention. While not mutually 
exclusive and often linked, they are not the same concept. In this thesis, I assume that 
the sine qua non condition to politicization is the manifestation of political salience. 
This is to say that market dynamics are diverted from their classical economic “natural 
balance” due to the interlinkage with political affairs. Politicization is a measure of a 
government’s (or another ruling political entity) propensity to intervene in a market 
being influenced by politics. That is, the political entity acts either because it believes 
its action will result in a political gain, or that a lack of action would result in a political 
loss. A simple illustration would be a government acting on an agricultural market to 
achieve food security, as a failure to do so could result in civil unrest or electoral defeat. 
Ultimately, when intervening in the market, the expected result (intermediary objective) 
of the intervention within the market is only a means to reach a goal (final objective) 
exogenous to the market. For example, state A applies an embargo on strategic goods 
against state B. The final objective would not be to harm state B’s export performances 
of these goods (this is the intermediary objective), but instead to have state B altering 
its political agenda due to the pressure of the intermediary objective. 
Why, then, are government interventions and politicization different? Firstly, a 
government can take a role in a market despite a lack of political salience. In this case, 
the function of the government is understood as bureaucratic or technocratic. The 
welfare provided by public policies benefit entities endogenous to the market. 
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Secondly, politicization does not only materialise when governments intervene, but 
also when there is a potential for political gain for a political entity if it were to distort 
the market. A political party running for an election can politicize a market by promising 
to intervene in this market to attract votes. The resulting uncertainty around the 
potential intervention (depending on whether the party is elected, or whether they fulfi l 
their promises) can trigger market reactions related to market participants’ 
expectations. Politicization can thus create market distortions without actual public 
interventions.  
One more detail will be useful in this chapter: the nature of the political salience. A 
distinction that will be useful is to distinguish between domestic or international political 
salience. This is to ask if the policy put in place by a government has for its final 
objective an effect on domestic politics (such as electoral gain, secured internal 
stability related to citizens’ satisfaction, harming of a political rival etc.) or international 
politics (essentially the achievement of a foreign policy goal). 
b. Forms of government interventions 
Whether public bodies intervene in the market or not, the previous section articulated 
that it is the perceived likelihood for politically motivated intervention that is the 
measure of politicization. This section explains the tools that governments have at 
their disposal to intervene in agricultural markets. To understand these mechanisms, 
it is useful first to shortly define what governments primarily aim for when intervening. 
This is about determining what the intermediary objective is. Essentially, when 
governments set up agricultural and food policies or temporary interventions in 
agricultural markets, they often pursue one of these three main objectives: affecting 
the production and/or supply of an agricultural product, affecting its price, or enhancing 
farmers’ revenues. The line between these categories can be blurry, as they tend to 
impact each other: higher prices trigger higher revenues, as well as send signals to 
plant more. More production in turn supresses prices. Governments can therefore 
intervene at different levels depending on whether they want those chain reactions. 
For example, they could artificially set high prices to enhance producers’ revenue, and 
remove the extra supply resulting from the incentive, from the free market, to plant. 
However, they can also attempt to achieve revenue enhancement without 
manipulating market prices (through direct subsidies to farmers). This is the case when 
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the government also needs to look after populations vulnerable to high food prices. 
Although we tend to think intuitively that governments mostly aim for increases in 
production, few reasons can push them to attempt a reduction. That can be to trigger 
a rise in prices or to reduce inputs consumption, such as fertilisers or water, for 
environmental reasons.  
Here is a short non-exhaustive review of the commonly used policy instruments to 
achieve these objectives: 
- Price setting and procurement: The government can set a reference price at 
which it purchases a crop from farmers and build stocks that it will later resell, 
domestically or internationally. If the government attempts to increase market 
prices, it can set a high reference price, forcing private traders competing for 
procurement to increase their offer. 
- Buffer stock: The government can procure the crop from farmers without setting 
a reference price and build a buffer stock. The goal is to offset price fluctuations 
by withdrawing some supply from the market when there is a surplus pushing 
prices down. It can be reintroduce later when a shortage pushes prices up.  
- Revenue insurance: If the government does not want to influence prices directly 
but instead only producers’ revenue, it can set a reference price and, when the 
market price goes below this reference price, pay farmers the difference.  
- Production/consumption subsidies: The government can provide every 
producer or consumer with financial aid to help them produce or consume. This 
can come in the form of direct cash payment, government credits and loans or 
tax cuts. 
- Export/Import quotas or bans: The governments can control the amount of a 
crop leaving/entering the country by setting quotas or even impose bans. This 
allows control of the supply available domestically, and eventually affects 
domestic prices.  
- Export/import tariffs: These are taxes that exporters/importers must pay when 
moving goods across borders. They act as disincentives against international 
trading by making the product less competitive in the destination country. It can 
result in more supply remaining in the origin country/less entering the 
destination country. 
- International agreements: Governments can enter international agreements to 
organise global trade and attempt to influence prices by controlling supply and 
demand at the international level. 
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- Government to government trade: Finally, governments can engage in direct 
trading on the international market to, on the one hand, sell domestic production 
or stock excess, and on the other, compensate for domestic shortages of 
supply. 
c. Effects of politicization on futures contracts 
As this chapter aims at demonstrating that the form of high politicization affecting the 
rice market contributes to the failure of derivative finance for this grain, I will describe 
the extent to which it is a politically salient crop. This section serves to provide a 
theoretical background to the proposed link between politicization and financial 
development. Politicization, when it results in government interventions actively 
influencing prices, reduces the incentive to trade derivatives due to a reduction in 
volatility, and therefore risk. Politicization can also affect the propensity to speculate 
when it produces important political uncertainty. Later in this chapter, I will argue that 
rice is politicized to an extent and in a form that no other agricultural commodity is. 
i. Reduction of volatility 
Government intervention, when price manipulation is directly targeted as the 
intermediary goal of politicization, can reduce the day to day volatility of the market, or 
narrow the range of price risk. For instance, a government procuring a commodity 
significantly above market price artificially fixes the price, and there is no price risk left 
to hedge and speculate. Therefore, there is, no more need for a derivatives market. In 
a nutshell, there is no ability to trade risk if there is no risk to be traded. This dynamic 
is more of a problem for futures contracts than OTC contracts because of the fragile 
nature of futures contracts exposed in Chapter II. If volatility is disrupted, participation 
in the futures contract disappears as there is no risk for hedgers nor profit to be made 
for speculators. The politicization leaves time for the futures contract to die out in the 
process, and when free-floating prices are restored, the hedging instrument has 
disappeared. Even if the exchange decides to keep the contract listed until the end of 
the government intervention (those are often temporary as they are budgetarily difficult 
to maintain), the exchange needs to restart entirely the process of building up liquidity 
once the market is freed from political interference. OTC contracts do not have this 
issue because it is an agreement between two parties that does not require market 
liquidity. However, as I will explain in Chapter VII, OTC contracts are rarely used 
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without the support of a terminal futures market, so the entire process of sophistication 
of the market structure is disrupted.  
Even if prices are not fixed, their variation range can be constrained by certain policies 
such as the introduction price floors and ceilings, or a public offer of free minimum 
price insurance, as was the case with the American farm program mentioned in 
Chapter III. In this case, the use of futures contracts is not halted as there is still room 
for prices to move at different levels above the minimum insured price or between the 
price ceiling and floor. However, when governments’ policies reduce the volatility, 
speculators are less inclined to get involved in the market as the prospects for profits 
are reduced. In addition, some physical market participants who are not completely 
risk-averse might consider that they can afford any of those movements and leave the 
price unlocked within the government boundaries. Governments providing price 
insurance act as competitors to futures markets, taking away a part of the hedging 
need for the farmers that are only concerned about severe falls in prices. Government 
interventions would always act as some impediment to hedging activity in the 
underlying commodity, but dependent on the extent of the price intervention, it is not 
an absolute impediment. Part of the argument in this chapter is that what has a major 
influence on the level of intervention is the level of politicization of the particular market.  
ii. Production of political uncertainty 
The reduction of volatility noted in the previous section is not always the prevalent 
result of the politicization of the market. The first reason is that, as I will show many 
times in this chapter, it is very frequent for agricultural policies to fail to achieve their 
expected goals when it comes to price stabilisation. Even when they do, the success 
in price risk reduction depends on which time frame and from which geographical 
location the actions of governments are observed. 
In this subsection, I argue that the announcement of policies derived from 
politicization, the uncertainty about their success or failure, and their abandonment 
creates difficulties in reading the direction of the market and understand price risk. 
This can contract the liquidity as adopting effective futures strategies becomes more 
difficult, especially for speculators. Although political uncertainty can increase the 




The effect of political uncertainty on equity finance has been extensively researched. 
Under a variety of circumstances, studies have demonstrated that political uncertainty 
has consistently caused higher levels of volatility in the value of financial assets, 
especially depressing stock prices. Pastor and Veronesi (2012) found that government 
policy changes trigger falls in stock prices. Savita and Ramesh (2015) show that 
political risk, which they define as the unforeseeable changes in public policy that 
affects investment values, is higher before elections and consequently increases 
return volatility and option prices. Chau, Deesomsak and Wang (2014) found an 
increase in the volatility of Islamic stock markets during the Arab Spring. This result 
was supported by Trabelsi Mnif (2017), who found that the Arab Spring caused 
temporary higher levels of financial volatility and more pronounced stock market 
cycles. Liu, Shu and Wei (2017) examined the effect of the Bo scandal73 on stock 
prices in China and found that a mostly political case depressed stock prices.  
Although these studies do not cover derivative finance, especially commodities, the 
behaviour of investors (in equity finance) and speculators (in commodity derivative 
finance) towards political risk is expected to be similar. However, those researchers 
only show that political uncertainty affects financial markets. By analysing volatility and 
prices, they do not explicitly tell us about the effect on liquidity or participation in those 
markets, and therefore on financial development. Investors selling their assets and 
leaving the market is potentially one reason explaining the fall in stock prices. Bearish 
trends on markets struck by political shocks can be interpreted as signs of 
disinvestment. However, it is also possible that investors simply revalue the stocks 
and buy them back at lower prices, potentially based on the revision of credit risk by 
Credit Rating Agencies. The rise in volatility suggests nervousness of the market on 
the revaluation of assets rather than withdrawal of investment that would trigger a 
unidirectional fall in prices. A study by Le and Zak (2006) takes us closer to 
understanding the effect of political risk on market participation. The authors look at 
the effect of political instability and policy uncertainty on capital flight in developing 
economies. They find that political risk does affect investors' asset allocation decisions 
and accelerates capital flight. Similarly, in their in-depth review of research in emerging 
                                                 
73 In 2012, Bo Xilai, a rising star of Chinese politics, member of the Politburo, and his wife, were accused 
of involvement in the murder of a British businessman with whom they allegedly shared financial ties.  
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markets finance, Bekaert and Harvey (2002) attest that political risk (which they 
consider more prominent in those emerging markets) is one of the factors discouraging 
foreign investment.  
Much of the research I referred to examines political risk related to a country level 
political instability rather than the politicization of a specific market. They look at the 
risk of political shocks creating collateral damage to those markets. Those political 
shocks do often impact commodity markets in the same way they could impact stock 
markets. For instance, when Ozdemir et al. look at the effects of political factors upon 
oil market prices, they look at external shocks such as “the 9/11 terrorist attack, 
political turmoil in Venezuela and the Second Gulf War are the most important shocks 
of this period” (Ozdemir, Gokmenoglu, & Ekinci, 2013). However, they also mention 
price alterations caused by OPEC policies, which is a form of politicization of the 
market. Ultimately there are two different cases, one being political actors actively 
looking at controlling the market, the other being political issues making market 
participants re-evaluate market prices. This chapter is concerned with the former, but 
the two cases have two things in common. First, they introduce a political variable to 
the price formation, which is no longer based on the microeconomics of supply and 
demand. Second, they tend to boost volatility. 
The question here is why political risk would deplete liquidity in commodity markets 
when volatility is a pre-requisite for financial development.74 The reason is that political 
risk is difficult to forecast, even more so to model. “I think political risk should be called 
political uncertainty” Lamon Rutten told me. By using the Knightian distinction of what 
is quantifiable or not, he had just put in words the concern that many of my 
interviewees had expressed. This is that political risk is difficult to analyse correctly in 
a price risk model because of its randomness and qualitative nature. In contrast, a 
weather risk can, for instance, be expressed with historical numerical data and 
probabilities, looking at how a given increase in rainfall would increase production. It 
would also consider how the modified resulting supply would impact prices. In the case 
of a political event, even if the probability of such events could be roughly measured, 
it would be difficult to transpose that into an estimated price change. At least, it would 
require tremendous data analytics resources. It should be emphasised that even in 
                                                 
74 See Chapter II 
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the absence of on-going major political action upon the physical market, futures market 
participants are concerned about the potential for unexpected political disruption. 
Unlike weather events such as rainfall above seasonal averages, which appear in the 
eye of market observer over time and smoothly affect prices, political decisions come 
individually and are difficult to forecast. “The problem is not politics per se, the problem 
is unpredictable politics” Lamon Rutten summarised further and in a few words 
explained a small but vital distinction. Although politics affects all markets, even very 
liquid ones, the role of politics in shaping prices is greater in some, and the degree of 
unpredictability also varies. The higher the political uncertainty, the more affected 
liquidity becomes. As I discuss further in this chapter, rice suffers disproportionately 
from problems of political uncertainty.  
As mentioned above, forecasting the impact of political risk requires a tremendous 
amount of data. It implies computing qualitative past political events into reliable 
numerical data to form a model that would later be applied to an infinite number of 
‘black swan’ events. Having the resources to carry such analysis can reduce 
uncertainty and increase calculable risk. However, these resources are usually very 
costly. This is where politicization impacts financial development: it affects the ability 
to trade risk of many market actors who have fewer resources to establish their futures 
strategy. In particular, speculators are often involved in many markets and aim at 
diversifying their portfolio in such a way that the balance between those markets will 
often be beneficial for them. To create such a portfolio, they prefer markets with risks 
that are simple to model. Therefore, extreme politicization of a commodity affects the 
ability of speculators to buy risk from hedgers because they cannot analyse the nature 
of this risk. From the hedger’s perspective, the effects of the politicization can also 
create distortions in the basis: if the contract is of an international nature, since 
politicization often creates distortions between various national markets, it creates a 
great deal of basis risk. Therefore, if the hedger had not planned to participate in 
delivery of the contract but instead settle financially, the basis risk can discourage the 
hedger from participating in futures trading. 
In addition, political uncertainty is not only the result of price policies failing to achieve 
their objectives. It depends on the time and place from which it is observed. While a 
policy in country A may stabilise prices over time in this country, the price in countries 
B and C will likely be impacted by the results in exporting or importing performances 
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of country A. Also, in both country A, B and C, there is a risk related to the potential 
random end of the policy. Finally, the abandonment of the policy might have long-term 
impact on prices in all three countries. The reduction of price volatility in a certain place 
at a certain time, due to government intervention, thus does not necessarily correlate 
with the reduction of price risk in other sections of the market and in the long run. Price 
stability in one place and time often results in politically generated price risk in others.  
d. Food markets are politically salient 
Julius Nyerere, first president of Tanzania, was leading a country facing food 
shortages in 1980. During a speech, he declared “If I were told that Tanzania has no 
shoes, and the only place I could get them were South Africa, I would not order any. 
But if I were told that Tanzania has no food, and that I could not get it anywhere else 
except from South Africa, I would buy it” (Honey, 1980). Coming from a leader of the 
decolonisation movement, while South Africa was at the time under boycott for its 
apartheid regime, this statement hinted at the political salience of food. Unlike other 
goods – like clothing – food is so vital that it would take over any ideological and moral 
politics consideration. “Food shortages can lead to riots, revolution and wars” 
(Hoekman & Kostecki, 2009). Food is important not only because it feeds people, but 
also because in developing countries, it often represents a high proportion of the 
spending from people’s income. Therefore, high food prices can be particularly harmful 
economically for vulnerable populations, even if they can still afford to purchase these 
goods. In the next section, I explain why rice is the most politicized of the food markets.  
 
II) The highly political economy of the rice market 
a. Reasons behind the politicization of rice and its manifestations 
“You just never know when someone is going to change something that, again, has 
nothing to do with supply and demand. It has to do with politics, rice is obviously the 
most political crop grown”. These words from a US rice trader fitted a prominent 
narrative in the rice industry. Although food markets have a natural propensity for 
politicization, rice is often argued to be by far the most politicized and this section 
explains why. This will later inform the degree to which the politicization of rice is a 
factor in the lack of financial development.  
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When the argument around the unique politicization of rice repeatedly came up in 
interviews, I asked myself whether that could be the result of interviewee’s bias 
towards believing their case is different. However, whether it was farmers, traders, or 
exchange executives, many interviewees were involved in other agricultural markets. 
Even actors from other markets sometimes acknowledged that the politicization of rice 
was nothing like what they are exposed to. Equally, the literature often highlights this 
notion without necessarily detailing it further. The politicization of rice should thus be 
explained. The reason behind this is that East, Southeast and South Asian countries 
concentrate on rice all the political issues that can individually arise when it comes to 
food, and do so to a large scale. Rice farmers constitute a large majority of rural 
populations in those countries and the grain represents livelihoods for millions of 
families in Asia; it is a major issue related to mass poverty (Cororaton, 2006; Harun, 
2017). Rice is also the staple food for billions of people (King, 1953). In developing 
countries of Asia, as well as some in the Middle East and Africa, rice is, therefore, a 
matter of food security. Therefore, two groups emerge: rice producers and consumers 
(often city dwellers), both of which are vulnerable groups that represent the masses. 
They have a large voting and protesting power. The issue is that the interests of these 
two groups are found in the same countries, and these interests are rarely 
reconcilable. Not only do consumers need enough rice, but they need it cheap (Harun, 
2017). On the other hand, farmers rely upon high rice prices. This need for 
governments to balance the assurance of food security and raising farm incomes 
creates a polarisation of political affairs around rice and a high degree of instability.  
Rice is also unique in that it is a socio-cultural crop. The first sign of the significance 
of rice in Asian societies is found in languages. In Thai, “food may be divided into two 
categories, khaw meaning ‘rice’, and kab khaw meaning, literally, ‘with rice’. Food is 
either rice or something eaten with it” (King, 1953, p. 453). In Japanese, gohan (ご飯
) means both rice and meal, as does fàn (飯) in Chinese. Bray (1983; 2016) argues 
that the agrarian, technological and social relationships constraints and evolutions 
resulting from rice-growing societies have shaped the history of Eastern nations, from 
medieval times to colonisation and the post-independence and green revolution era. 
Ohnuki-Tierney illustrates how rice has shaped Asian identities, using the case of 
Japan. She says that “among all rice-eating Asians, the symbolic/religious importance 
of rice is amply expressed in its ubiquitous presence in major festivals and rituals—
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rice planting rituals, harvest rituals, weddings, etc." (Ohnuki-Tierney, 2004, p. 4). This 
importance of rice in rituals, the role of rice in traditional beliefs, and the meaning of 
rice as a symbol of prosperity and abundance have been studied by many 
anthropologists (Misra, 1966; Kato, 1988; Simana & Preisig, 2006; Hussin, 2008). Bray 
explains that in places where rice is the traditional staple, “people assume that eating 
rice, or growing rice, makes them who they are” (Bray F. , 2014). This leads one to 
suppose that not only does rice create greater political tensions than other crops 
would, but unlike others, it plays a part in identity politics, reinforcing the political 
salience.  
The political salience of rice domestically also triggers its salience in international 
affairs. Many importing countries are concerned over the dependency towards other 
supplying countries and have, therefore, aimed at achieving self-sufficiency. Although 
the reasons for these policies are also rooted in identity politics and the ability to control 
consumer prices, avoiding rice being used for diplomatic leverage by exporting 
countries is key to understand the self-sufficiency agenda. Major Southeast Asian 
importing countries (Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia) have failed to achieve long-
term self-sufficiency in the post-WWII era, mostly because of population growth and 
the prominence of farming terraces due to these countries’ topography (Goldman, 
1975; Mears, 1984; Arshad, Alias, & Noh, 2011). Similarly, many Western African 
countries such as Nigeria, Benin and Senegal aim to achieve self-sufficiency 
(Ezedinma, 2005; Van Oort, 2015). While these countries have a strong competitive 
disadvantage and have little chance of achieving self-sufficiency, their efforts to 
achieve as much food sovereignty as possible when it comes to rice shows the 
strategic nature of the crop internationally.  
In practical terms, the sensitivity of the crop pushes governments to respond very 
quickly to all sorts of market shocks. Soon after the beginning of the Covid-19 crisis, 
public authorities reacted by restricting exports to protect their local supply, and, 
therefore, their consumers. Cambodia suspended its paddy and white rice exports, 
exporters in Myanmar could no longer obtain export licences, and Vietnam suspended 
exports for a few days to review its stocks before only allowing specific export quotas. 
This mirrored the 2008 food crisis when all major exporters, with the exception of 
Thailand, banned export due to concern of a global short supply. These countries, who 
often promoted farmers’ income, were quick to shift towards pro-consumer policies.  
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However, it does not take such extreme cases for governments to suddenly and 
regularly implement new market interventions. Even in the absence of major crises, 
every week on the rice markets, many government policies likely to affect prices are 
announced. This could be a public import tender coming from a Middle Eastern 
country, a food donation from Japan, the releasing of stocks through auctions in 
Thailand, government-to-government trade in Southeast Asia, rice distributions in 
India, international trade restrictions by a major player, or the modification of a subsidy 
programme in Asia or Africa. The rice market is characterised by the fact that, apart 
from a few exporting countries in the Western Hemisphere such as Uruguay, all 
countries that are heavily involved in producing and consuming rice experience 
government interventions. Later sections will show that in other markets, there are 
usually a few key players that are politicized, but rarely all of them. All governments of 
rice economies are very proactive in the market, constantly adjusting their policies to 
current realities of the international market, of the local industry or of the weather. This 
creates a high instability generated by politicization. Many of these policies are short-
term and do not need to be approved by parliaments. With the multiplicity of potential 
governments intervening and the number of ways they can do so, the political risk 
becomes very random and unpredictable, driving potential speculators away from the 
market. In the next section, I will illustrate the extreme politicization of rice in more 
detail by using Thailand as an example.  
b. Two decades of market politicization in Thailand:  
In this section, I look at the case of Thailand to illustrate the politicization of the crop 
in major exporting countries. Thailand is a particularly important case for many 
reasons. Not only is it a comprehensive example of the issues of politics in rice that 
are common in Asia, but its politicization also impacts the world trade due to the 
prominence of Thailand in the global market. Since the 1980s, it has consistently been 
the world export leader, only surpassed by India in 2011. Thailand holds a 
considerable share of international exports. In 2018/19, approximately 21% of the rice 
traded on the world market originated from Thailand. This, along with the rigour of Thai 
rice grading and the relatively transparent data, led its higher quality grade, Thai White 
Rice 5% broken, to often be used as a reference on the world market. Therefore, when 
the Thai market faces political shocks, the whole world market faces these same 
shocks. In 1986, the Thai rice market was liberalised and the grain was freed from 
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trade restrictions to flow abroad. However, since the turn of the 21st century, the rice 
market has experienced several political shocks generated by unstable politics and 
has been used as a political tool in the context of electoral races. This has been the 
source of much political uncertainty on the rice market. In this section, I examine the 
last two decades of the politicization of the crop in Thailand.  
To understand the politicization of the Thai rice market in the 21st century, I need first 
to go back to the 1980s and the root of the policy that would become, twenty years 
later, the instrument of politicization. Following their independence in the post-WWII 
era, many countries adopted policies of subsidising consumption to achieve food 
security, protecting vulnerable populations from malnutrition but doing so at the 
expense of farmers’ welfare. Domestic prices were set below international prices, 
discouraging exports (Laiprakobsup, 2014). At the turn of the 1980s, Thailand was a 
fast-growing economy; its city dwellers were starting to form a middle class less 
sensitive to the price of rice as they became richer and diversified their food basket. 
This sent a signal to the government to shift to a pro-farmer set of policies (Shigetomi, 
2011; Laiprakobsup, 2014). In the early 1980s, the government introduced a “paddy 
pledging scheme”, organised by the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
(BAAC), that aimed at giving farmers flexibility to delay selling their crop. The BAAC 
offered short-term loans to farmers who used their paddy as collateral. The loan size 
was calculated according to the quantity of rice pledged by the farmer and the price 
predetermined by the government (the pledging price). After five months, they could 
either redeem the loan or forfeit the collateral paddy (Kajisa & Akiyama, 2005; 
Shigetomi, 2011; Chulaphan, Chen, Jatuporn, & Jierwiriyapant, 2012; 
Poapongsakorn, 2012; Laiprakobsup, 2014). The second option was rarely used as 
the pledging price was set below the target price (paddy price at harvest). Farmers 
mostly used the loan to gain storage flexibility to exploit the price seasonality75. Thus, 
the scheme did not aim to influence the market price. At the time, only a small share 
of Thai farmers entered the scheme. In the late 1990s, the amount of paddy pledged 
only represented around 3% of the total production. The market thus faced a low 
degree of government intervention at the time, with policies formulated by technocrats 
                                                 
75 Due to the inflow of rice available soon after harvest, prices usually reach a low at this time of the 
year. Therefore, farmers would ideally store rice for a few months and sell when price picks up.  
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that lasted in the long run. Without distorted rice prices or changing policies, there 
were no major obstacles to potential financial development of Thai rice over these two 
decades. In fact, in Chapter VII, I do not attribute the failure of the 1990s London Fox 
contract over Thai rice to politicization but to exchange mismanagement. However, 
these times of liberalisation do not mean that the crop was not already politically salient 
but rather that it was not yet exploited. The subsidising of consumers before this period 
showed that there was an awareness in the government of the importance of feeding 
urban populations. However, there was not yet the realisation of the unexploited 
electoral power within the farming population, which left the market free floating for 
two decades.  
Things changes in the early 2000s. Following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, a 
telecommunications tycoon, Thaksin Shinawatra, created his political party, the TRT, 
in a bid to run for Prime Minister in 2001. His agenda was to free businessmen of the 
prevalent bureaucratic burden (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2008). However, the TRT 
understood that the business community’s support was not enough to win an election. 
The party intended to gain votes from the poorest rural populations. Thaksin soon 
inherited the label of a populist leader that observers never expected him to become 
(Phongpaichit & Baker, 2008). Throughout the campaign and subsequently after 
winning the election and entering office, he proposed and enforced all sorts of policies 
aimed at consolidating his support from farmers. Estimations from 2010 suggest that 
as many as 17 million people are engaged in rice farming activities, representing “a 
quarter of the country’s entire population, which makes rice farmers the largest voting 
bloc in the society” (Sriyakul & Jermsittiparsert, 2017, p. 20). The most important of all 
TRT’s policies was the transformation of the rice pledging scheme. The pledging price, 
historically set around 80% of the target price, was raised to 100% in 2001. The soft 
loan programme had suddenly become a “‘de facto price support’ program” 





Figure 12: Volume and share of paddy pledged (Data adapted from Shigetomi, 2011) 
The opportunity of selling rice to the government at a set price created a virtual price 
floor, as mills and traders had to buy the rice at a similar price to be competitive. This, 
on the one hand, smoothed farm price movements. On the other, as more farmers 
forfeited their rice, the government was forced to build stocks. The times when it would 
randomly decide to release these stocks were prone to trigger downward price shocks 
(Poapongsakorn, 2012). The market had artificially turned into a mostly smooth one 
prone to sudden price drops. A contract for rice at the time would only have served 
exporters but would have struggled to attract speculators because of the reduced daily 
volatility and the unforecastable political risk. 
 




However, it was also the dawn of two decades of unstable rice politics. Shortly after 
Thaksin’s election, Thai democracy evolved towards a strong political polarisation. The 
scheme was very costly as all the public money spent by the government for 
procurement at pledging price, transport, milling and storing would have to be financed 
by taxpayers. This alienated the urban middle and upper-middle class that carried 
most of the fiscal burden. Although the price of rice on the shelf had not significantly 
increased, they were indirectly paying a much higher price for it, regardless of their 
consumption. An anti-Thaksin group was formed in 2001, the “Yellow Shirts” (the 
colour of the monarchy), whose protests were answered by the emergence of the rural 
pro-Thaksin “Red Shirts”. Thailand was caught in a dynamic where the government 
answered the vocal protests of the opposition by increasing populist policies to 
reinforce its support base, strengthening further the opposition’s sentiment. This is 
illustrated by the particularly high pledging price of 2002 and early 2006 (see Figure 
14), which were a response to the Yellow Shirts’ massive demonstrations (Shigetomi, 
2011). The social tensions culminated in the sudden army coup of September 2006 to 
prevent a faceoff between the Yellow and Red Shirts in the heart of Bangkok. Military 
coups are common in Thailand and whether this one was legitimate and intended for 
the end of a political deadlock, unsustainable populist policies and anti -democratic 
behaviour by the TRT, or simply a royalist-motivated action in favour of the urban 
groups, is still subject to discussion (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2008; Charoensin-o-larn, 
2009; Bunbongkarn, 2015). The coup led to an abrupt and unexpected end to 
Thaksin’s policies, thus illustrating the extent to which this crop can be politicized 
(Charoensin-o-larn, 2009).  
The administrative government that succeeded him reverted to the late 20 th century 
policies with a pledging price slightly below market price, leaving more room for 
volatility. Immediately, participation in the scheme fell by more than half (Shigetomi, 
2011; Poapongsakorn, 2012). Despite this reversal being another unexpected political 
shock, it left the market in a state more conducive to financial development. It was not 
a coincidence that the first AFET rice contract was launched in March 2007. It failed 
to attract liquidity, although for other reasons related to the lack of willing sophisticated 
actors, as discussed in Chapter VI. Participants of the Thai rice market interviewed 
offered a variety of reason why they did not take part in that futures market, but 
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politicization was not one as the situation had improved in that respect. However, they 
had not expected that Thaksin’s policies were not a onetime event.  
Even with their former leader in exile abroad, the People’s Power Party (which 
replaced the TRT) won the new elections in late 2007 and high pledging prices were 
reintroduced. They were even maintained during the 2008 food crisis when Thailand 
was the only major Asian exporter not to oppose exports. Despite the farm price 
doubling within three months, the government still estimated that a high pledging price 
was legitimate, moving it from 7,000 to 14,000-baht (Poapongsakorn, 2012; 
Laiprakobsup, 2014). Despite target prices falling back to 9,000 baht for the wet 
season of late 2008, the government tried to maintain the pledging price at 14,000 
baht, before compromising at 12,000 bahts amid concerns about the fiscal costs of the 
scheme (Poapongsakorn, 2012). Such indecision about the value of the pledging price 
illustrates further the politicization of the crop. The government artificially set the price 
in a way that was hardly forecastable with the sole objective of solidifying its political 
base. This unpredictability was of nature to keep speculators away from the AFET, 
where the very few commercials were deprived of trading counterparts. 
 




In late 2008, the People’s Power Party was dissolved because of election fraud. A 
Democrat government was subsequently formed. It needed to reform the rice policies 
to favour its urban support base while not harming farmers in the hope to disrupt 
futures populist campaign. The pledging scheme was abandoned in 2009 and 
replaced by an income guarantee programme instead. This was similar to the US farm 
program discussed in Chapter III, with farmers “receiving a subsidy equivalent to the 
gap between the market price and the governmentally guaranteed price in the case 
the former falls below the latter” (Shigetomi, 2011, p. 90). The government kept farmer 
protection while attempting to return the market closer to its demand and supply 
mechanisms, and relieve the taxpayers from the pledging scheme’s logistical cost.  
Such policies were not effective in preventing Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, 
and her Pheu Thai Party (PTP) to win the general election in 2011. She campaigned 
over the reestablishment of the pledging scheme at a price 50% above the market 
(Chareonwongsak, 2015). In effect, it was not a pledging scheme anymore as the rice 
did not serve as a collateral, it was a procurement system. Farmers delivered their rice 
at their local mill in exchange of a warehouse receipt allowing them to claim the funds 
from the BAAC (Sawasdipakdi, 2014). The government hoped to build stocks while 
depleting exports so that the price of Thai rice would increase on the global market 
and intended to release these stocks at a profit later on. This never happened as India 
and Vietnam increased their exports and filled the space left by Thailand. The 
government thus had to carry the burden of rice it could not sell. In the long run, it 
created a surplus of rice, depressing prices globally (Permani & Vanzetti, 2014). Even 
if it failed, the government explicitly intended to manipulate the domestic and 
international markets, reinforcing the perception of the market as a politicized one 
where trading derivatives would be more harmful than beneficial. 
When a Pan-ASEAN futures contract based in Singapore was discussed by an expert 
meeting group in 2012, the Thai situation was in the minds of all participants. 
Politicization would always have been an issue raised but it was overly prominent in 
both the meeting discussions and the research and position papers published ahead 
of the meeting (Pochara, 2012; McKenzie A. , 2012; Hamilton, 2012). In the interviews 
he conducted in 2011 to prepare the meeting, McKenzie found that both Thai exporters 
and international trading houses believed that the Pheu Thai Party’s policies were an 
obstacle both to the second AFET rice contract launched that year and a regional 
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futures contract in Singapore. The uncertainty coming from Thailand, which had been 
the reference of liberalised rice trade for twenty years, made stakeholders doubt about 
how any financial development of rice could last through time. 
Back in Thailand, the PTP ended up losing all support. Prices were so high that urban 
populations were harmed not only as taxpayers but also as rice consumers. The anger 
also grew within the rice industry, who worried about the reputation of Thai rice being 
harmed (Poramacom, 2014; Bunbongkarn, 2015). The scheme soon started harming 
farmers too, as the government could no longer pay them on time due to a large budget 
deficit. Banks started to refuse lending money to the government as the system 
seemed unviable (Sawasdipakdi, 2014; Bunbongkarn, 2015). In total, the scheme may 
have cost as much as $16bn. The government had gone further than choosing 
between farmers and consumers, as nobody in Thailand was financially able to pay 
for the scheme. The PTP was overthrown by a new coup in May 2014 and replaced in 
power by a military junta. 
The effects of Yingluck’s scheme did not stop in May 2014. For years, the successor 
military government attempted to sell the stock through auctions. The release of the 
old crop, which suppressed prices at irregular time intervals, was an effect of 
politicization since the stock itself had been built for highly salient political reasons. 
Besides, the junta did not put an end to market intervention. In September 2017 for 
example, it approved a $2.2 loan scheme to stabilise rice prices in an effort to secure 
popularity in the rural regions loyal to Thaksin ahead of new democratic elections 
(Ratchathani, 2018). The Shinawatra family’s populist policies have entrapped all 
political forces into the politicization of the crop.  
Thailand illustrates how far the political salience of a crop can penetrate its market. As 
politicians seek votes from farmers to seize power and stay in office, intervening in the 
market becomes a priority. The effect of the politicization of Thai rice on financial 
development mirrors directly the effects theorised earlier in this chapter. On the one 
hand, the pledging scheme in Thailand has artificially set prices way above the market 
price on many occasions, taking away much of the underlying price risk. On the other 
hand, political uncertainty ahead of democratic elections, or political shocks triggered 
by military coups, make forecasting the Thai rice market particularly complex. Because 
of Thailand’s position in the world market, it has often been proposed that a futures 
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contract covering Thai rice 5% would be a good place to initiate financial development 
(I discuss this in Chapter VI and VII). If this hypothesis seemed legitimate in the 1990s, 
the promise of a stable political environment seemed to have faded in the 21st century. 
However, the issue goes further than simply the financial development of Thai rice, 
whether domestically or internationally. The politicization of Thai rice tends to affect 
the pricing of other important origins. For instance, several studies show the bi -
directional price transmission between Thailand and Vietnam (Ghoshray, 2008; John, 
2014; Sirikanchanarak, Liu, Sriboonchitta, & Xie, 2016). In particular, Sirikanchanarak, 
Liu, Sriboonchitta & Xie (2016) show that price shocks are transmitted between the 
two markets, and that the impact of a shock in Thailand will impact the Vietnamese 
market for seven months. They also show that periods of distortive policies applied in 
Thailand increases the co-integration of the two markets. This illustrates how the 
politicization of one origin – in a market where few countries hold large export shares 
– can affect prices globally and therefore spread the inhibiting effect of politicization 
on financial development (Jha, Kubo, & Ramaswami, 2016).  
The case of Thailand outlines how the market does not fulfil the criteria of prices freely 
determined. However, it is unclear whether politicization is specific of the rice market. 
The rest of this chapter investigates whether my compared crops are politicized and, 
if so, whether the politicization affected financial development. This will allow for the 
validating of the hypothesis for rice. 
 
III) Politicization in other commodity markets 
If politicization impeded the financial development of the rice market, it would suggest 
that the politicization of other crops that are financially developed is minimal. This is 
not the case. Agricultural markets that have high levels of financial development have 
not achieved this in the absence of politicization. I argue that it is the form of 
politicization and the market structure itself that determines the impact of politicization 
on financial development. This section explores the mechanisms of politicization of my 
compared crops. Wheat and coffee are discussed together as they have similar 
models of politicization. These markets are not currently very politicized. Yet, through 
history, they financially developed in contexts of politicization. However, the public 
interventions in those markets often failed, limiting the impact of politicization. Sugar 
148 
 
differs as it is still a very politicized market in most countries, characterised by 
government interventions. Yet, those are often rather forecastable and take place at 
the national level, having only a secondary impact on the international market.  
a. Wheat and coffee.  
This sub-section presents the similarities and differences of wheat and coffee that lead 
politicization to have had only a limited impact on their financial development. I find 
that the peculiar nature of politicization in these markets does not invalidate the 
hypothesis that politicization might negatively affect the financial development of rice. 
The wheat and coffee markets are characterised by little government intervention due 
to their limited political salience. I argue that while coffee is almost unpoliticized (or 
depoliticized, as I argue based on its history), wheat faces a little more politicization, 
but in a way that is manageable in terms of uncertainty for market participants. 
However, throughout history, different transnational policies have been put in place, 
but their lack of success has prevented government interventions from impacting 
financial development.  
Before rewinding history, it is useful to describe the present state of both markets’ 
politicization. In a subsequent paragraph, I will justify these levels of politicization. 
Nowadays, on the coffee market, government involvement is restricted to the 
minimum. A  coffee market analyst76 explained: “Since 1989, no policy to my mind has 
really impacted coffee. There are some regulations with regard to fumigations, there 
are some taxes for import and export, but all of this is extremely minor”. The market 
very much follows a logic of free trade. Only a few African countries apply some export 
taxes but, according to my interviewee, nothing impacting the global market. Brazil 
also applies an income support programme in case of prices falling below cost but 
only, due to the budgetary cost, to a minimal extent (Teixeira, 2019). In addition, the 
negotiations between farmers groups and the government are usually slow and 
transparent, therefore not creating price shocks. This absence of politicization means 
that financial development is not obstructed nowadays. Instead, coffee market 
analysis is driven by an analysis of available supply, mostly based on weather 
conditions. Draughts in Vietnam or frosts in Brazil are the main driver of a market 
                                                 
76 Interview with an anonymous coffee and sugar market analyst, Switzerland, April 2018. 
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where consumption increases steadily and is easily correlated to macroeconomic 
conditions in major consuming countries.  
The situation is somewhat less clear for wheat. Every time I asked my interviewees 
about political risk, politicization or government intervention on the wheat market, the 
answer was significantly different. A few response patterns still appeared: analysts 
and traders only involved in wheat think of their market as very politicized, while 
participants of multiple markets understand the wheat trade as relatively free from 
political salience. 
In practice, one geographical region is the source of most of the significant political 
event affecting the wheat market: the Black Sea region. In other areas of the world, 
government interventions are marginal and global trade in wheat is mostly liberalised. 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the centre of the world wheat market has 
shifted from North America to the Black Sea, with Ukraine and Russia collectively 
overtaking Canada and the US as the leading exporters globally. The heart of the 
wheat market is now in a politically less stable region, with two governments that 
practice the imposition of export restrictions to control the market for a variety of more 
or less salient political reasons (Sedik, 2017). For instance, the Russian government 
responded to the 2010 heatwaves and wildfires destruction of large shares of the crop 
by banning exports. Although that decision damaged the reputation of Russia as a 
wheat exporter, triggering anger within the industry, Vladimir Putin had other political 
aims in mind (Belton, Farchy, & Blas, 2010). The then Prime Minister aimed at 
deflecting criticism with grand gestures and addressed the population’s resentment 
towards the management of the crisis with a pro consumer policy, protecting the 
population from a rising crisis (Kramer, 2010; Belton, Farchy, & Blas, 2010; Welton, 
2011). However, seeing prices rising internationally as a result of the loss in supply, 
Russian producers decided to store the grain and wait for the embargo to be lifted, 
making the policy inefficient domestically (Welton, 2011).77  
                                                 
77 Other events contributed to some interviewees portraying the region as politically risky, although 
these are not results of the crop’s political salience, but rather shocks in international affairs affecting 
the wheat market. In particular, the 2014 conflict between Russia and Ukraine created uncertainty upon 
the future of the Port of Mariupol (the main port for Ukrainian wheat exports) and the ability of Russia 
to export amid the EU and US retaliating sanctions (Buckley,  2017). This destabilised the futures market  
for a time, as illustrated by the 4.5% increase in US wheat futures in a single day ahead of the invasion 
of Crimea (Lynch, 2014). 
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Sedik (2017) argues that the control of those governments over the market is only 
growing as they not only regulate the market but also take control of parts of the supply 
chain such as grain storage, transport and export facilities. However, market actors I 
interviewed often minimised the criticality of the political risk. A Switzerland-based 
broker78 told me confidently that “those political interventions in Ukraine and Russia, 
we are used to them by now, we know how to react”. Swithun Still79, a Switzerland 
based trader specialised in the region, went further, saying he believed those risks 
were not even so prominent: “Governments decisions such as the 2010 export ban 
are extremely unlikely to repeat, because they know it was a mistake. I don't think 
there is any significant political risk from that perspective. There is inevitably some risk 
that some restrictions will be put on exports if they had a bad crop. And they might be 
official or unofficial restrictions, but I don't think they are significant enough.” Whether 
they are correct or not, these perceptions partly explain the Chicago wheat contract 
and the newly established Black Sea Wheat contract remaining successful despite the 
level of political risk (I discuss these contracts in Chapter VII).  
Two other factors limit the effect of this politicization on financial development: 
concentration and diversification. The concentration of political risk in the Black Sea 
only simplifies its integration as black swan events in risk models. Such ability to 
integrate political risk is not possible in rice where it affects most key countries of the 
market, and where the frequency of political events is too high to be approached as 
black swan events. On the other hand, the many origins and destination in the 
international market allows for the compensation for shocks in one country, on a short 
notice. Russia and Ukraine do not own shares in the international wheat market 
comparable to the domination of India and Thailand in rice. Swithun Still argued that 
“there are enough origins to make up for the shortfalls if something happens in an 




                                                 
78 Interview with an anonymous European swaps and futures broker, Switzerland, November 2018. 




Figure 15: Percentage of exported volumes in the rice and wheat world markets, 2018-2020 (Data from 
USDA) 
The geographical distribution of production and consumption plays an important role 
in the limited political salience of coffee and wheat. Coffee is a luxury product, making 
it consumed mostly in developed countries, while being produced in developing 
countries. This geographical bi-polarisation of the coffee chain implies that, unlike rice, 
there is no political salience born out of conflicting interest groups (producers and 
consumers) within the same country. In importing countries, consumers’ revenue is 
high enough for the variations in coffee prices to be unimpactful. This is also reinforced 
by the small share of the price of a coffee cup sold in a shop that actually reflects the 
price of the coffee itself (around 10%). In wheat, apart from the Black Sea, policies to 
stabilise prices tend to be stable and undisputed, due to the low political salience: 
many of the biggest exporters in the world,80 which generate price formation, are 
countries where the level of wealth undermines the food security argument from a 
price perspective. Both wheat and coffee consequently escape the farmer vs 
consumer debate that triggers policy instability in rice. In addition, although in some 
countries producers and processors’ lobby groups hold some political leverage, these 
are rarely comparable to the electoral force represented by rice farmers. Coffee 
farmers usually represent a small portion of the rural workers in developing countries. 
Wheat farmers are even fewer in the rural areas of developed countries. As a result, 
unlike rice, these markets are not as politically salient, making them less of a key 
                                                 
80 Russia, Canada, the US, France, Australia and Argentina are the largest exporters.  
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aspect of national politics than rice. When farmer subsidy programmes are enforced, 
it is often more technocratic than politically motivated.  
Despite their low politicization at the national level, coffee and wheat have not 
developed financially without playing a role in international politics. During most of the 
twentieth century – periods during which the main futures market for both crops grew 
significantly – both markets have been the objects of various international trading 
agreements that had the stabilisation of production or prices as the intermediary 
objective, to ultimately serve a final political goal.  
Coffee agreements emerged following the failure of public interventions in early 20th 
century Brazil. For three decades, various policies were established to support the 
revenues of rich planters, who were often members of the congress of their state or 
held great economic power (coffee represented most of Brazil’s exports), held “political 
hegemony” in Brazil at the time (Font, 1987). None of the policies implemented – 
planting ban, buffer stock, export restriction – achieved the expected effect on price 
and it appeared that international agreements were needed in coffee to control prices 
(Hutchinson, 1909; Daviron & Ponte, 2005). Therefore, most of the 20th century was 
dominated by international agreements – the Inter-American Coffee Agreement in the 
1940s and the International Coffee Agreement post WWII – setting in place trading 
quotas and and price control (Daniels, 1941; Pelaez, 1973; Pendergrast, 1999; 
Daviron & Ponte, 2005). However, in a market with many exporters, a cartel could not 
be built and the functionning of these agreements were conditioned to the participation 
of large importers – the USA and later Western European countries – despite the 
disadvantageous terms of agreement for them. For these countries, coffee was only a 
means to achieve diplomatic goals. As for a lot of developing countries at the time, 
coffee was the main exported product and their largest source of foreign currency. For 
these developed countries, supporting the coffee industry helped prevent the 
developing countries from joining the Axis power during WWII and the communist bloc 
afterwards (Pelaez, 1973; Haight, 2017). Thus, the politicization of the coffee was high 
at the time, but the end of the cold war signalled the end of the need to achieve this 
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secondary objective81 and it ended the political intervention in coffee, resulting in the 
liberalisation of the industry. 
In wheat, the academic literature does not attribute diplomatic ambitions to the multiple 
renewals of the International Wheat Agreements (IWA) concluded between the 1930s 
and the 1970s. Instead, some authors suggest that the intermediary goals of stabilising 
farmers’ income and building up supply to feed vulnerable consumers were more often 
motivated by domestic political considerations (Golay, 1950; Kristjanson, 1951; 
Farnsworth, 1956; O'Connor, 1982). Although wheat farmers do not hold the voting 
shares of their rice counterpartrs, in some countries, such as the US, farm lobbies hold 
a significant power to trigger policies favouring the achievement of such goals, through 
campaign funding contributions for instance (Hansen, 1991). However, the lack of 
efforts from most countries in implementing the mechanisms of the IWAs suggest a 
low political salience of wheat at the time. This political salience only increased 
towards the end of the cold war where the dynamics of the wheat market revolved 
around the American-Soviet relations. In 1972, the US awarded USSR with a $750 
million credit over three years to purchase US wheat as a diplomatic tool to materialise 
détente. This cooperation between the two super powers was disrupted at the end of 
the decade when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. The US retaliated with the 
announcement of an embargo on grain exports to the USSR. The supply cut-off aimed 
at forcing the USSR to withdraw from Afghanistan and prevent any further invasion of 
Pakistan and Iran. Therefore, wheat was a diplomatic tool to the same extent that 
coffee could be.  
As explained earlier in this chapter, two questions should be asked when examining 
the impact of politicization in relation to derivatives trading: does it removes the need 
for hedging and does it creates risk that is particularly difficult to forecast? The answe r 
for both questions is generally no. Both the ICA and the IWA, as well as their 
predecessors, faced difficulties with putting mechanisms into practice and as a result, 
with impacting prices. These agreements were never successful in suppressing 
volatility in such a way that risk trading would have been no longer necessary. The 
IWA was never successful due to various technical issues making the enforcement of 
                                                 
81 In addition, the economic development of some exporters such as Brazil and the diversification of 
their export meant that coffee lost its economic leverage in international politics.  
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quotas impossible. It goes beyond the scope of this thesis to detail these issues, but 
they resulted in prices remaining generally unaffected by politicization. After the failure 
of previous coffee agreements due to their failure at including all significant producers 
and consumers, the ICA was eventually successful in keeping prices within a range. 
Yet, the market was free to float within it, therefore justifying the use of derivative 
contracts by any income maximising individual. The events around the American-
Soviet relations in wheat eventually impacted prices but these were one-time events. 
The fact that market analyst interviewed in the US still mostly refer to these when 
talking about politicization illustrate the rarity of such occurrences. Therefore, the 
politicization that accompanied the financial development of coffee and wheat in the 
20th century created little price risk. The main uncertainty was around the introduction 
of trading agreements, regarding the extent of their effectiveness. However, these 
were signed following long negotiations, allowing market observers to comprehend 
their ability to control the market ahead of their introduction. Once they were in place, 
the policies remained stable until their next scheduled renegotiations. 
We can conclude of these two cases that politicization, even under great political 
salience, does not always materialise into greater uncertainty, nor does it effectively 
suppress volatility. Thus, the practicalities of the policies resulting from politicization 
are key factors in the potential suppressing effect of politicization on financial 
development.  
b. Sugar 
Sugar is commonly described as the most politicized exchange-traded commodity. I 
discuss it separately from coffee and wheat because the processes and effects of 
politicization are fundamentally different between these commodities. This subsection 
exposes how sugar is a heavily politicized commodity that manages to maintain a 
futures market. I first briefly expose what sort of political distortions animate the sugar 
market. I follow up by pointing at the politically salient issue behind these distortions. 
Finally, I explain why financial development happens despite this politicization. I argue 
that the large remaining international market where sugar is traded freely makes 
futures contracts a valuable hedging mechanism. Financial development has found its 
place in areas of the market were politicization has less impact on price formation. 
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Furthermore, the long-term nature of sugar programmes avoids adding issues of 
political risk to the market. 
Sugar, like wheat and coffee, had international agreements (the International Sugar 
Agreement, ISA) in the few decades before and after WWII. Unlike other crops, this 
agreement did not aim to stabilise volatile prices resulting from the free market, but 
instead reconcile conflicting national sugar policies that collectively increased risk in 
global price formations (Swerling, 1954). Ultimately, these agreements have been 
unsuccessful at achieving their objective, and are often considered simply failed 
attempts that were not given enough power to achieved price stabilisation or 
suppression (Swerling, 1954; Mahler, 1984; Marks & Maskus, 1993). However, this 
highlights the main feature of the sugar market: powerful domestic policies and a 
liberalised international market characterised by volatility. Just like in rice, almost all 
countries – whether net importers or exporters – involved in the global market have 
their sugar programme. The goal of this section is not to describe in detail what these 
policies look like individually, although a few examples will be provided. 
India, a case often referred to by interviewees and the third-largest exporter of sugar, 
has a very interventionist policy covering sugar. The government fixes a minimum 
cane to which the states can add individually. This minimum price is fixed very high 
and millers are expected to accept every stick of cane offered to them at this price. 
The Indian sugar industry consequently produces a large surplus resulting in large 
stocks. The government attempts to liquidate those through export subsidies. Unti l 
very recently, Thailand, the second-largest exporter, used a quota system (detailed in 
Chapter VI). Through this system, the government distributed the production between 
the domestic and foreign markets, set a minimum price and set in place a revenue -
sharing system between farmers and millers. The EU similarly used a quota system 
from 1968 until 2017. The mechanisms of this system were very complex (and 
modified in 1992 and 2006) and beyond the scope of this thesis. However, to present 
it simply, the quota included a level of production for the domestic market that was 
bought from producers at a high minimum price. The surplus within this quota was 
offered export subsidies, while any sugar produced outside of this quota was exported 
at the world price. The EU also imposed custom duties on import. The three countries 
already discussed had (or will have) to transform and soften their interventionism in 
the market due to cases brought against them by Brazil (the world largest producer 
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and exporter of sugar) at the WTO. Brazil considers that they have breached 
international rules on maximum subsidies. Indeed, the Brazilian government does not 
provide such support programmes to its producers, allowing it to claim unfair 
competition from its rivals. However, it intervenes in the market through a very different 
mechanism: the setting of oil and ethanol prices. As ethanol serves as an alternative 
outlet for cane than sugar, Brazil can virtually set the price of cane when calibrating its 
energy policies. 
The above is not an exhaustive list (for example, it does not include domestic US or 
Chinese policies), but describing every single of them would be superfluous. What 
matters is undertanding why there is so much political intervention in this crop. Marks 
and Maskus set the record straight: sugar “has no real strategic importance” as a 
commodity (Marks & Maskus, 1993, p. 2). Unlike rice, it is not vital to feed a nation, 
and despite the growing importance of ethanol, cane does not have the importance of 
oil or coal in most nation’s energy mix. The reasons for politicization are not the same 
in developed and developing countries. Borrell and Duncan explain that the “aims of 
sugar policies in industrial countries are usually the stability and maintenance of farm 
incomes” (Borrell & Duncan, 1993, p. 16). However, that does not explain how the 
sugar industry has gained enough importance to justify public spending to support 
production. The explanation is historical. Since the 19th century and the emergence of 
sugar beet production in Europe, sugar became a rare commodity to be produced in 
both the North and South, forcing industrialised countries to protect their markets 
against more competitive producing regions, whether they were colonies or newly 
independent nations (Mahler, 1984; Marks & Maskus, 1993). These public support 
programmes have thus been in place for more than a century and carried on because 
of historical heritage. The sugar industries of Europe, the USA, Canada and Japan 
have been built upon these public schemes and abandoning them would now certainly 
mean the abandonment of the domestic industry. In developing countries, politicization 
finds reason closer to rice or coffee. Firstly, the number of votes that represent sugar 
grower is significant in countries with democratic elections like India and Thailand. “In 
India, I think there are 35M cane farmers. 50M altogether people whose jobs are 
directly in sugar. That is a lot of votes”, a sugar analyst82 said. In Thailand, there were 
                                                 
82 Interview with Julian Price, sugar trade analyst at julianprice.com, London, UK, September 2019. 
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already 1M farmers involved in growing the crop in the 1990s (Doner & Ramsay, 
2004), Although that represent a large pool of potential voters, it is low compared to 
the 16M rice farmers (Blake & Suwannakij, 2016). However, cane farmers are 
exceptionally well organised as a political group compared to other farmers (Ramsay, 
1987; Doner & Ramsay, 2004). This could be due to the existence of larger farms (rare 
in other crops), around which interest groups can originally form, and their 
concentration in restricted geographical areas, facilitating collaboration (Ramsay, 
1987). Boosting sugar exports has also been of interest for developing countries in 
order to earn foreign exchange (Marks & Maskus, 1993; Doner & Ramsay, 2004). 
Hewison also proposed an additional reason why the Thai government had initiated 
the revenue sharing system in the 1970s. He believes that one aim was to contain the 
progression of capitalism and its impacts in the Thai countryside, which the 
government understood as a threat to social and economic stability (Hewison, 1986). 
What should be noted through this analysis is that sugar’s politicization differs from 
rice in the sense that most political interventions are made in the interest of producers.  
The unidirectionality of policies is key to solving the topic of this section. I have shown 
that there were market distortions produced by the political salience of the crop. 
However, I must explain why financial development still takes place despite 
politicization. The governmental changes in market control are rare and often happen 
when previous schemes expire, making the scheduling of political events rather clear 
(Borrell & Duncan, 1993). This fundamentally differs from rice. The fact that there is 
no tension between protecting both producers and consumers is key in the ability to 
maintain these policies, in sugar, in the long term. As a result of quota systems, price 
formation is made complex for international trade, but the volumes traded are often 
forecastable based on production. They may not be traded at one single price 
(depending on which quota it falls into), even internationally, but sugar market experts 
can still forecast market trends. In addition, once the sugar passes through the quota 
system and is imported and exported, free-market laws apply. Therefore, there is an 
international market where traders need to be able to hedge price risk. Interviewees 
confirmed that all the major sugar trading houses – such as ED&F Man, Wilmar and 
Louis Dreyfus– are heavily involved in the futures market, whether for only hedging or 
also taking physical delivery. Sucden even has a subsidiary called Sucden Financial 
to trade derivatives. Thus, politicization of the sugar market offers little room for 
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financial development at the local level, but does not prevent it at the international 
level. 
The question remains whether the sugar contracts would be even more liquid should 
policies be abandoned. The answer can only be guessed, but I argue that they 
probably would be. Many farmers across the world would be stripped of their price 
protection and would possibly use OTC contracts, backed up by futures, to cover their 
risk exposure. There is of course no guarantee that such hedging would take place 
systematically. For example, the situation in cane and beet could mirror the one in the 
US rice market. However, the profiles of many producers of sugar differs significantly 
from US rice farmers. First, profits in sugar are lower, similar to the soybean case 
discussed in Chapter III. In developing countries, cane farmers rarely engage in 
diversification, triggering maximum exposure to sugar prices. They would be likely to 
engage in OTCs like they do in coffee, as I explain in Chapter VI. Finally, the 
participation of large trading house and processors in the sugar market guarantees 
the participation of sophisticated intermediaries to offer OTCs. According to 
interviewees, this tendency of farmers to use OTCs is already taking place in Europe 
since the end of the quota system in 2017.  
Despite a lot of the policies being long-term, the Brazilian ethanol policy and the Indian 
government's habits to enforce import or export bans on short notice resemble the sort 
of politicization encountered on the rice market. Sugar market participants 
acknowledge that managing these events is a challenge. If the political distortions of 
the sugar market are not at the extent as those in the rice market, it still hints at the 
fact that political uncertainty could only be one factor suppressing financial 
development, rather than a stand-alone explanation for financial underdevelopment.   
IV) Discussion 
The comparison between crops in this chapter shows that the question of impact of 
politicization on financial development is more complex than originally thought to be. 
In the theoretical review of contract failure I present in Chapter II, the main factor 
related to politicization that is proposed is the need for price to be freely determined. 
Although this is indeed a prerequisite for trading derivatives, as fixed prices remove 
the need for hedging, it is only one expression of politicization. The existing literature 
understands this factor as the risk potential for governments to fix prices, but fails to 
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discuss two important further matters. The first one is that politicization can, instead of 
supressing risk, exacerbate it to a level that discourages speculators to trade risk. It 
still fits the idea that prices are not freely determined, but instead of keeping them 
stable, make them unpredictable. The second is that the literature does not discuss 
how politicization comes about, and how it disrupts the functioning of markets. This 
chapter attempts to bridge that gap to the understanding of financial development.  
What appears through the comparative study of rice, wheat, coffee and sugar, is that 
politicization does not simply suppresses financial development. Instead, it is a certain 
type of politicization taking place under specific conditions that does. What matters is 
the propensity of politicization, which can be defined as the expression of political 
salience, to disrupt financial development. The comparative study tells us that when 
politicization leads to price stabilization policies reducing volatility, what matters is the 
effectiveness potential of these policies. For instance, in a globalised market where 
each market participant has limited market power, there needs to be a collective effort 
for the stabilization of prices at the international level. International agreements have 
been largely unable to impose such control on world markets for sugar, coffee and 
wheat. As a result, they have never successfully supressed the need for derivative 
trading. In rice however, the large domestic markets with both consumers and 
producers of countries such as India and Thailand, have made such stabilization 
possible in the medium term, although the cost of such program make them 
unsustainable in the long run.  
When politicization generates uncertainty instead, the question that should be asked 
is about the ability of political action to effectively disrupt the market pricing upon 
demand and supply. The case of rice showed a high potential for market disruption. 
This is due to multiple factors. Firstly, the conflicting interests of producers and 
consumers within the same political space is source of more policy reversal making 
future policies uncertain for observers. In addition, these reversals tend to come 
suddenly. Instead, in the compared markets, political intervention tends to aim 
consistently for the same goals, avoiding reversals. These policies are often the results 
of negotiation that develop slowly and give market participants time to anticipate the 
effects on their industry. One uncertainty that could be applied to the compared crops 
just as it does for rice would be on the probability of their price stabilisation programs 
to succeed or fail. However, the history of international agreements for sugar, coffee 
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and wheat in the 20th century has created a near certainty of failure. The reason to use 
futures markets was, therefore, not removed and derivative trading was free to 
develop. Finally, in sugar, domestic price policies do have a domestic effect reducing 
volatility, but these long-term programs have no real element of uncertainty. They 
simply remove the need to risk trading domestically while leaving it open 
internationally.  
The topic of politicization brings a new perspective to the various sub-questions posed 
in this thesis. Refining the understanding of how politicization affect derivative trading, 
beyond the idea that it supresses volatility, has already complemented the answer to 
why futures contracts fail. I also answered how rice differs from other commodity 
markets, with its higher level of political salience and different expression of 
politicization. When it comes to the identification of patterns of failure in the rice market, 
naming politicization is contentious. There are no cases where the politicization of the 
crop has been the prominent reason for the failure of rice contracts. However, as the 
case of the Singapore conference illustrates, this politicization is widely understood by 
market participants to be an issue. It is therefore possible that many projects have 
been discouraged by the politicization of rice, much before it could be a cause of 
failure. In this way, it does not explain the failure of futures contracts but is a credible 
factor for the low financial development of the rice market.  
 
V) Conclusion 
This chapter investigated to what extent politicization could have contributed to the 
financial underdevelopment of rice. It appears that rice is an excessively politicized 
crop. The main reason for that is that both consumers and producers vitally depend 
on its price: the former to feed themselves, the latter for their livelihood. What is also 
peculiar with rice is the presence of both groups within the same national political 
systems, and in developing countries, where food prices are a more sensitive issue. 
As a result, political entities attempt to establish policies to protect either of these 
groups and expect that doing so will result in strategic political gains. The fact that 
there are two potential client groups to satisfy increases the uncertainty towards the 
policies that could be implemented. This form of politicization thus affects the market 
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in two ways: it removes risk when the price setting is efficient and it creates political 
risk due to the volatility of these policies.  
To confirm that politicization could indeed be a cause for the failure of futures 
contracts, we examined whether it affected the compared financially developed crops. 
Wheat and coffee have been politically (mostly diplomatically) salient crops in the past, 
although they had already initiated their process of financial development. However, it 
appears that the implementation of this politicization into policies (mainly international 
treaties) did not succeed in their objective of controlling prices. Therefore, it didn't 
remove price risk, nor did it create particularly high political risk as these agreements 
were developed over the long term. Nowadays, only one geographical area of the 
wheat market is particularly political, the Black Sea. However, it allows for the 
monitoring of (rather low) political risk in only a single case, and this politicization does 
not remove the need for price hedging. As for coffee, the absence of the concentration 
of consumers and producers in a single political system has contributed to the decline 
of politicization. When the ICA was in place, both groups cooperated at the global level 
to attempt to control prices. However, consuming countries like the USA accepted 
disadvantageous terms as their final objective was to prevent producing countries from 
joining the eastern bloc rather than obtaining a low price for their citizens. However, 
the relationship between politicization and financial development in sugar is more 
complex. This market appears to be highly politicized, with almost all countries 
following complex national sugar schemes. Nevertheless, the risk is often suppressed 
for farmers at the local level, but not necessarily for processors and traders for whom 
using futures markets is still justified. Most of the policies in sugar create little political 
uncertainty as they are developed during long-lasting negotiations and remain in effect 
in the long run. However, there is a degree of uncertainty coming from the practices 
of some governments, in particular Brazil and India – two major exporters. If the effects 
of sugar's politicization are not as extreme as rice, it indicates that the financial 
development of a market can survive a degree of politicization. These two processes 
are thus not inversely correlated. Instead,the nature of the politicization matters. 
This chapter shows that the politicization of rice strongly affects its potential to develop 
financially, although it is unable to provide evidence that it is entirely responsible for 
the low financial development of rice. Therefore, the subsequent chapters of this thesis 
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Chapter V: Politicization of Futures 
Contracts and Exchanges 
 
The politicization of strategic commodity markets such as rice represents only one side 
of the issue faced by the derivatives industry, especially in developing countries. Going 
further than setting or affecting cash price formation, governments often have a say 
on the existence of futures markets and/or their individual contracts. Their approach 
to futures contracts, then, becomes crucial in the process of financial development. 
Even if those approaches vary, this chapter argues that commodity contracts are 
politically salient and government interventions in futures markets tend to impede 
financial development. These interventions are particularly common in developing 
countries where government rarely see futures markets for their risk trading function, 
and instead instrumentalise them for political or policy ends. This is even more likely 
to be the case for rice futures due to the political sensitivity of the crop, as discussed 
in the previous chapter. Through this chapter, I argue that governments are able to 
supress financial development but cannot actively promote it in the absence of actors’ 
willingness to trade derivatives. In addition, I argue that their action can be the result 
of lobbying by groups of actors interested in preventing financial development. I first 
portray the political pressure applied on commodity exchanges in developing 
countries. This section shows why these markets are particularly instrumentalised in 
the Global South. Afterwards, I use the three centuries of government interventions in 
rice futures exchanges in Japan to further analyse the mechanisms behind the 
politicization of futures contracts. By choosing Japan, the argument can go further than 
the geographical location of the exchange and show that rice futures are likely to be 
targeted even in a developed country because of their political salience in rice 
economies. This chapter explains why some rice futures contracts have fai led as a 
result of their politicization, but also why some exchanges may not have attempted to 




I) Commodity exchanges under pressure in developing countries 
When I interviewed Lamon Rutten in December 2017, he had held the post of CEO of 
the ICDX for less than a year. However, his long career in the industry made other 
interviewees describe him as perhaps the most experienced commodity finance 
person in the world, certainly when it comes to developing countries. Lamon had 
previously served as Chief of Commodity Finance, Risk Management and Information 
at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), senior 
advisor for the World Bank, and Managing Director and CEO of the Multi Commodity 
Exchange of India (MCX). Lamon spontaneously started by telling me how the political 
pressure he has encountered in his career is a challenge to achieving the development 
of derivatives markets. Through his narration of events, it appeared that the matter 
(examined in the previous chapter) of government intervention affecting the underlying 
commodity was to be entirely dissociated from the issue of intervention in futures 
trading itself. I asked him whether governments in developing countries would often 
get involved directly with the exchange and he answered, “it is very common”. In line 
with this argument, this section supports that the developing countries’ governments’ 
distorted understanding of commodity derivatives trading often leads to the failure of 
futures contracts. 
After witnessing government interferences in commodity markets across the 
developing world during his career in international organizations,83 Lamon Rutten 
faced these directly when he worked for MCX. At the time, the exchange was listing a 
small Basmati rice contract, with enough volume to be maintained but, as this variety 
represents a fraction of the total global production of rice, too small to be of real 
significance. Basmati, being a high-quality product with a large share devoted to 
export, is mostly uncorrelated with the market for white rice. “That did not stop the 
different political parties and the parliament to regularly talk about us for being 
responsible for price inflation”. Thus, Politicians were arguing that they had a solution 
to the high prices faced by consumers, and therefore voters, and the solution to this, 
was to ban futures trading. I asked him if futures contracts for rice were more likely to 
                                                 
83 Lamon Rutten mentioned, for instance, the case of the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) 
which was under parliamentary investigation following alleged manipulation for successive very  
depressed and very high prices in the early 2000s. It was later proven that futures prices were only 
reflecting market fundamentals (Vink & Kirsten, 2002).  
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be sensitive than for other commodities. In his opinion, although rice is undoubtedly 
the most sensitive, all commodities, especially food crops, can be targeted. Lamon 
complained that he had been under continuous pressure to abandon the potato 
contract during his time at MCX. Today, there is no longer a potato contract listed by 
MCX. However, his biggest regret was the MCX jute futures, a contract he developed 
himself. "In Orissa and West Bengal, there are 20M farmers that primarily bet on jute. 
They are the most oppressed farmers you can imagine. So we introduced a futures. 
The final price for farmers definitely increased, maybe doubled, it had a lot of positive 
effects on the jute economy. But of course, the jute mills and traders were very much 
against it." Lamon preferred not to go into detail as he knew he would be quoted, but 
he explained that the pressures that had built on the exchange since the introduction 
of the contract culminated in the weeks before an election, largely forcing him to close 
the well-functioning jute futures down. His experience was illustrative of a country 
where the complete banning of futures trading is a recurring discussion (Shamsher & 
Taufiq, 2008). 
In Indonesia, Lamon Rutten faced a more ambiguous governmental approach towards 
futures exchanges. Public authorities initially supported the development of an 
exchange, but not with the objective of enhancing the trading of commodities. Instead, 
the government was looking at solving issues faced with brokerage shops. Many 
brokers offering access to international contracts were engaged in rogue practices, 
using the money of their clients for their own benefit. "If you made a profit through a 
brokerage shop and tried to take the profit out, either the broker disappeared or sent 
some big guys with a baseball bat. This was a big, big problem. We are talking about 
billions of dollars in the 1990s". That was why the government opened up the 
possibility to have locally based exchanges that they could control. However, once 
established, the two existing commodity exchanges in Indonesia have often lacked 
governmental support for their contracts. Even in India, Lamon recalled that 
policymakers were not fundamentally against the idea of an exchange. The 
parliamentary delegation visiting him several times a year understood and agreed on 
the necessity for organised futures trading. "But when they have to operate on the day 
to day basis, there are political constraints, political realities" he concluded. Derivatives 
suffer from a perception issue, and it appears that the politicians who approach the 
question of the legitimacy of exchanges through their hedging and price discovery 
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function are often a minority within public bodies. Even if they are given the 
administrative green light to experiment with futures trading, any issue emerging from 
these attempts is often used to put an end to those experiments.  
Understanding what political constraints Lamon was referring to becomes necessary 
when studying financial development. The politicization of futures contracts revolves 
around the suspicion that there could be price manipulation. According to 
interviewees, in many instances governments have answered the complains of some 
politically important interest groups about extreme prices by blaming futures trading, 
even when there was little evidence of market manipulations or price distortions. They 
believe that blaming futures contracts is an easy way to attract voters (Shamsher & 
Taufiq, 2008). This is particularly true for high food prices harming consumers. 
However, the reasons behind governmental reluctance towards futures trading is not 
always rooted in electoral interests and the need to satisfy certain support groups. 
There is a sincere concern from policymakers about the potential manipulation of 
futures. This sentiment is potentially fed by the information generated by the markets 
themselves. In the absence of derivatives trading, there is very little transparency on 
the prices at which people are trading (this is discussed in more details in the following 
chapter), especially considering the individual and local level. An intermediary holding 
an information asymmetry advantage can easily trade (and often does) a ton of rice at 
$20 off the market. However, governments, like anyone else, cannot see those market 
manipulations. When futures trading breaks up the opacity of pricing, the general 
public is suddenly fed with an instrument to judge whether the market is fair or not. A 
European rice broker argued: "What we then see, is that because of this transparency, 
governments think that they know what is going on – so if you are then 10 cents off of 
where they think you should be, they think you want to cheat everyone when you have 
actually brought it from $20 down to 10 cents. But now, they can see it – they could 
not see it at $20". The negative political attitudes towards futures is thus also based 
on a form of misunderstanding of derivatives exchanges functions.    
In practice, the approach of politicians in developing countries regarding futures 
trading is often more complex than the aggressive stances observed in India. Many 
governments have found reasons to push for the creation of futures exchanges, but 
the subsequent development of those exchanges has often been chaotic, including 
their relationship with public authorities. 
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In China for instance, after the economy started liberalising in the late 1970s, the 
instability of free market-based prices in grains, combined with the lack of any hedging 
mechanism, became a source of financial stress for farming communities. In 1988, the 
state council decided to add the development of a futures market to the government's 
agenda (Zhao, 2015). A first commodity exchange was subsequently opened in 
Zhengzhou in 1990. During the first half of that decade, up to forty exchanges were 
opened across the country, trading all sorts of commodities: agricultural, metals, 
energy. However, China did not have the regulations in place to control the inflow of 
speculative money poured into those contracts by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
(Hou, 1997; Zhao, 2015). The situation eventually got out of control, with extremely 
volatile futures markets unsuitable for hedging first pushing the government to ban, ad 
hoc, specific commodities from being traded on exchanges, before starting to 
gradually reduce the number of exchanges allowed to operate (Hou, 1997). These 
bans and closures made the situation worse for the remaining exchanges as the 
speculative money was ultimately redirected to them and concentrated into their 
contracts (Zhao, 2015). In 1998, the government completely reformed the regulation 
of commodity futures exchanges and issued an authorisation to only three remaining 
exchanges, the Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange, the Shanghai Futures Exchange, 
and the Dalian Commodity Exchange. 
There is little evidence that governments of developing countries are fundamentally 
against commodity exchanges. They may even support their emergence for coherent 
market reasons, like in China, or sometimes to solve ad hoc issues, like in Indonesia. 
Certain developing countries also have less coherent arguments when it comes to 
supporting future exchanges. Government officials in those countries have sometimes 
shown interest in futures exchanges with the ultimate objective of displaying the image 
of a mature economy. Ultimately, when there are no hedging or transparency rationale 
behind the political push, it means the exchange is being instrumentalised. 
Politicization can, sometimes, go in favour of derivatives exchanges. However, 
discussions with interviewees revealed a pattern that when it comes to individual 
contracts, political support tends to fade away, as was shown with the banning of 
trading in many agricultural commodities in different countries such as India and 
China. This is in part linked to the lack of familiarity of local politicians and the general 
public with futures trading, but it is also reminiscent of the political salience of these 
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commodities, as discussed in Chapter IV. As these raw materials have more impact 
on economic systems of developing countries, there are more likely to be interest 
groups opposing their trading on financial markets. This also means that the opposition 
to futures trading could happen in a developed country, and that what matters instead 
is the political salience of the underlying commodity. For that reason, the rest of this 
chapter covers the case study of rice futures in Japan. Before WWII, it could be argued 
that many economic patterns there made possible a comparison to modern developing 
countries. However, the issues around rice futures trading observed in the 21st century 
confirm that the political salience of rice has impeded its financial development in rice 
economies. More importantly, these sections will discuss in more detail the impact of 
political interventions in futures markets. 
II) Instrumentalisation of Japanese Exchanges 
a. Governments’ role in the development of the pre-war Japanese 
futures 
As mentioned in Chapter I, commodity finance has its roots in the Tokugawa period 
rice market in Japan. Derivatives trading took time to formalise into well-organised 
exchanges following clear rules and regulations. If this can be the case for any 
emerging economic system transiting from informal to formal, the chaotic birth of 
futures markets lies in the story of government indecision about their fundamental 
legitimacy.  
Between the late 17th century and WWII, the market went through three situations that 
alternated depending on governmental policies:  
- (1) existing futures contracts that were however officially banned by the state, 
- (2) existing futures contracts authorised by the state and suitable for hedging, 
and  
- (3) existing futures contracts authorised by the state unsuitable for hedging.  
In case (3), despite the existence of contracts to secure sales at a future date, in the 
absence of convergence efficiency, the Japanese market structure could not be 
considered fully sophisticated. Government intervention triggered both a rise in 
financial development under policies transitioning the market from (1) and (3) to (2), 
and a reversal of financial development when reforms pushed the market from (2) to 
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(1) or (3). In this section, I analyse the role of the government in the financial 
development of the Japanese rice market. 
Ironically, the oldest proof of the existence of what looked like a futures exchange 
comes from a prohibitive decree issued in 1693 by the governor of Osaka: 
We have recently heard that many people gather at rice wholesale stores, compete 
over the rise and fall of rice prices, and name this practice “tsumekaeshi.” Store owners 
charge both sellers and buyers participation fees, as if it were a gambling dice game. 
This is outrageous behavior and we prohibit it. If we find out that people continue to 
engage in “tsumekaeshi,” we will punish both participants and store owners  (Sugie, 
1985, pp. 12-14).84   
The shogunate issued a similar type of prohibition in 1696: 
There are people who say they are just buying/selling rice, but instead set up a venue, 
invite many people, ask the participants to pay fees, set a due date, and speculate on 
prices in the market. As this is almost like gambling, we ordered them to stop this 
immediately (Sugie, 1985).85 
Thus, the first market in futures price trading had emerged without the approval of the 
government. Gambling was a concern for the shogunate within the frame of a society 
agitated by debates surrounding moral principles. The blaming of merchants’ greed 
was one focus of the Confucian moralistic tendency to condemn luxury (Gordon, 2003; 
Moss & Kintgen, 2010). Whether this market was similar to gambling or a proper way 
to sell in the future, its use of rice bills – certificates issued by rice warehouses that 
could be exchanged for money – as the underlying value increased the demand for 
those rice bills. This resulted in the issue of unbacked rice bills that consequently drove 
rice prices up, which was a factor of inflation. Some authors argue that this was 
another reason behind the government opposition to tsumekaeshi (Schaede, 1989; 
West, 2000). During the Tokugawa era, the military elite of Japan, the Samurais, were 
paid in rice that they later converted into cash by selling the grain to brokers (West, 
2000). However, the varying size of harvests from year to year resulted in widely 
fluctuating prices. Consequently, Japan went through economic instability and 
frequent deflation during the 18th century, strongly affecting feudal lords, who were 
                                                 




the primary concern for the government (Hamori, Hamori, & Anderson, 2001). The 
inflationary effect of the rice bills market, which was once of concern for the shogunate, 
appeared as a viable solution to falling rice prices, and a rice exchange in Dojima, 
Osaka, was first legalised in 1715 (West, 2000; Moss & Kintgen, 2010).  
 
Figure 16: Osaka Rice prices, 1713-1730. (Source: Ryuzwo Yamazaki, A Study of Early Modern Price 
History (1983), pp.92-93) 
Taking over a government with deteriorating finances in 1716, the 8th shogun 
Togukawa Yoshimune soon decided to implement economic reforms with a particular 
concern about rice prices (West, 2000). The regulatory policy towards what was still 
understood as gambling was now shaped to counteract price movements. "The 
shogunate typically enforced its prohibitions strictly when the price of rice was high, 
but relaxed its enforcement when the price of rice was considered to be too low" (Moss 
& Kintgen, 2010, p. 7). The authorised trade in rice bills from 1715 had the expected 
effect on prices, and consequently on inflation, between 1718 and 1721 (see Figure 
16). The market was then closed by the authorities as the price level risked going too 
high (Moss & Kintgen, 2010). As an increase in price was desirable again soon after, 
the shogun Yoshimune gave an unofficial assent to restart trading in futures in 1724, 
before definitely lifting bans on futures transactions in 1728 (Moss & Kintgen, 2010). 
In 1730, Yoshimune recognised Dojima as the only authorised rice future market in a 
decree stating: 
(1) the aim of officially allowing the market was to increase rice prices; 
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(2) ‘book transactions’86 must be conducted only according to conventional practices; 
(3) clearing business was restricted to the 50 clearinghouses that had been active in 
this business before 1730; 
(4) exchange members had to follow market rules; and 
(5) only Dojima, and no other market, could deal in book transactions (Schaede, 1989, 
p. 488)87.   
 
The sensitivity of feudal lords’ rice revenues in Edo era Japan can be compared to 
that of food security and rural incomes in contemporary developing countries. The 
approach of the shogunate in the early times of the Dojima exchange foretells many 
modern Asian governments’ behaviour towards agricultural futures contract, 
especially in developing countries. The Japanese rulers were – maybe legitimately – 
more interested in the effect of the market on prices rather than in its hedging function. 
It explains the short-term policies of the shogunate towards futures. Those policies 
were to be fitted to the objective pursued. In the feudal economy of Japan at the time, 
with well-defined social groups, the shogunate primarily intended to stabilise incomes 
for the Samurai elite, while the hedging function of the Dojima exchange was to benefit 
merchants, a previously oppressed social group of commoners that rose during the 
Tokugawa era (Crawcour, 1963; Gordon, 2003; Moss & Kintgen, 2010). Therefore, the 
discontinuity of support to the market by the government is not surprising, but 
symptomatic of a tendency of public authorities to set the hedging purpose of 
derivatives markets in the background when considering the pros and cons in allowing 
their development. Thus, their behaviour already fitted the framework of the 
instrumentalisation of futures markets. During periods of prohibition, many merchants 
kept trading rice bills through a market in which exchange mechanisms continued to 
develop (Moss & Kintgen, 2010). However, the arrest of many prominent merchants 
during these periods, such as in 1721, altered participation (Moss & Kintgen, 2010). 
                                                 
86 This name was given to the futures trading in rice bills which took place in front of Yodoya trading 
house and was fully recorded in books.  
87 Quoting Shimamoto (1953). 
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Also, the depressing effect of bans on prices proves a degree of success of the 
shogunate's ban to suppress the derivatives market.   
 
After 1730, there were no new government policies to ban futures transactions on the 
basis that futures trading was seen as undesirable. The government made some 
attempt to disrupt the market but could not ban it after having already formally 
authorised it, and higher rice prices had proven to be beneficial for all economic 
agents, from farmers to samurais (Schaede, 1989; Moss & Kintgen, 2010). In the 
subsequent period, the government chose to adopt minimal regulatory involvement in 
the market. The primary responsibility of the shogunate was its authority over the 
licences (called kabu 株) issued to market participants. Numbers differ, but it is 
estimated that during the Tokugawa period, 50 clearinghouses, 500 rice traders and 
800 rice brokers were licensed to use the market, but also to internally self-regulate it 
through a system based on reputation and informal internal rules. The government 
denied civil enforceability of futures trading88 (West, 2000; Shi, Li, & Reshetova, 2016).  
The shogunate took a step into regulation in February 1773 when the commissioner 
of Osaka agreed to hear futures-related suits on designated "suing days". "Dojima 
traders could thus choose between state and internal dispute resolution mechanisms”  
(West, 2000, p. 2607). West (2000, p. 2607) lists a few hypotheses to explain this 
policy change:  
- "the government may have thought it was responding to a need for dispute 
settlement services that the Exchange was not providing adequately." 
- "the shogunate sought to increase trading volume and control of the Exchange 
in general." 
- “broader political motives may have been responsible for the decree. … 
Tanuma intervened in a variety of markets, including Dojima, to gain greater 
control for the government over macroeconomic conditions”. 
                                                 
88 “By requiring private dispute resolution, the shogunate may have hoped to provide incentives for 
parties to develop efficient rules and norms to avoid disputes, thus spurring economic growth through 
market development without expending government resources” (West, 2000, p. 2606). 
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- “the shogunate may have desired to control the Exchange in order to limit the 
power of nouveaux riche Dojima merchants who were owed great debts by 
status-superior samurai."  
 
Although this debate isn’t settled, it illustrates the distortion between final goals being 
endogenous (in the case of the first two suggested hypotheses) and exogenous to the 
exchange (in the case of the latter two). However, in both case the government 
contributed to the functioning of the market.  
The involvement of the shogunate in dispute resolution was short-lived, with its 
discontinuation in 1784 (West, 2000). However, this episode demonstrated the 
government’s acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the rice futures market as part of 
the trading mechanism. The period of the shogunate's ban on rice futures already 
seemed far behind. A new exchange was even approved in Tokyo by the Meiji 
government in 1871, in an effort to strengthen the political function of the capital, 
illustrating once more the instrumentalisation of these exchanges (Ito, Maeda, & Noda, 
2016). However, in the two centuries following the legalisation of futures trading in 
Japan, government interventions have mainly been for the control of futures prices 
themselves.  
The work of Ito, Maeda & Noda (2016) gives an insight into the way the Japanese 
government intervened in the Osaka and Tokyo exchanges during that period and 
assesses the effects of these interventions. Firstly, it is essential to notice that unlike 
most modern agricultural futures contracts, pre-WWII Japanese exchanges saw most 
of the futures contracts being settled physically despite the possibility for cash 
settlement. It was already possible to deliver a quality of rice inferior or superior to the 
standard, with the related discount or premium then being applied. The buyers could 
not know which grade of rice would be delivered until the reception of their warehouse 
receipt (Ito, Maeda, & Noda, 2016). This system was functioning well while the 
Japanese rice delivered was mostly uniform, with only minor variations in quality. 
However, it would, become problematic as the delivery system became the target of 
the government interventions in the exchange from the late 19 th century. At the time, 
the urban population of Japan grew sharply while the growth in rice production could 
not keep up. During the last decade of the 19th century, the respective increases were 
17% and 7%, creating an imbalance in Japanese rice demand and supply. From that 
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point, Japan became a net importer of rice and about half the rice it imported in the 
1910s was procured from its colonies. Mainly, Taiwan and Korea became the two 
largest suppliers of the Japanese market (Ito, Maeda, & Noda, 2016). The structural 
transformation of the Japanese physical market pushed the government to frequently 
intervene in the futures market with the objective of lowering local physical prices. The 
government wrongly understood that futures markets were driving spot prices and 
consequently assessed that by raising the supply for delivery on the futures market, 
Japanese spot rice prices would go down89. The need of the government to control 
the deliverable supply led to fifteen government interventions in the exchanges to 
order or ban the deliverability of rice from the colonies and low-quality rice between 
1890 and 1921 (these interventions are listed in Appendix D) (Ito, Maeda, & Noda, 
2016). 
In their research, Ito, Maeda & Noda (2016) statistically demonstrate that not only did 
government interventions not have the desired curbing effects on spot prices, but they 
strongly affected the convergence. Futures prices were no longer representative of the 
local prices of the underlying commodity, Japanese rice. It means that during the 
periods when the government forced the exchanges to make Taiwanese and Korean 
rice deliverable, futures became inefficient for hedging. These interventions created 
substantial uncertainty about which rice would be delivered at contract expiration. At 
the time, Korean and Taiwanese rice was mostly indica rice, while Japan produced 
and consumed japonica varieties. Rice from the colonies was thus perceived to be 
much lower in value. The unpredictability of the type of rice delivered to traders long 
of the contract caused the dislocation of the futures market.  
There are records of the exchanges and their participants manifesting their 
disagreement with such distortive policies. In 1890, the Tokyo Rice Wholesalers 
Association already pointed out the issues created by the delivery of foreign rice into 
the exchange:  
Imported rice is different from domestic rice in quality and use. If the exchanges accept 
the delivery of imported rice, movements of futures prices will not be similar to those 
                                                 
89 Unlike at the creation of Dojima, when the existence of unbacked rice bills created inflation, the 
derivatives markets had reached a degree of maturity where the futures were efficient and reflected the 
fundamentals of the spot market. 
175 
 
in the spot prices of domestic rice. Therefore, the futures price will fail to be a fine index 
of the expected price of rice. We expect that the rice exchange will become instead a 
gambling place (Tokyo Keizai Zasshi (a), 1890).90 
Most of the foreign rice was imported into the ports of Osaka and its neighbouring city 
Kobe – the Dojima exchange was thus more sensitive to this reform and opposed the 
order (Tokyo Keizai Zasshi, 1890)91. Therefore, the Ministry of Agriculture revoked the 
permit to trade futures contract in Osaka and the exchange was briefly suspended  
(Tokyo Keizai Zasshi (b), 1890).92 
In 1898, after the revival of the foreign rice delivery order, newspapers such as the 
Yomiuri Shimbun once again reported the issues of convergence (Yomiuri Shimbun, 
1898).93 Similarly, the exchanges reacted to the 1912 order to make Korean and 
Taiwanese rice deliverable by stating: 
The rice futures price will fail to be an acceptable index of the expected spot price of 
rice because Taiwanese and Korean rice is different in quality from domestic rice 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 1959, p. 107) .94  
However, the government was not unaware of these issues and in 1918, the Director 
of the Division of Foreign Rice Management at the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce, Yoshinari Kawai, acknowledged the disruptive nature of the policies: 
Essentially, the price difference between the spot and the futures prices vanishes at 
the maturity date. However, after the exchanges began to regard the delivery of 
imported rice, the price difference between the spot and futures prices did not fall with 
the maturity date. The futures market showed hardly any relationship with the spot 
market because the rice futures market was strongly dependent on the price of rice 
from Taiwan and Korea. The function of the exchange is thus disrupted (Kawai, 1921, 
pp. 300-301).95 
Under those circumstances, liquidity in the market decreased, and lower liquidity 
naturally reinforced the dynamic of lack of convergence. 
                                                 
90 Cited in Ito, Maeda and Noda, (2016)  







The market frequently became inefficient because the contract modifications imposed 
by the public authorities were not pursuing an agenda of hedging performance, but 
rather price setting. In this case, contract specifications drift away from the specific 
needs of the market and can soon become irrelevant to the industry. The Japanese 
futures markets of the pre-WWII era are an illustration of their fragile nature under 
government intervention. The government could supress participation when it tried but 
could not easily impose its own terms while keeping the market liquid.   
The Dojima market first came to an end more than two centuries after its creation, 
once again following a government decision. In 1939, with the arrival of WWII, it was 
absorbed by the Government Rice Agency to maintain stable prices by controlling 
production (Frédéric, 2011; Whipp (a), 2011).96 It illustrated one last time its 
dependency on political goodwill. 
These two centuries worth of experience of a rice futures market teaches us several 
things about policy influence on financial development. In Japan, the financial 
development of the market was advanced on the one hand by the sophistication of its 
market actors, the merchants. However, the sophistication of the market structure was 
more fragile. The government never identified the need to trade risk as a priority. 
Instead, its interventions in authorising, banning, or regulating futures trading was an 
intermediary objective within broader policies, such as controlling inflation or 
integrating colonial rice to the Japanese market. It seems that these interventions have 
often been averse to the optimal development of the derivatives markets. It has, at 
times, limited participation through the threat of punishment for illegal trading, or by 
simply creating hedging inefficiency. What remains unknown is if this inconsistent 
involvement by the government in shaping the futures market rules triggered lack of 
trust in the futures contracts, preventing some merchants from generating further 
liquidity for fear of upcoming changes in policies. The next section will confirm the 
ability of governments to obstruct the process of financial development, as well as 
demonstrate their limited ability to encourage it.   
                                                 
96 Japan only entered WWII in 1941, but Japan had already initiated specific strategies policies for raw 
materials in the late 1930s (Cohen, 1946).  
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b. 21st Century Japan: Politicization of rice futures and its 
implications  
The post-war era saw the maintenance of the existing status quo on the rice market. 
The government was decided not to let go of its control over the staple market it 
acquired at the beginning of WWII and maintained the Staple Food Control Act 
established in 1942 (Tokyo Grain Exchange, 2012). Public authorities controlled large 
parts of the supply chain. If the production was done privately by farmers (often 
aggregated in cooperatives), the state oversaw the collection and distribution through 
a limited number of approved shippers, warehouses and retailing facilities. During 
most of the second half of the 20th century, Japanese individuals did not buy rice in 
regular food retailers. Rice was sold in specifically designated governmental shops  
(Otake, 2003). The government unilaterally determined farm and retail prices (Hsu, 
1999; TGE Rice Research Committee, 2004). The situation started to evolve in 1995 
when The Law for Stabilization of Supply, Demand and Prices of Staple Food initiated 
the lifting of restrictions upon the distribution of rice. This relaxing of the distribution 
rules legalised the trading of rice by the private sector outside the government system. 
This policy was pushed a step further with the implementation of the Revised Food 
Law in 2004, ending the governmental distribution system (TGE Rice Research 
Committee, 2004). Therefore, the rice market was back to a system of liberalised 
trading, implying free-floating prices, which created income risk for market participants. 
Under those circumstances, the Tokyo Grain Exchange (TGE) and the Kansai 
Commodities Exchange (KEX) initiated projects to develop contracts for Tokyo rice 
and Osaka rice respectively.97 Even though their projects were independent of each 
other, the two exchanges cooperated on the background research ahead of contract 
design. The projects developed through 2005 and a first attempt to get the contracts 
listed was in 2006. 
The law regulating the introduction of new commodity contracts in Japan makes new 
listings complex (Shamsher & Taufiq, 2008). Unlike in the US, where an independent 
commission, the CFTC, is in charge of contract approval, futures exchanges in Japan 
have to negotiate new listings with the government, in particular the ministry in charge 
                                                 




of the product being listed. In the case of agricultural contracts, TGE and KEX had to 
obtain approval from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF). The 
MAFF has three options: reject the contract listing, approve a permanent listing or find 
an in-between solution, which is often used when there is no consensus on the need 
for futures in an industry. The latter option consists of allowing for a pilot listing, giving 
it a trial period to gain additional support within the market. In this scenario, the contract 
must be reviewed every two years, to either approve the mutation to permanent listing, 
renew the trial period for two more years, or put an end to the trading of the contract. 
In 2006, the two exchanges received a strict "no" to their application to list futures 
contracts. The political environment under which the exchanges attempted to list the 
contracts made it almost impossible to succeed. The listing was opposed by the 
National Federation of Agricultural Co-operative Associations (Zen-Noh), the supply 
chain branch of the JA Group. The JA Group includes different bodies allowing for the 
functioning of Japan Agricultural Cooperatives, a grouping of almost 700 regional co-
ops (Zen-Noh, 2017). According to a Masahiro Yamashita,98 a former employee of 
TGE, Zen-Noh was concerned with what effects speculative money would have on the 
rice market, but more importantly, with losing control over the rice market. He told me 
that even if they never admitted it, everybody on the market was aware that they 
benefited from price opacity and did not want to lose their information asymmetry 
advantage.99 It was in their interest to deal directly with the farmers. Something else 
that was not a secret for anyone was the strong political power of the JA Group. Its 
administrative body, called the Central Union of Agricultural Co-operatives, or more 
simply JA-Zenchu, dictates the policy of the group but also manages relations with the 
government. It also lobbies members of the National Diet, in particular those coming 
from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), who are elected in rural areas upon the 
support of the 10 million members of JA (Stratfor, 2015; Zen-Noh, 2017). The party 
and the agricultural co-ops have maintained a long alliance since the 1950s (Mulgan, 
2000). Therefore, it was not surprising that the party in power would serve the interest 
of its clientele and oppose the listing, even if according to Mr Yamashita, their 
                                                 
98 Interview with Masahiro Yamashita, ex-General Manager at Tokyo Grain Exchange, Tokyo, Japan ,  
May 2018. 
99 This argument was confirmed by three other anonymous market stakeholders interviewed in Japan 
in March 2019. 
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independent approach to futures trading in rice was somewhat neutral. This situation 
also mirrored Gray’s (1966) argument of actors’ propensity to boycott being a reflection 
of market power. In this case, going beyond boycott only, JA used their political power 
to push the government to oppose the contract. This mirrors the situation faced by 
Lamon Rutten with the political power of jute millers. Importantly, in the case of Japan, 
the MAFF had a legitimate argument to put forward: they argued that they could not 
confidently reconcile their on-going price and production scheme and the operation of 
futures markets on which farmers could sell and hedge. The listing project failed but 
eventually allowed the two exchanges to learn about the rice market and design draft 
contracts that they would use again when new opportunities (Rice Market 
Development Committee of The Tokyo Grain Exchange, 2005). 
In the autumn of 2009, the Democratic Party (DP) came to power in Japan, and soon 
introduced a new set of policies. In 2010, as they had promised in their manifesto, the 
DP presented an agricultural reform to the Diet (Democratic Party of Japan, 2010). 
The goal was to transit from a market price support system to an individual income 
support system. The farmers were being offered a safety net. The exchanges saw this 
as a new opportunity and applied again for the listing of their rice contracts. This time, 
they received a more encouraging response from the MAAF. The DP was willing to list 
the contracts on a trial basis, as allowing farmers to hedge would reduce the need to 
enforce the safety net in case of a severe price drop. The supporters of the contracts 
argued that it would also significantly contribute to price transparency (Japan Times, 
2014; Whipp (b), 2011). Nobutaka Tsutsui, the senior agriculture vice minister, said 
"it's difficult to build an argument against an approval" (Whipp (a), 2011). His 
declaration was probably double-sided, as a sign that the opposition to the contract 
had no legitimate argument, but also that even if his government had wished to oppose 
the pilot listing, they did not have a viable argument for doing so, as the LDP had in 
2006. One interviewee100 also hypothesised that the DP was willing to approve the 
listing to develop a strategic political opposition to the LDP's refusal five years before. 
The success of the exchanges would have also meant that some farmers could have 
left their co-op and manage their risk independently. This would have weakened the 
power of JA and therefore weakened the LDP. Therefore, the support of the DP was 
                                                 
100 Interview with three anonymous Japan rice market stakeholder, Japan, March 2019. 
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for reasons both endogenous and exogenous to the market. Politics had turned 
around, and the exchanges seized the opportunity.  
Listing the contracts was one thing, but generating the liquidity was a completely 
different problem. TGE and KEX had to do without the participation of Zen-Noh, which 
controlled 60% of the market (Japan Times, 2014). Like in the US, when powerful co-
operatives hold significant control over the supply and oppose the futures market, it 
becomes an obstacle to the financial development of the grain. Furthermore, the 
contracts' introduction, in 2011, came in the context of an unstable supply of the 
national staple following the nuclear contamination of paddy fields due to the 
Fukushima disaster. The situation generated high trading activity on the futures 
markets to attempt to secure supply, making the price increase sharply over the first 
trading session, triggering circuit breakers. The tight price movement limits did not 
allow trading on TGE, reinforcing the ability of Zen-Noh to denounce what they 
presented as speculative trading. The co-operatives now had a legitimate argument 
to publicly justify its refusal to take part in futures trading in these times of crisis (Japan 
Times, 2014; Whipp (b), 2011). The Fukushima disaster had further impact on the 
exchanges when the publicly perceived poor management of the crisis brought the DP 
government down in late 2012, bringing the LDP back into office. In February 2013, 
the TGE, weakened by the low trading volumes of its rice contract, merged with the 
Tokyo Commodity Exchange, which did not want to keep the Tokyo rice futures.101 
This was transferred to the Kansai Commodities Exchange to be listed alongside 
Osaka rice futures. The exchange was subsequently renamed Osaka Dojima 
Commodity Exchange (ODE) (Japan Times, 2014). This was not enough to attract 
more activity on the market, and the objective of trading volumes of 4000 contracts a 
day has never been reached. Even combining Osaka and Tokyo rice, volumes rarely 
exceed 1000 contracts in a trading day (Japan Times, 2014; Quandl, 2017). The new 
LDP government was willing to dismiss the policy of their predecessors. However, 
when a futures contract is on a pilot listing, it must be reviewed at the end of the trial 
period. The government has to bring strong evidence of the futures undermini ng 
                                                 
101 Both exchanges were affected by the low volume of trade. However, KEX and its successor ODE 
are commodity exchanges of the old tradition – associations of traders that are not for profit. On the 




physical market mechanisms to delist a contract, or convincing proof of hedging 
effectiveness and participation to transfer it to permanent listing. If the government 
cannot demonstrate either, the trial is simply renewed. The pilot contract has therefore 
been renewed five times to date. Interestingly, it is possible that the trial listing 
suppresses liquidity as many market participants are concerned about participating in 
a contract that could be delisted shortly.       
The new era of rice futures contracts in Japan thus illustrates a different situation from 
the pre-war era. The government had a changing approach to futures trading 
depending on the party in power, illustrating the sensitivity of the crop within national 
affairs. Under the LDP, decisions about futures contracts in rice are dictated by the 
lobbying power of the JA Group and its large pool of farmer voters. This demonstrates 
the political salience of both the crop and the futures markets, which leads the control 
of the futures market to become an instrument of politicization. The arrival of the DP 
into office opened the door to governmental support for the financial development of 
the market. The policy of the DP was not reversible by the LDP and its results could 
have been observed in the long term if the market had taken off, forcing the MAAF to 
approve permanent listings. However, in the absence of support by a large share of 
market participants, liquidity could not be generated and the market never took off.  
 
III) Discussion  
The lesson to be learned is that a government alone cannot decide to make a market 
successful. When the futures market is politicized, there is no evidence that a 
government can effectively promote it against the will of the industry. However, 
governments seem well equipped to disrupt the functioning of the futures market when 
they believe they can obtain political gain from it. This is particularly true in none -
Western countries where regulations of these markets fall in the hands of the executive 
power. In North America and Europe, this function is more often performed by 
independent regulating bodies such as the American CFTC, removing the political 
instrumentalisation of derivative markets.  
Interestingly, it appears that unlike the politicization of the physical market discussed 
in Chapter IV, where government interventions happen at the initiative of the executive 
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power, the politicization of commodity exchanges tend to be an expression of the 
government’s client groups’ agendas. While governments sometimes instrumentalise 
futures contracts for political goals, it is often actions of lobbying from market actors 
that drive policies towards agricultural futures contracts.  This was the case with the 
co-operatives of modern Japan, the Samurai class of 18 th century Japan, and the 
millers of the Indian jute market. The ability of these groups to shape policies is a 
representation of their market power and political influence. It recalls the need, 
mentioned in Chapter III, to monitor structures of power within a market to predict its 
likeliness to develop financially. It is not only the ability of the group to influence 
government policies to prevent the development of futures markets that matters, but 
also what interest these groups have to do so. That often lies in advantages they derive 
from the status quo that I will discuss in the next chapter. This time, instead of resulting 
in their propensity to boycott the contract, which they may do too, it determines their 
propensity to disrupt financial development through political channels.  
Finally, it is important to notice that in the face of the politicization of futures contracts 
and exchanges, rice does not stand alone. Most staple food goods and strategic 
commodities can encounter these issues. However, the geographical concentration of 
rice in countries where it holds both strategic and cultural values exacerbates the issue 
that other commodities may only encounter in a handful of countries.    
IV) Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that the politicization of food and rice goes further than the 
politicization of the physical market. Futures markets can become an intermediary 
objective and policy tool for governments to achieve a variety of goals. Whether it is 
controlling inflation, integrating colonial rice in a domestic market, rejecting policies 
from a political rival and attempting to break the power of a co-op supporting this rival, 
displaying the image of a financially modern nation, or instead giving voters the vision 
of a government fighting speculation, the success and failure of futures markets are 
politically salient for governments. This chapter has demonstrated that governments 
are mostly successful in disrupting futures contracts but can hardly guarantee their 
success when they wish to. Politicization thus tends to often work against the process 
of financial development. I have argued that governments often encourage local 
futures exchanges but oppose individual food contracts. When high prices discontent 
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consumers, governments find it easy to blame futures contracts, which represent a 
major threat for the financial development of rice locally. Therefore, rice has faced 
limits to its ability to develop financially within countries that traditionally produce rice. 
Although the potential for the politicization of derivative contracts for food is higher in 
developing countries, the political salience of rice is such that developed countries, 
like Japan, could also be affected. In the following chapters, I will move on examining 







Chapter VI: Developing Countries and 
Financial Development of Commodities 
 
The geography of the rice market may partly explain its struggle to develop financially. 
Within the realm of this research, it was unavoidable to explore this hypothesis. I 
previously discussed the limited financial development of the US rice industry. 
However, it is one of the rare countries with a functioning futures market. What about 
the rest of the world? Despite the production and consumption of rice in countries like 
Japan and the US, the world trade is unipolar, with developing countries dominating 
the market. International trade is dominated by exporters from Mainland Southeast 
Asia (Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam) and South Asia (India and 
Pakistan) while major importers include Maritime Southeast Asia, the Middle East and 
Western Africa. The previous chapter discussed how the politicization of futures 
exchanges impeded the financial development of agriculture in the developing world. 
I now examine other developing markets’ obstacles to financial development in rice 
and compare them to other commodities, especially at the local level. I challenge the 
possibility of building derivatives markets in an industry rooted in the Global South. I 
argue that a variety of issues related to the development level of these economies – 
such as the lack of concentration of highly sophisticated actors, the asymmetry of 
information and ineffective laws and regulations - may lead to the failure of derivatives 
markets in rice.    
Section I explores the case of Vietnamese coffee exchanges, illustrating the difficulty 
to establish local futures due to the lack of sufficiently sophisticated local participants. 
I argue that only exporters can take part in trading futures. However, this model is not 
viable for rice in Vietnam as it is not only a developing country but also a transition 
economy: rice exports are still mostly in the hands of two major state trading 
companies. Therefore, section II focuses on Thai rice exporters, who are often seen 
as a potential motor of the financial development of rice. I argue that most of them do 
not wish to trade derivatives, as their risk aversion is mitigated by many factors, 
similarly to US rice farmers. They are thus less pressured to become sophisticated. In 
contrast, financial development threatens their information asymmetry advantage. 
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Section III, details how information deficits, characteristic of most developing 
countries, prevail in rice and obstruct financial development. Section IV discusses the 
common weakness of contract law in many countries the Global South. The case of 
Vietnam shows that in the absence of robust formal contract laws, industries must rely 
on informal enforcement mechanisms when it comes to OTCs. Some are successful, 
like coffee, while others fail, like rice, and I explain the difference. Section V asks how 
soft commodities have developed financially despite the importance of the Global 
South in their markets. I argue that the shares of the Global North in production or 
consumption avoided the unipolarisation of sugar and coffee industries in developing 
countries. As a result, financial development started in the North before extending to 
various degrees into the South. These markets are thus deceptive models for rice. 
Implications are discussed in the discussion section. 
 
I) Scarcity of financialized actors 
The US case showed the importance of the concentration of sufficiently sophisticated 
actors to sustain the financial development of the market. When initiating financial 
development, the mass of actors able to participate becomes even more critical. As 
discussed in Chapter I, building up a futures terminal market is usually a necessary 
first stage to financial development. However, the functioning of futures markets 
requires the participation of actors with an advanced level of sophistication. The pre-
requisites, from capital availability and capacity to meet delivery obligations to financial 
educations, are not fulfilled easily by physical market participants. This section argues 
that the scarcity of sufficiently sophisticated actors is prevalent in developing countries. 
This issue impedes the establishment of local futures markets, such as the ones that 
had been suggested by the expert meeting group in Singapore, in 2012 (RSIS Centre 
for Non Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, 2012). I use Vietnamese coffee as a case 
study. There, two attempts at establishing localised futures contracts for coffee in the 
last decade failed at developing the market financially. I demonstrate that the mass of 
market actors did not display a sufficient level of sophistication to adapt to the rules of 
futures trading, or even design them. I argue that rice would likely face similar 




a. The BCEC 
After approval in 2003, the Buon Ma Thuot Coffee Exchange Center (BCEC) was 
opened in December 2008 as a centre for organising spot coffee transactions upon 
spot contracts for immediate delivery. In March 2011, it started listing a futures contract 
designed as a precise copy of the spot contract but with a delivery date set in the 
future. 
The exchange worked with three partner organisations to support its operations: a 
clearing bank, a coffee inspector and a warehouse operator (Roldán-Pérez, Gonzalez-
Perez, Huong, & Tien, 2009). The BCEC, situated in the Highlands, in the heart of the 
coffee-producing region, belonged to the Vietnamese Ministry of Industry and Trade 
and aimed to serve the interests of local producers and traders. "The intention was to 
provide the farmers access to all available information and so negotiate better prices, 
whereas buyers would be assured of both contract integrity and quality" (International 
Trade Centre, 2011, p. 141). However, the market failed to attract significant trading 
activity both in the spot and futures contracts, with volumes declining over time.   
Closed in 2013 to carry out infrastructure work, the market reopened in 2015 under a 
new name – Buon Ma Thuot Coffee and Commodity Exchange (BCCE) – and with a 
new contract, which extended trading hours and increased the contract size from 2 to 
10 tonnes (BCCE, 2015). This new contract entailed moving away from the prior 
intention of involving farmers in the trade. The exchange failed in attracting trading 
activity, yet currently, the market is officially only dormant. Despite its website being 
active in 2020 to report on coffee news, and the government promoting of the 
exchange’s development in 2018 (Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, 2018), 
interviewees were unambiguous about the present situation of the BCCE: “BCCE is 
gone” one said102; “BCCE’s current status? Dead”, another wrote103. 
b. The VNX 
Prior to the launch of futures trading on the BCEC, another exchange emerged further 
south in Ho Chi Minh City. The Vietnam Commodity Exchange (VNX) launched trading 
                                                 
102 Interview with Mr R., Vietnamese Coffee Exporter, Vietnam, February 2019. 




of futures contracts on coffee, steel and rubber in January 2011 (Nguyen T. N., 2015). 
Therefore, VNX was the first fully-fledged commodity derivatives exchange in Vietnam 
(Parizat, et al., 2015). VNX listed four futures contracts for coffee (see Appendix E). It 
offered contracts for both varieties – robusta and arabica – with each having a local 
and an international contract. All mostly replicated the ICE contracts’ specifications but 
differed by their contract size: local contracts were for 1,000 kg, while international 
contracts were aligned with the ICE coffee futures (10,000kg for robusta; 37,500 
pounds for arabica) (Nguyen T. N., 2015). VNX had been unable to choose between 
the (unreconcilable) strategies of (i) having a contract size that would allow for the 
participation of small market actors, or (ii) making contracts whose positions could be 
offset on ICE in case of lacking liquidity, as their specifications were identical 
(International Trade Centre, 2011; Parizat, et al., 2015).  
VNX was closed in August 2012, officially only temporarily due to issues with the 
exchange’s informatics system (Nguyen, 2015). The exchange never reopened and 
was abandoned in 2013 (Parizat, et al., 2015). While it attracted some trading volume 
after its introduction, VNX witnessed a sharp decline in activity in both rubber and 
coffee throughout its lifetime (Nguyen T. N., 2015).  
c. Lessons from the failure of local coffee futures contracts 
Despite the failure to build-up liquidity during the lifespans of those contracts, these 
experiences provided valuable lessons about the limits of financial development of a 
commodity market at the local level. Three main problems may explain the failure of 
the BCEC and VNX: financial literacy, farmers' access to the market, and the 
complexity of the delivery. They are presented below. These issues are likely to be 
replicated for other agricultural commodities in developing countries if they display 
similar features to coffee farming in Vietnam. This is mostly the case for rice.    
i. Financial Literacy 
The coffee market faced a variety of issues regarding the financial literacy of market 
participants. The concept of a commodity exchange appeared new, even to the market 
organisers. Often in developing countries, those put in charge of contract development 
in new exchanges (usually privately held) are either citizens of those countries, who 
have worked on well-established foreign commodity exchanges, or experienced 
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commodity finance experts – industry professionals or academics – coming 
predominantly from the West or Eastern Asia. Due to the lack of financial development 
of its economy as a whole,104 Vietnam lacked such experience locally. After cancelling 
the April, May and June 2011 contracts due to infrastructure issues, the Deputy 
General Director of the BCEC (Mr Vo) drew a first review of the futures trading 
experience in a Vietnamese financial newspaper (Kha, 2011). He stressed the positive 
aspect of his staff being able to familiarise themselves with the mechanisms of futures 
exchanges, but in doing so, he drew attention to BCEC employees' prior lack of 
knowledge. He explained that as the state owned the exchange, the budget was too 
tight to hire professionals with derivatives exchange expertise. Even if this issue could 
be avoided in the case of a better funded, potentially privately held exchange, it still 
hints at a general lack of knowledge within the industry.  
A similar issue was found among market participants. Surveys carried out in 2008 and 
2009 to capture agricultural producers’ level of understanding of price hedging 
instruments found that 60.1% of producers did not know anything about them and that 
only 3.7% were aware of the notion of a futures contract (University of Economics Ho 
Chi Minh City, 2009).105 Nguyen (2015) states that the relatively high level of activity 
of the 2000 accounts opened at VNX (mostly by individuals) and its subsequent 
decline was an effect of curiosity. Coffee agents and investors got involved in the 
futures with the motivation of understanding the mechanisms of derivative trading but 
soon abandoned the market.106 
Vietnam was facing the issue of an economy financially mostly undeveloped. In some 
developing countries, knowledge exists within a financially underdeveloped industry 
as some market participants have been involved in futures markets for other 
commodities. In Brazil where the Bolsa de Mercadorias developed a futures contract 
for coffee in 1978, the exchange could rely on:  
                                                 
104 I discuss the prior lack of financial development later in this sub-section.  
105 Cited in Nguyen (2015) 
106 An economic slowdown and unclear macroeconomic policies in the second quarter of 2012 drove out 




(i) local staff experienced in developing commodity futures contracts  (Bolsa 
de Mercadorias was established in 1917 for cotton trading) (De Mello, 
2006).  
(ii) the coffee industry being exposed to futures markets for decades, with 
the NYBOT contract (current ICE arabica) already a reference for the 
market.  
(iii) a pool of investors used to trade a variety of financial products had been 
in place in Brazil for some time.  
The success of the coffee contract was a function of the financial development of the 
economy as a whole and not just a specific agricultural commodity market. Instead, 
Vietnam struggled with this attempt to establish coffee futures – the economy’s first 
experience of derivatives trading. This is potentially a result of Vietnam’s status as a 
transition economy, which limited its exposure to financial products, even in terms of 
the equity. Therefore, the financial development of the economy is  a factor 
contributing to the ability of financially developing a market. If the financial 
development of the economy is low, as it often is in developing countries, the prospect 
of financial development of domestic commodity markets is restricted. However, the 
cases of rice in the US and Japan also show that the financial development of the 
economy is, alone, insufficient to guarantee the financial development of the market.  
The case of Vietnamese coffee highlights that the sophistication of the market 
structure and individuals influence each other. If there are no futures contracts in 
place, there is no incentive to learn about futures contracts. If there is no experience 
in trading futures, keeping the contract alive is difficult. It is a vicious cycle. Therefore, 
the matter of financial experience could impede the financial development of rice in 
countries with little prior exposure to derivatives trading, such as Vietnam. 
Consequently, a question is which country resemble the Vietnamese case, and which 
is similar to Brazil. Looking at Southeast Asian exporter, Cambodia and Laos face the 
issue of the communist economy. Myanmar is also in a comparable situation. After a 
brief period of socialist rule, it faced under development of its economy due to the 
embargo against its political junta. Its stock market was only established in 2015. 
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Thailand is the only country of the region to not have faced these problems. Therefore, 
it is included as a case study. 
ii. Farmers’ access to futures markets. 
At their foundation, both exchanges intended to be a direct hedging solution for 
farmers. Usually, farmers benefit from futures exchanges through the availability of 
public information, as well as from the opportunity to engage in OTC contracts backed 
up on the futures terminal market (Pochara, 2012). They rarely trade futures 
themselves. However, the VNX and the BCEC relied on farmers to directly generate 
liquidity in the market. They adapted the contract size and delivery locations to make 
futures accessible to farmers. The exchange probably believed that the mass of 
farmers was an assurance of intense trading, and that they could hold one side of the 
contract when their trading counterparts would hold on the other.   
This expectation of intense involvement from farmers was somewhat ill-judged.  
Breger Bush (2009) listed five main obstacles to accessing futures markets that, she 
believes, are likely to be faced by farmers from developing countries: small farm size 
(production is often too small compared to the lot sizes of futures contracts), yield risk 
(production variabilities triggering uncertainty regarding the amount of product to 
hedge), cost (the lack of funds to finance futures accounts), information (little access 
to data to manage positions), and knowledge (lack of understanding of futures 
markets). However, the case of US rice proved that many of these issues are not 
exclusively characteristic of developing countries. Additionally, some coffee farms in 
Brazil, a developing country, do not face these barriers. Instead, these issues are 
exacerbated by small-scale farming. The reasons listed above result from the first: the 
size of the farm. Larger farms have easier access to credit – higher margins reduce 
the effect of yield risk, which can also be managed through better access to insurance. 
Furthermore, medium and large-scale farmers have more resources to access 
information and knowledge (Breger Bush, 2009). However, small scale farming is 
more prevalent in developing countries and this issue is likely to be particularly 
common in certain industries of the Global South. This is the case for coffee production 
in Vietnam, and the same issues would arise for rice in its Asian producing countries.   
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The BCEC thought that listing a contract for lots of two tonnes would solve the issue. 
Yet, such lots remain larger than the output of an average Vietnamese coffee farm.107 
In practice, exchange rules set farmer's needs to an even larger production. In order 
to prove that the physical commodity existed before trading, sellers were required to 
(i) deposit five tonnes of coffee for inspection by Cafecontrol, the coffee inspector; (ii) 
own at least three hectares of coffee plantations, although 90% of Vietnamese coffee 
farmers do not fall into this category (Nguyen T. N., 2015). These rules were necessary 
to bring contractual guarantees to the futures. However, as such, the contract only 
opened the market to local traders and intermediaries. Therefore, to build liquidity the 
market relied on a mass of actors – the farmers – that were, in fact, not sufficiently 
sophisticated: their ability to trade risk is limited by their physical profile. This is where 
the Vietnamese coffee contract contrasts with the US rough rice contract. Although 
some similar issues arose in Louisiana, they did not reach the same extent seen for 
Vietnamese farmers, who were limited by their small scale operations. In the US, most 
rice farmers chose not to engage in futures trading but could have, in theory, done so, 
like some of their colleagues do. Vietnamese coffee farmers were simply ineligible. 
This point would appear equally critical in any attempt to build futures contracts for rice 
in the Global South. There is no reason to expect rice producers in other developing 
countries to display a higher degree of sophistication to access futures trading. 
iii. Delivery 
As explained in previous chapters, delivery is essential to obtain convergence. Both 
Vietnamese exchanges struggled with delivery issues. The BCEC settled in the main 
coffee producing area, hoping to ease access to delivery. However, for many farmers, 
implementing delivery to BuonMa Thuot – sometimes tens of kilometres away from 
their farm – was not logistically viable. Farmers are used to selling to intermediaries at 
farm gates or in nearby villages and are not able to move coffee over longer distances 
(International Trade Centre, 2011). They ought not to have been expected to make 
delivery on the exchange without assistance from collectors. However, in the light of 
                                                 
107 Two-thirds of Vietnamese coffee farms are smaller than 1ha and the average yield has moved just 
beyond 2tonnes/ha since 2000 (Marsh, 2007; Gro Intelligence, 2016). As small farms often offer lower 
yields, most Vietnamese farmers would likely have an output of less than two tonnes. Yield risk 




its budgetary constraints, the exchange never had the means to pay commissions to 
such collectors.   
VNX not only had a problem with who could make delivery but also with who could 
take delivery. As the Vietnamese domestic coffee market is insignificant (only 8.1% of 
the production was consumed locally in 2017), exporters are consequently the end of 
the supply chain (ICO, 2019). They were also the only group of actors with the logistical 
capabilities to move large volumes of coffee to the exchange warehouses and make 
deliveries on VNX. Since exporters would have no reason to trade with each other,108 
they cannot hold both sides of the contract and would need to deliver the coffee to 
foreign coffee companies. A coffee analyst explained: 
"…you can have [exporters] in the futures contract, but you actually need 
roasters to buy the contract as well. I don't know why a roaster in New York 
would actually buy a contract in Vietnam, that would probably never take off. I 
think the World Bank has tried to do that as well on a very local basis, but it is 
very tough to get the liquidity on the long side…” 
The warehouses were thus destined to remain empty and the arbitrage to fail.  
However, the exchange had the idea of linking its contracts to international contracts. 
The similar robusta contracts specifications in the West and Vietnam made arbitrage 
between the two futures possible, ensuring that their prices would not diverge 
significantly (Parizat, et al., 2015). This intra-futures arbitrage was the only way of 
ensuring convergence between the VNX futures and the physical market. Instead of 
being directly linked to the physical market, the VNX coffee futures were linked to the 
LIFFE and NYBOT coffee futures, which were themselves linked to the physical trade.  
The VNX attempt at increasing the sophistication of the market structure at the local 
level was only made possible because of financial development at the international 
level. LIFFE acted as a backup for VNX, solving the issue of rare physical delivery 
triggered by the low sophistication of its participants. VNX still failed because of the 
other factors presented earlier in this section. However, without the availability of 
                                                 
108 Exporters have a precise role of transferring the crop from the local market to the international 
market, they do not trade the commodity domestically.  
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international terminal markets such as LIFFE, it would have looked even more evident 
from the start that the project was doomed. This seems to further imperil the prospect 
of a domestic futures solving the issue of the lack sophistication of the market structure 
for rice. Supply chain and delivery on the exchange issues are likely to be similar, if 
not more pronounced, on the Vietnamese rice market. The small size of trading entities 
is exacerbated on the rice market where the near monopoly of state trading 
enterprises, Vinafood 1 and 2, has suppressed the emergence of well-established 
private companies that could deliver or take delivery on an exchange. The state 
exporting companies have their own channels of procurement reducing their domestic 
risk. This situation echoes the US rice market, where the market power of the two co-
ops deprived the futures contract from potential liquidity. Even if Vinafood wanted to 
trade futures contracts, two commercial companies would not be sufficient to build 
robust liquidity.  In contrast, Vietnamese coffee has at least a large number of solid 
exporting companies.  
It appears that sophistication of the market structure at the local level, which is solely 
based on futures contracts, is hardly viable for agricultural commodities, especially in 
frontier markets like Vietnam. It is even less likely that farmers could be used as agents 
of liquidity. Setting up futures contracts in contexts where sophisticated entities are 
rare creates challenges both in terms of liquidity, but also in physical delivery to obtain 
convergence. The existence of a terminal market in developed countries is an 
alternative for achieving some level of financial development in a developing market – 
local futures contracts can then act as a local relay to the terminal market. However, 
limitations in the domestic context remain, constraining the sophistication of market 
actors. For the terminal market to develop, particular factors conducive to that 
development must be present. Why these are not present in rice is discussed in the 
next chapter.    
 
II) Thai exporters and derivative trading  
Section I presented the irreconcilable obstacles facing the financial development of 
the Vietnamese rice market. However, not all discussed obstacles are present across 
the other rice export powerhouses of the Global South. For instance, the issue of 
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financial literacy is less prominent in Thailand, the most advanced exporting country 
in Asia. Unlike its Southeast Asian competitors, Thailand did not experience 
communism or socialism, resulting in its advance in the financial development 
process.109 Some local participants of the rubber and sugar markets use futures 
contracts. Consequently, Thailand is often taken to be the ideal place for the financial 
development of the rice market. The hypothesis is that the Thai rice market may not 
face the issue of the absence of sufficiently sophisticated actors. This section looks at 
the group most likely to contribute to financial development: Thai rice exporters110. 
When the London FOX (in the 1990s) and the Agricultural Futures Exchange of 
Thailand (AFET) (in the 2000s - 2010s) attempted rice futures in Thailand, they 
focused on generating liquidity from exporters. Situated at the end of the domestic 
supply chain, exporters consolidate large volumes of the commodity, making them 
targets for exchanges in need of participation. I interviewed Thai exporters to 
understand why derivatives projects have failed to attract them. Early on, three 
hypotheses arose: (i) Thai exporters are not sufficiently sophisticated; (ii) they are 
sufficiently sophisticated but deliberately choose not to use derivatives; (iii) the market 
structure is not sophisticated enough to allow for the participation of sufficiently 
sophisticated Thai exporters. I argue that this business community is made of diverse 
profiles and that any of these three hypotheses can be valid for each exporter. 
Ultimately, their case is similar to the American rice farmers. There is space for them 
to be involved in developing the market financially, but without a pressuring need to, it 
does not happen. 
Thai exporters have a variety of profiles, and thus needs, in the face of price risk.111 
The typical business of a rice exporter involves procuring rice from mills – directly or 
through brokers – before exporting it. However, some exporters do not fit this typical 
business model. Many exporting companies own mills around the country. Depending 
on their milling capacities, they can exclusively procure paddy and process all the rice 
                                                 
109 Well-functioning financial exchanges have existed in Thailand since the 1970s. The Thailand Futures 
Exchange (TFEX), a subsidiary of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), was established in 2004, 29 
years after its parent company, to trade financial and commodity futures. 
110 Unlike Vietnam and its two main state rice exporting companies, Thailand has more than 200 
licensed exporters, giving the prospect of potential liquidity.  
111 Such analysis of market actors’ profiles could not be conducted in Vietnam due to the access issues 
discussed in the methodology section.  
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they export or process a share of their export and purchase the rest of the rice from 
other mills. Inversely, others started as millers that acquired exporting licences 
afterwards. Some of the rice processed in these mills may also be consumed on the 
local market. 
Risk perception seems homogenous within the exporting industry. Exporters112 state 
that prices are fundamentally driven by politics, weather (both domestically and 
abroad, affecting supply and demand for Thai rice) and the exchange rate. The views 
on how to manage these risks vary. One risk management practice is shared by all 
exporters: hedging currency risk. Exporters work with their banks to lock in the 
exchange rate between US dollars, which they receive payments in, and Thai bath, 
which they use for procurement from farmers or mills. Exporters hedge the exchange 
rate, through what can be assimilated to forward contracts with their banks, which are 
themselves active on the FX futures market, “which helps” one exporter said. These 
practices hint at Thai rice exporters being sophisticated actors, at least partially. They 
are not directly active in currency futures but understand the need for hedging. The 
hypothesis that Thai rice exporters are mostly unsophisticated is invalidated to some 
extent.  
Exporters feel less exposed to risk when they hedge the exchange rate, yet are left 
with price risk related to potential price swing between the export contracting time and 
the rice or paddy procurement. They usually manage this risk “in a traditional way”, 
with a combination of market knowledge and use of storage. Most of them own 
warehouses to maintain stocks. With their understanding of seasonality, demand and 
supply dynamics, they refill those stocks when they believe the market is low. When 
an exporter concludes an export deal, they will cover the volumes on the market if the 
prices are sufficiently low or use their stocks and refill them after the next harvest. Thai 
rice has the advantage of having up to three harvests a year, smoothening the market 
and adding more market lows to the calendar. In contrast, Vietnamese coffee is 
harvested only once a year, although the harvesting period is longer. Furthermore, 
                                                 
112 Five interviews with traders and exporters of Thai rice from July 2018 to November 2019. Thee 
remained anonymous (although one worked for the company Tanasan). The other two were Chandra 




Thai rice exporters can set up other physical hedges. A typical example, suggested by 
an interviewed broker, would be an exporter that sold 30kMTS of parboiled rice, 
without being already covered already by stocks. If there is limited availability of 
parboiled rice (PB) on the market, the exporter may only be able to start by covering 
10%, waiting for more PB to be available. The pressure from their demand could push 
the PB rice price up by approximately $10 for every purchase, threatening the financial 
viability of the trade. The exporter could instead take a position in an equivalent 
amount of white rice (WR). As the prices of both types of rice are closely correlated, 
every time the exporter subsequently buys an additional amount of PB rice to cover 
their sale, they will release an equivalent amount of WR on the local market. It is the 
sort of solutions market actors with storage capacities can use in the absence of 
derivatives. Exporters' ability to manage risk is, therefore, a function of storage space. 
It echoes the behaviour of US rice farmer in the face of price risk. The concept of 
physical speculation, or physical hedge, is once more relevant as stocks are 
purchased at a time when the market is perceived to be low in prevision of upward 
trends (Cordier & Gohin, 2014; Diaz-Rainey, 2017; Jégourel, 2017). The storability of 
rice thus contributes to the little use of financial derivatives by certain key market 
actors, as was already suggested in Chapter III.  
Despite the opportunities for physical risk management, some exporters would prefer 
a functioning futures market, avoiding overcapacity of storage and reducing costs. 
Despite their enthusiasm, they did not get significantly involved in the AFET when it 
offered a futures for milled rice from 2007. Rice market participants often state that 
this contract was not traded because soon after its creation, the government pledged 
rice prices, removing the need for hedging, before using the market to auction their 
stocks (McKenzie, 2012). However, this only happened in 2011 after the contract 
already failed to generate liquidity. As often, the memories about those failed markets 
are dispersed. One exporter, for instance, justified their – and other exporters – refusal 
to trade the AFET contract (despite their enthusiasm about derivatives trading) by 
mentioning issues with the market regulations at the time. While the task was officially 
in the hands of the Agricultural Futures Trading Commission (AFTC), he recalled 
finding out market surveillance was being subcontracted to a private company. That 
contradicted the promises of the communication around the AFET's credibility, which 
was based on the presence of various government officials on the Board of Directors 
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and the support received by the American CFTC (Office of the Agricultural Futures 
Trading Commission , 2004; CFTC, 2006). The contradiction between the official 
mechanisms of regulation and the apparent reality casted doubts on how the market 
would actually be supervised. “So by the time it started, the confidence level of all the 
players was low”. Shamsher and Taufiq (2008) argue that such issue of regulatory 
framework are common in the context of derivatives markets in Asian developing 
countries. Some exporters may have been concerned about the fairness of regulation 
and thought the contract unviable, making the sophistication of the market structure 
non-existent in their eyes. Other exporters were simply put off by the lack of available 
counterparts. They explained that when they got involved in the AFET, they lacked 
liquidity to clear their positions. This is not different from the US catch 22. Many of 
those willing to see a financially developed Thai market attempted to get involved at 
first, but they were not enough to create a market. They were dependent on the 
goodwill of other exporters, but they refused to join the market. This dynamic 
corroborates this subsection’s hypothesis (iii): the sufficiently sophisticated actors do 
not have an efficient contract to trade. The market structure was unsophisticated, not 
because of an absence of contract, but because this contract was not viable as a result 
of a scarcity of potential participants locally.  
I also talked to exporters not willing to trade derivatives. When explaining their – and 
their colleagues – disinterest for futures markets, they often compared those to stock 
markets. They did not seem to consider a futures contract for hedging, but only saw 
the speculative aspect of it. One exporter, for instance, gave a puzzling argument that 
it was not their place to trade futures, while also hedging currency: 
“We are rice suppliers – we are not a finance company that hedges risk. We 
offer the service, we sell the rice and fix everything (i.e., exchange rate). We do 
not forecast or play with the price volatility or the exchange rate up and down. 
Our main business is to supply rice, not to play with the margin of the price 
change. … If we sell today’s price at today’s exchange rate, we fix it with a bank 
with the exact amount.” 
It is difficult to understand how this exporter understood the use of currency futures as 
a hedge (after contracting for physical trade) but the use of futures to lock in the price 
risk as speculation. This lack of understanding hints that many of these exporters may 
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confirm the first hypothesis - that they are actors with little sophistication. In addition, 
they state that physical hedging works well enough. However, many people in the 
market argue that these exporters only pretend not to understand because they intend 
to protect their market power. Similarly to US co-ops, Thai rice exporters can have an 
interest in the failure of the futures contract. However, further comparison is not 
relevant, as unlike US co-ops, Thai exporters have a rational behind hedging price 
risk. However, some exporters may be privileging their market power. They want to 
discourage the emergence of futures contracts because they create transparency.113 
As exporters benefit from information asymmetry in the trade, increased transparency 
could reduce their potential margin over negotiated procurement and selling prices. If 
this is the case, they shift validation of hypothesis (i) to validating (ii): being sufficiently 
sophisticated to use the futures market but attempting to impede its development by 
depriving it of liquidity. In practice, it is complicated to evaluate how truthful they were 
being on an individual basis. Some of them likely fall in either category. However, an 
interesting pattern emerged during interviews. As I asked all interviewees about 
transparency, the narratives of the exporters showing no interests in futures contracts 
diverged widely from all other market actors acknowledging market opacity. Instead, 
the “unsophisticated” exporters described a “very efficient” market when it comes to 
information. Instead of telling me about the general ability of the market to process 
information, they explained their own lack of struggle to access data as a result of their 
advantageous position in the market and their long-lasting relationship with suppliers 
and buyers. In the short term, whether those exporters are sincere or not is 
unimportant. It leaves other Thai exporters enthusiastic about derivatives (and often 
the most vocal about the issue of opacity) with too few trading counterparts. During 
the research, no clear profile patterns appeared to help determine the likeliness of an 
exporter being enthusiastic about derivative contracts or preferring the protection of 
opacity. However, what emerged was that enthusiastic sophisticated exporters were 
a minority. In the long term, exporters with low sophistication could become more 
sophisticated, while sufficiently sophisticated exporters hostile to futures are unlikely 
to change their position. The next section details the issue of opacity to explain why 
this is a function of the geography of the rice market. 
                                                 




III) Information Deficit: 
“… you have a market where there is very little transparency, where there 
is no real talk of what’s happening in the future with any of the professionals, 
or at least they keep their thoughts very close to their chest. So you don’t 
have a forward curve, you don’t have a lot of information; and you just have 
physical trading at fix prices where you have different people trading at 
vastly different prices, on the same day for the same product. And you could 
easily be, let’s say, $20 off the market.” 
In a few sentences, a European broker114 summarised the complex issue of opacity 
on the rice market. This section argues that, above the lack of sufficiently sophisticated 
actors, opacity is an additional factor impeding the financial development of rice, and 
that opacity is characteristic of financially underdeveloped markets. This is 
exacerbated by the lack of transparency generated within developing economies. I 
start by providing a background on the difficulties of gathering ground level agricultural 
data in developing countries. I argue that, along other strategic issues, it makes the 
rice market particularly deprived of market information. I also explain that futures 
markets have a price discovery function, which is the usual way to solve this issue and 
process information in commodity markets. However, I argue that it is difficult to start 
a futures market without previous basic levels of information. Therefore, rice faces a 
‘chicken and egg’ scenario: it cannot establish futures in the absence of information 
resulting from its unipolar nature but futures would be the solution to this same lack of 
information. Many markets linked to developing countries, including coffee and sugar, 
could get over this issue because some part of their activity, whether consumption or 
production, is geographically located in developed nations. The geography of rice has 
thus been the obstacle to financial development once more. Nevertheless, I conclude 
this section by arguing that progress in IT technologies and private intelligence 
services may be a game changer for rice regarding this issue.  
 
                                                 
114 Interview with Ben Savage, rice broker at Jackson Rice, England, UK, July 2017.  
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a. Lack of agricultural market transparency in developing countries 
It is widely acknowledged that lacking, imperfect and sometimes unreliable agricultural 
information have characterised most developing countries. However, only little 
research has been done to why this is the case (Perloff & Rausser, 1983; Barrett & 
Mutambatsere, 2008; Deichmann, Goyal, & Mishra, 2016). This subsection attempts 
to analyse and synthetise the existing discussion on this topic. This will able the 
understanding of why information can be an obstacle to local financial development in 
developing countries.  
Information has a cost, whether to produce or purchase. This cost is the crux of the 
difficulty facing the development of transparent agricultural markets in developing 
countries. It shall first be acknowledged that, regardless of geographical 
considerations, it is particularly expensive to acquire and exchange information on 
commodity markets (Perloff & Rausser, 1983). However, the financial constraints 
faced by most actors in developing countries creates opacity because most 
participants face an asymmetric disadvantage. Large trading firms are usually the 
beneficiary of this asymmetry upon which they can build their market power. Their 
financial capacities allow them to collect and analyse data. They have an interest in 
keeping this information private to dictate prices (Perloff & Rausser, 1983). This sort 
of information asymmetry is less likely in developed countries where there is a 
profusion of participants with sufficient financial abilities to purchase information. 
Ultimately, the market power derived from holding information encourages these big 
players to avoid sharing it. It also allows them to trade similar stocks at various price 
with different counterparts. This lack of market integration, reinforced by the lack of 
grading standardisation in developing countries, further complicates the gathering of 
agricultural price data (Barrett & Mutambatsere, 2008; Deichmann, et al., 2016). 
Participants are no longer looking for one price that matches the dynamic of the whole 
market but instead a variety of prices that have dynamics and irrationalities of their 
own. Although it is an improving issue, the lag of many developing countries in access 
to information and communication technologies (ICT) also contributes to the inability 
of disadvantaged market participants to exchange information and close the gaps in 
prices they trade at (Aker, 2010; Deichmann, Goyal, & Mishra, 2016). Furthermore, 
agricultural prices in developing countries are often difficult to track because of 
farmers’ inability to store their production, pushing them to sell after harvest, which 
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triggers wider price swings than the ones observed in developed countries (Carletto, 
Jolliffe, & Banerjee, 2015).  Small scale farming poses another challenge as it implies 
more producers and, therefore, less consolidation of data at the farm level. Any 
stakeholder willing to collect its own data will face higher costs to obtain reliable 
estimations of the market dynamics. As I will discuss in subsection c., the absence of 
futures markets in many agricultural developing markets is a further problem when it 
comes to disseminating market information.  
The one market actor that could attempt to rebalance the asymmetry of information by 
providing data freely is the state115. However, Carletto, Jolliffe, & Banerjee (2015) 
provide a comprehensive review of why developing countries’ governments face 
difficulties in providing agricultural statistics. Firstly, they face the same sort of 
budgetary constraints as other actors for data collection. When external donors 
contribute to this budget, the irregularity of financing flows can ruin the effort to build 
consistent statistics year after year. When financing is available, human resources can 
be another obstacle. Importantly, the authors notice major deficiencies in consistent 
data collection methodology, reducing the reliability of the information collected, 
therefore, limiting further analyses. However, they also argue that analytical capacities 
are often themselves lacking. Jerven (2014) also argues that agricultural statistics are 
highly political information and that they are commonly manipulated by public bodies 
to serve their own interests. Finally, due to the ICT issues previously mentioned, 
governments often struggle to disseminate information (Carletto, Jolliffe, & Banerjee, 
2015; Deichmann, Goyal, & Mishra, 2016) . 
All these issues contribute to making agricultural markets in developing countries 
opaque. However, this opacity varies depending on the market. The next section will 
argue that rice, as a Global South market, exemplifies all these information difficulties, 
and that additional obstacles make opacity prominent in this industry. 
b. Opacity of the rice market  
The fact that rice is a uniquely opaque market has been a consensus for decades. In 
his book drawing on his experience at the London FOX in the early 1990s, Julian 
                                                 
115 International organisations such as the FAO are sometimes involved in producing market information 
but often do so on a yearly basis, which is not sufficient to carry out consistent market analysis.  
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Roche discussed the restricted availability of public data on rice, compared to other 
markets. He states that international trade volumes of rice were readily available from 
some exporters (e.g. Thailand; USA) but rarer from smaller countries and importing 
countries, and the data on consumption and stocks were not available at all (Roche, 
1992). In my own professional experience on the rice market, I noticed that even the 
information about trade flows was insufficient to be used for price analysis, as these 
export statistics are rarely broken down in qualities and varieties. At the time, Roche  
was urging the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)116 to quickly achieve its 
project of a price intelligence organisation (1992). A quarter-century later, the so-called 
FAO Rice Market Monitor tracks prices only monthly, does not provide a transparent 
methodology for its price index, and, as a non-market actor, has no incentive to do 
more. The situation on the rice market did not evolve significantly in the two decades 
following Roche’s observation. If particular statistics are available for some countries, 
they are not complete enough for market participants to interpret the market dynamics, 
and they often lack consistency (Timmer, Did Speculation Affect World Rice Prices?, 
2010). While some countries would provide export data, others would perform better 
at production forecast or the provision of estimated domestic paddy prices. Trethewie 
explained the reasons behind this: 
Whether because of resource limitations or due to an unwillingness to share, official 
statistics are not always available on rice production and trade, leaving outside 
stakeholders to put together estimates. The lack of statistics on rice in the ASEAN 
Food Security Information System (AFSIS) exemplifies this reality. Figures on stocks 
held in emergency rice reserves are also not made public. … There are clear strategic 
reasons, including those related to competition, for keeping this information from fellow 
member states, but the dearth of data plays a role in the decision-making behaviour of 
rice stakeholders. Furthermore, there is very little data available on the stores of rice 
held by millions of rice farmers, households, mills and traders in the region (Trethewie 
(a), 2012). 
The fact that government to government trades are still prominent in rice is also a 
reason for countries to retain the market data they hold, or for not gathering it at all. If 
they were to purchase or sell rice, their negotiation counterpart could not take 
                                                 
116 The FAO is the agricultural agency of the United Nations. 
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advantage of their low or high available supply locally. Some interviewees also 
expressed a struggle to trust their government’s data as they suspect them to 
disseminate inflated price information to support rice farmers without enforcing official 
policies. However, the difficulty to access the data (discussed earlier in this section) 
should not be undermined as a genuine reason for major rice-producing and 
consuming countries to struggle to provide market information.   
The problematic gathering of information from smallholders mentioned by Trethewie 
is complicated further by the geographical fractionalisation of domestic markets, which 
makes rice prices sometimes not correlate, even domestically. This level of market 
complexity exacerbates the issue of less advanced Asian countries’ limited 
administrative resources. The gap between the robust information services provided 
by the various Thai public agencies and the scarcer ones provided by their Vietnamese 
counterparts is an illustration of this. Despite a few voices praising the efforts of 
Vietnam to provide information, most interviewees said that the results were 
unsatisfactory. A Vietnamese stakeholder even said that when information is given, 
“the data from the state agencies are often inaccurate”. In this context, traders 
complained about struggling to form bids and offers, as well as producing future price 
expectations.   
Comparatively, soft commodity markets are very transparent despite their production 
and trade flows in developing countries. The reason is found in the structure of those 
markets and their process of price formations. As the international markets for coffee 
and sugar are significantly bigger than the rice market in relative terms to local 
markets, the price is formed differently. The examination of import and export flows in 
the sugar and coffee markets give more insight into the available supply compared to 
rice, where the international market is a residual trade. Data on consumption are also 
more widely available, especially for coffee as most of the supply is consumed in 
developed countries. Furthermore, the lack of strategic issues and coffee’s 
contribution to food security removes the incentive for governments to hide data. 
Finally, the smaller number of exporters and international trading houses involved in 
soft commodities avoids the fragmentation of information between too many actors, 
making data collection simpler for public bodies. The issue of monitoring internal trade 
as it appears in rice is reduced in sugar and almost non-existent in coffee.   
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An issue that the rice market shares with other grain markets is the opacity regarding 
information coming from China. Global traders are prepared for all sorts of market 
shocks resulting from decisions of the Chinese authorities or their trading companies. 
Interviewees often expressed concerns about this uncertainty. “We don’t know what 
is going on in China”. The opacity comes in two forms. First, certain information is 
simply not shared, especially relative to stocks. Second, when those data are made 
public, it is difficult to determine the extent of their reliability. For instance, market 
participants are not only worried about whether Chinese stocks figures could be 
underestimated or more likely inflated, but also what could be the quality in those 
stocks. As China has been dealing with environmental issues related to soil pollution, 
an interviewee argued that part of those stocks may have a high tenure in metal 
particles and be improper for consumption. Those difficulties are not unique to rice. An 
international grain trader described how information sometimes suggests volumes of 
wheat held in storage in China, but when visiting the warehouses, these would be 
empty. Traders know what is held in the ports but are uncertain about what is stored 
inland. However, the market share of China is far larger on the rice market than in 
other grains. China, as a wheat importer, is likely to impact the total demand only 
slightly in a particular year. In rice, depending on policies adjusted in function of the 
supply available domestically, China often moves from being a major importer to a 
major exporter from year to year, and vice versa.   
c. Information function of a futures market 
The complexity of making information available on the cash market for rice is 
reinforced by the absence of financial development. While the next subsection seeks 
to understand information as a mean for financial development, this one explores the 
notion that futures markets can also be understood as the mean of information as a 
goal. The relationship between futures markets and information should be understood, 
in developing countries, as another ‘chicken and egg’ issue. 
Hieronymus (1971) has categorised the dissemination of information in three ways: 
information coming from governments, information gathered and shared by private 
companies, and information produced through futures trading. Compared to other 
major commodities, a reason for the opacity of the rice market is the very absence of 
futures trading in this grain. Unlike coffee, sugar and wheat, there is no global contract 
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providing the function of price discovery (Timmer, 2012). Apart from hedging, futures 
markets have a function of concentrating all information held by market participants 
who translate it into price expectations and take futures positions accordingly 
(Anderson & Brorsen, 2009; Prabha, Savard, & Wickramarachi, 2014). If futures prices 
deviate from cash prices by more than what should be expected based on the current 
information, actors who can afford to purchase information – often the speculators – 
arbitrage the futures and bring it back to where it should be. If every informed market 
participant takes part in arbitrage, all pieces of market information impacting present 
and potential future demand and supply will be contained in the futures price. It is 
expected to be a reliable estimate of what spot prices will be in the future (Working, 
1961). Therefore, we call it ‘price discovery’. Using the case of stock futures, Pati and 
Padhan explain that “due to market friction such as transaction cost or market 
microstructure effects, futures market processes information faster than the spot 
market. Futures price leads spot price, indicating that the futures market performs the 
price discovery function” (Pati & Padhan, 2009, pp. 7-8). Hieronymus argues that “a 
spin-off result of futures trading is an increase in the amount of information relevant to 
commodity price and pricing” (Hieronymus, 1971, p. 99). Many interviewees argued 
that it is not a spin-off, but a primary function of the futures market, as much as hedging 
is. Futures markets perform data dissemination not only by concentrating information 
in one place, but they also make this information public and free. Informed players 
come into the futures market with their knowledge to correct the price and benefit from 
this investment in information, revealing this information as a result to the uninformed, 
who benefit at no cost (Brannen & Ulveling, 1984). That is particularly true for farmers 
who rarely hedge directly on futures markets but benefit from public information that 
they could not afford to acquire otherwise. Information from futures markets enhances 
their bargaining power (UNCTAD, 1995). Lamon Rutten explained how this function 
was evident at MCX in India: “one of the things that we noticed before we introduced 
agricontracts, the rural market used to start very early, at 7 am or 7.30 am; but after, 
the farmers only came to the market after 9.30, after we and the other exchange 
NCDEX opened". This did not come as a surprise for him as he witnessed the thirst of 
agricultural markets for price data:  
“back in the 1990s, when you travelled around India during the harvest season, 
you would see lines of dozens and dozens of farmers waiting in front of 
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telephone kiosks and most of the calls these farmers made was to discover 
prices. It was already visually evident that people want efficient markets. They 
want to know what the prices are. They will look for that information, and they 
will use it."  
A soft commodities analyst told me that the availability of prices from ICE with only 10 
minutes delay makes the soft commodity markets extremely transparent for all actors. 
Coffee and sugar farmers all around the world would be looking at the London and 
New York prices on their phone or hearing it on the radio, using the futures as a 
benchmark. The rice industry, in the absence of futures benchmarks, misses out on 
their information function. It is therefore left without means of processing information.    
d. Establishing futures under scarcity of information 
As I have now established how the rice market is particularly affected by the lack of 
available information, this subsection explains how it impedes the creation of a 
functioning futures market. I argue that, even if their function is to concentrate and 
disseminate information, futures can hardly function when no information is available 
in the first place. 
The first problem with starting a futures in the absence of market data is the ability of 
contract managers on exchanges to even produce a contract. Their job consists in 
researching the commodities they aim to launch contracts on, before consulting 
market stakeholders. The process allows them to understand, in detail, the 
mechanisms of the market that they transpose into the contract's engineering. In the 
absence of available information, this research process is significantly impaired. They 
report not having the available documents to familiarise themselves with the market 
they work on. Opacity of markets in the Global South even triggers problems in the 
consultation phase. Lamon Ruten explained how this issue goes further than their own 
knowledge: “You go around talking with traders, it is amazing how many things they 
don’t know. In opaque markets, it is not only opaque for us, it is also for the people in 
the market.” The first stage of the futures market’s construction in developing countries 
is thus complicated by an industry’s struggle to concentrate information and 
knowledge.  
If the exchange managers succeed in developing an adequate contract nonetheless, 
the opacity is still likely to limit the chance of contract success. Firstly, speculators are 
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kept away from the market by the limited availability of information. In other markets, 
data can exist but be expensive to purchase and analyse (Brannen & Ulveling, 1984). 
Such work to collect and process information is an investment for speculators who 
translate it into a price forecast, leading them to take the right positions in the futures 
market with a hope to achieve significant returns. For rice, the purchasable information 
is scarce and incomplete, making such forecasting difficult. In addition, the gathering 
of information at the grassroots hardly happens. To take advantage of information 
asymmetry (if a futures market existed), a speculator would need to set up their own 
data collection scheme to beat the market. It is not part of their job and expertise. The 
cost of such a scheme would probably outweigh the benefits. Another issue arises 
when analysing the market: the lack of historical record. Market analysis often involves 
comparing current situations to historical events to see how current shocks compare 
to previous ones and anticipate a replication of the effect. Similarly, technical analysis, 
based on examining average market cycles, is tempered by the absence of detailed 
historical records. The fragmentation of the rice market also implies that holding a 
piece information is not enough to understand its implications for different segment of 
the markets. The market is not efficient in balancing demand and supply 
geographically and between varieties and grades, which makes price formation 
challenging to forecast. Not only is information scarce, but its analysis is particularly 
challenging. Speculators need a thorough market understanding to analyse the 
causes and effects of rice price changes. Markets such as coffee, that are better 
integrated and more liberalised, are more straightforward to interpret. A shortfall of 
production in Brazil will necessarily result in bullish prices for Vietnamese coffee. 
Speculators often doubt that the time and money invested in such analysis of rice 
information is worth the reward. Finally, government to government trades are often 
negotiated confidentially. A Mekong Delta broker117 explained: “when Indonesia or the 
Philippines are buying from us, no information transpires. There are surely people in 
the first circle of Vinafood who are made aware, but market participants do not have 
access to those negotiations". This implies that anyone speculating on upcoming G2G 
trade would be suspected of insider trading. As a result, this kind of data cannot be 
used for price forecasting. Speculators can evaluate shortfalls in production in some 
                                                 
117 Interview with an anonymous Mekong Delta rice broker, Vietnam, July 2018.  
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countries to anticipate their import volumes. However, obtaining precise figures on 
upcoming production and existing stocks remains difficult. These various challenges 
faced by speculators mean that they have little enthusiasm for rice and are unlikely to 
provide the early liquidity for a rice futures market (Roche, 1992).    
The other challenge in building a futures contract for an opaque market is convincing 
its participants to be involved when they currently benefit from information asymmetry 
under the existing arrangements. In opaque markets, the largest companies have the 
resources to collect information by maintaining large relationship networks or by 
gathering data in unconventional ways (Hieronymus, 1971). For instance, Milo 
Hamilton, as Uncle Bens’ head trader, maintained a fleet of “people on motor scooters 
in Thailand to go up the country and check out where the rough rice price was”. As a 
result, he could take advantageous positions in Bangkok before the variations in farm 
price had been transmitted down the supply chain. The issue is that the big companies 
that can make use of this information asymmetry to negotiate better prices or take 
early positions in the cash market are often the ones targeted to generate the early 
liquidity in the futures. For the exchange, the large volumes these companies trade on 
the cash market represent as much potential hedging volumes on the contract. It is 
easier for an exchange to bring in a few big players at the start of the contract than 
attracting many small stakeholders. However, the big trading companies have an 
interest in contract failure, to protect their information advantage obtained from the 
market opacity (Baer & Saxon, 1949; Perloff & Rausser, 1983). It is not a secret that 
a few key market actors present this opposition to a futures market in rice. Julian 
Roche believes the desire to preserve market opacity was one reason for the failure 
of his rice contract in the early 1990s:118 “you certainly have people who pay lip service 
to the idea of a rice futures market but in fact rather fancy the idea of being able to tell 
people the price was $300 per MTS when it was actually $250.” Milo Hamilton agreed: 
“there are people who don’t want discovery. Their money is made in the dark. They 
don’t want anything to change. And it’s incredibly difficult to change anything in a 
commodity market. … you deal with people who have a lot of money at stake…”.  
Talking about big international trading companies such as Cargill and Olam, Lamon 
Rutten told me that these companies, even though they know how to use futures and 
                                                 
118 I discuss the failure of the FOX rice contract further in Chapter VII. 
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will most likely do so enthusiastically once they are in place, do not want anything 
creating transparency, nor will they contribute to the development of futures in the first 
place. An analyst argued that large trading companies, having already lost their 
opacity premium in soft commodities, were likely to be very protective of it in rice. 
However, Lamon Rutten emphasised that they will not actively sabotage the contracts 
either.  
e. Changing patterns 
When Thai exporters argue that the market is transparent, their good faith should not 
always be doubted. While some may want to keep benefiting from opacity, others may 
simply relativise it as they witness the information situation improve over time. The 
transparency of the market has improved over the past decade from the opacity 
previously portrayed by Roche (1992) and Trethewie (a, 2012). There are two reasons 
behind this change: (i) awakening of the market to the criticality of the information 
scarcity, and (ii) the improvement in information technology. The former resulted from 
the 2008 food crisis. For most crops, futures markets have been pointed at to explain 
the crisis. The literature suggests that heavy speculation by investors looking at 
diversifying their portfolio and taking advantage of other macroeconomic dynamics 
initiated the rise in food prices (Wahl, 2009; Ghosh, 2010; Cheng & Xiong, 2013).119 
In the absence of futures, this explanation does not stand for rice. In rice, studies and 
market participants often argued that price increased due to the export ban imposed 
by most major exporters (except Thailand) as a result of panic (Timmer, Did 
Speculation Affect World Rice Prices?, 2010; Dawe & Slayton, 2010; Sarris, 2010). 
Exporting countries feared that low stocks and a contracted supply would cause a 
price rise, threatening food security. They decided that their production should thus 
satisfy their local demand in priority first. Their withdrawal from the global market 
resulted in high international prices. In fact, 2008 was a record supply year (FAO, 
2020). The crisis was built upon the lack of transparency. Regardless of the validity of 
this diagnosis, many rice market stakeholders took it as a wakeup call to tackle the 
opacity issue. Some saw it as a public necessity while other took it as a business 
                                                 
119 Others argue instead that the crisis was driven by fundamentals parameters  (Headey & Fan, 2008) 
and that the futures market only reflected those (von Braun, et al., 2008; G 20, 2001; Irwin & Sanders,  
2011) even if they eventually exacerbated the problem (Colbran, 2011). 
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opportunity. The governments that had been making bad decisions upon incomplete 
information still lacked resources to solve the issue of opacity themselves. Instead, a 
few private information companies were established in the following years to replicate 
the models of privately gathering and disseminating data prevailing in other 
commodities, including energy and metals. Entrepreneurs felt confident that the crisis 
had provided evidence that decision-making was poor when market actors could not 
buy information. The emergence of this private model in rice has been slowed by the 
size of the majority market actors. The unaffordability of information services via 
subscription is an obstacle for small businesses. The founder of luagaoviet.com,120 a 
Vietnamese rice intelligence website, said that even for $20/month, his subscription 
fee is unaffordable for most farmers and traders in Vietnam. Therefore, the business 
model of information companies rested upon the commitment of richer market 
stakeholder to purchase their services. It is the severity of the 2008 crisis that pushed 
those stakeholders to invest in or pay expensive subscriptions to those market 
intelligence solutions to make them viable in the long term. Nowadays, despite 
occasional scepticism over the data provided, most international trading stakeholders 
closely follow price assessments, market reports and analysis from private companies.  
Progress of IT over the past decade contributed to transparency too. Interviewees 
often mentioned WhatsApp as a game-changer. The messaging app not only reduced 
the cost of communication at the international level, it made possible the dissemination 
of market news through group chats. In Asian markets, large Whatsapp groups bring 
together farmers, millers and traders, together or separately. As all group members 
receive the same messages, it reduces the asymmetry of information. This also 
contributes to market integration. People in different regions communicate to align 
prices with transportation being considered, avoiding situations where villages a few 
kilometres apart trade at vastly different prices. Furthermore, people are now aware 
of opportunities for arbitrage. This newly gained access to information by farmers limits 
the potential profit from information asymmetry for big traders. Consequently, their 
reasons to oppose futures contracts are fewer. It could result in more people willing to 
provide early liquidity in new rice futures (Roche, 1992). 
                                                 




IV) Lack of contract law enforceability  
Apart from the lack of sufficiently sophisticated actors and ability to produce and 
process information, limiting the production of liquidity for futures contracts, developing 
markets face another common challenge: the consistency of contract law. I proposed 
this issue within the hypotheses section of Chapter 1, and Roche (1992) previously 
argued that it was an obstacle to futures markets. I argue that this is not a direct issue 
for futures markets, which rely on margin deposits, but contract law is key to the good 
functioning of OTCs. In turn, those contracts matter in the process of financial 
development as these simpler instruments give less sophisticated actors indirect 
access to futures markets, whether these are established domestically or in the Global 
North. Therefore, OTCs are play a role in financial development as they do not exclude 
actors up the supply chain from risk trading. However, their enforceability is rarely 
guaranteed in developing countries. In this section, I argue that the lack of formal 
contract law can be an obstacle to the expansion of financial development in rice-
producing countries. Commodity markets must rely on informal contract enforcement 
practices, which are not a function of a country's economic system but of an industry 
instead. However, I also emphasise that while weak contract law is an obstacle to the 
expansion of financial development, it is not in itself a primary factor for the financial 
underdevelopment of the rice market. This section uses the case of Vietnamese coffee 
and rice industries, and their greatly diverging response to lack of enforceability, to 
expose the challenges created by weak contract law and the conditions under which 
they might be overcome or not.  
a. Contract law in Vietnam 
Unlike futures markets, which use a variety of internal mechanisms to guarantee the 
enforcement of contracts, OTC contracts entail a high default risk and rely, at least in 
theory, on contract law. However, in Vietnam contract law lacks consistency, making 
the use of OTC contracts somewhat complicated. 
Under the planned economy, all authority over business organisation was in the states’ 
hands – individuals had no right to private enterprise or to contract freely. Commercial 
contract law was not used at the time and only re-emerged with the Doi Moi in 1986. 
As such, the Vietnamese legal system should not only be understood in the context of 
a developing country but also as a transition economy. It is widely accepted that 
213 
 
Vietnam – despite the economic transformations – remains deprived of functioning 
contract law. “Legal documents related to contracting have overlapping jurisdictions 
and contradicting rules, which has made them largely ineffective” (Steer & Sen, 2010, 
p. 1604). A contract can fall under three different bodies of contract law: the Civil Code, 
the Ordinance on Economic Contracts, or the Commercial Code. As there has been 
no unification of Vietnamese contract law, it can be difficult for contracting parties to 
know which law applies to a particular contract and which court is qualified to handle 
the case (either the civil or economic court) (Nghia, 2002). Agricultural markets are 
particularly affected by the lack of clarity in the law as it is not clear whether contract 
law for the sale of goods applies to crops (Nghia, 2002).  Nguyen T.P. states that “the 
consistency of the contract law of Vietnam is still very low. Where violations occurred, 
it will take a lot of time and costs for parties and the Court to interpret the meaning of 
contract law’s provisions and parties true will during the dispute resolution” (Nguyen 
T. P., 2016, p. 16). Nghia (2002) explains that a general lack of knowledge impedes 
the use of Vietnamese contract law. It is not only ordinary citizens' understanding that 
is lacking but also that of judges. It is commonly assumed that courts have failed to 
win firms’ confidence in their abilities to settle disputes. Courts tend to systematically 
look for (and find) reasons to declare contracts invalid (when it is not a claim of any 
contracting party) to avoid taking a stance on the litigation. When it does not know how 
to settle a case, a court can also “submit an official letter to the Supreme Court and 
request the latter to issue guidance. By doing so, the lower court avoids responsibility 
for a possible wrong decision” (Nghia, 2002, pp. 306-307). The outcome for the 
litigating party is then an additional prejudice from the delayed procedure. 
The inconsistency of Vietnamese contract law exposes market participants to high 
default risk when using OTC derivatives. Interviewees have repeatedly expressed 
concerns about the lack of enforceability of contracts in rice. In this context, the ability 
to use OTCs depends on the ability of commodity markets to adapt to the legal void. 
McMillan and Woodruff (1999) explain that it is normal for contract law to take an 
extensive amount of time to develop. They expect other formal institutions such as 
trade associations and other intermediaries to serve a contract-supporting function by 
promoting extra-legal means of contract enforcement. However, it seems that such 
trade associations are still lacking in Vietnam, especially in agricultural trading 
communities. They must instead rely on informal institutions and networks to ensure 
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the proper execution and enforcement of contracts. The form and effectiveness of 
these informal institutions vary widely. The following section examines their effects in 
the rice and coffee markets.    
b. Informal enforcement of contracts in Vietnam. 
The Vietnamese rice and coffee markets differ fundamentally in their ability to enforce 
contracts informally through business networks. A report from the United States 
International Trade Commission (USITC) on the world rice market pictured a promising 
market-based hedging solution for farmers, stating that “traders and mills buy paddy 
rice from farmers either on the spot market or under three-month contracts” (United 
States International Trade Commission, 2015, p. 221). Vietnamese rice professionals 
interviewed denied the existence of such a contract and depicted a different reality 
attached to forward sales. To understand the mechanisms of contracting in the 
Vietnamese rice industry, it is first necessary to give a simple overview of the structure 
of its supply chain: 
Farmer -> Broker -> (Paddy) Trader -> Miller -> Exporter 
The general rule is to sell spot at each stage. However, a “forward contract” can 
sometimes be used in the transaction between the broker and the farmer, though the 
time frame is much shorter than that advanced by the USITC. The agreement is 
usually concluded one month in advance, for delivery immediately after harvest. The 
broker offers a price that the farmer is free to accept. If accepted, the broker will 
provide a deposit to the farmer before paying the full amount at delivery. Pre-payments 
are common in economic systems where contract law is not enforced. McMillan and 
Woodruff (1999) explain that paying in advance is in theory unrelated to the need for 
liquidity,121 but rather creates an obligation between parties. Since the brokers have 
large relationship networks and hold a position of strength with other parties, they 
usually do not struggle to obtain the price they want from the paddy traders who 
depend on them. However, sometimes the reality of the market can result in the spot 
price falling too far from the forward price for brokers to make a profit by executing the 
contract.  "If they cannot make a profit, they can give up the deposit; most forward 
contracts do not have documentation. [SL: It is just an informal agreement?]. We call 
                                                 
121 Liquidity is used here in the sense of early cash payment.  
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that a 'mouth contract'”, a Vietnamese trader and exporter122 told me, amused that the 
USITC had idealised derivatives trading in Vietnam. What the Americans believed to 
be a formal OTC contract was merely a loose spoken agreement that had already 
involved a cash transfer. Brokers are not the only ones to contract with the farmers, 
as some big exporters with processing capabilities are sometimes interested in 
contracting with farmer a quantity at a price, to be delivered after harvest. The exporter 
pays a first instalment of 5% to 10% of the contract value, with the rest to be paid in 
cash when the paddy is loaded on boats in the Mekong delta. A broker based there 
told me: 
“…the main source of price risk comes from foreign market shocks. For 
instance, this year, the Chinese government raised the import duties on rice by 
about 50%. Vietnam was one of the major exporters to China; we exported 
about 1M MTS of glutinous rice to China last year. But this had a disastrous 
effect on the glutinous rice market. The market has collapsed, no one buys 
anymore. And the farmers who were contracted by exporters, who had received 
their deposit, will not receive the rest. The exporters prefer that the farmers 
keep the deposit rather than having to go and collect the commodity. The 
market has collapsed, the paddy is worth nothing.” 
In effect, the agreement between the broker and the farmer is not a forward contract, 
but rather an option for which the deposit would represent the premium, which would 
be counted within the settlement price. The farmer becomes an option seller rather 
than a hedger. Such a system of deposits is necessary to the reality of trading 
derivatives in the Mekong Delta. Asked why derivative contracts (formal or informal) 
are not more popular in Vietnam, a local rice analyst wrote the following: “It simply 
does not work very well. The contract is poor, so buyers and sellers are often very 
easy to give a reason to cancel the contract [sic].” Price hedging contracts, by nature, 
expect at delivery to create a winner and a loser from the contracted price. In the 
Vietnamese rice industry, the loser feels no obligation to fulfil the agreement. 
Therefore, there is no incentive for anyone to engage in this kind of transaction: if they 
win, their counterpart will most likely default; if they lose, they will default themselves. 
With the deposit, the party expecting to make a profit is assured to be better off than 
                                                 
122 Interview with an anonymous Vietnamese Rice Trader, Vietnam, March 2018. 
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they would have been without a contract, even if this profit is negligible. A Thai exporter 
compared the rice industry in his country to that in Vietnam. He admitted that a long -
term relationship was still necessary in Thailand to guarantee contracts. However, 
forwarding without an initial deposit is a viable option in Thailand as counterparts are 
becoming increasingly reliable: 
"we can buy long from the rice mill. In Thailand now the rice mills are getting 
better – if the price shoots up, they will still send you the goods. But in Vietnam, 
they will not honour the contract. If the price shoots up, they will just tell you 
'look, sorry, the price shot up too much I cannot ship to you', or they just 
disappear. In Thailand, in the old days, it was like that, but now it's getting 
better."    
The probability of defaults is not simply a function of a country’s contract law. Business 
practices of different industries also play a role. Just as for rice, defaulting on OTC 
contracts for coffee is theoretically possible, the party defaulting would not expose 
itself to much legal risk. However, when I asked Mr R., the Vietnamese coffee trader 
whether that encouraged defaulting, he depicted a different situation from the rice 
market:  
“Trader: Yes, sometimes [defaulting] happens, but the coffee market right now 
in Vietnam is very transparent. It is really hard to survive, and the ones who 
survive need to have the commitment. Not many people default on OTCs now.   
SL: You would harm your reputation by doing that? 
Trader: Yes! That kind of things. The coffee market is big… but it’s small, within 
the industry… 
SL: Everybody knows each other? 
Trader: That’s right, so if you default, you’ll be on the blacklist of everybody.”  
Blacklisting is a common form of informal rule application in developing countries and 
transition economies (McGrory, 1995; Posner, 1998). It appeared that coffee 
intermediaries had even more to lose by defaulting than if they were exposed to a suit 
in a court of law, which would force them to compensate their counterpart financially. 
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Trebilcock and Leng (2006) offered a theoretical framework that helps explain the 
effect of a lack of robust contract law on economic development that can be applied 
to financial development. They ask “whether the existence of a formal contract law 
and enforcement regime significantly contributes to economic growth in developing 
countries” (Trebilcock & Leng, 2006, p. 1518). They explore two hypotheses found in 
the literature: (i) economic development cannot be achieved without strong formal 
contract law and enforcement mechanisms, (ii) informal contracting mechanisms 
already make possible the achievement of much economic development. They 
reconcile those two arguments by concluding that:  
… at low level of economic development, informal contract enforcement 
mechanisms may be reasonably good substitutes for formal contract 
enforcement mechanisms. At higher levels of development, however, informal 
contract enforcement may become an increasingly imperfect substitute due to 
the presence of large, long-lived, highly asset-specific investments, as well as 
the prevalence of increasingly complex trade in goods and services that often 
occurs outside of repeated exchange relationships (Trebilcock & Leng, 2006, 
p. 1519). 
The financial development of the Vietnamese coffee and rice markets fits into this 
theory. Both industries attempt to use informal contracts, but only the coffee market is 
characterised by self-enforcing contracts. In theory, the self-enforcement of contracts 
can be due to a variety of factors including ethnic, religious and cultural ties that can 
trigger informal extra-legal sanctions from the concerned network. When those 
networks are not in place, the long-term investment-intensive relationship between two 
business partners creates enough incentive for them to respect contracts to maintain 
the relationship (Trebilcock & Leng, 2006). The coffee industry presents both 
characteristics. On the one hand, the relatively small number of people involved in the 
market and the transparency of the market triggers sanctions within the business 
network (that forms a community) in the form of blacklisting of contract defaulters. This 
is a function of the ability of the industry and its formal (associations) and informal 
(networks) business groups to process information about market participants (Steer & 
Sen, 2010). In addition, market participants are concerned about maintaining stable 
business relationships in the long term, partly because it can be cost-intensive to 
identify new reliable trading partners (McMillan & Woodruff, 1999; Steer & Sen, 2010). 
218 
 
Another reason might be that price discovery from international futures markets 
eliminates the need to often change business counterparts to find the best price offer. 
The rice market is different as participants need to explore more options to find 
profitable prices and there is a larger number of participants in the industry. Their 
supply chains are more flexible, and long-term relationships are thus less of a concern. 
These factors result in a business culture that leans towards defaulting that is self-
perpetuating. Since it is the norm to default on contracts within the rice business 
network, most market actors will do so to avoid significant loses. A mill owner, for 
instance, would not get offended and encourage the industry to blacklist a defaulting 
supplier, as they would be likely to adopt the same behaviour if exposed to important 
losses. There are even suggestions that retaliating against a defaulting contracting 
partner can damage the image of an individual and drive away their other trading 
partners (McMillan & Woodruff, 1999). In a nutshell, the differences in business habits 
between the two markets are stark, to the extent that a rice trader would be blacklisted 
for pushing for the enforcement of a contract, while a coffee trader would be blacklisted 
for defaulting.  This difference between the two industries illustrates well Trebilcock & 
Leng’s assertion that “contracting in developing countries is a function of highly 
context-specific factors that defy easy generalizations” (Trebilcock & Leng, 2006, p. 
1577). This produces a situation where both industries are deprived of formal 
contracting mechanisms due to the lack of enforcement from public authorities. 
However, the coffee industry can rely on informal contracting due to its small 
integrated structure and resulting business culture. By contrast, the norms generated 
by the less transparent and more siloed organization of the rice industry deprives its 
contracts of any form of reliability.   
If we adapt Trebilcock and Leng’s theory by looking at financial development more 
specifically than economic development in general, the coffee market confirms that at 
low levels of economic sophistication, with contracts being agreed between close 
parties, informal channels perform well in making financial development possible. 
However, this system excludes market actors that are not naturally part of the business 
network. This is observed with foreign coffee trade houses in Vietnam that do not share 
similar cultural norms of reliability on long-term relationships and refuse to offer 
hedging contracts that would specify long periods of time between pricing and delivery. 
In order to reach a higher level of financial development based on OTC contracts, the 
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Vietnamese coffee market would need to rely on stronger enforceability of contract 
law that would allow foreign traders to sue their counterparts in case of defaults 
(Trebilcock & Leng, 2006). On the other hand, unless it sees a transformation of 
business culture similar to the Thai case, the financial development of Vietnamese rice 
depends entirely on the development of formal commercial and contract law. The 
opportunity for financial development is thus reduced, but this factor would only come 
into play if there was a futures market to back up the OTC contracts. This is therefore 
only secondary to the low financial development of rice.  In Thailand, for instance, 
before the amelioration of informal contract enforcement in recent years, the issue 
could have affected the FOX or AFET contracts. However, the lack of willingness to 
take part from most exporters and millers made that they would not have offered OTC 
contracts to farmers anyway. One would also think that if such OTC contracts were 
offered to particularly risk averse participants, these would quickly develop habit of 
honouring contracts shall that be their only barrier to hedging. 
 
V) The deceptive models of coffee and sugar 
Before validating the ‘geography matters’ hypothesis, a counterargument must be 
challenged: why would being produced in developing countries affect rice but not other 
crops like coffee and sugarcane? In this section, I argue that this is because those two 
comparative markets are not unipolar. They are globally traded, with developed 
countries highly involved in the trade and generating the financial development of 
those markets. They host the most sophisticated actors as well as the contracts. The 
financial development of those commodities in developing countries is often an 
illusion; it is most of the time only transmitted from developed countries.123 Therefore, 
the financial development of coffee and sugar does not invalidate the hypothesis that 
the direct financial development of the market at the local level in most developing 
countries is unlikely.  
a. Different market structure.  
                                                 
123 The case of Brazil stands as an exception, although the prior existence of a world futures market for 
coffee long before certainly contributed to the establishment of the contract. 
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To understand how the coffee and sugar markets developed financially, it is important 
to understand their geographical organisation. The structure of the rice market 
worldwide is peculiar as it differs from the compared crops in two ways: it is an 
excessively localised market, with only 9% of rice being exported, and the major 
players on the international markets are almost exclusively developing nations. The 
coffee and sugar trade involves substantial participation from developed countries. In 
2019, 75% of the global coffee production was exported (ICO, 2020). Most of this 
coffee went to developed nations with an advanced level of financial development. In 
2018, 35% of all sugar was exported, with developed nations being heavily involved 
in both production and consumption (ISO, 2018). The futures markets of those 
industries have thus been historically fed by the participation of large and sophisticated 
trading houses based in the West. The location of most commodity futures exchange 
in Western countries (Germany, USA, UK and France) indicated that the hedging 
market was originally destined for their end of the supply chains. In the case of coffee, 
those countries were the destination. Coffee futures developed through the 
participation of roasters and merchant companies in the US and Western Europe. In 
sugar, Western countries served both export (when it was sugar beet) and import 
channels (for both beet and cane). Furthermore, many contracts have been operating 
at different points in time and have been replaced by other contracts, reflecting the 
changing needs of the industries (Hannah & Spence, 1996). However, there was 
continued sophistication of the market structure, fed by the participation of derivatives 
hungry sophisticated Western actors. Those markets also benefited from the injection 
of liquidity from speculators active in financial places such as New York and London. 
Since they emerged in the late 19th century, many futures contracts for soft 
commodities have failed. However, this long history has given exchange managers 
time to experiments with many contract specifications, upon the guarantee that there 
would always be a large pool of sophisticated actors, hedgers and speculators, to 
trade them if they were well designed. Such a scenario could not happen in rice as 
sophisticated actors are scarce and dispersed in poorly integrated markets. The 
strength of soft commodity markets when it comes to financial development is not only 
that those global markets create a link to developed economies, they also provide the 
large integrated markets underlying the futures. The liquidity of ICE contracts for soft 




b. Local financial development of sugar in Thailand 
It is necessary to reflect on whether the financial development of the markets that 
originated in developed nations, extended to developing countries. I argue that it is not 
necessarily the case. For example, with Thai sugar, the price system limits the need 
for domestic actors of the supply chain to take part in derivatives trading. At the 
beginning of the crop season, the OCSB projects expected revenues for the total 
industry sell of sugarcane, based on the Quotas A, B, C. These revenues are expected 
to be shared between the 300,000 sugar farmers and the 55 sugar mills: 70% for the 
producers and 30% for the processors. This allows for the calculation of an initial price 
– the one that millers must pay farmers. At the end of the season, the OCSB re-
evaluates the total revenue to obtain the final price (Meriot, 2015). If it is lower than 
the initial price, the shortfall is paid by the government to millers, while farmers keep 
their extra profit. When higher, the millers compensate farmers (Klanarong, 
Vanichsriratana, & Sunthornvarabhas, 2016; Manivong & Bourgois, 2017). The 
difference between the initial and final prices is due to variations in world prices. As 
the Quotas A and B are at fixed price, it is only the price that exporters will pay to 
millers under Quota C that can vary.  However, as Quota C represents 75% of the 
sales, these variations can be important (Manivong & Bourgois, 2017). As millers and 
farmers are protected by the price setting system, only the government and the seven 
exporting companies are exposed to risk over the year. The consolidation through the 
supply chain means that exporting companies are giant traders with significant 
financial capacities. For instance, Mitr Phol and Thai Roong Ruang124 are respectively 
the 3rd and 4th biggest sugar exporter in the world. This means that they face no issues 
participating actively in futures trading to hedge their positions. As a result, Thailand 
greatly participates in generating commercial liquidity without financial development 
reaching the higher local levels of the supply chain. The farmers are still exposed to 
year-to-year price variations of the world market when a new revenue is estimated by 
the OCSB to determine the initial price. In theory, farmers could hedge this risk with 
futures as the open interest goes far into the future on the ICE contract. However, the 
obstacles to access futures markets remain the same as for rice farmers. Interviewed  
                                                 
124 They are also the two biggest processing companies in Thailand, crushing about 35% of all Thai 
sugarcane. They respectively export through the exporting companies Pacific Sugar Corporation and 
Siam Sugar Export (Manivong & Bourgois, 2017).   
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traders and analysts explained they were not aware of any of the millions of sugar 
farmers in Thailand trading derivatives. Even if for some of them, the scale of farming 
is significantly larger than the average rice farm, they are still not engaged in hedging. 
It is not possible for millers to offer farmers forward contracts far into the future either 
as the procurement price is, once again, not freely determined. 
Therefore, there is high sophistication of some local actors but mostly for big 
companies in the later stages of the export channels. This does not represent the 
financial development of a crop at the local level that could be replicated in rice. 
Instead, it is an integration of the biggest actors of the local industry into the financially 
developed global market. 
c. PTBF for Vietnamese coffee 
It would be simple to argue that the financial development of small local actors never 
happens in developing economies. In coffee, many small producers are sophisticated 
enough to make use of derivative contracts on offer. However, those contracts are 
only made possible by the pre-existing financial development of the market at the 
global level. I use the case of the Vietnamese OTC market for coffee to illustrate the 
interaction of the local financial development of the market.  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a limit to the Vietnamese coffee chain’s financial 
development, in the absence of formal contract law, is foreign trading houses’ 
scepticism towards informal contract enforcement. Foreign trader interviewees 
maintained that contract default is a risk and pricing closer to shipment is preferable. 
Instead of offering forward contracts for Vietnamese coffee, they introduced shorter -
term 'Price To Be Fixed' (PTBF) contracts that have become highly popular throughout 
the last decade. These kinds of OTCs ensure the transfer of a commodity without 
setting the price, mandating only the grade, quantity and delivery date. The contract 
specifies which party holds the right to fix the price, doing so upon the futures market 
price – usually LIFFE/ICE for Vietnamese Robusta – at fixing time. We talk about 
seller’s call or buyer’s call. The global coffee market traditionally uses PTBFs at 
buyer’s call, giving roasters the advantage in the transaction (May, Mascarenhas, & 
Potts, 2004). However, in Vietnam seller’s call prevails – it is first awarded first to 
farmers, giving them market power. Subsequent actors along the supply chain (trading 
and processing intermediaries and exporters) use similar contracts to continue 
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transferring ownership while waiting for farmers to fix their price. As PTBF reach them, 
international roasters use futures to offset their risk.  Once the price is fixed, they settle 
the futures position and use the cash to settle the PTBF contract, and payments go 
back up the supply chain. It is possible for farmers to transfer ownership – through 
delivery to the PTBF buyer – of still unpriced coffee. The supply chain can use (process 
or ship) the coffee but “everybody is waiting for the farmer to fix”, a coffee analyst 
explained. This system allows farmers without storage to stay in the market by pricing 
at a later date. 
Paradoxically, these contracts do not fully allow for the sophistication of the decision-
makers – the farmers – unlike it does for the market intermediaries. The market 
structure’s sophistication at the farmer level is only partial, as they can buy the right to 
keep their market risk after harvest but not the right of locking in a price before harvest. 
The ability to trade market risk this way is not the optimal sophistication for farmers, 
as most of them are risk adverse and would ideally fix their price in advance. Instead, 
intermediaries in the supply chain, thanks to PTBF, could either stay in the market, or 
lock in their price at future date, which they commonly do. For instance, an exporter 
engaging in a PTBF with a local trader assumes the risk of the contract as the buyer. 
However, when they enter a similar type of contract with an international roaster, i t is 
as the seller. When the local trader executes its call and fixes the price, the exporter 
only needs to instantly do the same on its contract with the roaster to receive their 
margin. Therefore, exporters describe the trade as a hedge. It is the case for all local 
intermediaries. Going back up the entire supply chain, we find that PTBF contracts do 
not offer a hedge to farmers. For farmers who have not been able to invest in storage 
capacities, a PTBF mostly allows for the moving of the crop, avoiding any on-farm 
post-harvest crop risk,125 as well as the receiving of a first share of the payment (often 
agreed in PTBF) before definitively fixing their price. As my interviewee regularly 
repeated, these contracts “gives farmers flexibility” to take advantage of the market. 
However, they are not given all options to manage price risk. With a PTBF, the farmer 
is not protected from downward movements in the market until the price is fixed. Coffee 
farmers thus display high levels of sophistication in marketing their crop using a PTBF 
                                                 
125 In contrast to farmers in heavily stormed hit Louisiana mentioned in Chapter III, these farmers don’t 
seem to perceive production risk as a primary concern. 
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but are not hedging per se. Nevertheless, they avoid a loss of opportunity to benefit 
from a post-harvest price rally. Combining this with the transfer of storage risk to the 
buyer, PTBFs thus allow farmers to partially trade risk. This instrument creates a 
difference in sophistication of the market structure at different stages of the supply 
chain. It gives more risk trading options to intermediaries than to farmers.  
The other important observation about the impact of PTBFs on financial development 
is the articulation between the local and global derivatives market. The pre-existence 
of a futures market, and therefore, of financial development of the global market 
structure, is an almost sine qua non condition of the use of PTBF contracts. There is 
a need for a permanent underlying price benchmark for prices to be fixed against, and 
this is provided by futures markets. Spot indices could also be used, but liquid futures 
present the advantage of an enhanced trust value for all parties. More importantly, a 
terminal futures market allows international companies down the supply chain to take 
offsetting positions and thus offer PTBFs in the first place. If this were not the case, it 
is unlikely that any other intermediary would be willing to offer a PTBF to their sellers 
while being unable to hedge it. The local OTC market is an expansion of the global 
market into developing countries through simple derivative instruments, rather than a 
sign of spontaneous local financial development. Similar structures of risk 
transmission through the supply chain could, therefore, not be replicated in rice. The 
financial development of a market in a developing country is mostly the result of a top-
down process, an expansion of the global risk trading onto local industries.    
V) Discussion  
As it appears through this thesis, the reasons for the low financial development of the 
rice market are multiple, and they often feed onto each other. It creates a challenge in 
the process of pinning what exactly is a factor for financial underdevelopment, and 
what is a cause for these factors. This chapters discusses the effect of geographical 
unipolarization of the market in the Global South on the prospect of financial 
development and establishes that it cannot be an endogenous dynamic. However, it 
appears that this geographical specificity mostly serves to group a wide range of 
issues that are more likely to arise in developing countries. Importantly, I did not fail to 
recognize that these issues are not always taking place in developing countries – using 
the case of Brazil and its sugar estates – and should also reaffirm that many of these 
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issues can take place in the Global North too. What the developing country argument 
suggests is that these countries are likely to accumulate the factors that impede 
financial development, such as market opacity and the lack of sophisticated actors. 
This coincides with the argument made in previous chapters that it is the accumulation 
of obstacles to the functioning of derivative markets that causes their total absence, 
as it does for rice. Once again, when issues accumulate, they start interlocking with 
each other. For instance, market opacity feeds the market power of key actors that 
boycott futures trading due to its price discovery function. Similarly, the lack of 
enforceability of contract, although it can be compensated for in many ways, affect the 
development of OTC markets.   
In many ways, the situation in Thailand and Vietnam mirrors the case of the US. Market 
actors that are expected to trade derivatives (US farmers and Thai exporters) have the 
possibility to not do so, based on their ability to physically hedge and diversify. Some 
sophisticated actors (US co-ops and some of the Thai exporters) prioritize the 
protection of their market power over their ability to hedge risk. Once again, the study 
of actors’ interests and behaviours is highly significant to the study of financial 
development, beyond the simple level of financial sophistication of these actors. It 
appears that being highly sophisticated is not a guarantee of wishing for the market to 
develop financially.       
Both the cases of the US and Southeast Asian countries demonstrate the important 
interaction between the OTC market and futures market. If terminal markets are highly 
liquid, it is because, through various OTC instruments, they bring risk trading up the 
supply chain.  
What is interesting is that despite sharing various characteristics, the cases of 
Thailand, Vietnam and the US diverge severely in one aspect: the US has a 
sophisticated market structure with the Rough Rice contract. That tells that despite the 
industry specific issue to develop financially, the economic environment of a 







In this chapter, I argued that the financial development of the market is a top-down 
process, an expansion of financial development from the global market, generated in 
the Global North, progressing to some extent into the local markets of developing 
countries. At the local level, issues with information and, to a lesser extent, contract 
law, limit the ability of developing markets to develop financially by themselves. More 
importantly, in the local markets of developing countries, there is a scarcity of 
sufficiently sophisticated actors willing to trade derivatives in the early stage of the 
contract. Those actors who can and wish to participate cannot produce liquidity in a 
futures contract by themselves. They are facing other market participants that are 
either insufficiently sophisticated or sufficiently sophisticated but reluctant to the 
sophistication of the market structure, as it would solve opacity that benefits their 
business. I have argued that in its early stages, financial development needs a 
concentration of highly sophisticated and willing actors to maintain futures contracts. 
As the sophistication of the market structure increases, the introduction of OTCs also 
renders the participation of less sophisticated actors possible. This is a condition to 
the financial development of the local level in developing countries. This chapter has 
argued that this stage is obstructed in many countries across the Global South by 
weak contract law. However, as this stage is secondary, although it could affect rice if 
the industry remains unable to enforce these contracts informally, it has not been a 
primary cause of financial underdevelopment till now.  
With economic development, it is possible that some of these issues will be solved. 
However, rice would need a global futures contract to see a degree of top-down 
expansion of financial development that results in participants’  ability to trade risk. It 
would also allow the willing sophisticated actors of different national market to trade 
with their counterparts in other countries. The final chapter will question the possibility 




Chapter VII: The Making of a Global 
Contract 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the financial development of soft commodities 
happened in the context of globalised markets. The contracts for coffee and sugar in 
London and New York, just like the contract for wheat in Chicago, are global contracts.  
They are liquid, making the sophistication of the market structure substantive because 
people in those markets across the world use it as hedging instruments, not only the 
ones for whom the specifications of the contracts match the commodity they produce 
or trade very closely. A large number of varieties and geographical origins are, 
therefore, part of the underlying market.  
In Chapter VI, I argued that the construction of commodity futures contracts at the local 
level is complicated because they are rooted in the context of the developing economic 
systems of the producing countries, which rarely fulfils the needs of derivative finance. 
An obstacle to financial development is that the sophistication of the market structure 
hardly lasts in the absence of willing sophisticated market actors. I have previously 
exposed the factors attached to many developing countries that restrict the 
sophistication of the market actors in the context of rice trading. There are willing 
sophisticated stakeholders in the rice market, but they are too geographically 
dispersed to create liquidity at the local level. If a rice futures were to be global, it would 
offer all sophisticated actors the opportunity to meet in one market and therefore 
maintain a newly created instrument that makes the market structure increasingly 
sophisticated. This chapter explores that possibility of aiming for global contracts to 
attract liquidity from various origins. It questions why rice did not see the emergence 
of such global contract like coffee, sugar and wheat did. I argue that there are two 
distinct paths in constructing a global contract: a contract deliberately designed to be 
used all around the world by international trade actors, or a contract specified for local 
use before becoming a world benchmark. I examine the lessons learnt from my 
compared crops and analyse how these transposed onto rice. I find that both of these 
models meet strong obstacles to serve for the financial development of rice, and were, 
therefore, never viable. In the face of the difficulties to adopt these models, I examine 
228 
 
the most recent attempt to develop rice financially through the use of other derivative 
instruments, swaps and index-based futures, as the industry is currently aiming to 
replicate the recent success of the Black Sea wheat market. I find that this model could 
solve some of the issues discussed in this thesis, potentially leading to a higher degree 
of financial development of rice in the future. 
 
I) The two paths to a global contract 
The financial development of a commodity at the global level can follow two different 
paths regarding the establishment of a futures. The first option is a local contract 
becoming a global benchmark against which other origins and varieties of the 
commodity are hedged. The Chicago SRW (soft red winter) Wheat contract illustrates 
this model. These local contracts primarily target the involvement of domestic 
producers and processors, as well as intermediaries in the national supply chain. As 
the contract grows in domestic liquidity, market participants in foreign countries start 
using this contract to hedge their own price risk.  This option requires the different 
varieties and origins126  of the crop to have a consistent price relationship with the 
deliverable growth specified by the contract, to guarantee hedging effectiveness. 
Another logic is to establish, from the start, what I will call a world or international 
contract, as is the case for sugar and coffee. These use physical settlement, accepting 
different origins at one or many delivery points. These contracts target international 
trade. They specify crops in the form most commonly traded internationally. This 
system needs a consistent grading of the commodity with a premium and discount 
from the reference price, such that a large share of production is deliverable on the 
contract across the world. Delivery usually takes place in ports, either FOB127 in the 
producing countries or in port warehouses in importing countries.   
In this section, I examine these two options through existing contracts in sugar, coffee 
and wheat. This will allow for understanding their mechanism. Later this chapter, 
attempts to fit rice within one of these traditional models.   
                                                 
126 Origin refers to geographical origin, aka the country where the commodity is grown. The word growth 
is also used in some markets such as sugar.  
127 Free on Board: the price includes the delivery on board a ship.  
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a. The global benchmark system 
The subsection tackles the global benchmark system. This model has been common 
for grains such as wheat and corn. It consists of using a functioning domestic contract, 
often located in a Western country, and in time using it as a reference for the market 
globally. Discussing the mechanisms of this model will be useful as I will subsequently 
question whether the CBOT rough rice contract could serve as a global benchmark.  
Before examining the functioning of global benchmarks, it is useful first to understand 
how domestic contracts are built. It will also later be valuable to have broadly 
discussed their geographical organisation. A futures exchange most often offers a 
contract upon a commodity produced or extracted in its home country. It designates 
delivery points in a restricted geographical location: the delivery points should be close 
enough to avoid variations in prices due to transport fee differences between these 
delivery points. The delivery area may or may not be close to the exchange itself. 
Historically, exchanges were established close to strategic points for delivery. The US 
wheat market in the 20th century illustrates this, with contracts in Chicago, Minneapolis 
and Kansas City. However, as exchanges evolved, it became more efficient to have 
exchanges in cities where speculators were located, while the commercial delivery 
could take place elsewhere. The case of rice is one clear illustration: the exchange 
hosting the contract is based in Chicago and the physical delivery is in central 
Arkansas. With time, and through merger and acquisition, the wheat market also 
consolidated in Chicago.128  As for primarily targeted physical users, they usually 
operate around the geographical location of delivery or must operate within the same 
supply chain to obtain a coherent basis. Louisiana rice farmers are a good i llustration 
of this second case: they produce a similar type of rice to Arkansas farmers and are 
part of the same consumer markets. Rice prices in the two states are therefore related. 
In domestic contracts, the liquidity is in part generated by producers and traders 
directly concerned by the underlying commodity of the futures contract, holding most 
of its short positions and some long positions (speculators should hold most remaining 
positions). The liquidity of a contract should thus, in theory, indicate the financial 
development of a specific geographical area of a market.  
                                                 
128 CME now hosts the Kansas City wheat contract.   
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In practice, this logic no longer stands when a contract becomes a reference for other 
geographical areas of a market. The large OI and trading volumes in wheat or corn 
futures in Chicago are in part generated abroad as the futures contracts serve as 
global benchmarks. The high liquidity of these grain futures, therefore, creates 
confusion upon what geographical market is being developed financially. The case of 
wheat illustrates this issue. The Chicago SRW Wheat Contract is the most liquid wheat 
contract in the world. The specifications of this contract – including the grade 
deliverable and the location of delivery points – makes it primarily suitable for use by 
US producers growing and trading soft red winter wheat. They can be found in Illinois, 
Indiana, Arkansas or Mississippi. Despite the liquidity, American producers of other 
types of wheat usually stay clear of trading Chicago futures. Farmers growing hard red 
winter (HRW) wheat (mostly found in Oklahoma, Kansas or Nebraska) use the Kansas 
City HRW wheat contract and farmers growing hard red spring (HRS) wheat in North 
Dakota chose the Minneapolis HRS wheat contract. Price movements between 
different varieties tend to be well integrated, but producers still prefer the near-perfect 
hedge provided by contracts designed for their market, reducing basis risk further. 
Although the liquidity is small relative to Chicago, Kansas City and Minneapolis can 
still be qualified as liquid contracts. The open interest figure of Chicago SRW Wheat 
contracts is approximately three times that of the Kansas City HRW Wheat contracts. 
However, the US produces approximately twice more hard red winter wheat than soft 
red winter wheat. Does that mean that the market alongside the Mississippi river is 
much more financially developed than the market of the Great Plains? Not necessarily. 
Instead, the Chicago SRW wheat contract serves as a global benchmark for wheat 
trading. Most originators of wheat, who would not benefit from a local wheat futures 
contract, hedge their price risk against Chicago. They chose this contract over Kansas 
City or Minneapolis, even if they do not produce SRW, because unlike American 
producers, they are faced with a significant basis risk for the three contracts and 
therefore chose to use the most liquid one. Besides, the internationalisation of the 
Chicago contract means it is more likely to reflect variations in the global market than 
the two others that solely reflect the American trend. The liquidity of the Chicago wheat 
contract is an indicator of the high financial development and integration of the 
international wheat industry, rather than the local market producing and trading its 
underlying commodity only.  
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The transformation of a contract into a world benchmark can be an initiative of the 
exchange attempting to attract foreign liquidity or a spontaneous dynamic of 
international market players looking for a viable hedge that the exchange does not 
actively trigger. The three highly liquid agricultural contracts (corn, soy and wheat) at 
the CME exemplify these two options. For example, until 2000, delivery on the corn 
and soybean contracts was made in warehouses in Chicago, Illinois or Toledo, Ohio. 
That year, to turn those futures into international contracts, CBOT product developers 
implemented a fundamental transformation in the delivery mechanism. The contract 
was changed to delivery on Illinois River barges, along the export channel. The 
commodities, once delivered, were then dedicated to being sold abroad. From that 
point, the futures market was not discovering a US price anymore but an export price 
(an international price). In liberalised global markets, such as corn and soybeans, 
export prices naturally converge and establish stable spreads representing the cost of 
transport. Any sophisticated actor involved in the export or import of those agricultural 
products can thus hedge their risk against the Chicago futures with the confidence of 
keeping reasonable basis129.  
Creating an export price is almost a guarantee of success for an undifferentiated 
commodity130 because the international market integration is natural if the trade is 
liberalised. For example, there are no major disparities in quality (or in potential use) 
between American and Brazilian soybeans. Wheat was facing different constraints to 
become a global benchmark. The market has many different varieties and quality 
levels to manage. Fred Seamon, the product manager at CME, explained that the 
market took care of this issue:  
“… there is about 20 wheat futures contracts around the world, most of which 
are not liquid. Chicago wheat, because of its liquidity, became the world 
benchmark. Even though the type of wheat that is being traded is a small 
percentage of the global wheat supply, so that was a case where [the market] 
organically was looking for liquidity. There is correlation there, don't get me 
                                                 
129 Although other futures for corn exist, they are illiquid in comparison to the Chicago contract.  
130 Corn and soybeans are mostly undifferentiated crops. There is no significant market fragmentation 
between varieties and origins.   
232 
 
wrong, it is a hedge. Even though there are all those differences, wheat does 
correlate across all those different classes of wheat." 
The price of all types and origins of wheat around the world tend to move in a 
synchronised fashion because different types of wheat can be blended into flour, and 
the market is liberalised. As a result, hedgers outside the US will not necessarily target 
the contract specifying the type of wheat they trade themselves. Instead, they tend to 
target the most liquid contract that reflects changes in global prices most accurately. 
This attraction for liquidity has been consistently referred to by my interviewees. 
Market participants are looking for “that ability to trade with a minimum of slippage”. 
Therefore, the SRW Wheat contract globalised naturally, before the exchange decided 
to play its part in giving this contract its global dimension. “We have added river 
delivery, we've added some regions in Ohio for delivery that load shuttle trains that 
transport to the Gulf. So we've made our wheat contract more internationally 
representative of the soft wheat market. But most of that came to us organically”, Fred 
Seamon explained. Once a contract became global, it becomes much more liquid. It 
is a virtuous cycle: the most liquid contract attracts hedgers and speculators, and their 
involvement in the market increases liquidity.  
b. The international contract system 
To create a global benchmark, there is a need for an already liquid futures at the local 
level. This does not exist for all commodities. I showed in Chapter VI that the financial 
development of the coffee and sugar markets at the local level is somehow 
overestimated. The physical liquidity of the contracts for those two commodities is 
essentially the result of their use by international traders. This is possible because the 
futures currently hosted by ICE for sugar and coffee are designed for their global 
market. They are thus ideal examples for the international contract model. A variety of 
factors within their specifications makes these contracts international: their delivery 
location and systems, the currency they are traded in, and the variety of growth and 
grades eligible for delivery. This sub-section presents this model of international 
contracts, allowing the examination of these models' viability for rice later in this 
chapter. 
Sugar and coffee have two major global contracts listed on ICE each, used as global 
benchmarks for the commodity. These are the Sugar No. 11 Futures, for raw cane 
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sugar trading, hosted in New York City; the White Sugar Futures (formerly known as 
Sugar No. 5 futures) for white refined sugar (from cane or beet), hosted in London; the 
Coffee C Futures, for arabica coffee hosted in New York City; and the Robusta Coffee 
Futures, for robusta coffee hosted in London. All these contracts are denominated in 
US dollars, easing their use for market participants across the globe.  
The delivery system differs between the two commodities. Delivery of coffee takes 
place in licensed warehouses in ports across the West. For arabica, the coffee is 
deliverable to five ports in the USA, and in single locations in Germany, Belgium and 
Spain. For robusta, the coffee can be delivered to many ports in Western Europe (UK, 
Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Italy and France), as well two ports in the 
USA. It reflects that through history, Western European countries and the USA have 
owned very large shares of the world imports. These countries were, therefore, the 
expected location of the most demand for delivery. Although demand has grown 
recently in Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia, the traditional Western import markets 
still represent more than half of the coffee consumption and, as a result, constitute a 
reliable benchmark (Bain, 2013). Contrarily, the sugar market sees less consistent 
stability in the major importers as most countries in the world can produce sugar 
through cane or beet. Since many importing countries (such as China, Indonesia and 
Pakistan) aim at reducing their dependency on import, and others (such as India and 
the EU) have inconsistent production, the import locations are not well defined. On the 
other hand, certain countries have been very consistent exporters (Bain, 2013). As a 
result, both global sugar contracts are delivered FOB in exporting countries’ ports. The 
white sugar contract can be delivered in no less than forty-one countries spread across 
all regions of the world.  The Sugar No. 11 contract is delivered in ports of the country 
of origin (or in the case of landlocked countries, at a berth or anchorage in the 
customary port of export). There are twenty-nine eligible growths, essentially in cane 
growing areas of Africa, South America and the Pacific. White sugar does not have 
this issue of deliverable growth, as white sugar is an undifferentiated product.    
This issue is more complex for coffee. For arabica coffee, twenty growths are eligible 
for delivery, but only twelve of those are at par with the price of the contract.131 
Colombian coffee will be delivered at a premium while the remaining seven countries 
                                                 
131 Like other contract specifications, the exchange decides premium and discount.   
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are delivered at various discounts. An additional premium and discount system is 
applied depending on the grade of coffee delivered and the testing for flavour. 
Therefore, such a system necessitates the ability to compare all types of the 
commodity on a single scale, and have a very precise and globally accepted grading 
system. A premium and discount system is even applied to the various delivery ports 
to account for freight. While the robusta futures accept any origin, Class 1 Robusta 
Coffee is deliverable at the contract price and other qualities are delivered at premiums 
or discounts. The grading system and its attached premium and discount are crucial 
in a commodity such as coffee. Similar systems were used in other extinct coffee 
contracts, such as the ones of the Tokyo Grain Exchange and the Singapore 
Commodity Exchange.132 If the mechanisms do not assure stakeholders taking 
delivery of the contract that they will pay a fair price for the coffee they received, they 
will simply not take part in the delivery, and arbitrage and convergence will not happen.  
A fundamental reason why the commodities fit the global contract system is the 
structure of their markets. As mentioned in the previous chapter, large shares of the 
commodity produced are exported. Approximately one third of the global sugar 
production and three quarters of the global coffee production are exported by a variety 
of countries to a variety of importers. Since most grades and growths are deliverable 
on the contract, they are all included in the price discovery mechanisms of the futures 
contracts and can therefore be reliably used for pricing or hedging any type of coffee 
or sugar. Thus, any sophisticated actor can use a contract that will suit their needs. 
The international contract and the global benchmark models presented are both 
imperfect fits for the rice market. It is already possible to see differences in terms of 
liquidity and market integration in the case of the global benchmark, and a lack of 
international trading and grading system when it comes to rice. However, in the 
following sections I explore whether these issues can be, to some extent, overcome 
to create financial development at the global level.   
 
 
                                                 
132 Those contracts were discontinued following the M&A of the commodity exchanges hosting them.  
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II) A Global contract for rice?  
The question is whether a global contract for rice can be built by applying one of these 
two models. There are cases to examine what has been done or not to build such a 
contract. This section explores the option of an international contract. This has been 
attempted at the London Fox in the 1990s and has been reconsidered in 2012 during 
an expert meeting group in Singapore. However, the first attempt resulted in failure, 
while the other was dismissed as it was not deemed feasible. I argue that the obstacles 
to the standardisation of the grain and the establishment of delivery mechanisms are 
such that replicating this model from soft commodities is not currently a viable option.  
a. The failure of the London Fox Experiment in Rice 
In the early 1990s, the London Futures and Options Exchange (Fox) attempted to 
launch a new kind of rice contract (Latham, 1998). All previous rice futures contracts 
had been for a single origin, local to the country where the exchange was found. The 
delivery points were also in the same country. The London Fox came up with a whole 
new logic of trading Thai 100% grade B rice, with seller's option to deliver US rice 
grade #2, 4% broken (at 5% premium). Together, these varieties represented a 
standard for high quality internationally traded long-grain rice (mostly destined for 
export to rich Western markets). However, the contract did not exactly intend to 
combine two markets in one. Instead, the deliverability of US rice was put in place to 
ensure that in case of a scarcity of supply for Thai rice in Kohsichang,133 the 
convergence through delivery arbitrage would still take place. However, the 
international aspect of the contract was still demonstrated by the use of US Dollars, 
the specification of milled rice and its delivery on vessels in international ports.  
The contract failed to attract liquidity. Despite the participation of some international 
traders such as Sucden and Louis Dreyfus, as well as few local traders, the exchange 
did not manage to convince other market actors in Thailand and the US such as 
Continental and Uncle Ben's (Roche, 1992).  The London Fox is a complex case 
because it is not only the story of an unsuccessful contract; it is also the story of a 
failing exchange. Therefore, there is nothing obviously separating what was the result 
                                                 




of mistakes in building the contract, structural market issues or and what was the result 
of the exchange operation. 
London Fox Rice Contract Specifications 
Contract Unit 50 tonnes 
Price Basis US Dollars and cents per tonne FOB 
(Kohsichang) or FAS (Houston, Lake 
Charles, Now Orleans) FAS at 5% 
premium 
Minimum Price Fluctuation US Dollars 0.25 per tonne.  
Specification Tenderable Either Thai 100B rice current crop in 50 
kg polypropylene or jute bags with a 
minimum delivery of 500 tonnes (or a 
penalty of $2000 payable) or at a 5% 
premium at sellers' option, US 2/4 rice 
delivered similarly. 
Trading Positions October, December, March, May, July. 
Seven months always quoted. 
Trading hours 09.00 – 18.00 hours or as decided by the 
Market Committee. 
Table 9: Specifications of the London Fox Rice contract 
 
The London Commodity Exchange (LCE) was founded in 1954 and hosted trading in 
soft commodities during most of the second half of the 20 th century. In 1986, the LCE, 
formerly a trade association, was demutualised and renamed London Fox in June 
1987 (The New York Times, 1987; Spence, 1992). The 1990s were a time of optimism 
about the globalisation of exchanges, but there was also of fierce competition between 
those exchanges. Consequently, the London Fox was like many other exchanges – it 
lead a policy of fast expansion, materialised by the launching of many new contracts.  
In 1990, the London Fox’s CEO, Mark Blundell, appointed a friend of his, Julian Roche, 
as business development manager. Roche was then 29 years old and inexperienced 
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with commodities. The logic behind his recruitment was that Blundell wanted to create 
a real estate futures based on a property index, and Roche knew about indices. He 
was not only given the responsibility to launch the real estate contract but was also 
asked to develop other contracts: rice and cotton.  
The exchange did not follow the best practice for how a futures contract should be 
launched. Usually, the exchange to assembles a committee from the industry and gets 
a consensus on the optimal contract specifications to attract liquidity. This did not 
happen with the London Fox contract, as Julian Roche told me: 
"The London Fox absolutely did not do that when it came to launching its rice 
contracts. What it did is that the chief executive, Mark, who was a very 
unconventional chief executive to say the very least, just said: "right, we're 
going to launch a rice contract Julian. Here you are, go and launch it". So the 
question about whether it was a sensible thing to do to launch the rice contract 
and whether the rice contract would succeed or not – and all the usual rational 
criteria that ought to have underlined whether the contract would be launched 
at all – just simply didn't apply. Mark's logic, which was deeply flawed, was that 
with the introduction of electronic trading – which you have to remember was 
brand new at that point – because terminals were very cheap and you could get 
as many contracts as you wanted to on the same terminal, you may as well  
launch a hundred contracts. I remember Mark famously saying, "launch a 
hundred contracts, throw them all on the wall, some will stick, and that will be 
great". Of course, this approach to launching futures contracts has now been 
comprehensively discredited." 
This is not only Julian Roche’s recollection of the events. For instance, The 
Independent, when reviewing a tough beginning of the decade for the exchange in 
1992, found that: “the root of the exchange's problems have been [sic] diagnosed as 
bad business strategy … A spend, spend, spend approach to improving business led 
the exchange to create a huge marketing budget and throw money into dubious new 
contracts which had doubtful backing from members” (Vaughan, 1992).  
The failure of the London Fox rice contract is partly rooted in the misunderstanding of 
the technological change brought by electronic trading. The exchange was using an 
Australian computer trading system called FAST (Roche, 1995). FAST terminals could 
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display a maximum of four screens. Brokers would usually hold four licences for cocoa, 
coffee, raw sugar and white sugar, leaving no space for an additional contract. “To 
trade anything new, you would need a new fast screen that would mean a new 
subscription to the exchange, and a new employee”, Roche told me. That appeared 
to be an issue for all the new London Fox contracts. 
Although the contract had not shown promises in its first year of existence, it is 
important to remember that some contracts simply have a slow start. Chapter III 
mentioned that some contracts slowly pick up before suddenly attracting enthusiasm. 
However, in 1991, the last hope to see the rice contract succeed was erased. The 
development of the Fox rice contract suffered from fraud committed by exchange 
officials. The property contracts for which Roche had 
been recruited, had been launched in May 1991. Blundell 
expected that these futures would be the ones bringing 
the exchange prosperity, so the FOX invested heavily in 
this project (Bray N. , 1991).  For various reasons, 
including the same issue of FAST terminals, the property 
contracts failed to attract liquidity and the volumes traded 
started to severely drop from August 1991. The property 
contracts never turned into the boost expected for the 
exchange. Facing this ongoing failure, Blundell "initiated" 
a market manipulation: the exchange started trading its 
own contract "in the hope that the illusion of liquidity 
would draw investors from outside" (The Economist, 1991). The strategy to lure 
investors was uncovered by regulators at the beginning of October 1991. The London 
FOX chairman, as well as Mark Blundell, subsequently resigned on the 5 th of October 
(The Economist, 1991; Bray N. , 1991).  
The confidence of exchange participants dropped as a result and many withdrew. 
Although all commodities were affected, the ones with the smallest liquidity were 
logically the first to suffer. In the summer of 1991, no rice contracts were traded, while 
the volumes were up to five contracts traded in September of that year (Bray, 1991). 
While five contracts might have been enough to encourage the continuation of the 
contract early in its life, it remained an illiquid contract before the scandal and the turn 
of events put an end to any hope of late blooming success. At the time, it was unclear 
Figure 17: Trading volumes of 
London FOX Real Estates 




whether rice was directly affected by manipulations. Immediate coverage of the events 
by The Economist and The Wall Street Journal suggested that the exchange may have 
traded rice contracts (The Economist, 1991; Bray N. , 1991). However, the 
Independent mentioned only the property futures in late 1992, and Roche heavi ly 
insisted, when I interviewed him, that the exchange never traded its rice contract 
(Vaughan, 1992). The absence of significant traded volumes tends to confirm this 
version. In any case, this casted doubts about the fairness of the contract for many 
participants and brought the project to its end.  
Roche argued, both in his book and during the interview, that the issue was not to do 
with the specifications of the contract itself (Roche, 1992). Instead, he mentioned the 
traditional issues presented in previous chapters: the market opacity kept market 
participants away as they aimed at protecting information asymmetry, and the catch 
22 – the lack of market makers prevented attracting further participation. However, he 
also thinks that the project was feasible, simply not on London Fox134. Many 
arguments developed in the previous chapter – such as opacity and the lack of willing 
sophisticated actors – cast doubts about that feasibility, but the London Fox was 
particularly unequipped to lead the project. If there was, indeed, a narrow opportunity 
of establishing an international contract, the rice industry missed a rare chanceof 
achieving it. As the project was mismanaged, the London Fox case did not confirm 
whether these obstacles could be overcome with the international contract model. 
However, the experiment allowed me to discuss with Julian Roche what sort of lessons 
could be learnt, despite this failure. 
b. Lessons from an international contract 
In this section, I review the lessons from the London Fox and compare them, when 
applicable, with the conclusions of the Singapore Expert Working group of 2012. This 
allows me to observe potential changes or stagnations in the market two decades 
later. I used the interview from Julian Roche and his book to reflect upon the London 
Fox and explore the position papers and reports written before and after the Singapore 
                                                 
134 See following sub-section. 
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working group. I also, use the recollection of my interviewees who were present at that 
meeting, especially Sally Trethewie.135   
A consensus regarding the existing prerequisites for a functioning global futures 
market in rice is that the market must present the necessary level of volatility in prices 
(McKenzie A. , 2012). In both cases, there was indeed some risk to trade. However, 
another consensus is that the market does not lend itself to standardisation. An issue 
for an international rice contract is that it needs to be based upon what is traded 
internationally: milled rice. As a result, constructing a contract upon paddy was not 
possible. Milled rice is a highly diversified commodity. A first issue encountered by the 
rice market is the lack of grading standards to classify the diversity of varieties and 
qualities at the international level (McKenzie A. , 2012). Each country uses widely 
different grading systems, and the inspections of these grades are not systematically 
done in many of the producing countries. In addition to the problem of standardization 
that could eventually be overcome, lies the more complex problem of integration. 
Roche reflected on how prices of different grades of rice tend to diverge. It is not only 
the price of different grades that are not integrated but also the price of different origins. 
McKenzie (2012) looked at the hedging effectiveness for Southeast Asian rice of a 
hypothetical futures contract for Thai 5% WR FOB. He found that it would be effective 
for two other Thai grades and to a lesser extent Vietnamese 5% FOB, but not for the 
13 other grades and origins he tested. “In other words, a lack of price correlation 
renders the hedge ineffective” (McKenzie A. , 2012, p. 34). This makes difficult the 
instauration of a premium and discount system for rice and turns down the possibility 
of seeing the delivery of different grades and origins in various ports. The added lack 
of reference benchmark price of a single widely traded variety seems to mean that the 
rice market has little prospect of producing an international contract that would be 
widely used by most international traders (RSIS Centre for Non Traditional Security 
(NTS) Studies, 2012). 
Despite that, it seems that many market actors (traders, market analysts and derivative 
finance professionals) are enthusiastic about the idea of a contract for internationally 
                                                 
135 Sally Trethewie was, at the time, in charge of organising and coordinating the meeting in her position 
as Senior Analyst at the RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies. I interviewed her in 
Edinburgh, UK, in April 2018.  
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traded rice. However, in the absence of correlation, only international trading 
companies, Thai exporters, and, to a small extent, potential Vietnamese exporters, 
would be likely to trade the contract as commercials. The thinness of the international 
market had come up consistently in my interviewees’ explanation for the absence of 
rice futures contracts. As mentioned in Chapter I, only 7-9% of rice is traded 
internationally. A large share of this is done through Government to Government trade. 
If other major origins such as India, Pakistan and the US are removed from the picture, 
only an even thinner market is left to trade upon.  With such a prospect, there has 
been no questioning in the literature or my interviews about whether such a contract 
should be based upon delivery in Bangkok for a higher quality of rice (McKenzie A. , 
2012).136  The futures would effectively not be a contract for internationally traded rice 
but Southeast Asian exports instead. The thinness of the physical market was one 
reason listed in Chapter II for the failures of futures contracts. However, while 
recognising this fact, both Julian Roche and the Singapore Expert working group noted 
that a small futures market could still function, and profit market actors through its 
hedging and information function. Taking the CBOT contract as an example, it was 
argued that what matters is having a functioning contract to work from before moving 
towards broader market integration (RSIS Centre for Non Traditional Security (NTS) 
Studies, 2012). They imagine financial development taking place and contributing to 
market integration, instead of depending on it.  
If the contract were to specify delivery in Bangkok, the question remains where it 
should be traded. Roche (1992) argued that a local futures exchange in Thailand could 
not host the contract because it would not provide enough speculative liquidity. The 
London Fox picked up on the opportunity as its pool of speculators could be injected 
into the market. However, the exchange faced other issues, especially its lack of 
resources necessary for the development of the contract: 
SL: Could you have expected the contract to survive, was that the objective? 
JR: I think so. With the right preparation and the right conditions, and stationing 
somebody in Bangkok. … Now if somebody had said to me in 1991 "hey Julian 
move to Bangkok", my answer would simply have been "no". It was no 
                                                 
136 In the 1990s, the people consulted by the London Fox pushed for Thai 100% Grade B. However,  
over the last decade, the consensus of the market seems to settle upon Thai 5% WR.  
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suggestion of anybody going out there to do that. Maybe by the end of 1991 I 
would have been willing to do it, but by that time the exchange had run out of 
money and then it had the property futures scandal … So, it was never a 
possibility of any of those things to actually happen. 
Roche explained to me that such a person on the ground would have been responsible 
for trying to mobilise liquidity there. The tasks would have included publishing 
newsletter, getting local brokers to join the London Fox, organising brokers trips to 
sign up trading partners to get the Thais themselves to become members. The job 
would also have involved negotiating with the Thai government to get the fast terminals 
installed in Thailand. None of this, of course, ever happened: 
"That was well beyond the thinking of anyone in London Fox. The idea that 
London Fox would send somebody out and pay for somebody in Thailand on a 
UK wage, £40k a year – at that time quite a lot of money – to work exclusively 
on the rice contract that was never going to do little more than a few hundred 
to a thousand contracts at best, it just didn't match. The required resources to 
do the job did not match at that time. Remember we're talking pre-internet 
days." 
At the time, four exchanges had the resources to consider such a Thai rice contract, 
but according to Roche, all had reasons not to go forward with the project. CBOT did 
not want to create competition with its own rough rice contract137. CME was not yet 
involved in soft commodities and grains. The Japanese exchanges probably did not 
want to venture into Thailand, while ASX, the Australian exchange, was not interested 
in commodities apart from wool. 
Twenty years later, the consensus was that such a contract should be based in a 
Singapore exchange. The financial hub of Southeast Asia had all the infrastructures 
in place to host the contract and hosted both a large pool of speculators and the 
regional offices of many international trading companies (RSIS Centre for Non 
Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, 2012). Sally Trethewie emphasised that no one 
during the meeting expressed any doubt on the choice of Singapore as a host. 
However, the question of the Singapore-based exchanges being interested in setting 
                                                 
137 See below. 
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up such a contract is not so straight forward. In 2012, the Singapore Exchange (SGX) 
and the Singapore Mercantile Exchange (SMX) both sent representatives to the 
meeting138. The two exchanges, especially SGX, were confident in their technical 
ability to host and implement a rice contract despite some technical issues raised 
during the meeting. However, they showed little enthusiasm for doing so due to certain 
reserve on the probability of success, judging from the scepticism of many market 
participants and the structure of the cash market (McKenzie A. , 2012). In contrast to 
other situations discussed previously, where the exchanges were the primary movers, 
in this case, they wanted the impetus to come exclusively from the market 
stakeholders. “They [the exchanges] did not feel as if they were the ones to be the 
champion of it”, Sally Trethewie said. They would have eventually listed a contract that 
had been designed by the industry but did not want to invest in the research and 
development necessary. As seen in the case of the London Fox, such a contract 
necessitates a significant amount of resources. As exchanges do not believe it could 
be lucrative, the investment is not justified in their eyes. As the chances of success 
are perceived as low, the model of international contracts with delivery is therefore 
unlikely to be attempted. 
c. The Chicago rough rice contract: not meant to be a benchmark?  
If instead, a system of a global benchmark (similar to the wheat market) was to be 
established, it would have to be done upon the most consistently liquid rice futures, in 
this case, the CBOT rough trice contract. Many of the millers and farmers I met in 
Louisiana, who don't use this contract, pointed out the same issue. They believed CME 
should work on generating liquidity from abroad before they get involved in the market, 
creating a new catch 22. While Chapter III examined the case of the CBOT in the 
context of the US rice industry, this section questions its role within a wider 
international spectrum, and investigates why the Chicago rice futures have not 
globalised.  
Market participants in Chicago were broadly unanimous that the current contract is not 
made to attract liquidity from Asia. The lack of integration of local markets at the 
international level is an obstacle that most brokers, analysts and contract developers 
                                                 
138 It should be noted that Singapore exchanges were hardly involved in agricultural commodities, with 
only a robusta coffee contract hosted by SGX. 
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believe this contract cannot overcome. Two main issues drive this lack of integration. 
Farm programmes around the world segment the market into national entities with 
their own price logic and partially remove the need for hedging. As mentioned 
previously, the fragmentation of the market into many varieties and qualities make it 
difficult to evaluate the basis. Arguably wheat has overcome this issue but rice ads 
more complexity due to the way it is consumed. Wheat is mainly processed into a few 
types of flour, for which quality plays a minor part. Its origin is also of little importance 
- only the variety fundamentally matters. Rice, as it is used for human consumption as 
a differentiated product, has an important dimension of quality specification added to 
it. Scott Minton, the CME rice futures broker, started the list of what can come into play 
when identifying a certain type of rice: "the taste, the length of it, the translucence, 
whatever…". As previously stated in the introduction to this thesis, there are in fact are 
about twenty  criteria to rate rice on after milling (see appendix A).    
Over some periods, Asian and American prices eventually correlate. That happens, 
for instance, during global shocks such as the 2008 crisis, or when a Middle Eastern 
country calls public tenders for rice where both hemispheres can compete. In those 
cases, the CME gets a little open interests from Asia “and we’re very happy when that 
happens”, Fred Seamon said. But this correlation does not hold in the long term. The 
design of the contract, its use of American paddy as the underlying crop, makes it 
isolated from Asian influence. Most of the paddy is processed into milled rice that is 
consumed on the US market itself, or other markets, essentially in Latin America, 
where Asian origins do not compete for market shares.  
It may be a good thing for the liquidity of this contract to minimise the correlation with 
Asian prices. The market could lose speculative liquidity if the market had major 
exposure to political risk. However, even if Asia is not targeted to be covered by the 
contract, the debate remains about to what extent this futures can be a Pan-American 
contract. Jack Scoville, a Chicago based agricultural commodity broker, was the most 
optimistic about reaching new markets in Latin America. He suspected some Mexican 
market participants of using the contract. Most importantly, he mentioned having been 
contacted by a woman working for a Brazilian public organisation who wanted to find 
out about futures, including rice. Brazil uses the CME futures to finance certain public 
price schemes for producers but cannot apply it to rice “because the liquidity really 
isn’t there”. An interesting question was to what extent using the rice futures in the 
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three major South American exporting markets is practically feasible. I asked Jack 
Scoville if we could imagine Uruguayan producers hedging against American futures 
contracts or if the spread was too unstable for that. He answered: 
JS: We could, and I think the spreads would not be all that unstable; it's not 
something they don't know how to do. And the reason why I can say that is 
because I do have some Brazilian clients and some clients from Argentina, 
nobody from Uruguay per se, but the whole region, for corn and soybeans, and 
I do a lot of pricing for them. They don't necessarily hedge, but in Brazil, if you 
look at the Brazil export contract that is promoted by the government and the 
exporter associations, they are basically basis contract. And they're based 
against Chicago. So, they know how to make that work. It's a little counter-
seasonal because their growing season is the opposite of ours. But they know 
how to make those spreads work for them. … They do that in the beans, they 
do that in the corn, they should be able to do it in rice. 
SL: But they don't? 
JS: I don't see it. Not through me, and probably not at all because our market 
is not really there to do it. But yes, it could be done.”  
Jack Scoville was describing a complicated case: according to our definition, South 
American markets are financially developed. Market participants who trade in a variety 
of commodities know how to use American futures contracts and can be considered 
sufficiently sophisticated. The market structure is sophisticated due to the existence 
of the rough rice contract that South American traders are free to engage in. In 
theoretical terms, there is the ability to trade risk on these markets. However, in 
practice, this ability is not used. This fact is even more puzzling when one considers 
that within South American rice exports (Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay), there is a 
large share of paddy. They often sell paddy in other Latin American nations, which is 






 Total Rice Exports (MTS) Paddy Rice Exports (MTS) Ratio 
2017 870268 100172 11.5% 
2016 935085 190911 20.4% 
2015 1308622 219422 16.8% 
2014 1242655 263497 21.2% 
Table 10 : Brazilian Rice Exports (Source: Instituto Rio Grandense de Arroz, UN Comtrade Database) 
The sentiment coming from the South American market is that the price integration is 
not the fundamental issue, but that they did not want to use an illiquid market. 
Exporters cannot see any reason why they should be the ones producing the liquidity 
in the contract while stakeholders from the US could later benefit from the sudden 
inflow of liquidity. The catch 22 that exists within the US market is just enlarged to the 
whole western hemisphere. Therefore, the Chicago Rough Rice contract is unlikely to 
become an international contract unless it manages to attract more liquidity 
domestically.  
III) The emergence of swaps in Europe for Asian markets and the 
case of wheat. 
The difficulties exposed so far in this chapter could suggest that the prospect of seeing 
the rice market develop financially at the international level in the near future is 
doomed. However, a dynamic born in Europe over the last decade for wheat proposes 
a new pathway for the sophistication of the market structure: the introduction of swaps 
by brokerage houses that are later converted into index-based futures by exchanges 
have gained traction in both markets.  
A swaps transaction consists of engaging in a forward contract but settling this contract 
financially upon an index. The two counterparties will agree on a fixed price when 
signing the contract. At expiration, the index provides a settlement price (often called 
floating price). In commodities, it is usually the arithmetic average of all the daily price 
assessment of the index in the delivery month. The long position will pay the difference 
between the fixed price and the settlement price to the short if the settlement price is 
below the fixed price or vice versa. For instance, if a producer enters a swap 
transaction with any counterpart for a fixed price of $400 per tonne and that the 
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settlement price is $380, the counterpart will pay $20 to the producer. The producer 
should sell the commodity for approximately $380 on the cash market and have a total 
revenue close to the value of the fixed price as a result (Pochara, 2012).  
With the slow reversal of the wheat market towards the Black Sea, as explained in 
Chapter IV, the wheat industry, as well as the derivatives industry, had to adapt. For 
a long time, like other origins in the world, Black Sea Wheat was hedged on CBOT or 
Matif, in France. However, those markets did not always guarantee correlation for 
wheat from the Black Sea, as many interviewees reported. It appeared that this area 
of the world could benefit from its own futures contract. As a result, CME introduced a 
deliverable Black Sea Wheat futures in 2012. It failed to attract liquidity and was 
withdrawn in March 2019 (Trompiz & Parent, 2018; CME Group (a), 2019).  According 
to Swithun Still, a Black Sea grain trader, this failure was due to the contract being 
deliverable in four ports in Ukraine, three ports in Russia and one port in Romania 
(CME Group (a), 2017). This created an unclear pricing structure preventing 
stakeholders from taking delivery of the contract. However, the maturity of the industry 
was also blamed for the failure. According to the Financial Times: 
The historical reasons for the lack of derivative trading in Black Sea grains are 
multifold. On top of geopolitical concerns, Ukrainian and Russian authorities have a 
record of political interventions in the grains markets, and there have long been 
concerns about Ukrainian and Russian sellers defaulting on agreements. 
A simple lack of knowledge about futures markets among buyers and sellers in the 
region as well as specification and logistical issues have also hampered derivative 
transactions (Terazono, 2017).  
These issues appear very similar to many presented throughout thesis for rice. While 
it could not generate liquidity in its deliverable contract, CME successfully overcame 
the challenge of developing the Black Sea Wheat market financially with an index-
based contract. This was not the achievement of CME alone but a multitude of industry 
stakeholders over half a decade.  
Back in 2012, a price-reporting agency, Platts, the leading benchmark in the energy 
and metals markets, acquired Kingsman, a sugar reporting company (S&P Global 
Platts, 2016). As a result, Platts entered the agricultural markets and its grain division 
launched a daily assessment for Black Sea Wheat in 2014 (S&P Global Platts, 2019). 
248 
 
It specifically prices 12.5% protein Russian wheat, FOB in Novorossiysk. The following 
year, it replicated the move with an assessment for APW (Australian Premium White) 
Wheat FOB Australia (S&P Global Platts, 2015). Platts managers started to talk to 
brokers on the market to suggest using their indices as underlying pricing mechanisms 
for swaps. Brokers answered negatively due to the size of the challenge, until one of 
them, a Singapore based broker who worked for SCB Brokers and was experienced 
in swaps for palm oil, took on the idea. He succeeded in his attempt and in November 
2016, Louis Dreyfus and Cargill traded a swap on 5,000 MTS of Australian wheat. The 
contract was to be settled against APW FOB Australia price assessment of the newly 
renamed S&P Global Platts (Hall, 2016). This remained only a one-time deal for the 
Australian wheat market. However, SCB decided to replicate the contracts for Russian 
wheat. In March 2017, they facilitated the first deal for Black Sea Wheat between two 
Swiss-based grain trading companies: Ameropa and Solaris (S&P Global Platts, 
2017). International traders welcomed the opportunity to manage their risk and SCB 
started brokering such contracts more often, with five or six regular counterparts. 
Soon, CME saw an opportunity and picked up the project. The swaps contract was 
standardised and turned into a publicly listed cash-settled futures, with Platts 
remaining the underlying index. It launched in December 2017 (CME Group (b), 2017). 
CME introduced it on its two trading platforms: Globex, its electronic trading platform 
that matches bids and offers, and Clearport, its clearing service for OTC markets 
where privately negotiated trades can be reported by brokers and added to the price 
discovery and clearing mechanisms (CME Group (b), 2019). According to a broker, 
most of the volume of the Black Sea Wheat Contract is produced through Clearport. 
While at first, an independent OTC market coexisted alongside the CME system, it 
soon disappeared as contracts can be negotiated privately before using the CME 
clearing house as a guarantor for the trade. The contract is thus a mix of the swaps 
and futures system. 
These types of futures contracts attracted participants’ interest because of their 
simplified settlement. There is no need for arbitrage during the delivery month to obtain 
coherent prices: the final settlement price is determined by the index instead of the 
mechanisms of physical delivery. In addition, there is no risk of being caught in the 
delivery month for participants who cannot make and take delivery. Instead, they stay 
in the market until the expiration of the contract. This also implies that participants are 
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not afraid to participate in the contract when it is not yet liquid. They have no risk of 
being unable to pass a cancelling trade before the delivery month, which necessitates 
the availability of a counterpart for this trade.   
The contract succeeded in attracting large trading volumes that even allowed the CME 
to launch options upon its contract, generating further liquidity (see Figure 18) 
(Trompiz & Parent, 2018; S&P Global Platts, 2019). During the first few months, 
Solaris and Ameropa generated almost all the liquidity. Soon, more hedgers – primarily 
from Ukraine – and speculative funds started trading the contract. Within three years, 
the sophistication of the market structure had been achieved in a region that was unfi t 
for traditional futures markets. To a lesser extent, the CME has also succeeded with 
its Black Sea Corn contract, based on Platts assessment of Ukrainian corn. This was 
launched simultaneously with the Black Sea Wheat contract. However, it failed to 
attract regular volumes and open interest in its Australian Wheat contract launched in 
June 2017 and the reporting of the company on this contract had become scarce in 
the second half of 2019. Therefore, one should be careful of seeing index-based 
futures as a guaranteed solution to sophisticate the market structures of markets that 
are previously financially underdeveloped.   
Soon after the launch of the wheat swaps by SCB, the idea of replicating the method 
for rice grew in the mind of certain market participants in Europe. The idea of having 
an index-based derivative was not completely new. It had been discussed in 
Singapore in 2012 but the absence of a well-established index at the time made this 
option impossible. Many participants of the working group were calling for an expert 
and well-established body to create such an index but believed it would be difficult to 
do so (McKenzie A. , 2012; Pochara, 2012). Julian Roche had himself thought about 
a cash-settled contract in the 1990s, but the market did not have a reliable index to 
work upon either, so the exchange would have had to establish one itself. That was 
not possible within the time frame allocated to him. “Look at the organisation you 
worked for, look at the efforts that went into that, imagine an exchange doing that. It 
would be deadweight capital cost. An exchange has to piggyback off an index, not the 
other way around”. When mentioning the organisation I worked for, Roche was 




 Figure 18: Volume and OI of CME Index Contracts (Source: CME Group) 
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In 2016, just as wheat benefited from Platts, rice could rely on price assessments 
provided by the LRI. A UK-based brokerage firm, Jackson Son & Co. had started 
reflecting on swaps contracts even before the wheat market took the initiative. At the 
time, the company was made of two divisions: rice and oil. From discussions between 
the two departments, it appeared that the rice market was lacking the sort of forward 
pricing and hedging solutions found in oil and that an OTC swaps contract was the 
way forward. In 2017, Jackson launched it swaps project based on LRI assessments 
for Thai LG WR 5% Broken, Thai LG Parboiled 100% STX, and Pakistan LG WR 5% 
Broken, while also exploring the possibility to attract interest for Thai Hom Mali rice as 
well as Indian and Vietnamese rice. One of the arguments advanced by Ben Savage, 
a broker at Jackson, in favour of these types of contracts, is the flexibility in term of 
varieties covered. The ability to trade the needed variety through OTC derivatives 
appeared as a solution to the lack of price integration between varieties. In addition, 
speculators could trade the spread between two origins, generating more liquidity. The 
following year, after their successes on the wheat market, SCB stepped in the rice 
market too. It traded its first rice swap in February 2019. “The trade, based on the Live 
Rice Index was a swap based on price for Thai white rice, 5% broken. … The  
transaction took place between a Thai-based rice exporter and a Singapore-based 
rice trader” (SCB Group, 2019). 
In May 2019, I was invited to join the conference LIVE2019 organised by the LRI to 
discuss the prospect of seeing the market expand. It gave room for the two brokerage 
companies to present their new products and the potential developments for the 
futures. It took place in the presence of representatives of both CME and ICE, both of 
which showed interest in listing those contracts as futures on their exchange. 
However, the OTC market first demonstrating the ability to attract liquidity is still a 
condition for their involvement. At the conference, one of the many issues discussed 
was the important counterparty risk presented in chapter VI. The market could find a 
new catch 22: participants wait for the guarantees brought by an exchange's 
clearinghouse to be involved, but exchanges want to see participation in the OTC 
market to be convinced to list the contract. In August 2019, I interviewed a Thai 
exporter139 using the rice swaps for hedging. It was difficult for them to find a 
                                                 
139 Interview with an anonymous Thai rice miller, trader and export, Thailand, July 2018.  
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counterpart. “It is a small market; there are not many people ready to play with it. You 
have to find the people who can match”. Even when trades are concluded, the exporter 
confessed that the participants’ cautiousness led to very small volumes being 
contracted, only two or three months before delivery. The issues of transparency and 
political risk discussed in previous chapters mean that counterparties are still reluctant 
to forecast market dynamics.   
Another issue is that such contracts are based on indices. Some industry participants 
like to present this as the perfect solution, but it can also be a disadvantage. Just as 
stakeholders can lack trust in the convergence for a deliverable contract, some can 
lack trust in the underlying index. The LRI has been generally trusted and praised for 
its improvement over the years as well as for its transparent methodology. It has been 
widely used for spot market information, as an indication of the ongoing prices. 
However, serving as the reference for a contract necessitates extremely precise 
pricing. The LRI is one of the rare companies concentrating the largest amount of rice 
data to determine its prices. Yet, it does not stop some market actors to doubt the 
index’s reliability. Some traders and exporters believe that they sometimes see prices 
that are not in sync with the index and that the index must thus be wrong. The other 
worry from market participants, when it comes to indices, is the risk of their 
manipulation. They fear that once the market becomes an instrument used for price 
settlement, there would be more incentive for market stakeholders to share incorrect 
trading prices with the PRA, if that benefits their own positions in the contract. 
Therefore, to see such a contract succeed, there needs to be a high level of trust in 
the index from the market. The acquisition of the LRI by S&P Global Platts – 
announced in September 2019 – is likely to lift many doubts upon the reliability and 
impartiality of the index, as it benefits from the reputation of its new mother company 
that has successfully provided benchmarks for energy and agricultural contracts  (S&P 
Global Platts (2), 2019). This is the same reputation that allowed the Black Sea wheat 
contract, when it was launched, to not meet the scepticism of market participants 
regarding the underlying index.  
Despite the fact that trading in the OTC swaps remains small, CME announced in 
October 2020 that it would launch a Platts based Thai 5% WR futures on the 23rd of 
November of that year. The exchange managers seemed to have acknowledge the 
limited scope for the swaps to attract liquidity without counterparty guarantees. Only 
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time will tell whether this contract will succeed. It benefits from the end of delivery 
issues avoiding a potential catch 22 similar to the rough rice contract. The contract will 
not increase transparency far beyond what the LRI and other rice intelligence 
companies already do. Thai exporters and international trading houses could therefore 
show less reluctance to join the market. However, market participants acknowledge 
that CME will need to provide a great deal of education seminars to enhance the 
sophistication of actors. The politicization of the crop will remain an obstacle but if the 
interventions in Thailand remain low, as they have been since the fall of the PTP, the 
market may have time to develop financially around its Thai white rice benchmark.  
 
VI) Discussion 
In previous Chapter through this thesis, I have many times insisted on the role of 
market actors in the potential of a market to develop financially. The validity of that 
argument should not overshadow the fact that the rice market has deeply entrenched 
characteristics that would always present a challenge to its financial development. In 
a – very – hypothetical scenario where contract engineers shall find a consensus for 
traders to support their project, and that politicians were willing to step back from 
intervening on the rice market, difficulties in building a global contract would still exist. 
The lack of global integration of rice prices and the multiplicity of varieties suiting 
different taste mean that rice has little prospect of financialization in a similar way to 
wheat, sugar and coffee. Following the arguments developed in this chapter, I propose 
that the use of the term rice market is somehow misleading. It would sometimes be 
more useful to discuss rice markets, with a ‘s’, as the industry shares actors and 
practices, but is animated by a multiplicity of supply and demand balances, resulting 
in a wide range of often uncorrelated prices. If the rice market is to develop financially, 
eventually through new models of contract such as swap, it will probably be in the 
realm of a restricted part of the industry, the export market for high grade White Rice 
from Southeast Asia. If that was to happen, it would already represent a profound 
transformation for the market.  
Despite arguing that this Chapter re-establishes the importance of the physical market 
structure in its propensity to financialize, I have once again awarded individuals a great 
deal of importance in the process. In particular, contract developers hold some of the 
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keys of financial development. Whether they are brokers or work for an exchange, 
they have the ability to innovate and adapt to the reality of the challenging market 
structure. This is what happened with the Black Sea wheat contract. However, their 
failure to deliver well-engineered contracts can result in the wrongful perception that 
they failed because no one could succeed. This comforts one last time the idea that 
the study of financial development should include a great deal of study of individuals.  
 
IV) Conclusion 
The prospects of seeing rice replicate the old global contract models (global 
benchmarks in wheat and international contracts in coffee and sugar) seem limited. 
The lack of liquidity of the CBOT means that it is unlikely to be used as a hedging 
instrument across the American continent. The case of the London Fox has been 
affected by too many external factors related to the exchange itself to conclude that 
an international contract for rice has already been attempted and failed. However, the 
lessons regarding the limitations of such a project seem to persist through time, as 
was demonstrated in Singapore in 2012. The multiplicity of uncorrelated varieties and 
origins of rice in an already thin international market means that an exchange could 
not concentrate the world trade into a single futures. Instead, it would be possible to 
create a deliverable contract for the Thai export market. However, such a contract is 
unlikely to be liquid enough to justify the investment by a commodity exchange. 
Instead, many European actors of the rice market hope to be able to replicate the 
success of the Black Sea Wheat swaps market that has been turned into an index-
based futures market.  
This chapter also confirmed the importance of market structure and geography in the 
construction of financial development. Contract designers need to adapt to the 
specificities of each market regarding the way they are globalised. Coffee is ultimately 
a global good because it is produced and consumed in different countries. This line is 
more blurry for wheat, which explains why it adopted a different model. This challenges 
the idea that financial development is an independent dynamic that grows within 
agricultural markets. It is instead an explicit project that must be well-engineered by 
its advocates to function smoothly and bring actors around the world within the same 
contract. The emergence of the swaps model proves that these contract engineers 
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can adapt to the limitation posed by the market structure of some markets. It also 
suggests that the derivatives industry is entering a new era where the challenge will 
no longer be to calibrate delivery mechanisms but instead to establish trusted price 
indices. Putting in place these mechanisms for rice could solve many of the structural 
problems it faced in its financial development, making an instrument available for its 
few sophisticated actors. Other issues, especially the politicization, will remain an 
obstacles to attract large speculative interest, but a listed index-based futures will 
constitute a first layer of financial development. The rice industry is removing the many 







Chapter VIII: Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has explored the financial development of rice and the compared markets 
of coffee, sugar and wheat, in order to answer my research question – what explains 
the fact that financial development – materialised on commodity markets by the 
increasing capacity to trade risk through derivative contracts – characterises most food 
markets but has remained marginal in the rice market? – and the associated sub-
questions. Chapter III to VI, in the light of the theory of contract failure provided by 
chapter II, theoretically and empirically analysed the hypotheses proposed in the 
introduction about the reasons behind the underdevelopment of the rice market.  In 
these chapters, I have been able to successively: question the low liquidity of the only 
well-functioning rice contract despite being hosted in a financially highly developed 
country, the USA; explore the politicization of the agricultural commodity markets and 
futures exchanges, and their impact on the financial development; study the patterns 
of crops’ financial development in developing countries; and to explore the building of 
derivatives market at the global level, including the changing process of financial 
development through index contracts and its impact on the future of the rice market.  
This final chapter concludes from the discussions developed in this thesis and 
provides answers to the research questions provided in the introduction of this thesis. 
I begin by questioning to what extent past contract failures teach us about the financial 
underdevelopment of the rice. Subsequently, I summarise the major arguments 
explaining why rice did not develop financially and is unlikely to do so through futures 
contracts. I continue by examining these arguments against my comparative case 
studies, in turn confirming my findings. After briefly summarising my findings regarding 
the financial underdevelopment of rice, I terminate this thesis by going beyond the 
case of rice and propose a final reflection on the contributions of this research to the 
study of financial development, especially the financial development of agricultural 





I) Theoretical legacy of the history of rice futures: 
I argued in Chapter I that the financial development of a commodity rested in the 
existence of futures contracts for that commodity. This is because derivative contracts 
allow the trading of risk, but futures contracts allow the transfer of price risk, outside 
the market, to speculators. However, rice has been deprived of very liquid futures 
contracts since the end of WWII, despite successive attempts by various commodity 
exchanges to list rice futures. This was why I asked the sub-question: do patterns of 
contract failures appear in the rice market? 
To answer this question, I need to go back to the theory built in Chapter II. In line with 
the argument of Black (1985), I argued that the failure of futures contracts can be due 
to the specificities of the underlying cash market (these are the so called 
prerequisites), and the circumstances surrounding the building of this contract. 
Importantly, I argued that the probability of the contract avoiding unfavourable 
circumstances, whether it be mistakes in the contract design or inability to build the 
initial liquidity, is low. Therefore, contracts tend to fail primarily for reasons unrelated 
to the underlying market. When the contract is victim of ad hoc issues, it obstructs the 
diagnosis of whether the prerequisites were fulfilled. A failure in meeting the 
prerequisites is only apparent when all other parameters function well.   
When I asked whether the history of rice futures held the key to the financial under-
development if the commodity, I aimed at examining whether past contracts had failed 
because of recurrent systemic issues with the market. However, the study of post 
WWII rice futures contracts in this thesis has instead brought light a variety of ad hoc 
issues that led to the failure of these projects. The New York contract of 1964 and the 
first New Orleans attempt in 1981 failed because of issues with bag labelling. It 
illustrated how details in the contract specifications can lead to contract failure. The 
London FOX in the early 1990s created a contract without the resources to develop it 
and the exchange was mismanaged, exemplifying the individuals’ input in the fate of 
a contract. The AFET in Thailand was potentially victim to a lack of trust in the 
regulation system, even before politics came into play. Although the difficulties of the 
Japan contracts are strongly influenced by politics too, the peculiar approval system 
for Japanese futures combined with the Fukushima disasters are factors that made 
this politicization possible. Similar issues could have emerged in the attempt to 
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establish futures contracts for other commodities, and these contracts would have 
failed in the same fashion. As there is a disproportionate chance for a new futures 
contract to fail in attracting liquidity, due to circumstantial issues, human errors or 
impediment, the failure of five exchanges to make their attempts successful, over 
seven decades, is not enough to prove the structural non-viability of the project. 
Therefore, these failures have, as expected, obstructed the observation on whether 
futures for rice could thrive under normal circumstances. 
The failure of contracts from circumstantial issues seems to make the history of rice 
futures less valuable because non-generalisable reasons for these failures are at the 
forefront. However, that is not exactly the case. Firstly, because it did not prevent me 
from exploring, beyond these issues, whether the market was viable in the first place. 
Analysing the structural issues around the contracts, such as the politicization of rice 
in Thailand or the lack of standardisation and correlation in the case of the FOX 
contract, was possible and gave more context to the rest of the analysis where the 
prerequisites had to be analysed in a more theoretical way. This was an important 
contribution as research on commodity futures contracts often bonds its analysis at 
the ad hoc level. Secondly, and most importantly, these failures are not stand-alone 
events in history. While arguing that they have not proven the infeasibility of the 
project, I also acknowledge that these failures may have been misinterpreted. It is a 
common misconception in the industry that the success of a rice contract has been 
proven impossible by past attempts.  As a result, many contract engineers may have 
been reluctant to make their own attempt, reducing further the probability of rice 
financially developing through functioning futures contracts. 
However, I shall classify this lack of attempt as a minor factor contributing to the 
financial underdevelopment of rice. Instead, through analysing the underlying market, 
this thesis has argued that there were fundamental issues that would have prevented 
the development of futures market, even if one had emerged in an optimal ad hoc 
situation. 
II) Reviewing the hypotheses for the low financial development of 
rice 
Although the history of contract failure did not consistently display structural patterns 
of failure, I have analysed the rice market to understand whether, and to what extent, 
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the factors hypothesised in the introduction had contributed to the low financial 
development of the rice market. I found that all those factors supressed the potential 
for risk trading, although to different extents. In this section, I review those hypotheses. 
This will allow me to compare them to the situations in my comparison markets and 
later discuss their link to the dynamic of financial underdevelopment. 
a. Politicization: 
I start with politicization because of all the structural parameters that this thesis has 
identified as impeding the financial development of rice, it is the most popular 
explanation in the view of industry actors and previous research (Carter, 2007; 
Hamilton, 2012; McKenzie A. , 2012; Pochara, 2012; Trethewie (b), 2012). However, 
these studies, reports and position papers have never attempted to portray, in detail, 
the mechanisms of politicization, its roots and the effect it has on the financial 
development of rice. McKenzie (2012) mostly argued that government uncertainty 
hindered speculation, which I agree with, but it was beyond his scope to explain why. 
He also failed to acknowledge that some government interventions simply remove the 
need for hedging.  
In the various experiments to establish futures contracts for rice, politicization has 
manifested itself in all its possible forms discussed in this thesis: through the 
suppression of risk, the manipulation of price formation, or the direct targeting of 
futures exchanges themselves. In the US the farm program has been pointed at as a 
contributing factor to the low liquidity of the CME rough rice contract, although the 
scope of this programme was not a sufficient stand-alone explanation. Unless price 
movements are completely supressed, there is always room for risk to be managed 
through derivative contracts, although the pressure on market participants to hedge is 
reduced. In Thailand, the heavy manipulation of the market in the 21st century through 
the rice pledging schemes of the Shinawatra family and their parties removed the need 
to hedge and ultimately, in the long run, reduced the confidence of derivative 
participants in the formation of prices in the Thai market. The case of Japan, with both 
TGE and ODE, has also proven the capability of a government to impede and 
destabilise a contract through the targeting of the exchange itself to satisfy the 
clientelism of Japan Agriculture. More importantly, politicization did not only affect rice 
futures when they were attempted. I argue that the political salience of the crop is such 
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that it casts a permanent doubt upon the viability of derivatives trading in rice. This 
may have prevented, in the past, other exchanges to even attempt to build a rice 
contract. Although I used Thailand as main case study for the politicization of the rice 
market, I explained that this politicization is widespread within the major exporters and 
importers of rice, reinforcing the political uncertainty. Politicization is likely to once 
again keep potential market participants from trading the newly introduced Thai 5% 
WR contract traded at CME from November 2020. 
From case to case, these political issues are not isolated from each other. I argued 
that rice is an abnormally politicized commodity. Its role in the socio-economic system 
of many developing countries, especially in Asia, makes it politically extra-sensitive. It 
is the deciding factor of many elections in rice regions. This is because rice is both a 
food staple and a livelihood within the same political space, making it conducive to 
unstable politics. Unlike other commodities, governments are also even involved in 
trading the grain themselves, highlighting its strategic importance. The political 
salience of rice motivates various political entities to use the crop to achieve other 
goals, creating unpredictable distortion along the way. All these factors contribute to 
the lack of trust in the ability to build and maintain a derivatives market coherently 
linked to the physical trade. When politicization does not stabilise price, which would 
remove the need for hedging, it makes the modelling of risk too challenging for 
speculators to embrace derivatives trading for this crop. Therefore, politicization was 
always going to be an obstacle to the financial development of rice.  
b. Market size and fragmentation: 
Beyond politicization, which has limited the success of past contracts and affected the 
potential for financial development, the market structure of the rice market displays 
patterns that would always limit the liquidity of a newly created contract (Roche, 1992; 
Latham, 1998; McKenzie A. , 2012). The rice market does not fulfil the prerequisite of 
a large and homogenous cash market (Sandor, 1973; Brorsen & Fofana, 2001). The 
lack of integration of different geographical markets and the large number of varieties 
of rice results in the heavy fragmentation of the industry. The price relationships 
between different varieties and origins of rice are inconsistent. This discourages the 
perspective of creating a standardisation system and the use of benchmark against 
which all types of rice could be priced following premium and discount. It is reinforced 
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by the varying tastes of rice importers and consumers. Thus, they do not value different 
varieties the same way, meaning that the willingness to pay a premium (or be granted 
as discount) will mostly depends on the buyer rather than on the type of rice. This also 
creates separated channels of distribution with buyers consistently procuring from the 
same supplier. The fragmentation of the industry means that we should not talk about 
the rice market, but instead about many rice markets, making i t harder to establish a 
large international futures contract. However, the case of the US has proven that even 
a small market could produce a futures contract suitable for risk trading. Therefore, 
this factor hinders the spreading of financial development through the industry as a 
whole rather than making it completely impossible within these small markets.  
c.  Information: 
Through this thesis I have repeatedly highlighted the issue of market opacity in rice, 
which was already Roche’s (1992) main hyptohesis. The lack of easily available 
information impedes the functioning of futures market in many ways. Firstly, contract 
managers are deprived of the basic ability to understand the market that would allow 
them to design the perfect contract and consequently sometimes avoid some of the 
mistakes made during product development. Secondly, the lack of accessible 
information to establish futures strategies is an obstacle for market participants, 
especially for speculators. Finally, and most importantly, the existing opacity benefits 
the most powerful stakeholders – international grain trading companies and larger 
local exporters (Gray, 1966; Perloff & Rausser, 1983). Their position in the market 
allows them to use the lack of price transparency to set up prices and receive extra 
benefits. This is a disincentive for these actors, who usually display a higher level of 
sophistication, to take part in futures trading, which would contribute to public price 
discovery. 
Opacity constitutes a major obstacle to the financial development of rice because it 
not only keeps participants from trading futures, but it even motivates some to 
sabotage their development. If OTC contracts could function alone, a market could 
financially develop without creating transparency and therefore attract the participation 
of sophisticated actors owning an information asymmetry advantage. However, OTC 
contracts are instead limited in their ability to function without a terminal market.  
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The peculiarity of opacity is that if the issue can be overcome, futures contribute to 
transparency and put an end to the advantage held by some market participants who 
will, then, be likely to become involved in futures trading. The progress in market 
intelligence and the sharing of information through technology and the development 
of private pricing firms means that, although this issue has affected financial 
development in the past, it is less likely to affect rice since the last decade.  
d. Developing countries: 
The developing countries hypothesis has been confirmed through this thesis. Rice 
remains a grain traded almost entirely within and between countries of the Global 
South. Beyond the lack of market integration and transparency issues, which are 
themselves partly characteristic of developing countries, I argued that the 
advancement of financial development in countries where rice is prominent as an 
export or import crop is not sufficient to host a futures exchange. The most important 
issue was the lack of potential commercial market participants. To generate liquidity 
in a market, the industry must not be in the hands of very few companies and vertically 
integrated, as this limits commodity and money transfer between stakeholders and 
dissipates price risk along the internalised supply chain (Brorsen & Fofana, 2001). This 
has happened in rice, but mostly in developed countries, with the US and Japanese 
co-ops. However, in developing countries, the rice market instead consists mostly of 
many very small entities, rendering large participation unlikely. These small actors 
cannot afford the cost of participating in futures because of financial cost (such as 
margin calls) and transition cost, or the cost of financial education. I argued that the 
large numbers of farmers could not be the main actors of financial development at first. 
They need to wait for intermediaries to offer OTCs linked to the futures market. 
However, this issue was not exclusive to developing countries as most US rice farmers 
also lacked, to some extent, sophistication. Similarly, while Thai exporters are 
expected to lead the way in generating liquidity in a rice futures, many of them were 
not large enough to be sophisticated. Although they are considered big because of the 
volumes of commodity they manage, their human resources remain limited. They are 
not multinational grain trading companies that can have an in-house department 
dedicated to futures trading.  
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This hypothesis was contrasted by the argument that there are sophisticated actors in 
the rice market, including bigger exporters in Thailand and elsewhere, as well as 
international traders, who are in fact sophisticated. If these actors were willing to 
participate in futures trading and were brought within the same derivatives trading 
market, they could enhance the financial development of the market. Some of them 
may even be able to provide OTC contracts to some of the smaller player discussed 
previously. However, the opacity issue (discussed above) prevents many of them from 
getting involved. Others can also be reluctant because they know that they would, as 
a result) lack trading counterparts as a result. Importantly, in many countries, the 
number of sophisticated actors being insufficient for financial development, a regional 
futures market, rather than a local one, would be needed to pool together these 
potential participants.  
Other problems discussed within the context of the developing countries hypothesis 
include the absence of a legal framework, lack of property rights and the various legal 
systems not matching the needs of western style financial trading, especially in 
countries that are transition economies. I argued that this is an important obstacle to 
OTC derivatives trading. It limits the possibility of financial development as these 
contracts would give less sophisticated actors an indirect access to the futures market. 
Only strong informal contract enforcement systems that exist in some industries 
(depending on the country) can compensate for the absence of formal law. However, 
these informal practices are not common in rice and usually exclude foreign parties 
that are not familiar with the local habits of the commodity industry. Nonetheless, this 
argument should be relativised and considered as secondary for two reasons. First, a 
futures contract should come before OTC trading, and futures trading are enforced 
through the exchange mechanisms. Although the lack of contract law could limit further 
expansion of the derivatives market, it is not a primary inhibitor of financial 
development. Secondly, it should be expected that under pressure to become more 
sophisticated to hedge risk, market actors could build informal enforcement 
mechanisms within the industry.  
I have presented the four major structural factors that were observed as unfavourable 
for the rice market’s financial development, which could be considered as impeding 
financial development – whether they have led to futures contract failure in the past or 
not. However, three sub-questions remain unanswered: how does the rice market 
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manage its risk without derivatives? How did the compared crops developed 
financially? How do they compare to the rice market? Answering these questions 
facilitates a challenge to the hypotheses described in this section. 
 
III) Risk management in the absence of derivatives 
One of the research sub-questions is: how does the rice market currently manages its 
risk? That is to say, how could it be that a market doesn't develop financially if risk-
averse market actors don't otherwise have the ability to sell their price risk? The y 
should have a demand for a financial product allowing them to do so, and this demand 
should be matched by the offer of such a contract.  
I highlighted two main ways in which some key market actors, mainly American 
farmers and Thai exporters, manage their risk, reducing the pressure to financially 
hedge. The first one is to build storage capacity, allowing market participants more 
flexibility in the time of selling, and as a result, allowing them to not be price takers 
when trading the physical commodity. This is a function of the storable nature of the 
crop, substituting financial hedging for physical hedging (Cordier & Gohin, 2014; Diaz-
Rainey, 2017; Jégourel, 2017). Secondly, some market actors engage in 
diversification, whether it is in their farm activity or in the rice grade they trade, reducing 
their income exposure to the price variability of a single good.  
Apart from these factors, which allow key market actors to manage risk differently, 
other factors have incentivised them to not manage risk at all. Some of these are 
related to factors already discussed in the conclusion. Firstly, political intervention 
reducing price volatility mean that the risk is afforded by public bodies instead of 
individual actors. The Thai rice pledging scheme illustrates the ability of the state to 
temporarily remove the risk for producers. Secondly, some actors prioritise their 
information asymmetry advantage over the ability to hedge risk. This is a matter of 
opportunity cost. Some Thai exporters believe that the return from opacity outweighs 
the risk that they cannot hedge through derivatives. Finally, if a contract does not 
consistently link the paper and physical market through convergence, then it does not 
perform its role of risk manager. Not using any risk management tools or using an ill 
functioning contract would make no difference except for the transaction cost of 
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derivative trading. Therefore, in many cases it is not that there are well functioning 
long-term alternatives to derivative finance, but rather that derivative finance does not 
satisfy the need of risk management.  
 
IV) The implications of the financial development of other 
commodities 
The last step in determining to what extent the diagnosis of the financial 
underdevelopment of rice is correct implies comparing it to the environment 
surrounding the financial development of other commodities. Therefore, I shall answer 
both questions: how did other crops develop financially? How do these markets 
structurally differ from the rice industry?  
It appears that to some extent, a failure to satisfy at least one prerequisite of financial 
development set out in this thesis for rice has been found in each compared crops. 
For instance, sugar appears as a very politicised market and this was the case for 
coffee and wheat in the past. When it comes to homogeneity, coffee, in particular, fails 
to satisfy this prerequisite. It presents a large number of grades and origins that should, 
in theory, complicate the establishment of a futures market. Equally, coffee, like rice, 
is characterised by its production in developing countries where mostly small entities 
with low levels of sophistication are involved in the production and trade. This is also 
true to some extent in sugar when it comes to sugarcane. 
Despite these issues, the industries of these commodities have seen derivative 
contracts becoming a core component of trade. The futures markets for these crops, 
in New York and London, are very liquid. This proves the importance of understanding 
prerequisites as gradual variables. Although the sugar market is politicized, this 
politicization does not come in the extreme form of the rice market. In sugar, political 
interventions are more predictable, more manageable and unfold over the long term, 
where public policies tend to stabilise. Similarly, although the coffee market is not 
homogenous, it has been possible to create a functioning system of premium and 
discount, to relate different grades and origins on the futures market. In fact, all 
commodities are politicized to a certain degree, lack homogeneity to a certain extent, 
and have pockets of unintegrated markets, etc. Approaching the prerequisites as 
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simply binary thus does not allow us to determine, in advance, whether a contract will 
be successful or not. 
The second lesson from the failure of financially developed markets, such as the ones 
for soft commodities, to fulfil the theoretical prerequisites is that they are not 
individually sine qua none conditions. In many cases, the failure to tick one box can 
be overcome if it is the only problem. The reason why rice failed at developing 
financially is not because it lacks one of the prerequisites, it is rather because it fails 
to fulfil many of them. The sugar market may be politicized and the coffee market may 
lack homogeneity, but these do not accumulate multiple obstacles making the market 
unlikely to financially develop. Black (1985), too, had rejected the total endorsement 
of the prerequisites as single exclusive explanations for failure. However, instead of 
assuming the need for a degree of fulfilment of each prerequisite, she assumed that 
what mattered was the contract characteristics. In addition, the prerequisites she 
selected to reject the importance of the commodity characteristics, such as storability 
and being traded in forward markets, have since been largely discarded as conditions 
for the success of futures contracts.    
Another take away from analysing these two crops is that geography matters when it 
comes to financial development. Although these agricultural goods are mainly 
produced in developing countries, their main destination markets are developed 
countries of Western Europe and North America. This has allowed futures markets to 
develop in the global North, within financially developed economies. These futures 
exchanges serve as terminal markets for other OTC markets, localised in developing 
countries, to emerge. Financial development in developing economies is mostly a top 
down effect transmitted from developed countries. In this thesis, there is no evidence 
that such process can happen independently within developing countries. Rice trade 
being characterised by unipolarisation in developing countries, unlike sugar and 
coffee, it had little chance of developing financially through this process. The US rice 
market does not compare to the Western import markets in soft commodities. There 
is only a share of the already small US industry that could trade derivatives, and the 
US paddy market is insufficiently linked to the global market in milled rice.  
A key observation from the coffee, wheat and sugar markets is that history also 
matters. Their futures contracts have developed over long periods of time, 
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continuously during more than a century when these commodities were already traded 
globally. In comparison, the rice market is very young and immature, and global trade 
remains marginal despite its increase. The compared crops have also experienced 
their share of contract failures in different countries and different contexts. The 
disappearance of the Tokyo Grain Exchange (TGE) coffee contract (during the merger 
with TOCOM) and the Singapore Exchange coffee contract show that these 
commodities do not always tend towards more sophistication of the market structure 
either. However, both coffee and wheat experienced a significant increase in financial 
development after the end of the cold war that put an end to much of the politicization 
of these crops. That suggests that structural issues surrounding a commodity can 
change with time. The obstacles obstructing the financial development of rice today 
may not still hold tomorrow. 
The comparative study methodology is not perfect. It remains unclear what the 
modalities of the most successful commodity contract's birth were. For instance, this 
research was not able to determine how the issue of transparency was solved in the 
compared crops before the build-up of their futures contracts.  
The final lesson to be learnt from the financial development of these markets is that 
the way a market develops financially is changing. With the rise of the Price Reporting 
Agencies and indices, new doors have opened for financial development. While Black 
Sea Wheat was a grain unlikely to develop financially two decades ago due to the low 
sophistication of market actors there, the emergence of the swaps model has allowed 
for a new form of financial development, which I argued should suit rice better. It allows 
for the overcoming of issues such as market homogeneity and does not, in its early 
phases, threaten the information asymmetry advantage of the most sophisticated 
actors. It also avoids the need to standardise the commodity until it is listed by an 
exchange and avoids any critical issue of convergence between cash and futures 
prices.  
 
V) Summarising the low financial development of rice:  
It is now possible to answer why financial development characterises most major 
agricultural markets but has remained marginal in rice. The rice market has been the 
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birth place of derivative finance during the Meiji era in Japan, but at the time already, 
the market displayed signs of the issues (politicization and lack of homogeneity) that 
would later be deterrents to the resurgence of it financial development post WWII. 
Although at the time it only temporarily suppressed participation until these issues 
were solved, they have since grown in importance. Politicization, in particular, has 
become more prominent, in proportions unique to rice. This is because with the rise of 
voter power in countries like India and Thailand, the political salience of rice has 
deepened further. Government interventions in rice have, more often than not, created 
political uncertainty, rather than reduced price volatility. However, in both cases the 
politicization of rice deprives futures markets of key participants. In the first case, 
although commercials may still want to hedge, most speculators are unlikely to get 
involved and transfer the risk out of the hand of industry participants. In the second 
case, there is a reduced (or no) risk to trade. In addition, the growth in international 
trade has increased the potential for transmitting political shocks and the number of 
governments likely to trigger these shocks.   
One issue that old Japanese futures markets never faced was the lack of potential 
market participants. It appeared, through this thesis, that in modern times, domestic 
conditions in rice producing and consuming countries made most actors in the market 
unlikely to participate in derivatives trading. The factors discussed through this 
conclusion, whether it is the opacity of the market, its size, its geography with the 
prominence of developing countries, created two classes of market actors that would 
never contribute to the initial liquidity in a rice futures contract: the unsophisticated 
ones and the unwilling sophisticated actors. This thesis has shown how powerful 
market actors have been able to prevent financial development when they perceived 
it as against their interests. They have done so by either refusing to participate in 
derivatives trading, or by pressuring governments to disrupt the functioning of 
commodity exchanges. In rice, the small set of actors that are sophisticated and willing 
to trade is spread between different domestic markets too poorly integrated to create 
a derivative market where they could concentrate and trade risk together.  
In rice, the lack of sophistication of the market structure, due to the ad hoc failures of 
various contracts, has been harmful for the process of financial development. 
However, the sophistication of market actors and their willingness to trade appears 
even more critical in the process: while the market structure can be made partially 
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sophisticated in the short run through the introduction of the contract, gathering 
enough suitable participants is a long-term problem.  
Finally, one could question which out of politicization and the lack sophisticated actors 
willing to trade derivatives is the biggest obstacle to the financial development of the 
rice market. My answer is that they are equally important. Even in the absence of the 
other, each of these factors would heavily supress the financial development of rice.   
VI) Implications for the study of the financial development of 
commodity markets.  
To conclude the discussion of this thesis, I want to highlight its contributions to the 
broader study of financial development, especially in the context of developing 
countries.  
I argued that financial development, at least for commodities, is a process that is 
exogenous to developing economies. The literature does not lack the argument that 
developing and transition economies are not conducive to the development of 
derivatives markets (Fernandez, 2003; Shamsher & Taufiq, 2008; Kuzman, 
Ercegovac, & Momčilović, 2018). While I agree with – and reinforce – this argument, I 
state that financial development still takes place in the domestic markets of developing 
countries, as has been the case in sugar and coffee. However, it does so through an 
expansion of the financial development of global markets, initiated in the developed 
West, into the domestic markets of developing countries.  This expansion needs to 
take certain aspects into consideration, adapt with different forms of contracts (such 
as PTBF for coffee), and does not always manage to reach all levels of the market. 
That was illustrated by sugar producers in Thailand, who did not have the ability to 
trade risk on financial markets. In rice, the London FOX failed at expanding into 
Thailand despite the availability of computerised trading. This debunks the 
technological myth of financial development through globalisation. Fast speed cables 
and information technologies do not simply allow to make derivatives trading available 
everywhere in the world for any product. Once again, economic geography must be 
explored when discussing the expansion of financial development, taking into account 
domestic institutional cases and local socio-economic systems. I consequently argue 
that financial market development cannot be seen as in anyway inevitable.  It is a 
nuanced process, heavily influenced by domestic conditions. It is not inevitable in a 
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developed economy, even less in a developing economy.  It does not quickly find its 
place in any economic space where the lack of active regulatory suppression allows it 
to. Instead, financial development needs a set of favourable conditions to slowly 
develop. The increase in the sophistication of market actors is a long-term process, 
while the sophistication of the market structure can take several attempts before being 
successful. Furthermore, even if financial development takes place, there is scope for 
the reversal of this process. Although the sophistication of market actors tends to be 
acquired for the long term, the sophistication of the market structure can reverse and 
the process of rebuilding a futures contract can be equally long. Although at the second 
attempt, market actors may be more capable of trading derivatives from the start, they 
will often feel more reluctant as a result of the first failure. 
The second set of takeaways from this thesis is the importance of understanding 
derivatives markets as a set of derivative instruments feeding each other.  Although 
most of my research focused on building futures contracts, I have highlighted the role 
of many types of OTC contracts in the process of building liquidity and making more 
actors able to trade risk. Futures and OTC contracts are sometimes seen as 
alternatives to each other (Gray, 1966; Black, 1985), while my research highlights that 
they ideally function in complement to each other. OTC contracts are not easy 
instruments to use for speculators and therefore do not allow the market to externalise 
the risk, taking it away from the hands of market participants. Therefore, futures 
exchanges serve as ideal terminal markets to OTC transactions within a commodity 
industry. This is even more relevant in agriculture where many small stakeholders take 
part in the trade and could not participate in futures trading otherwise. This is precisely 
what OTCs provide for futures contracts. It increases commercial liquidity by giving 
less sophisticated entities, who cannot afford the cost of managing margin calls or 
monitoring futures markets, an indirect access to futures. Usually, the OTC contracts 
they will enter (weather forwards, Asian options or PTBF) will be hedged by their larger 
counterpart on futures exchanges. Financial development becomes contingent to the 
existence of intermediaries that offer these OTC contracts, as Mohan (2007) had 
previously argued. When analysing futures market, I therefore argue that any 
researcher should explore the mechanism of the underlying OTC market. However, it 
is important to highlight that OTC markets are necessarily more difficult to document. 
They are not public and transparent like futures contracts are. It is less obvious who 
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engineers and offers these contracts and tracking their participants can be 
challenging. There is also less consistency in their use between various actors as any 
OTC contract is potentially made ad hoc. Their mechanism can vary indefinitely and 
capturing the rational of their mechanisms can be a lengthy challenge for an academic 
researcher. This may explain why commodity OTCs are often overlooked in the 
existing academic literature, and why their complementarity with futures market has 
not been clearly articulated before.  
The last legacy of this thesis regards the behaviour of individual agents in the face of 
financial development. Firstly, as Hardie (2012) theorised from the case of government 
bond markets, I often argued that being a highly sophisticated agent does not correlate 
with likeliness to pursue the sophistication of the market structure. I confirmed Gray 
(1966) and Perloff and Rausser’s (1983) argument that some sophisticated actors 
protect their market power (obtained from their information asymmetry advantage) 
through their opposition to futures trading. Others simply estimate that other types of 
risk (such as default risk or crop risk) outweigh the benefit of hedging prices. Some 
may be able to physically reduce their risk without the need of financially selling it. 
Ultimately, this creates complex individual profiles regarding the willingness to support 
derivative markets. However, these profiles must be examined in detail within any 
study of financial development because they can determine the outcome (success or 
failure) of any derivative contract, beyond the exogenous observation of the market 
profile. The other lesson regarding agents’ behaviour is that the presence of willing 
sophisticated actors is not sufficient to launch a futures contract. Their number is also 
critical. Through this research, I have encountered several cases of commercials 
willing to hedge through derivatives but who were simply deprived of counterparts. To 
make a derivatives transaction succeed, there must be two willing actors. To make a 
derivatives transaction fail, one is enough. Transposing that to the need of large 
liquidity to make a futures market function, contract managers face the particularly 
challenging job of convincing many to be involved or they will be disappointing the few 
that wished them success. Individually, sophisticated market participants have more 
power to impede a contract than to make it work. This is one way to cause failures in 
the financial development process, one of many. So many that I come to wonder if 
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List of interviewees140 
 
July 2017: 
Julian Roche, Former Product Developer at London FOX, Western Australia 
Ben Savage, Rice Broker at Jackson Rice, England, UK 
 
August 2017: 
John Morgan, Vice President, Supreme Rice Mill, Louisiana, USA 
Two Anonymous interviewees, US Rice Millers, USA 
Anonymous interviewee, US Rice Miller, USA 
Paul “Jackie” Lower, US Rice Farmer, Louisiana, USA 
John Owen, US Rice Farmer, Louisiana, USA 
John Denison, US Rice Farm Manager at Sweet Lake Land and Oil Co, Louisiana, 
USA 
Anonymous interviewee, US Rice Farmer, Louisiana, USA 
Anonymous interviewee, US Rice Broker, Louisiana, USA 
Milo Hamilton, Former Head of Trading at Uncle Bens (Mars), President at Firstgrain, 
Texas, USA.  
 
September 2017 
Scott Minton, CME Rice Futures Broker, Chicago, USA 
Jack Scoville, CME Commodity Futures Broker, Chicago, USA 
                                                 
140 In this list, the location provided is the one of the interviewee at the time of the interview. I do not 
detail which interview were conducted face to face and which were held on the phone in order to protect  
the anonymity of some of my participants.  
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Anonymous Interviewee, US agricultural futures markets stakeholders, USA 
Two Anonymous Interviewee, US agricultural futures market stakeholders, USA 
Fred Seamon, Director in Agricultural Markets at CME Group, Chicago, USA 
Anonymous Interviewee, Wheat Market Analyst, Illinois, USA 
Anonymous Interviewee, Commodity Markets Analyst, Illinois, USA 
Anonymous Interviewee, US rice futures trader, Illinois, USA 
December 2017 
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March 2018: 
Anonymous Interviewee, Vietnamese Rice Trader, Vietnam 
Hoang Hai, CEO and Founder luagaoviet.com, Rice Market Analyst, Vietnam 
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Sally Trethewie, Former Research Fellow at RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security 
(NTS) Studies (Singapore), Edinburgh, UK 
John Lestingi, US Rice Exporter, USA 
Anonymous Interviewee, Coffee and Sugar Analyst, Switzerland 
Swithun Still, Black Sea Grain Trader, Switzerland  
 
May 2018: 
Masahiro Yamashita, ex-General Manager at Tokyo Grain Exchange, Tokyo, Japan 





Anonymous Interviewee, Thai Rice Exporter at Tanasan, Thailand 
Anonymous Interviewee, Thai Rice Trader and Exporter, Thailand 
Anonymous Interviewee, Thai Rice Miller, Trader and Exporter, Thailand 
Anonymous Interviewee, Vietnamese Rice Broker, Mekong Delta, Vietnam 
 
November 2018 
Anonymous Interviewee, European swaps and futures broker, Switzerland 
 
January 2019: 
Anonymous Interviewee, International Trader of Vietnamese Coffee, Vietnam 
Chandra Hartono Jokowdjaja, Rice Exporter at Ponglarp, Thailand 
February 2019 
Mr R.141, Vietnamese Coffee Exporter, Vietnam 
 
March 2019 
Three Anonymous Interviewees, Japan Rice Market Stakeholder, Japan 
 
April 2019 
Anonymous Interviewee, International Wheat Trader, Singapore 
 
                                                 








Julian Price, Sugar Trade Analyst at julianprice.com, London, UK 
 
November 2019 














Common futures contract specifications. 
Grade and 
Quality 
This specifies the standards of the commodity that should be in the 
delivery. Varieties and qualities can vary significantly within a commodity 
market (involving differences in prices), and stakeholders taking delivery 
should know what they will receive.  
Contract Unit 
(contract size) 
This is the quantity of the commodity represented by the contract. If 
delivery takes place, the quantity of commodity delivered will be matching 
the contract size. 
Price 
Quotation 
The price quotation indicates the currency the contract is denominated in, 
and for what volume is the price quoted. This volume can be different from 
the contract volume. For instance, the CME rough rice contract is for 2000 
hundredweights, but the price quotation is in cents per hundredweight. 
Minimum 
Price Variation 
Also called tick size, it represents the minimum the minimum price 
difference at which market participants can trade the contract, and the unit 
at which the price of a contract can move. . It is usually denominated both 
in the price per unit of commodity and the price for the entire contract. 
Trading Hours These are the hours during which trading takes place. They are important 
because, for a contract with a global ambition, trading hours are often 
extended to attract liquidity from other areas in the world. 
Settlement 
Method 
The settlement method specifies if the commodity is deliverable or not. If 
it is not, contract users will use cash settlement. (see section below)  
Listed 
Contracts 
This is the list of existing delivery months. A futures contract reaches 
expiration (involving settlement and delivery) multiple times a year, in 
different months. Market participants can trade any delivery months but 
will tend to focus on the months where they will find liquidity (see below).  
Position Limits Market participants individually face position limits determined by the 
exchange, which represent the number of contracts owned by a trader at 
one point in time that may not be exceeded. There is usually a different 
position limit in the spot month (the nearby contract once it enters its 
delivery period) and in all other months. 
Price Limit The price limit is the level that the price of a contract is allowed to rise or 
fall to before trade is suspended until the next day. The price limit is 
determined from the previous day closing price. For instance, if the price 
300 
 
limit for rough rice on the CME is $0.90 and the previous day closing price 
was $12.30, the trade would be suspended if the price rose to $13.20 or 
fell to $11.40.   
Delivery 
Points 
Certain contracts specify exchange designated warehouses suitable for 
the delivery of the commodity. Sometimes the delivery point is not a 
warehouse but a port, for instance. Some contracts specify Freight on 
Board instead, meaning that the commodity is delivered once it is loaded 
in a vessel at a specified location. 





Volatility of the CME Soybean and Rice continuous contracts.  
Calculated by the author. 
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Table from Ito, Maeda & Noda, (2017) 
Government Interventions in the Rice Futures Exchanges 
Date    Orders and Amendments 
May, 1890  Rice futures exchanges accept imported rice as an alternative to 
listed domestic rice. 
November, 1890  The amendment of May 1890 is abolished. 
January, 1898  The amendment of May 1890 is revived. 
October, 1898  The amendment of January 1898 is abolished. 
June, 1912  Rice futures exchanges accept imported rice from Taiwan and Korea 
as an alternative to listed domestic rice. 
October, 1912  The amendment of June 1912 is abolished. 
March, 1913  The exchanges accept imported rice from Taiwan and Korea as an 
alternative to listed domestic rice on a steady basis. 
August, 1914   Rice from Taiwan is undeliverable. 
April, 1918  Low-quality domestic rice is deliverable and the exchanges accept a 
change to the standard rice from medium quality to low quality. 
February, 1919 Rice from overseas is deliverable. 
November, 1919  Lowest quality domestic rice is deliverable and the exchanges 
accept a change to standard rice from low quality to lowest quality. 
December, 1919  Rice from overseas (excluding Korea) is undeliverable. 
October, 1920  The exchanges accept a change to standard rice from lowest quality 
to medium quality. 
December, 1920  Lowest and low-quality domestic rice is undeliverable. 
November, 1921  Low-quality domestic rice is deliverable. 
Sources: 
(1) Bank of Japan (1957), “1899 Statistical Yearbook of Bank of Japan,” in Nihon Kinyuushi Shiryo Meiji - 
Taisho Hen Dai 19 Kan [Materials on Japanese Financial History in the Meiji -Taisho Period Vol.19], 
Printing Bureau of Ministry of Finance, Tokyo, Japan. 
(2) Ministry of Finance, Financial Bureau (1919), “History of Rice Price Adjustment in the Meiji -Period,” 
Tokyo, Japan. 





Vietnamese coffee contracts specifications: 
Specifications 2011, BCEC 2015, BCCE 
Quality  Robusta Grade R2B (Moisture: 
12.5% ;  Foreign matter: 1% ; 
Blacks and Brokens: 5%; 
Screen 13: > 90%) Robusta 
grades R1A, R1B, R1C et R2A 
are delivered at contract price 
plus premium.  
Processed and unprocessed 
Robusta coffee, to be 
Standardized to Robusta 
coffee Grade 2 (Moisture: 15% 
;  Foreign matter: 1% ; Blacks 
and Brokens: 5%; Screen 13: > 
90%; Screen 12: > 98%) 
Trading time  2pm – 5pm, Monday to Friday From 08:00am Monday to 
12:00pm Saturday 
Place of Transaction  Center BCEC – 153 Nguyen Chi 
Thanh – BuonMaThuot - 
Daklak  
BCCE - 161 Nguyen Chi Thanh 
– BuonMaThuot - Daklak 
Unit of Currency  VND/kg  VND/ton; USD/ton 
Tick Size 10 VND/kg (20 000 VND/lot)  100,000 VND/ton, 1USD/ton 
Contract Size  2 tons 10 tons 
Delivery Months  6 consecutive delivery months  January, March, May, July, 
September, November 
Stop Loss/Gain  +/- 4% of the previous day 
settlement price.  
- 5% of the previous day 
settlement price. 
Minimum Margin 15% 10% 
Margin Call N/A 7% 
Delivery Point  Warehouse system of BCEC Warehouse system of BCCE 
Source: (Nguyen, 2015; BCCE, 2015) 
 
CONTRACT VRC/VLRC - Robusta 
Contract Unit 1,000 kg/lot (VRC); 10,000 kg/lot (VLCR) 
Quality Norms  - Sample weight: 300 g  
- Blacks and Brokens: < 3%  
- Foreign matters: < 0,5%  
- Moisture: < 12,5%  
- Screen 14: > 90% 
- Screen 12: > 96% 
Delivery Months  January, March, May, July, September, 
November  
Currency  VND  
Tick mark  10VND/kg  
Unit of delivery  N x 20 tons  
Trading hours  3pm – 11pm  




For companies: <= 20.000 lot of net buy or 
net sell  
VNX can change the position limits according 
to the real demand 
Delivery place  VNX warehouses 
 
CONTRACT VIAC/VKC - Arabica 
Contract Unit 1.000 kg/lot (VIAC)/ 37,5000 pounds/lot (VKC) 
Quality Norms  - Sample weight: 300 g  
- Between 9 and 23 full imperfections 
- Screen 15: > 50% 
- Screen below 14: < 5% 
- Moisture: 9% - 13%  
Delivery Months  March, May, July, September, December  
Currency  VND  
Tick Mark 10VND/kg  
Delivery Unit N x 20 tonnes  
Trading Hours 2:30pm – 1:00 am  
Position Limit  For individuals: <= 5.000 lot of net buy or net 
sell  
For companies: <= 20.000 lot of net buy or 
net sell  
VNX can change the position limits according 
to the real demand 
Delivery Location  VNX Warehouses 
Source: (Nguyen, 2015) 
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